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THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

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THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

A PHASE IN THE REGENERATION OF A WORLD POWER

BY

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"When the Great Doctrine prevails, all under Heaven will work for the common good." — CONFUCIUS

"Understanding is difficult, action easy." — SUN YAT-SEN

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PREFACE

THIS book is the fruit of an investigation undertaken under the auspices of the Bureau of International Research of Harvard University and Radcliffe College for the purpose of estimating the influence of the Chinese Revolution upon international relations in the Far East. The conclusions which my findings seem to support are briefly set forth in the Epilogue at the close of the volume. The main body of the volume is devoted to a study of Chinese politics and of the changes in the Chinese political system which have been brought about by the Revolution.

The program for my investigation called for a visit to the Far East and a study of the Revolution on the ground. With this in view I went out *via* Suez and Singapore to Indo-China, where I arrived in November, 1927, spent seven months in Annam, Tongking, southern, central, and northern China, Manchuria, Korea, Japan, and the Far Eastern region of Soviet Russia, and left *via* Siberia for Moscow and western Europe in July, 1928. During this period I travelled in thirteen Chinese provinces and spent some time at the capitals of ten of them. It was the critical period in the Chinese Revolution. The Communist insurrection at Canton in December, 1927, marked the end of one phase of the Revolution; the capture of Peking by the Nationalists and the assassination of Chang Tso-lin at Mukden in June, 1928, marked the end of another.

While in the Far East I was privileged to meet representative scholars, politicians, officials, and military leaders, belonging to all the principal factions, as well as foreign diplomats, missionaries, and business men. I became convinced that, if the Chinese possess the political capacity to organize and operate a modern government, capable of meeting the obligations which fall upon governments under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, the outlook for peace in the Far East is bright, but that if they lack such capacity, which I found to be a widespread opinion among foreigners, both in China and elsewhere in the Far East at the time of my visit, the prospect for domestic tranquillity in China is poor without foreign intervention. The chances of successful foreign intervention without embroiling the Powers with one another also seemed poor. Thus the maintenance of pacific relations among the Powers in the Far East seemed to be closely associated with the ability of the Chinese to establish a stable government and maintain law and order within their country. Hence I devoted myself particularly to a study of Chinese government and politics for the evidence it might produce concerning the capacity of the Chinese to regenerate their state and give it an equal position in the family of Powers.

The materials for this study were gathered partly from books on the history and government of China, but chiefly from contemporary newspapers and other current sources of information published in the Far East and from interviews with participants in the Revolution and observers on the ground. I have listened to much conflicting testimony concerning the events of the Revolution and have been favored with a great variety of interpretations of those events. My own view of the political scene is based upon information which I believe to be reliable but which I cannot guarantee, and which I am not in all cases free to reveal. Under the circumstances it seems best not to attempt to set forth the sources of particular statements of supposed fact or of opinion on controversial subjects, for which in any case I must assume the responsibility.

Nor can I give adequate expression to my gratitude to all those who kindly helped me during my travels in the Far East. But I wish to acknowledge here my indebtedness for many courtesies to the authorities of the École Française d'Extrême Orient at Hanoi, French Indo-China, of the Morrison Library at Tokyo, and of the Research Department of the Sun Yat-sen University at Moscow. I should also include herewith the officers of the Royal Asiatic Society at Shanghai and of the Chinese Social and Political

Science Association at Peiping, whose libraries were most courteously opened to me. I am under special obligations for information since my return from the Far East to Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attaché in China, Professors M. S. Bates and J. H. Reisner of the University of Nanking, Dr. J. C. Ferguson, formerly Constitutional Adviser to the President of the Republic of China, Professor J. J. Heeren of Shantung Christian University, Dr. Ralph M. Hogan of the Chinese Y. M. C. A., Mr. Henry W. Kinney and Mr. Taneo Taketa of the South Manchuria Railway, Messrs. J. B. Powell and G. E. Sokolsky of Shanghai, editors respectively of the *China Weekly Review* and of the *Far Eastern Review*; also to Dr. Fong F. Sec, formerly of the Commercial Press at Shanghai, and Bishop Logan H. Roots of Hankow, as well as to several officials of the National Government and of the Kuomintang Headquarters at Nanking and of the Kuominchun Headquarters in the northwestern provinces. To Professor T. S. Chien of the National University at Nanking and to Professor William Hung of Yenching University at Peiping I am under the deepest obligations for invaluable counsel and other assistance both while in China and subsequently. I wish also to acknowledge my heavy indebtedness to Messrs. Ray Chang and E. C. Tang, students of political science in the Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, who have made translations for me from the Chinese, procured needed information from sources available only to those who understand the Chinese language, and otherwise given me indispensable aid.

ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE

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THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

PROLOGUE

REVOLUTIONARY CHINA AT HOME

MONDAY, March 12, 1928, the third anniversary of the death of Sun Wen, better known in the West under his Cantonese name, Sun Yat-sen, was celebrated with appropriate ceremonies throughout Nationalist China. Happening on that day to be in the ancient city of Kaifeng, capital of the province of Honan and seat of the civil government for all the northwestern provinces under the control of the "Christian General," Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, I was able to observe the celebration at its best. For Kaifeng at the moment was the headquarters of the most ardent Nationalism in China, and its inhabitants were excited at the prospect of the early opening of the military campaign which they believed would determine the fate of the Republic. All the morning there was an air of expectancy in the narrow streets. Every ricsha had a little white flag, adorned with picturesque blue characters, flying from the arm of its seat. Blue and white were the colors of the Nationalist party, and the characters were the symbols of the slogans of the day. Assuring myself that my special permit to travel in the province — for which I had paid twice the standard rate, because I was a citizen of the "imperialistic" United States — was in my pocket, I left the friendly shelter of the leading Chinese inn, and hailing a ricsha which happened to fly the slogan, "Long Live the Revolutionary Spirit of Sun Yat-sen!" I started out to see the town.

Everywhere were the signs of the new spirit which had come into the city the previous year on the heels of the fleeing Northerners. The fronts of the shops in the principal streets were freshly painted in the Nationalist colors, and the whole city seemed recently to have passed through something very much like a regular American "clean-up and paint-up" week. All convenient blank walls were covered with Nationalist propaganda. There were caricatures of old-fashioned mandarins, wearing smoked glasses to indicate their mental blindness, being unceremoniously kicked out into the void by irreverent youngsters with radiant countenances; of northern generals, the well-known faces affixed to the bodies of rats, scurrying off the map of China into the Pacific; of soldiers in foreign uniforms, ugly-looking but terrified, prodded from behind by up-standing Chinese peasants armed with the latest model of rifle and bayonet. There were also more elaborate productions. Here, a picture of an open boat on a stormy sea with a load of passengers, labelled "The People of China," while a sturdy crew, labelled "The Nationalist Party," pulls manfully toward a friendly shore, guided by powerful beams from a lighthouse, labelled, "The Three Principles of the People"; there, a picture of a wretched person in the last stages of dissolution, labelled "Opium Addict," while near by a handsome young man in the midst of a group of anxious female relatives looks longingly at a pipeful of the drug. Above all were the crude but familiar portraits of Marshal Feng and, in the place of honor, Dr. Sun himself.

The great gates of the city were open and long lines of countrymen were filing through. Many rode in oxcarts, the ungreased wooden wheels creaking hideously. Others, less fortunate, must content themselves with wheelbarrows, women and small children riding in careful balance, two or three on each side of the wheel, while a sturdy swain pushed the barrow forward, aided by a diminutive donkey or another sturdy swain tugging at a rope in front, the single wheel all the time creaking even more hideously, if possible, than those of the oxcarts.

Strange sights they would see that day! Strangest of all, perhaps, in the peasants' eyes, were the outer yards of the official yamens, transformed into playgrounds for the children, with swings and see-saws and other simple pieces of apparatus for wholesome exercise. And on the walls near by were seductive views of more elaborate playgrounds, filled with laughing boys and girls playing tennis or football. The great Buddhist Temple near the central market was converted into a patriotic museum, containing portraits of revolutionary heroes and lurid panoramas of foreign gunboats bombarding Chinese cities, while an adjoining temple had become a commercial and agricultural museum, displaying the products of the province, sheaves of millet and golden wheat, masses of raw cotton, and bolts of blue cloth. The tablet of the Sage had vanished from the central hall of the venerable Temple of Confucius and a library of patriotic literature had taken its place, while a kindergarten was established in the lateral halls. The Memorial Hall in honor of the Tseng brothers, heroes of the great war against the Taiping rebels, now sheltered a museum of archaeology, where the curious could look at rare specimens of ancient Imperial art. The old Sung palace and grounds were now converted into a public garden, and here and there handsome silk banners, hanging from the walls, proffered good advice in blue characters on a white ground or white characters on blue. One read, "Cut off queues, Unbind feet, Smoke no opium"; another, "Plough land, Weave cloth, Read books."

While the countryfolk were admiring the innovations which met their eye at every turn, the city dwellers themselves were hard at work preparing fresh surprises. The Nationalist Government at Nanking had suggested that the day be celebrated, not only with patriotic pageantry and oratory, but also by the planting of trees. The Kaifeng Government adopted the suggestion with enthusiasm and fixed at 120,000 the total number of saplings to be set out in their capital. Each department of the Government, each local organization, possessed of sufficient vitality, received its allotment of young trees. The provincial university's quota was 10,000, and the prudent president, a psychologist trained in America, who had acquired the "hustler's" spirit along with his doctor's degree, had begun the task on the previous Saturday afternoon, himself setting the pace by planting more than his share of the trees. In an empty corner of the city, not far from the famous porcelain tower, a young forest sprang up within the walls, and the populace looked forward to the future enjoyment of an unprecedented shade.

The event of the day was a pageant of the school children, culminating in a mass meeting on the Y. M. C. A. grounds at noon. The rightful occupants of the "Y," like those of the Confucian and Buddhist temples, had long since disappeared, leaving the Nationalist Government to a questionable but, for the moment at least, undisturbed possession. The main building now accommodated a public school, and the recreation field was a combination play- and drill-ground and meeting-place for public assemblages. Long before noon a picturesque procession was making its way through the narrow streets, each class of boys or girls carrying a blue-and-white banner displaying a patriotic sentiment or revolutionary slogan. Some of the latter recalled the destructive propaganda of the previous year: "Down with the Unequal Treaties" or "Down with Imperialism," "Down with Militarism," and "Down with the Oppressors of the People!" But for the most part the banners proclaimed the necessity of new knowledge and hard work to bring about the regeneration of China. Here and there, a troop of Boy Scouts or Campfire Girls in the familiar western costume lent variety to the throng. The staffs of the Government departments were also in line, occupying much of the space within the grounds not taken by the children. Soldiers, workmen, and peasants crowded in behind them, until the grounds could hold no more.

Precisely at noon the master of ceremonies, who was also the provincial director of propaganda, stepped to the front of the rostrum and signalled for order. Behind him was a huge portrait of Dr. Sun, decorated with blue-and-white silk. Across the front of the rostrum above the heads of the speakers was written in picturesque characters: "In Memory of Sun Yat-sen, died March 12, 1925." Along one side the terse assertion ran: "The Three Principles of the People will save China!"; along the other side: "Execute the last will and testament of Sun Wen!" All around was a sea of children, officers, soldiers, workmen, and peasants, while a multitude of blue-and-white silk banners fluttered overhead. The great assemblage stood in solemn silence with bowed heads for three long minutes, meditating, and then recited aloud the words of Dr. Sun's will. They sang the Song of the Revolution and repeated after the master of ceremonies a score or more of revolutionary slogans. At several of the slogans many of the men standing near looked at me curiously, but not unpleasantly, and my interpreter was too busy shouting with the rest to translate their meaning. The children, however, seemed not to suspect that I might have in my pocket the special permit that betrayed my imperialist connections, and always returned smile for smile.

Speeches followed from the master of ceremonies, the civil governor, and other high officials. But it was difficult to hear and presently all but those directly in front of the rostrum showed unmistakable signs of inattention. The organizers of the meeting with rare wisdom curtailed the program, and by one o'clock the huge crowd was melting away.

I lingered to talk with the master of ceremonies. He had been debating with the civil governor the higher strategy of the Revolution. Was it feasible to build a new state in China without also reconstructing the country's economic and social institutions? More particularly, could they hope to establish a modern commonwealth without destroying the patriarchal family-system, the foundation of their culture for thousands of years? The governor had said "yes, it could be done; and it is our duty to upset as little as possible of the old in order to ease the way for the coming of the new." But the director of propaganda dissented. The patriarchal system was more than a mere family-system, more than a form of social order, more than an instrument for the production and distribution of wealth. It was also a kind of government, an important part of the structure of the old state. It carried with it habits of thought and rules of conduct that were incompatible with the proper functioning of a modern state. It would have to go, along with queues, bound feet, and opium-smoking, before the old order in politics could be made to give way to the new. And as I walked slowly away, I reflected that, if the patriarchal system was involved in the Chinese Revolution, what I had just seen was no mere prelude to another summer's campaign. It was rather a fleeting glimpse of a phase in one of the great processes of history.

That night I stayed with the two men who directed the operations of the Chinese Post Office in Honan province. One, the chief director, was an Englishman of many years' experience in China, who had been sent to Kaifeng the previous autumn when Marshal Feng had made it possible to restore the normal service. The other, a Scandinavian, was chief financial officer and had remained at his post through all the preceding disorder and violence when other foreigners fled from the province. Thrice his Chinese subordinates, stirred by the new Nationalism, had deposed him, and thrice he calmly told them that he alone had the keys to the safe and would surrender them to no one but a lawfully appointed successor. And so the postal service, the only unified nation-wide service in China at the time of my visit, continued to function in accordance with the treaties. The two men lived alone outside the wall on the edge of the city in two fine big houses, built for official use by the Chinese Postal Administration. We strolled around the gardens, which were enclosed behind strong high walls, and observed the bullet-marks, which still remained, mute witnesses of sanguinary battles between Northern and Southern armies for the possession of Kaifeng. When I suggested that we walk through the fields outside, they replied that they did not leave the shelter of their walls except to go to the post office or to the city. On that they agreed. When I asked them which side they favored in the civil war, they agreed again. They both replied that there was no politics in the postal service and that they had no favorites.

But when I asked them about the future of China agreement ceased. One said that the Chinese were hopeless. They could not govern after the fashion of the western peoples, could not even stop fighting among themselves, and would have to be rescued by the foreign Powers, if they were not to sink into anarchy and barbarism. What the foreign Powers had done with the postal service, they could and should do with all necessary public services. The other said that intervention by the foreign Powers was hopeless. The Chinese could govern themselves, if the foreign Powers would permit them, and the way to stop the fighting in China was for the Powers to stop interfering in Chinese affairs. Since the expulsion of the Russians, he said, things had gone better, and the other Powers could well reflect upon the significance of the Russian experience. And the two men, being in a way prisoners together, wisely agreed to disagree.

This, I found, was typical of China. The best-informed, the most intelligent, and the most courageous foreigners were of different minds. No casual traveller could discover any authoritative opinion that would stand unchallenged. It was necessary to investigate the facts for one's self and to form one's own opinions.

I

THE PROBLEM OF CHINA

1. THE DISINTEGRATION OF CHINA

The area which we call China fills a great space on the map of Asia. It is larger than the United States, including Alaska. It is larger than the whole of Europe. It is larger than the Australian Continent, together with New Zealand and all the islands of the East Indies and South Seas.

The contemplation of this vast area cannot fail to stir the imagination of the westerner. On its borders are the loftiest mountains in the world. Its coast is washed by the grandest of the oceans. Within its limits are mighty rivers, broad plains, fertile valleys, bleak plateaus, hideous deserts. Though no exact enumeration of its inhabitants has ever been made, it is known that they exceed in number those of any other country. One of the most conservative estimates, that of Mr. W. W. Rockhill (made shortly before the overthrow of the Manchus), accounted for more than thrice as many people in China as in the United States at that time, more even than in the whole of Europe, outside of Russia as it then was. By more recent and probably more accurate estimates, such as those of the Chinese Post Office and the Maritime Customs Administration, the total population of China is nearer four than three times as great as that of the United States, and may equal or even exceed that of Europe, including Russia. China contains at least a fifth and perhaps a fourth of all mankind.

Such a country with such a population profoundly impresses the western mind with a sense of sufficiency. It seems big enough. It seems to contain more than enough people.

But the contemplation of the map of China makes no such impression on the minds of the Chinese. On the contrary, it leaves them unsatisfied and discontented. It leaves them unsatisfied because they know that, big as China is, it has been bigger. It leaves them discontented because they know that the present boundaries of China are a measure of its decline rather than of its greatness. The China of today is an area on occidental maps, bounded by frontiers reflecting alien purposes, responding to alien needs, and serving alien interests. To find a map of China satisfactory to the Chinese, it is necessary to find a map of China made by the Chinese.

One such map is painted on the wall of the ancient Sung palace in Kaifeng. It was put there by the Department of Propaganda of the Provincial Government of Honan shortly before my visit in March, 1928. The former Imperial palace and grounds had been converted by the Nationalists into a public park, named Chungshan Park in honor of their late leader, Sun Yat-sen, and the palace walls were covered with pictures and inscriptions designed to stimulate the patriotism of the people. A light line indicated the limits of China recognized by the foreign Powers. A heavier line marked the boundaries of the China of the Chinese. On the east it included Formosa and the Liuchiu Islands, Korea, and the North Pacific coast to a point well beyond the mouth of the Amur river. On the north it included the whole of the watershed of the Amur. On the west it ran deep into central Turkestan. On the south it included Tongking and Annam, Siam and Burma, nearly all indeed of what westerners call Indo-China, together with parts of the East Indies.

The contemplation of such a map may make others than Chinese uneasy. To extend the boundaries of China to these limits would involve taking from the Japanese Empire Chosen, Taiwan, and the Liuchiu islands. It would involve taking from the Soviet Union the better part of its Far East Area, together with the Buriat-Mongol Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic, as well as substantial portions of the Kazak and Kirghiz Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republics and of the Uzbek Socialist Soviet Republic, including the Tajik Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic.

It would involve taking from the British Upper and Lower Burma and also Hongkong, from the French Annam and Tongking, Laos and Cochin-China, from the Dutch a slice of their East Indian possessions, and from the Portuguese Macao. It would involve a change of status for Siam. In short, it would involve making China synonymous with the Far East, except for the main islands of Japan and the Philippines, together with the whole of Central Asia. It is evident that, even if not all Chinese would accept this vision of the Nationalists, China means something quite different to the Sons of Han and of Tang than to those they were wont to term the Barbarians. A dream only, the foreigner may say, this vision of Greater China, a dream nevertheless which betrays the existence of a living past.

But how different from the dream was the reality! Far from holding sway throughout the extensive dominions shown on the map in the ancient Sung palace at Kaifeng, the Chinese were not even masters within the narrower limits of the occidental maps. Tibet had been practically independent since the overthrow of the Manchus. There was a British agent at Lhasa but no representative of the government of the Chinese Republic. The Republican five-bar flag contained a broad band of white in honor of the people of Tibet; but the Tibetans remained unmoved by this unsolicited distinction. Their lamas maintained the great temple at Peking; but they took no part in the politics of the northern capital. Outer Mongolia also had fallen away. Taking little interest in the Chinese Revolution, the Mongols had made a revolution of their own, and in 1921 set up a soviet republic. Though the Soviet Union in its treaty with China in 1924 consented to recognize the sovereignty of China over Outer Mongolia, four years later it was necessary to obtain a visa on one's passport from the government of the Soviet Union in order to travel through Mongolian territory. And on the great map of China, which hung against the wall in the Far Eastern section of the Revolutionary Museum at Moscow, Outer Mongolia was splashed with red like any soviet republic within the orbit of the Soviet

Union. In Sinkiang, China's so-called New Dominion in the heart of Asia, a Chinese governor maintained an uneasy sway with one eye perhaps cocked upon the feeble government in distant Peking, but with the other peering anxiously over the border into the adjacent socialist soviet republics of the Kazaks and Kirghiz, the Uzbeks and Tajiks, Mohammedans all, like his own subjects, and captivated by the statecraft of Moscow.

There remain the home-lands of the Chinese themselves, which they commonly refer to as the Eighteen Provinces, and also the Three Eastern Provinces, which we call Manchuria. When I reached the Far East in November, 1927, these twenty-one provinces were divided among more than half a dozen separate governments. Everywhere the authority of these governments was disputed, and in many places reduced to a state little better than anarchy.

In the northeast the Manchurian "warlord," Chang Tso-lin, held sway over five provinces, the three which constitute Manchuria and two within the Great Wall. The latter, Chihli (now Hopei) and Shantung, are among the largest and most populous in China and together with Manchuria form a princely domain. Its area is about equal to that of all the states in the northeastern part of the United States, extending as far west as the Mississippi and as far south as Virginia and Kentucky, and its population, according to the estimates of the Chinese Post Office and Customs Administration, is considerably greater. With respect to climate and natural resources the region dominated by Chang Tso-lin might better be compared with the northwestern states from Missouri and Kansas to the Canadian border. Tientsin is in about the same latitude as St. Louis, and Harbin not much farther north than Minneapolis. The areas of these two regions are approximately the same, but the population of Chang Tso-lin's domain was probably six times as great. It was greater than that of any country in Europe outside of Russia.

Chang Tso-lin was the last hope of that influential element in most countries in modern times, especially numerous among the

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foreign business men in China, whose favorite form of government is the military dictatorship. The "strong man," they say, alone can cope with disorder and violence, keep insubordinate classes of society in their proper place, impart the necessary energy to the governmental machine for vigorous exploitation of natural resources and production of wealth, and assure that distribution of honors and profits which will be most conducive to enterprise and prosperity.

China had not lacked experience with the "strong man" type. Yuan Shih-kai had possessed most of its traditional attributes. He was energetic, shrewd, bold, and unscrupulous. Free from the load of honorable but useless learning which overburdened the cultivated mandarins of the *ancien régime* and rendered them unfit for the management of a modern state, he staked his fortunes on the success of the iron hand. By superior efficiency in the manipulation of brutal force, in the organization of official violence, he hoped to mount the Dragon Throne as similar men had done before him. He found favor in the eyes of foreign business men. They pronounced his efforts good, and backed him with their money. But Yuan Shih-kai failed. After him came a long line of "strong men," each feebler than the last, each destined to a more ignoble end. And with each failure of the policy of the iron hand, confidence, especially on the part of foreign business men, in the ability of the Chinese to govern themselves grew fainter. At the same time the yearning for the "strong man" became more intense. The fame of Mussolini reached the Far East and stimulated the desire for willful leadership in Chinese affairs of state. The Primo de Riveras, the Pilsudskis, the Pangaloses, and the whole crew of European military dictators fired the imaginations of Far Eastern soldier-politicians, in whose eyes distance perhaps lent enchantment to the view of European militarism. At last there remained only Chang Tso-lin to justify the faith in the efficacy of the "strong man."

Chang Tso-lin was a native of Manchuria. He had begun his career by that dubious combination of agriculture and banditry which still provides employment for untold numbers of Chinese. During the Russo-Japanese War he served on the side of the Japanese and made the basis of the reputation which afterwards carried him to the shadow of a throne. Entering the Chinese military service he rose rapidly under the Manchus, and under Yuan Shih-kai became Tuchun or military governor at Mukden. After the fall of Yuan Shih-kai he made himself master of all Manchuria and one of the foremost war lords in China, finally emerging the victor from their fratricidal struggles with the richest provinces of the north as his share of the spoils. A man of small stature, delicate hands, and undistinguished appearance, he was consumed with a passion for power, crafty in its pursuit, and ruthless in its use.

Chang Tso-lin's government was a pure military dictatorship, unrestrained by such vestiges of republican institutions as he permitted to survive. The possession of Peking, however, gave him recognition as actual if not legal head of the Chinese Republic. His ministers were consulted by the representatives of the foreign Powers in residence at the northern capital; his envoys were received at Geneva and permitted to speak in the name of China at the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations. But while he himself dreamt of mounting the Dragon Throne, the foundations of his power were dissolving beneath his feet. Altogether deficient in the western arts of self-display, he followed faithfully the oriental tradition which wraps up power in a shroud of mystery, and conceals the weaknesses it cannot or will not overcome. Amidst a glut of wine and women and a dearth of song he exploited his power for the gratification of his passions, assigning the actual conduct of affairs to more intelligent or perchance even to more brutal men operating in his name.

The best that can be said in favor of military dictatorship as a form of government — and also the worst — was said long ago by Walter Bagehot, a sagacious observer, in his book, *The English Constitution*. "By the Dictatorial or Revolutionary sort of government," he wrote, "I mean that very important sort in which the sovereign — the absolute sovereign — is selected by revolution. In theory, one would have certainly hoped that by this time such crude elective machinery would have been reduced to a secondary part. But in fact . . ." — and Bagehot proceeded to relate some facts familiar enough to his readers of a half-century before the World War.

In view of the widespread revival of faith in military dictatorship in recent years it is worth while pausing a moment to reflect on the wisdom of Bagehot. "The representative despot must be chosen by fighting," he observed, "as Napoleon I and Napoleon III were chosen. And such a government is likely, whatever be its other defects, to have a far better and abler administration than any other government. The head of the government must be a man of the most consummate ability. He cannot keep his place, he can hardly keep his life, unless he is. He is sure to be active, because he knows that his power, and perhaps his head, may be lost, if he be negligent. The whole frame of his state is strained to keep down revolution. The most difficult of all political problems is to be solved — the people are to be at once thoroughly restrained and thoroughly pleased. The executive must be like a steel shirt of the middle ages — extremely hard and extremely flexible. It must give way to attractive novelties which do not hurt; it must resist such as are dangerous; it must maintain old things which are good and fitting; it must alter such as cramp and give pain. The dictator dare not appoint a bad minister if he would. I admit that such a despot is a better selector of administrators than a parliament; that he will know how to mix fresh minds and used minds better; that he is under a stronger motive to combine them well; that here is to be seen the best of all choosers with the keenest motives to choose. But I need not prove in England that the revolutionary selection of rulers obtains administrative efficiency at a price altogether transcending its value; that it shocks credit by its catastrophes; that for intervals it does not protect property or life; that it maintains an undergrowth of fear through all prosperity; that it may take years to find the true capable despot; that the interregna of the incapable are full of all evil; that the fit despot may die as soon as found; that the good administration and all else hang by the thread of his life."

Chang Tso-lin fell far short of the measure of the "fit despot" or capable military dictator, as described by Bagehot, and he was not long in fulfilling Bagehot's prophecy concerning the fate of dictators who are incapable. Before I finally left China, he had duly "lost his head" by one of the most artistic assassinations in modern history. Despite their disappointing experiences with military dictatorship in China the elements which favored that form of government there were slow to learn the lesson which Bagehot taught so persuasively so many years ago. Yet the opinion was gaining ground that, if the Chinese were to govern themselves at all, it must be by some form of government superior to a vulgar military dictatorship. Especially among the Chinese themselves this opinion was making rapid headway and finding acceptable expression through the new Nationalist movement. Nowhere in China, outside Chang Tso-lin's domain, when I first arrived in the country, was it possible to govern without at least pretending to appeal to moral as well as physical forces. Even Chang Tso-lin claimed to be ridding the country of the menace of Bolshevism, but elsewhere the appeal to moral forces had a more positive ring.

2

THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

The moral appeal to which Chinese everywhere were responding in increasing numbers was made in the name of a man who had died nearly three years before in the hospital of the beautiful Union Medical College which Mr. Rockefeller had built at Peking. Sun Yat-sen, as he was called by his fellow Cantonese, or, as he will be known in Chinese history, Sun Wen, was born in 1866, in a small village not far from Macao and received a western education, partly in an American missionary school in

Hawaii, partly in a British medical college in Hongkong. From youth up Dr. Sun shared the traditional dislike of the Manchus, which had never died out among the Chinese and was especially strong in the far South. His western education made him discontented with the Manchu opposition to modern ideas and the humiliation of China in the Sino-Japanese War destroyed his confidence in the mandarins at Peking. Abandoning his profession, he devoted himself to revolutionary agitation, and presently he was forced to abandon his country also and take refuge abroad. For years he was the principal leader of the Chinese Revolutionists, organizing their supporters in foreign lands, the bankers and wealthy merchants and prosperous planters in Indo-China, in the Straits and East Indies, and in America, plotting conspiracies against the Manchus, planning the New China which should follow their overthrow. Despite poverty, regardless of bodily peril, he succeeded in keeping alive an active revolutionary movement, and was especially successful in firing the patriotism of the students who in swelling throngs were resorting to the universities of Japan and the West. Endowed by nature with an eager and active mind, he lived in a self-made world of ideas, which the ardor of his enthusiasm transmuted in the imaginations of his followers into the land of their dreams. From the unexpected success of the Chinese Revolutionists in October, 1911, to the day of his death, Dr. Sun struggled in vain to give substance to these dreams. He died, as he had lived, an agitator, a conspirator, a leader of revolt.

There has been in recent years much discussion of the real character of Dr. Sun. By the enemies of Chinese Nationalism he has been described as a hopeless visionary, as a vainglorious trouble-maker, and even as a mere disappointed office-seeker. In April, 1928, when the final collapse of the opposition to Chinese Nationalism was imminent, though still in many quarters unexpected, I visited one of the leading statesmen of the First Republic, Yuan Shih-kai's right-hand man, Marshal Tuan Chi-jui. He had been Chief of the Executive Power at Peking (for so his equivocal title ran), when Dr. Sun went there on the mission which ended with his death. I asked him why Dr. Sun had come to Peking at that time and what he thought Dr. Sun had really wanted. His reply was short and explicit. "Dr. Sun came," he said, "to get a job." Weary of continual failure, Marshal Tuan believed, the unfortunate Nationalist leader wanted rest, that is, a position to which he could retire, if not with dignity, at least with the prospect of a competence for his old age. Tuan Chi-jui planned to accommodate him with an innocuous sinecure as formerly Yuan Shih-kai had put him off with an empty title in exchange for the presidency of the First Republic. But instead Dr. Sun found the peace which he desired in the grave. And now, as Tuan Chi-jui saw it, more practical men than Dr. Sun had created a fictitious character for their dead leader in order to exploit his good name for their private ends.

I heard a different tale from those who had known him best. Old men who had known him in his early poverty and obscurity, young men who had followed him through the vicissitudes of his later career, told of the fascination which he exercised over them. They observed his eagerness for knowledge, especially the new science of the West, his love of wisdom, not overlooking the old wisdom of the Far East, his faith in his countrymen, and his high hopes for China. What others called a stubborn and domineering spirit, they deemed loyalty to his principles; where others saw only foolish vanity, they perceived unselfish devotion to the public good. His last visit to Peking, which seemed to soldier-politicians of the old school a confession of defeat, demonstrated in their eyes his invincible faith in the power of reason and antipathy to the needless effusion of blood. I visited the house in Shanghai which his grateful admirers presented to him, and turned the pages of the books he had owned and loved to read. It was his practice to carry a book with him wherever he went. He read even while he took his daily constitutional in the neighboring park. I examined the notations he had made upon the margins of the pages in his copy of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' brilliant essay on "The Common Law" and observed that he had read with similar care much of Pollock and Maitland's "History" and other weighty books dear to the hearts of western lawyers and students of the science of government. It was evident that there was solid substance in this man. My thoughts turned to the mountainside near Nanking, out beyond the ancient tomb where lie the remains of the founder of the Ming Dynasty, to the serene slope where the tomb of Sun Yat-sen was under construction, a magnificent memorial — far more beautiful and stately than any of the Ming tombs — to the founder, as his followers believe, not of a dynasty but of something nobler than any dynasty, a new state. Some three months later, in conformity to the custom of the country, the victorious Nationalist generals repaired to the temporary resting-place of their late leader's body in the Western Hills outside Peking and reported that in his name they had conquered. So, while the spirit of Chinese Nationalism lives, Sun Yat-sen will be known as his disciples knew him.

When towards the end of 1927 I first saw the Far East, the unification of China seemed to casual onlookers as remote as the stars in the heavens. The Nationalists claimed all the territory not actually in the possession of Chang Tso-lin, but their claims had to be judged by their conduct. And their conduct was far from reassuring.

In the northwest the "Christian General," Feng Yu-hsiang, was consolidating his power in the provinces of Honan, Shensi, and Kansu, while Shansi remained under the control of the "Model Governor," Yen Hsi-shan. These four provinces formed a domain neither as extensive nor as populous as that of Chang Tso-lin, but large enough to sustain rulers able to set effectual limits to his power. Comparable roughly in climate and resources to the American Southwest, they embraced an area nearly as great as that of Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, and Colorado, and contained probably ten times as many inhabitants. Kaifeng, where Feng Yu-hsiang had established his seat of government, one of the ancient capitals of China, is in nearly the same latitude as Oklahoma City and is the center of a rich wheat and cotton-growing region resembling Oklahoma. Taiyuanfu, Yen Hsi-shan's capital, lies farther north and west, commanding a fine valley which is separated by a range of mountains from the great plain of North China. This northwestern region as a whole exceeds in area the territory of any of the Great Powers in Europe outside of Russia and contains more inhabitants than any of them except Germany.

The two generals who divided this splendid domain had long been marked men in Chinese politics. The less powerful of them, Yen Hsi-shan, having received a modern military education, entered public life near the close of the reign of the Manchus, and, being intelligent and industrious, was well launched on a conventional official career at the outbreak of the Revolution. Joining the Revolutionists, he took the lead in overthrowing the old régime in Shansi and made himself master of the province. A humane man of moderate temper, he steered a prudent middle course among the contending factions and for many years kept both himself and his province out of serious trouble. Meanwhile, he earned his title of "Model Governor" by founding schools and building roads, and by persistent devotion to the improvement of the condition of his people. At the end of 1927 he was the only ruler in the Eighteen Provinces who could claim a clear title to his domain. Safe, sane, and progressive, he was universally recognized as an admirable provincial executive, but deemed deficient in the more heroic qualities needful for successful cruising on the turbulent seas of national politics.

Of sterner stuff was the "Christian General," Marshal Feng. Beginning life as an ignorant coolie, he soon turned soldier, as many another had done under similar circumstances, and sought a precarious livelihood among the mercenary troops of the Manchu Empire. Gaining the confidence of his superiors, he received a military education in the famous Peiyang Academy at Paotingfu, where he attracted attention by his prodigious energy and capacity for work. Gifted with extraordinary powers of organization, he rose rapidly in the armies of Yuan Shih-kai, and after the latter's death was recognized as one of the most efficient commanders among the northern militarists. Picking his way shrewdly through the morasses of army politics, he eventually became a principal contender for the mastery of China. Driven from Peking by Chang Tso-lin in the spring of 1926, he retired through Mongolia to Russia, whence after a season in Moscow he returned with fresh courage and, rallying his scattered armies, forced his way down the valley of the Yellow river, as many a conqueror in Chinese history had done before him. A big, burly, boyish-looking man of simple tastes and sound habits, he presented a striking contrast to the usual type of Chinese military adventurer, and inspired his followers with a matchless loyalty that gave him a great advantage over his rivals in the struggle for power.

In fact, Marshal Feng was no ordinary militarist. Early in his career he had been converted to Christianity and strengthened himself in his new faith by marrying a secretary of the Young Women's Christian Association in Peking. Like most converts he was ardent in his devotion and eager that his soldiers should become good Methodists like himself. With a rifle in one hand and a hymn-book in the other, they offered a contrast to the armies of the other generals no less striking than that between the generals themselves. The Protestant missionaries, proud of their brilliant convert, hailed him as another Cromwell and his fame spread abroad. But after his return from Moscow he incorporated many Mohammedans into his army and was compelled to alter his policy in the matter of religion. When I visited his headquarters in March, 1928, his soldiers still began the day with song, but the spirit had changed. The tune was still that to which Christians sing their doxology, but the words suggested the propaganda of the Kuomintang.

This food is supplied by the People;
We ought to work for the People;
Imperialism is the enemy of the nation;
Saving the country and the People is our sacred duty.

This patriotic song was sung regularly before meals in lieu of saying grace, a custom once practised in the Marshal's armies but now abandoned. Yet Marshal Feng adhered to the strict regimen which he had learned with his Methodism. His men might neither smoke, drink, nor gamble, and if his army was in consequence an uncommonly sober one, it was also uncommonly inexpensive to maintain. The Marshal set an example of the simple life, contenting himself with a single dish at meals like his men, and while they strove to fit themselves for the duties of citizenship in a modern state by learning two Chinese characters before each meal, he sat up far into the night, after his staff had retired for rest, studying the books which he thought he ought to know to fit himself for leadership.

When I first arrived at Marshal Feng's headquarters and inquired how the new militarism differed from the old, I was told to look around and see for myself. I looked around and saw that it was different. Later I met the Marshal in his private quarters at Hsin-hsiang, and I began to understand how the difference had come about. When I told him I had recently visited his "model village" near Chengchow, he did not ask me if I liked it. He asked me only if I had any suggestions to make for its improvement. When one of my suggestions stirred his imagination, he did not wait to be urged to put it into effect. He ordered its adoption the next day. Physically, as he first loomed upon my sight in the doorway of the cottage which served as his quarters, clad in the simple uniform of a common soldier, quilted with cotton to resist the cold, he might easily have been mistaken for an American football captain, dressed for play. Vigorous, alert, impulsive, companionable, the admiration of his followers needed no explanation. The only complaints I heard from those about him were that he would do too much of the work himself, not delegating enough of the details to others; that he would interfere in secondary matters where subordinates should have been left to bear the responsibility alone; that he was too careful of his men and sometimes missed opportunities which less considerate leaders would have turned to account. But these faults, if faults they were, only increased the devotion of his followers. Their confidence in his leadership, their assurance of victory, was amazing in view of the dejection, not to say despondency, so much in evidence in other parts of China on the eve of the 1928 campaign.

For the lack of confidence, which existed in other parts of Nationalist China, Feng Yu-hsiang himself was an important cause. The devotion of his followers was matched by the distrust of his rivals. He was dominated by selfish ambition, they said, and no man could rely upon his support without fear of betrayal. The man who deserted Wu Pei-fu on the eve of possible success, and thus frustrated what then seemed to many foreigners and not a few Chinese a promising effort at the unification of China, in order to form an alliance with the Manchurian Warlord, his open enemy for the preceding two years, only to break in turn with the latter and retreat to Moscow, seemed to be a man who needed close watching. "We trust him," declared a member of another faction among the Nationalists, as the campaign of 1928 was about to open, "only so far as it is to his interest to keep faith." Others confessed openly that they feared victory in the coming campaign almost as much as defeat, since it would surely be followed, unless they misjudged their man, by a quarrel between Marshal Feng and the other leaders. Still others were known to be awaiting the day when the quarrel should break out, hoping to find better fishing in troubled waters. And there were some who professed satisfaction at the Marshal's dubious reputation. "China," they declared with invincible optimism, "needs a strong man, a dictator, and Feng is our strongest man. The sooner he whips his rivals, the sooner we shall have peace." But when I asked him at his quarters in March, 1928, what he intended to do when he arrived at Peking, he replied instantly, and with every appearance of candor: "I will carry out the principles of the Kuomintang."

Both Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan were recent converts to Nationalism. The former had announced his conversion on his return from Moscow at the end of 1926, while the latter had successfully guarded his neutrality in the Civil War until the summer of 1927. Then, forced to choose between the Nationalism of Feng and the militarism of Chang Tso-lin, he seized his arms and joined the league against the Manchurian Warlord. But, whatever might be the difference in spirit between the new militarism of the Nationalists and the old militarism of the Manchurian party, the governments operating from Kaifeng and Taiyuanfu were not so greatly different in form from that at Peking. The seats of power were located at the military headquarters, and chiefs of staff were more important personages than civil governors or party executive committeemen. Nominally the northwestern provinces were Chinese territory and their rulers members of the Kuomintang. But a stranger could not visit Kaifeng without a special visa from the diplomatic bureau at General Headquarters on his passport, and the formalities would not have been much greater if the city had been the capital of an independent state. Taiyuanfu, being surrounded on all sides by open enemies or uncertain friends, was without special negotiation hardly to be visited at all.

The rest of the Eighteen Provinces were nominally also Nationalist territory, but what government, if any, their inhabitants would obey was uncertain. The principal Nationalist leaders had established their headquarters at Nanking, but their authority was challenged by undisciplined rivals and undermined by internal dissensions. Five provinces at most were under their effective control. These five, however, constituted the richest and most populous, though not the largest, of all the domains into which China was divided. Three of these provinces, Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Anhui, lie astride the lower reaches of the Yangtze river; the other two, Chekiang and Fukien, stretch down along the southeastern coast. Nanking is in the same latitude as Savannah, Georgia, and the region as a whole possesses a climate somewhat similar to that of the southeastern part of the United States. Its area is about equal to that of the South Atlantic coast states from North Carolina to Florida, together with Alabama, and it contains possibly ten times as many inhabitants. Once the world's principal source of silk, tea, and porcelain, and still a great producer of the first two of these commodities, this domain contains famous old cities, like Hangchow and Soochow, as well as the commercial metropolis of the new China, Shanghai. In population it surpasses all the European countries and may even surpass the United States. Formerly in wealth also not a country in the West could match it.

The Nanking Nationalists professed to be the legal heirs of the Republican tradition in China, but their claim had been challenged at home and was unrecognized abroad. Their government was in form that of a soviet republic, dominated as in the original home of the soviets by a political party; but the Nanking leaders had denounced communism and were ridding their party as thoroughly as possible of communist influences. They justified their efforts to maintain and extend their power on the ground that they were the accredited representatives of Dr. Sun's "Three Principles of the People," but their actual authority was largely derived from the support of successful generals. The most influential of these generals, however, Chiang Kai-shek, was an exile in Japan, and the politicians who had enjoyed the benefit of his support were unable to agree upon the use to be made of the authority conferred upon them. Among them were the oldest and best-known of Dr. Sun's followers, above all, his favorite disciples, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min. Both had been steadfast in their devotion through all the vicissitudes of the Chinese Revolution, but they could not get along together and now they could carry on no longer. Presently they abandoned the attempt and, followed by other prominent party leaders, notably the son of Dr. Sun, Sun Fo, and C. C. Wu, the son of Dr. Sun's old associate, Wu Ting-fang, left the country. The task of reorganizing the Nationalist government at Nanking and directing the Northern Campaign to a successful conclusion, if that were possible, was bequeathed to Chiang Kai-shek, now returned from exile.

Chiang Kai-shek was the youngest of the outstanding military leaders. He was also the one most closely associated with the Nationalist movement. A follower of Dr. Sun before the Revolution of 1911, he remained faithful to him throughout the succeeding years. Forced to flee from China after the failure of Dr. Sun's revolt against Yuan Shih-kai in 1913, he passed the next decade in obscurity. At one time he was a clerk in Shanghai. He managed to pick up the elements of a military education in Japan and later, like many other ardent young Revolutionists in the period following the Bolshevist Revolution, he went to Moscow. There he studied the art of war as practiced by the Red Army. Returning, he was put in charge of the new military academy at Whampoa, where officers were to be trained for the Chinese Revolutionary Army after the Russian fashion, and at last had the opportunity to show his mettle. He began turning out excellent young officers from the Whampoa Cadet School. As his graduates became more numerous his influence grew until, when the Kuomintang government was reconstructed after the death of Dr. Sun, he emerged as one of its important men. At first a favorite with the Russian advisers, his power increased and by 1926 he had become the most prominent figure at Canton and received the command of the Northern Expedition. It is unnecessary to dwell here upon the circumstances which led after the capture of Hankow to the breach between the Russian advisers and the more moderate leaders of the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek favored the Moderates and was encouraged by the latter to repudiate the Hankow government and set up an independent government at Nanking. The demoralization which ensued in the ranks of the Kuomintang threatened to defeat the Revolution itself and in August of 1927 Chiang Kai-shek withdrew in the interest of harmony. But harmony was not restored, and before the close of 1927 he was called back to Nanking to set the Nationalist government on its feet again, if he could. It was a gesture of despair on the part of the Nationalist leaders.

Chiang Kai-shek was well qualified to lead a forlorn hope. When I first met him at his quarters in Nanking in March, 1928, he was almost overwhelmed with preparations for the approaching Northern Campaign. But he talked as calmly and deliberately as if he were at a tea-party. Youthful in appearance, modest and unassuming in demeanor, he betrayed no sign of the burden he was carrying. Yet it was a matter of common knowledge that he was contending against the proverbial sea of troubles. Shortly afterwards I met him on a Sunday afternoon out for a stroll with his bride of a few months, the youngest of the charming Soong sisters, and like the rest of her family a politician of no less skill than charm. They were coming down the mountain beyond the old Ming tomb where they had been visiting the Purple Cloud Cave, and as they sauntered along together, gaily chatting, they might have been the most carefree young couple in the whole city of Nanking. Some distance behind were his military aids, clothed in proper uniform, but Chiang himself was attired in a natty outing-suit, the last man in the party to be taken for the generalissimo of the Nationalist armies. In Canton, when I was there, Nationalist generals appeared in public only in powerful motor-cars with three soldiers on each running-board, pistols in hand, fingers on the triggers. In Tsinan, Chang Tsung-chang, the Northern militarist who ruled the province of Shantung at the time of my visit, did not appear in public at all, unless the streets were first cleared. But Chiang Kai-shek could go on foot in his capital like any honest citizen.

Under this placid and serene exterior the Nationalist generalissimo concealed a stout heart and a strong will. With few words but firm purpose, he drove ahead at his objective, undismayed by the most formidable obstacles, the machinations of numerous and powerful enemies, the doubts and hesitations of timid friends. I met him for the last time at luncheon amidst a delegation of Shanghai bankers, summoned to help finance the approaching campaign. It was a simple meal, served partly in the Chinese, partly in the western style. Doubtless at the moment an appearance of economy was good policy, but, simple as was the meal which was served to his guests, he contented himself with still more frugal fare. And while for the guests a light wine was provided in addition to the inevitable tea, for himself there was unfermented grape-juice of a well-known American make. What a contrast to a dinner I attended a few weeks later in Tsinanfu at the yamen of Chiang Kai-shek's principal opponent in the campaign, then already opened! Chang Tsung-chang, commander-in-chief of one of the principal northern armies, ex-bandit and Tupan of Shantung, was giving a farewell banquet on the eve of his departure for the front. The great hall of the yamen was thronged with officers, both military and civil, invited to the feast, and the long board groaned under the burden of expensive dishes. The champagne began to flow before the soup was served, while bevies of sing-song girls and geishas vied with one another to entertain the guests. Amidst a torrent of wine and an avalanche of feminine pulchritude the genial host, big and gay, chased away his forebodings, if he had any, of impending doom. Meanwhile a hundred miles or more away to the south a quiet man of medium size and far from powerful, indeed almost frail, physique was patiently and persistently advancing toward his goal.

But would his strength hold out? That was a question as dubious in many minds as the other question about the loyalty of Marshal Feng.

Another Nationalist government maintained a fitful existence at Canton. This city, which lies in the same latitude as Havana, Cuba, is the metropolis of the two provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. They have an area four times as great as that of Cuba and a population ten or fifteen times as great. Kwangtung alone has an area about equal to that of Great Britain and according to the Post Office estimates a population about equal to that of England. Long considered the most progressive city in China, Canton was the capital of a domain which, though inferior in area and population to the domains governed from Peking, Kaifeng, and Nanking, was abundantly capable of supporting a vigorous and aggressive government.

But Canton and the two provinces tributary to it, though the original base of the Nationalist movement, had been neglected since the departure of the Northern Expedition in the summer of 1926. During the course of the following year the city was the scene of a series of violent contests for power, culminating in the bloody Communist uprising of December, 1927. Though quickly suppressed, the uprising prostrated trade and industry, ruined the credit of the government, and sadly impaired the prestige of the party. When I visited Canton shortly afterwards, Li Chi-sen, the general who had finally succeeded in restoring a semblance of order, was engrossed in the task of reconstruction. Though professing allegiance to Nationalism, his relations with the Government at Nanking were apparently cool, and the extent of his coöperation with it problematical.

A third Nationalist government was located at Hankow. This city, which lies in the same latitude as New Orleans, is the metropolis of the two provinces of Hupeh and Hunan. Their combined area is about thrice that of the state of Louisiana and their combined population is twenty-five or thirty times as great. Hankow is located at the crossing of the Yangtze river, the great highway from east to west through the heart of China, by the main trunk-line railroad from north to south, which will eventually connect Peking and Canton. Together with the adjacent cities of Hanyang and Wuchang, it forms a center of trade and industry surpassed only by Shanghai. The domain of which it is the political as well as business center is little inferior in area to that ruled from Canton, and probably exceeds the latter in population.

To the Wuhan cities, as the Chinese call them, the Nationalists transferred their seat of government after the initial successes of the Northern Expedition in the fall of 1926. But friction between the Communist and non-Communist elements within the Kuomintang split the party in the spring of 1927, and drove the principal leaders to Nanking. Of those who remained at Hankow, the most influential, notably Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, the devoted widow of the founder of Chinese Nationalism, and Eugene Chen, the spectacular foreign minister, sought refuge in Russia, when the Communist advisers were dismissed in the summer of 1927, and the principal general, Tang Sheng-chi, was driven out in the autumn after he had attempted to seize the government for himself. The discouraged remnant who remained at their posts in the Wuhan cities were engaged in salvaging what they could from the wreckage. At the end of the year Wuhan, like Canton, maintained a discredited government in nominal submission to the leaders at Nanking. Like Canton, Wuhan bore its nominal submission uneasily and bided its time to recover its lost leadership.

In the southwest the three provinces of Szechuan, Kweichow, and Yunnan constitute a veritable empire by themselves, which, nominally Nationalist, was reduced at the time of my arrival in the Far East by long-continued disorder and violence to a condition little better than anarchy. The capital of the largest of the three, Szechuan, is located in about the same latitude as the capital of the state of Texas, and the province itself is not greatly inferior to Texas in area. The estimates of its population vary excessively, but according to the most moderate, their number is ten times that of the population of Texas. Compared with European countries, Szechuan has about the same area as France but more nearly approaches Germany in population. At the end of 1927 half a dozen generals contended for the mastery of the province and no one of them could subdue the others or establish law and order securely within his own domain. Szechuan was China itself in miniature, if a land of such magnitude may be so described.

Kweichow and Yunnan together have nearly the same area as Szechuan, but are greatly inferior to it in population. Embracing a region of rugged mountains and isolated plateaus, they bear a certain resemblance to the highlands and interior valleys of northern Mexico but contain a greater population than the whole of Mexico. In Kweichow a vigorous young general of obscure origin had recently seized the government and at the end of 1927 was maintaining his sway within his own domain, but in Yunnan the young Revolutionist who had dominated the scene for most of the time since the overthrow of the Manchus had recently been assassinated and the province was plunged in confusion and disorder.

3

THE QUESTION OF CHINESE POLITICAL CAPACITY

Such was the political condition of China towards the close of 1927. The five-bar flag of the First Republic still flew over Peking and also over the Chinese consulates and legations abroad; but Chang Tso-lin was plotting the transformation of his domain into a new Empire of the Northeast, while all hope of unifying the whole country under his authority had been abandoned by his subordinates. In the northwest and throughout the south the red flag of the Chinese Soviet Republic, with its white sun on a blue field in the upper inside quarter, was flying over all public buildings; but prudent persons were keeping the other flag carefully concealed whence it could be quickly produced for public display in case of a sudden change of masters. In Nanking the official leaders of Chinese Nationalism disputed over the problems of a government whose actual power fell far short of its pretensions, while at Canton, Hankow, and throughout the southwest the local authorities mended their own fences, rendering lip-service to a Nationalist movement which they were little disposed to assist in more substantial ways. While Sun Yat-sen's favorite disciples, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min, manoeuvered for position at Nanking, aided and abetted, or opposed and thwarted, as the case might be, by the lesser Nationalist politicians, the Nationalist generals laid their plans for the next campaign. Feng Yu-hsiang in his headquarters in Honan, Chiang Kai-shek in exile in Japan, lesser fighting men like Tang Sheng-chi and Cheng Chien in their respective lairs and places of refuge, considered how best to bring the Northern Campaign to a victorious conclusion or to exploit it for their private ends. Doubtless the "Three Principles of the People" and the other propaganda of Chinese Nationalism had captured the imagination of great numbers of the population, but governments everywhere still seemed to owe their existence to the support of successful generals. Everywhere militarism seemed still to prevail.

On the great map of China, hanging against the wall of the Revolutionary Museum in Moscow, the Lower South, the original seat of the Chinese Soviet Republic, was still splashed with red. It still stood out from the rest of the area we call China, like the territory of the Mongolian Soviet Republic, as one of the lands whose candidacy for admission into the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was officially approved. So the lands of central and western Turkestan might have looked before they were actually admitted to the Soviet Union, if the map had existed then. To be sure, the Communist insurrection in Canton had been suppressed. But would there be no more insurrections? No one could say. The Russian Borodin, the Hindu Roy, and the other apostles of the World Revolution had been driven out of China. But would they never return? The Kuomintang had been purged of Communists. But would there be no more converts?

And to what end was all this contention in China? To satisfy the greed for wealth and power of lawless politicians and generals? Many foreigners and not a few Chinese thought so. Or was it, as others believed, a determined but perhaps blind effort to unify China and make her strong and prosperous?

If China were to assume the rank among the Powers of the world which patriotic Chinese might deem compatible with her area, population, wealth, traditional culture, and place in history, there was much to be done. A patriotic Chinese could not be unmindful of the past of his country. It had been a great Power before any of the western Great Powers had existed. The Chinese Empire was organized more than two thousand years ago. When the warring states of China were first welded into a single political entity, Rome was contending with Carthage for the supremacy of the Mediterranean world, and when Rome at last became the World Power of the West, China had long been the World Power of the Far East. Rome in her greatest days dominated no greater area, held sway over no greater population, than the contemporary Empire of the Sons of Han. The Roman Empire has long since passed away, but the Chinese Empire survived until our own time. The leadership of the western world is now contested by a number of so-called World Powers. But for long periods in the past China was a World Power in a better sense of the term, because it was the only Power in the Far Eastern world.

The old Chinese name for their Empire, Chung Hua, was usually translated, "Middle Flowery State," or simply "The Middle Kingdom." But to a Chinese the words meant something quite different from what they mean to the casual western reader. A more accurate, though less literal, rendering of their original meaning would have been "The Foremost Civilized State." That version expresses also the opinion of the Chinese Empire which was once universally held by the Chinese themselves. That is the opinion which was accepted by the other peoples of the Far East. That is the opinion which patriotic Chinese cannot now forget. They called their First Republic, Chung Hua Min Kuo, "Middle Flowery People's State" or "Foremost Civilized Commonwealth." It is an expression to be reckoned with. But it represents an aspiration, not a fact. When I left China in July, 1928, much progress had apparently been made towards the unification of the country. The northern militarists had been expelled from Peking and driven beyond the Great Wall. But would the Nationalists keep the peace among themselves? No one could say.

The perennial questions were on all lips. Can the Chinese put an end to the disorder and violence which has raged with increasing destructiveness since the collapse of the old empire? Or must their dissensions continue until their body politic is paralyzed by anarchy? More precisely, can the Chinese Nationalists achieve what Yuan Shih-kai and the lesser militarists who followed him failed to accomplish, the unification of China on a basis conducive to strength and prosperity? Or will all their propaganda and fighting end in nothing but greater misery and despair? In short, are the Chinese capable of building a modern state and governing themselves so as to secure both order and progress? And if so, how should they go about it? That is the problem of China. It is a problem of supreme importance to foreigners as well as to Chinese, because, if the Chinese fail to solve the problem, foreigners will try to solve it for them, and it is more than possible that such an attempt would involve the foreign Powers in a greater welter of confusion and disorder among themselves than that which they sought to terminate in China. The problem of China is no mere domestic problem of the Chinese. It is an international problem affecting the peace of the world.

II

THE SCHOLASTIC EMPIRE

1. PREREQUISITES OF THE REGENERATION OF CHINA

Are the Chinese capable of building a modern state and maintaining a government which shall meet the needs of modern times? In other words, are they capable of self-government in the western sense of the term? This is a question which immediately suggests another: How shall it be known whether any people is capable of self-government?

Considering the importance of the latter question, it is surprising how little effort has been made to answer it. The American Government has promised to terminate its tutelage of the Filipinos, when they are fit for self-government. British policy in Egypt and India since the World War seems to imply a disposition to treat their dependents likewise. A similar policy was also adopted by the League of Nations with respect to the government of the territories formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire and now under the tutelage of Great Britain and France. But no adequate test of fitness has been provided.

The Covenant of the League suggests a partial test when it states that the former Turkish territories "are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world," and that administrative advice and assistance must be rendered by a mandatory "until such time as they are able to stand alone." But what is meant by the expressions "able to stand by themselves" or "alone"? It might be supposed, perhaps, that this refers to their capacity for maintaining their national independence, and that the qualification "under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" refers to a world threatened by lawless violence. In other words, the peoples of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq will not be fit for self-government until they are able to defend themselves against violent aggression by bellicose neighbors or covetous World Powers. But surely the ability to repel armed attacks by foreign foes is a peculiar test of a people's capacity for self-government. By that test the Belgians, Dutch, Scandinavians, and Swiss, and other peoples exposed to attack by more powerful neighbors, must be pronounced unfit for self-government. Such a test may be satisfactory to the Great Powers, but it will not be accepted by other states except under pressure of superior force. Doubtless it may be replied that the League intends to shorten the time until the weaker peoples can safely stand alone in this sense of the term by providing for general disarmament and the pacific settlement of international disputes. Meanwhile, however, the inability of some nations to stand alone under the existing conditions would be evidence of the unfitness of those Powers which make the modern world unsafe for weaker peoples rather than of that of the unhappy peoples who are the victims of international disorder and violence. In short, this interpretation of the League test of fitness for self-government is clearly untenable and must be rejected. Doubtless the provisions of the Covenant concerning peoples under the tutelage of a mandatory have reference to their domestic condition rather than to their foreign relations; but in that case do they mean anything more than that, to be fit for self-government, a people must be fit for self-government?

Less inadequate tests of fitness have been laid down by committees of the League Assembly, which have deliberated over applications for admission to the League. To be sure, a people might be capable of self-government, although their state might not be deemed qualified for admission to the League. The instance of India shows, too, that a state may be admitted to the League, though not fully self-governing. But in general the members of the League must be deemed capable of governing themselves, that is, of standing "by themselves . . . alone." The conditions prescribed for admission to the League, therefore, should throw some light on the question of fitness for self-government.

In passing upon applications from certain bodies of people in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan the committee reported that states should have definite boundaries, stable governments, and a firm purpose to fulfill their international obligations. Doubtless these tests will not be construed too strictly. A liberal interpretation is necessary to justify the inclusion within the League of certain states, which need not be named, long involved in bitter disputes over boundaries, of others whose governments have been violently, and in some cases repeatedly, overthrown in recent years, and still others which have repudiated their debts or paid them in depreciated currency. Nevertheless, there must at least be ground for the belief that boundaries can be fixed without resort to open war, that governments will not be overthrown too often or with excessive violence, and that obligations towards other states will not be held so lightly as to strain too far the bonds of international fellowship. But such tests involve the determination of no ordinary matters of fact, but rather of fine points concerning the degree to which certain ideas have developed, the extent to which certain purposes have acquired strength and durability. Thus the question whether a people be fit for self-government is not to be answered by any objective inquiry, but becomes a matter of opinion. It becomes necessary to consider whose opinion is to prevail, that of the people whose fitness is to be determined, or that of their neighbors and others who will have dealings with them. And if all opinions are to be consulted, what weight is to be assigned to each? The proceedings of the League furnish no sufficient answer to these questions.

The cases of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan illustrate further difficulties in determining fitness for self-government. The League of Nations doubted the capacity of their peoples to stand alone and refused them admission. But they were not satisfied with this decision. Under new leadership they sought admission into the Soviet Union and were accepted. Within that Union they maintain their position as states. Are they now fit for self-government? Their boundaries are settled. Their governments have stood more firmly than those of not a few members of the League. But they do not recognize the sanctity of private property after the fashion of capitalistic states. Under their socialistic régime the rights of property owners are much more circumscribed and precarious. The government of the Union to which they belong denies its liability for the debts of the imperial and republican governments which preceded it and maintains possession of factories, mines, oil wells, and other properties taken from former owners in foreign countries without compensation. Are peoples which seek to profit by such disregard of international obligations fit for self-government?

Does ability to stand alone imply a decent respect for the opinion of other portions of mankind? If so, what is decent respect? Or may peoples who are strong enough to defy the opinion of others conduct their affairs upon such principles as they choose without forfeiting their title to statehood? And must peoples who are not strong enough to maintain their independence by force accommodate their policies to the interests of more powerful states on pain of being pronounced unfit for self-government?

Practical statesmen do not answer such questions, if they can avoid them, but evasion is not always possible. In his report to President Coolidge denying the present fitness of the Filipinos for self-government, Mr. Carmi A. Thompson put first the lack of the financial resources necessary for maintaining an army and navy,[1] and President Coolidge seemed to make this view his own when he subsequently vetoed the bill of the Philippine legislature, authorizing a popular referendum on the question of independence. He did not attempt to lay down a complete formula for determining their fitness. But he did insist that they were too weak to defend themselves in an imperialistic world and that they could not furnish convincing evidence of their disposition and capacity to protect foreign investments within their terri-

[1] Senate Document No. 180, 69th Congress, 2d Session (Dec. 22, 1926), p. 3.

torial limits. Are these the tests to be applied to the Chinese? Must they prove that they are strong enough to defend themselves against any possible enemy? Must they demonstrate a due solicitude for the interests of foreign capitalists and missionaries? Practical statesmen may perhaps agree that these tests of fitness will serve well enough in the absence of any better. But the political philosopher cannot be so easily satisfied.

The foundations of the modern constitutional state consist of the purposes of the people who compose it. To establish justice, to insure domestic tranquillity, to provide for the common defence, to promote the general welfare, and to secure the blessings of liberty: these are the purposes by which the modern constitutional state is sustained. The fitness of a people for the management of such a state depends, therefore, fundamentally upon the extent to which they are animated by these purposes. If the state-sustaining purposes are widely spread among the people of a state and firmly held by them, their fitness for self-government is certain. If they are not widely spread nor firmly held, the fitness of the people is doubtful. But the difference between the fit and the unfit is marked by no clear line. On the contrary, fitness merges unto unfitness so gradually as to leave the distinction imperceptible. No line can be drawn between the two except one that is purely arbitrary. If the line is drawn by statesmen, they are likely to be unduly influenced, whoever they may be, by the interests of their own state or of persons belonging to it. The leaders of any people will overestimate their own qualifications for government; they will underestimate those of others.

The political philosopher will always suspect that each people, while less competent in affairs of state than their own spokesmen claim, is more competent than the spokesmen of other peoples concede. In the case of the Chinese, therefore, he will not be content that the question of their fitness be settled exclusively by the opinions of foreigners, whether statesmen or business men or missionaries. He will insist that some consideration be paid to the opinions of the Chinese themselves. But some foreigners wish to rule out the opinions of the Chinese themselves on the ground, putting it baldly, that they are unfit not only to govern themselves, but also to form opinions concerning their fitness for self-government.

Among foreigners of this way of thinking, an excellent specimen of a numerous class is the learned author of *La Civilisation chinoise moderne*, Dr. A. F. Legendre.[1] The Chinese, he believes, after long residence among them and some study of Asiatic ethnology, are a mixture of Aryans and Negroids. Their racial composition, therefore, in his opinion, makes them incapable of organizing a modern state and governing themselves in accordance with the precepts of modern science. That being so, he concluded, it should be the task of the white race to establish law and order in China and to undertake all public services as it had already undertaken to collect the customs and operate the post office.

Before accepting this condemnation of the Chinese to perpetual servitude, one would like to put some questions to Dr. Legendre. Why does he confine the task of governing the Chinese exclusively to the white race? There are their neighbors, the Japanese, who surely have sufficiently demonstrated their ability to stand alone under the strenuous conditions of the modern world. Evidently on Dr. Legendre's principles the Japanese cannot be a mixture of Aryans and Negroids. Why should not they also have a share of the white man's burden? Indeed, why should they not undertake the task alone, as the Manchus and Mongols have done before them? Doubtless the Manchus and Mongols are disqualified from repeating their performance by their ignorance of the white man's ways, but the Japanese would not labor under any such disqualification. Dr. Legendre's conclusions do not follow from his own premises.

A more subtle form of the racial argument is presented by a more ingenious and plausible writer, Mr. Rodney Gilbert. Mr. Gilbert, like Dr. Legendre, knows the Chinese well from long residence among them, and is equally convinced of their incapacity to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world. In his book, *What's Wrong with China?*[1] he explains the grounds for his lack of confidence in the political capacity of the Chinese with an impressive display of illustrative detail. "The Chinese mind," he declares at the outset, "is the child's mind — the mind of a precocious child at its best and worst."[2] Most of China's ills, he thinks, have grown out of her own and our failure to appreciate this fact. "If China's ills are to be laid at our door, as her propagandists say, it is because we have failed to realize that we are dealing with children, because we have treated the individual Chinese as an adult and the nation as a grown-up."[3] Logically enough upon such premises, he draws his conclusions concerning the policy which the Powers should adopt towards China. "The lesson to be drawn from these facts, as we see them, is that, if we hope to continue to trade in Asia (a hope upon which the immediate well-being of Great Britain and probably the future of America depends) we must sooner or later revolt against the spirit of charity towards China, which is interpreted as weakness and acknowledged with contempt, instead of thanks, and reimpose discipline by force, or a show of force, as any sane master would in a disorganized and demoralized school."[4]

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[1] Paris, 1926, p. 299.

So, in the opinion of this writer, the problem of China is a part of the general problem of the revolt of modern youth, but, as the Chinese are youths who will never grow up, the problem cannot be solved except by their perpetual tutelage. Thus Mr. Gilbert's first conclusion is much like Dr. Legendre's. The Chinese are disqualified for self-government by their race. But at this point the two writers part company. It is necessary next to know what is the race that is called to be the schoolmaster of the Chinese. Dr. Legendre is a devotee of an earlier ethnological sect than that to which Mr. Gilbert belongs. The former puts his faith in the Aryans; though just why he reserves the burden of tutelage to the white race alone and excludes the Brahmins of India from any share therein he does not make clear. Mr. Gilbert is more discriminating, and would not trust the burden to all the members of the white race. It is the Nordics alone in whom he places his full confidence. Like Dr. Legendre, he has little faith in the Japanese, but, unlike Dr. Legendre, this lack of confidence extends also to the Russians and Italians, who, despite their Lenins and Mussolinis, fail to qualify in his opinion as vigorous rulers, capable of ministering to the needs of inferior races.

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[1] London, 1926, p. 315.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 308.

This view of the juvenile character of the Chinese, if it could be accepted, would greatly simplify the problem of China. Unfortunately, long residence in China and intimate acquaintance with its inhabitants produce a directly contrary impression upon many observers no less competent than Mr. Gilbert. For instance, there is Mr. Charles W. Campbell, formerly Chinese Secretary of the British Legation in Peking. In his report on China, prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office for the use of the British delegation to the Peace Conference at Versailles, he expressed his opinion of the Chinese people. "The Chinese," he wrote, "are a sober industrious race, highly endowed with judgment, good sense and tenacity." Not exactly the characteristics of children, one might think. "Though comprising many types, they are markedly homogeneous, owing to centuries of uniform mental cultivation. The ideals of their intellectual life are not inferior to those of the Western World; and their religion — ancestor-worship — tends to bind society together. They are amenable in intercourse; moderation is a virtue with them; and they are accustomed to conduct their own private and local affairs with tact and consideration. By education and temperament they are markedly pacific."[1]

Such a view leads to precisely the contrary conclusion to that of Mr. Gilbert. The Chinese, Mr. Campbell advises his superiors in the British Foreign Office, "possess the qualities and attributes which entitle a people to an independent existence, and if they are not rapidly inoculated with militarism there is no inherent reason why other nations should fear them or exercise a preventive domination." Emphasizing these conclusions, Mr. Campbell continues: "The Chinese have always demanded moral qualities in their leaders; and it is reasonably certain that if left to themselves, they would in a short time show their customary good sense by placing suitable men of their own race in power."[1]

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[1] British Foreign Office Handbooks (London, 1920), vol. XII, no. 67, p. 132.

It is evidently not possible to settle the problem of China by arguments based upon the supposed racial traits and tendencies of the Chinese. When Dr. Legendre and Mr. Gilbert wrote, they had the views of Mr. Campbell and many other experienced and responsible observers before them, but were not restrained from writing down the Chinese as children or even as a kind of Far Eastern mulatto. Nor do the views of such writers seem to have any effect on those who hold the contrary opinion. Despite such writings as those of Dr. Legendre and Mr. Gilbert, others like Mr. Campbell, who are contrary-minded, remain of the same opinion as before. One may well inquire what is the basis of a so-called science of ethnology which makes political capacity a function of race, and condemns all but the chosen race to perpetual servitude. What indeed is a race?

Explanations of Chinese politics in terms of race are no more unsatisfactory than similar explanations of the politics of other countries. Since the beginning of the romantic period in modern historiography a century or more ago, the different ethnological sects have offered their various ethnographical interpretations of history. The devotees of the Anglo-Saxon cult thought they had discovered something in the blood of the original inhabitants of the German forests, a sort of latent political capacity of superior quality, because of which Anglo-Saxon political institutions were destined to become the models for mankind. Likewise, they were prone to conclude, the descendants of the Anglo-Saxons would be justified in laying down the law to the inferior peoples. The Nordic cult took a broader view of the racial basis of politics and would have added the Scandinavians to the Anglo-Saxons and other Teutons to form the "great race." The Aryan cult was broader still, and included along with most of the European peoples the Persians and the Brahmins of India. But attempts to demonstrate the actual relationship between the favorite ethnic category and the assumed superior political capacity of its members have been unconvincing, and ethnographical interpretations of history have had little result beyond furnishing specious justifications for the aggressive policies of opportunistic statesmen and diplomats acting for the so-called Great Powers. The candid reader who surveys the literature of modern ethnography is bound to conclude that the proper racial classification of the peoples of modern states is itself a very dubious enterprise, to say nothing of demonstrating any definite relationship between racial character and political capacity. The cultural character of different peoples is certainly very different, but a people's cultural characteristics, unlike those which are strictly racial, are evidently not predetermined by their ancestors. A man cannot, we are told, by taking thought add a cubit to his stature, but he can add a great deal to his earning power and also to his proficiency in the art of politics.

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[1] British Foreign Office Handbooks (London, 1920), vol. XII, no. 67, p. 133.

If Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, Russians, Japanese, Americans, and others have in fact dictated more or less to the Chinese in modern times, may the explanation not be found in those attributes which they possess in common rather than in those with respect to which they differ? They differ in blood, but they resemble one another in the possession of certain branches of modern knowledge. Their superior knowledge undoubtedly gave them a great advantage over the former Manchu rulers of China and over the old mandarins who assisted the Manchus. That superiority explains much which it is needless to ascribe to the influence of race. But cannot the same knowledge be acquired by the Chinese? and if so, can they not obtain similar results by its use?

2

THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Before attempting to answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the traditional political system of the Chinese, to ascertain the causes of its decline and fall, and to consider what light Chinese political experience throws upon the present problem of China.

The opinions concerning the political institutions of the Chinese, which have prevailed in the Western world, have reflected the vicissitudes of China itself. In recent years the disorder and violence which preceded and followed the collapse of the Manchu Empire have discredited the traditional Chinese political system. Foreigners generally have been better acquainted with its obvious shortcomings and defects than with its merits, so much less apparent, and have emphasized the patent incapacity of both Manchus and mandarins to deal effectively with the novel problems of the modern world. Young China also, as long as the *ancien régime* frowned upon its aspirations and blocked its way, was prone to magnify its faults and belittle its good qualities, and in the first flush of anticipated triumph treated its memory with contumely and contempt. Now that the way is cleared for the reconstruction of China in the modern style, its new masters may be expected to search the ruins of the past in the hope of salvaging what may be serviceable in their present task. They will view the foundations of the old order with a more sympathetic, if no less critical eye, and will be less concerned with the causes of its final failure than with those of its previous great success. They will remember that the old political system secured sufficiently good government during the greater part of the two hundred sixty-eight years of Manchu rule, or, if one reckon from the establishment of the Empire in virtually its final form by the founder of the Ming Dynasty, during more than half a millennium. They will perceive more clearly than heretofore that such a political system, based upon principles more than two thousand years old, could not be without substantial merit despite its sorry end. Foreigners too will do well, in forming an opinion concerning the political capacity of the Chinese, to consider the causes of the long-continued success of the old political system.

When the Portuguese first established regular contact between China and the West, the Ming Emperors had sat upon the Dragon Throne for a century and a half and were destined to remain there for nearly as long a time to come. The early Portuguese traders and missionaries found the dynasty at the height of its power, and, though its vigor had begun to decline, its prestige endured unimpaired for many years. During the sixteenth century the Empire easily repelled the feeble assaults made upon it by the Portuguese and Spaniards, and with greater difficulty the far more powerful attack of the Japanese under Hideyoshi. Though Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea exposed the growing weakness of the Mings, the seizure of the Empire by the Manchus was accomplished without inpairing its prestige in the eyes of the western "Barbarians." Indeed the infusion of new vigor into the old political system rather enhanced its reputation in the western world.

Among foreigners in China under the Ming dynasty none observed its people and institutions with a more discerning intelligence than the Portuguese missionary, Alvarez Semedo. He, like most other occidentals in the Far East at that time, was profoundly impressed by the good features of Chinese civilization. In many respects he compared it favorably with that of Europe. In truth this was not then difficult to do. Western Europe had been torn asunder by the Protestant Reformation and was wasted by the religious wars. A multitude of sovereigns, grand and petty, with little respect for any law but that of self-preservation, struggled to aggrandize their kingdoms or estates while their peoples gave uncertain submission to their sway. Everywhere authority was challenged, and Machiavellian politics was the order of the day. But in China there seemed to be order and tranquillity. Commerce flourished; industry was sure of its reward; the art of living was highly cultivated. People of fashion wore fine silks, plain people soft cottons, instead of the rough woolens and linen of Europe. Beautiful porcelains replaced the coarse crockery of the West, while spirituous liquors and strong drink had largely given way to cheery tea. Cooking, too, was one of the fine arts, and people left their knives and other weapons behind when they came to table, but never ate with their fingers, preferring to use dainty sticks of wood or ivory. Father Semedo particularly admired the houses of the Chinese, which, he observed, were better decorated and more comfortable than the European. Most remarkable of all, by way of contrast with modern reports, the prisons also were more comfortable than in Europe. Such impressions predisposed the early voyagers to a favorable opinion of the political system under which these conditions prevailed, and Father Semedo examined its structure and operation with a lively interest. His great work on the Chinese, translated into French and published at Lyons in 1667, contains a remarkable chapter on Ming Imperial politics, entitled "Certain Practices which make the Government of China easier and more satisfactory."

The first of these practices was the payment of fixed salaries to public officers. This seemed to Father Semedo a great improvement over the practice which he had known in Europe which treats public offices as personal property to be bought and sold at the pleasure of the office-seeker and office-holder and pays for the services rendered with the fees and other official receipts. The latter practice too often reduced the public business to the same level as private traffic and enabled the official to charge for his services what the traffic would bear. Under the Chinese practice public and private accounts were kept separate and the distinction was clearly preserved between extortion and bribery, on the one hand, and the payment of public officers for the performance of their official duties, on the other. To this end also it was the practice to provide public buildings for public officers and to conduct public business in public. Personal servants were excluded from public offices, while official employees were required to remain at their posts during office hours. All these practices, in the opinion of the judicious Portuguese Father, afforded a remarkable contrast to those which he had observed in the West.

Remarkable also was the practice according to which public officers remained only three years at a time in the same post, and in general the "marvelous subordination" of the various ranks of officers. Throughout the period of service there was the careful watchfulness of the censors to check the dishonest or negligent officer and at the end of each appointment there was a thorough review of the service-record by the supervisory officers in Peking. There was opportunity, too, for the higher officers in the provinces to memorialize the Emperor directly and secure a hearing for grievances unredressed by the regular processes of administration. All ranks of officers behaved towards one another with due respect, and it seemed to Father Semedo that the universal observance of good manners contributed greatly to the smooth working of the administrative machine. Indeed the importance attached by the Chinese to personal courtesy and official etiquette has always arrested the attention of foreign observers. The proper performance of official ceremonies and rites was an integral part of the due process of administration and highly esteemed by the people among the services of the state. The Imperial rites at the Altars of Heaven and of Earth, the provincial celebrations conducted by the governors-general and governors, the devotional services in the administrative districts by the local officials, all played their part in maintaining the morale of the people and the prosperity of the Empire.

Certain minor practices were also noteworthy. In cities and towns warders were appointed in each street to watch over the inhabitants; the gates were kept closed at night; the inhabitants did not carry weapons and fought, if at all, only with their fists; prostitutes were not permitted inside the walls; and foreigners were in general excluded from the country altogether. These practices made for better order in Chinese cities and towns than

Father Semedo had known in Europe. The exclusion of foreigners was a practice which he especially commended. It kept at a distance strangers who through ignorance or perversity were likely to disturb the peace of the Empire. Others who had something of value to offer, like the Jesuit missionaries with their knowledge of mathematics and astronomy and the Portuguese traders with their spices and other tropical wares, were admitted under special conditions as long as they observed the customs of the country and gave no trouble to the authorities. Any tendency towards unruliness was promptly suppressed. The Portuguese at Ningpo were massacred, when their mode of life outraged the Chinese sense of decency, and their traders and adventurers were eventually confined to the promontory at Macao. The Jesuits and other Catholic missionaries were more discreet, and, in Father Semedo's time, were gradually winning the confidence of the rulers of the country. They, like the embassies from tributary states, were received with dignity by the authorities, and in return showed a proper respect for the law of the land.

The general respect for the laws on the part of the people was the last and most important of the practices which Father Semedo noted in his list of those which made the government of China easier and more satisfactory than that of other countries. Under the Confucian code of morals there was no clear distinction between politics and ethics. To be a good subject of the Emperor was merely one of the attributes of a good man. The five classical virtues made for law and order in the state as well as in the home. The dutiful Chinese supported the authority of the Son of Heaven on the Dragon Throne in the same spirit as he supported that of the patriarch in the family hall. From infancy he was taught to respect parents, teachers, rulers, and all elders. It was this general respect for persons of superior rank, as prescribed by the Confucian code, which gave substance to the reign of law and constituted in effect what modern occidentals would call a government of men. But it was a government of men in accordance with a recognized moral law. At least such was the design of the

Chinese scheme of government, and in Father Semedo's time the design was executed with a degree of fidelity that evoked not merely his admiration, but also that of most other candid and intelligent observers from the West.

The spirit of the laws is illustrated best by the selection of public officers. The official hierarchy was divided into two parts, the supervisory officers at the capital of the Empire and the officers actually in charge of governmental operations in the provinces.

Under the Ming dynasty the principal supervisory officers were the Grand Secretaries and the members of the Six Great Boards — the Board of Civil Officers, the Treasury Board, the Board of Rites and Ceremonies, the War Board, the Board of Criminal Justice, and the Board of Public Works. These were the boards sometimes called in the picturesque classical language the Boards of Heaven, Earth, Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter. Under the Manchus a special superior Council of War gradually developed into a Grand Council, which eventually overshadowed the Grand Secretariat, and towards the end of the dynasty a special council for foreign affairs, the Tsungli Yamen, was created to deal with the western "Barbarians." But there was no one supreme council of ministers or cabinet as in western countries and no prime minister. Neither was there any clear distinction between legislative, executive, and judicial powers. There were however, certain extraordinary supervisory officers, who played a specially noteworthy part in the general scheme of government, namely, the Imperial historiographers and censors. There were also numerous officers at the seat of the Imperial Government with special administrative duties relating to the Imperial Court or the local government of the capital. With the exception of these last, the officers at Peking were supervisors of administration and were not personally responsible for the ordinary operations of government.

The actual administration of public affairs was entrusted to the officers in the provinces. Under the Mings the home-lands of the

Chinese had been divided into fifteen provinces; under the Manchus the number of provinces was increased to eighteen. At the head of the provincial governments were the governors-general and governors, eight of whom under the Manchus were of the former description and ten of the latter. Each governor-general not only administered a province of his own but also in most cases had a hand in the administration of one or more of the neighboring provinces. Though nominally responsible to the Emperor and actually held more or less strictly accountable by the supervisory officers at the Imperial capital, they were necessarily entrusted with a wide discretionary authority. The provincial capitals were so far distant from Peking and communication was so slow that it was not feasible to centralize the government in the Imperial Court. In emergencies of all kinds the governors-general were expected to act upon their own judgment without awaiting instructions from the Son of Heaven. If their measures were successful, they would obtain in due course the approval of the Throne; otherwise, they expiated their failure by submission to disgrace. Under these circumstances the governors-general whose capitals were situated in such important centers as Nanking, Hangchow, Canton, and Wuchang were outstanding figures in the Chinese political system, and the governor-general of Chihli province, in which Peking was situated, was generally the most powerful figure of them all.

The real position of the governors-general, or viceroys as they were usually called by Westerners, was long misunderstood by the statesmen of the occidental Powers. Until the opium wars their representatives were not permitted to negotiate directly with Peking but were forced to deal with the governors-general at the provincial capitals, and as late as the Sino-Japanese War the conduct of hostilities with foreign Powers was still a provincial rather than an Imperial affair. It was Li Hung-chang and the provincial forces under his command whom the Japanese defeated, not the Chinese Empire, though the Empire as a whole suffered the loss of prestige which the defeat entailed. But the governors-general continued to maintain their traditional place in the Imperial political system. In 1898 several of the more progressive governors-general successfully intervened to save the young Emperor, Kwang-hsi, from the vindictiveness of the Empress Dowager and her reactionary followers, who were suspected of an intention to put him to death along with the unhappy reformers whom they had overthrown. Two years later the governors-general of central and southern China protected the foreigners in their provinces against the fury of the Boxers in direct opposition to the wishes of the Imperial Court, and some of them even sent messages to the foreign diplomats, in order to manifest their disapproval of the Court's policy. The authority of the governors-general was in fact so great that the provinces under their direction cannot properly be compared with the provinces of either the feudal or the centralized monarchies which formerly flourished in Europe. The term is a misleading translation of the Chinese expression which designated the principal political areas in the Celestial Empire. A better, though by no means exact, comparison would be one with the member-states of some novel kind of federal union. The fact is, that the Imperial Chinese political system was unique and there has been nothing like it in the West.

The ordinary provincial governors were considerable figures also in the organization of the Empire, though somewhat overshadowed by the governors-general. The relations between the governors and the governors-general were not clearly defined and were not infrequently strained, but the division of power between them checked the authority of each and rendered the provincial governments as a whole more easily manageable by the supervisory officers at the capital of the Empire. They were assisted by certain other high provincial authorities, notably, the superintendents of the salt and grain trades, the treasurer, the judge, and the director of public instruction. For the more convenient conduct of affairs in areas as large and populous as the Eighteen Provinces there was a series of subordinate administrative divisions. Each province was first divided into several circuits, of which there were usually four or five in a province, under an officer called in Chinese the "tao-tai." Each circuit was further divided into several smaller administrative areas, of which there were usually three or four in a circuit, under a corresponding administrative officer; and finally these areas in turn were divided into local administrative districts, of which there were usually five or six in an area, under a district magistrate. The total number of these districts in the Eighteen Provinces at the end of the Empire was about fifteen hundred. Some of them had more than a million inhabitants, others less than a hundred thousand. The average population was probably above a quarter of a million, that is, about as great as the average congressional district in the United States.

The local district, generally called a "hsien," was the administrative unit of the Empire and the district magistrate, often called by the Chinese the "father and mother officer," was the member of the hierarchy immediately in touch with the people. He represented the Imperial Government in all its relations with the inhabitants of his district, serving as chief of police, public prosecutor, judge, jailer, tax-collector, superintendent of schools and of public works, minister of the official cult, and general factotum. He was a mandarin of the seventh class, and, since he could not discharge all his multifarious duties in person, several eighth- and ninth-class mandarins were generally assigned to assist him. In addition he might employ as many clerks, messengers, constables, tax-gatherers, and so forth, as were necessary, but these employees formed no part of the official hierarchy. The business of his office was divided into six parts, corresponding to the division of business at the Imperial capital between the Six Boards, and his staff was generally organized into a corresponding number of bureaus, all housed together in the official yamen.

The district magistrate's yamen was always located in a walled city, whence he ruled over the peasantry in the surrounding country through the aldermen and selectmen of the villages. He ruled over the urban population through the wardens of the sections into which the cities were divided for protection against fire and disorder and through the grand masters of the guilds in which the inhabitants were organized for the regulation of trade and industry. Grand masters, wardens, selectmen, and aldermen in turn dealt with the heads of families, the patriarchs, whose word within the family, in accordance with time-honored tradition, was law. In the country, indeed, where between eighty and ninety per cent of the population lived, the patriarchs were commonly members of the village boards of aldermen, and local government was as democratic as was possible under the Chinese family-system. In the towns authority was more highly organized, but the system of merchant and craft guilds, as in the West during the later Middle Ages, furnished a solid basis for vigorous municipal home rule. The man without a family, and in the towns also the man without a trade or craft, was a man without a country. He was practically an outlaw, unless he found a place for himself somewhere as a servant or a soldier.

Thus the organization of the home was the foundation of law and order in the Empire. If the Emperor and the official hierarchy were the rulers of China, they were rulers whose management of affairs depended upon the collaboration of the patriarchs. The patriarchal family, and the social and economic institutions built upon it, had their own laws and customs, their own established authorities, and their own corporate spirit. With such a large measure of local self-government in town and village the official hierarchy needed to intervene only for the protection of the general interests of the province and the Empire. Vigorous and intelligent "father and mother officers" might accomplish more than this, but not without the unconstrained coöperation of the local authorities. Backed by the prestige of the Son of Heaven, in whose name they acted, they exerted an authority that was moral as much as political in its nature. They achieved results that reflected the strength of their own personalities as much as the force of law. It was a government of men, by which honest and capable men could render great services, while immeasurable harm could be wrought by the incompetent and corrupt.

The active members of the official hierarchy, exclusive of military officers, were remarkably few for so vast an empire. In the middle of the nineteenth century the total number of mandarins under the Board of Civil Officers was less than ten thousand.[1] Of these nearly a third were education officers, concerned with the training of future mandarins and the administration of the elaborate system of examinations upon which the recruitment of the hierarchy depended. Less than two thousand were described as principal administrative officers, being mainly the members of the supervisory boards in Peking and the high provincial authorities and heads of administrative areas down to the district magistrates. The latter formed about two thirds of the whole number.

According to the traditional scheme of government as perfected under the Ming dynasty, these officers were carefully trained for the business of government and selected by competitive examination on the ground of merit and fitness. It was the nature of that examination system which gave its special character to the Chinese Imperial Government. Candidates for public office had to qualify themselves by long study of the classics and of history. They mastered the moral code taught by Confucius and his disciples. They memorized the rites and ceremonies which went so far to give substance to the moral constitution of the Empire. They searched the dynastic records to learn the art of government. When the system was honestly administered there were none but scholars in politics, and, such was the character of the Chinese classical learning, one could not become a scholar without also becoming a philosopher. Though philosophers were not to become kings, as in Plato's ideal state, the Celestial Empire, as the Chinese liked to call it, was, in principle at least, a scholastic empire.

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[1] See G. Pauthier, *La Chine moderne* (Paris, 1853), p. 151.

This system of recruiting the personnel of the official hierarchy not only determined the character of the government, but also profoundly influenced the nature of the state itself. The attraction of an official career was so great at the height of the Empire that the number of students who took the examinations far exceeded the number of vacancies in the hierarchy. For every certified candidate for office there were hundreds of approved scholars. Among so many aspirants it need not be supposed that the best were invariably chosen by the examiners. It was enough that the unfit were eliminated and that the survivors were men of superior mental vigor and sound habits of work. Such a system made for political stability. Though only a fortunate few could hold office, the whole class of educated men were imbued with the scholastic spirit, which was the spirit of the Imperial Government. Since any family, however humble, might furnish a candidate for an official career, the masses of the population were as interested in the maintenance of the system as the learned class itself. Ambitious men who failed to gain admittance to the official hierarchy found it difficult to show that it was the system and not themselves that was at fault, and one great cause of discontent and disorder in undemocratic countries was stopped at the source. Respect for authority, when the authority of the mandarins was in fact respectable, was confounded with respect for knowledge and wisdom. In principle the scholastic empire was not only a body politic, but also, so to speak, a body moral.

The moral nature of the scholastic empire appeared most clearly in the character of the Imperial office. The old Chinese Empire is sometimes described as a paternalistic institution, but the relationship between Emperor and subject under the traditional code was not at all like that between father and son. The patriarchal family was an absolute monarchy. The authority of the father over the son was not limited by any law other than that of nature itself. The Chinese classics furnished no sanction for violent resistance by a son to a father or for any ordinary form of disobedience to his will. Sons sorely vexed by aged and infirm and perhaps senile fathers might pray that Heaven would intervene and give them relief; but they might never rebel. Rebellion, on the other hand, was the recognized right of oppressed subjects. No emperor had any claim upon the loyalty of his people except that conferred by the mandate of Heaven, and what Heaven had bestowed it might withdraw at discretion. According to the classical political theory, Heaven would withdraw its mandate from an emperor who proved unworthy of his high office. Successful rebellion was merely the evidence that the Heavenly mandate had been withdrawn. The Son of Heaven was no absolute monarch, but a chief magistrate whose duties were punctiliously prescribed by long-established custom, whose powers were carefully defined by the moral law.

The right of rebellion against the Son of Heaven was not the same as the right of revolution, claimed so generally by the peoples of modern states in the West. It gave authority to change the supreme ruler of the Empire by force and violence, if necessary, but not to change the form of the Empire itself. According to the classical code, indeed, there was a duty of rebellion, if the Son of Heaven proved unfilial, that is, if he abused his trust by oppressing his subjects, and Heaven itself would sanctify the rebels by transferring its mandate to their leader in case of success. The Chinese classics are full of precedents for the performance of this duty and of encouragement for those who would undertake it.[1] Confucius himself had said that "if the people have no faith in their ruler, there is no standing for the state." Since the maxim that "man is by nature good" was the foundation of the moral code, it followed that, if the people lost faith in their ruler, the fault lay with the ruler and not with the people. By the same logic the remedy was for the people to apply. Mencius was even more emphatic in his assertion that government, although it derives its authority from Heaven, must satisfy the people and look for its existence to their consent. "Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as my people hear." Accordingly Mencius insists upon the right of the people to be well governed and asserts that "he who restrains his Prince loves his Prince." He was as literal an interpreter of the maxim, *Vox populi vox Dei*, as the most ardent democrat in the modern West.

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[1] E. D. Thomas, *Chinese Political Thought*, chaps. 10, 11. See also W. S. A. Potts, *Chinese Political Philosophy*, Pt. II, chap. 3.

The institutions of the Empire gave practical force to these maxims and served to reconcile the theory of Imperial autocracy with the practice of limited monarchy. The selection of public officers by competitive examination and promotion on the basis of service-records limited the power of the Emperor by restricting his control of the patronage. The appointment of censors to supervise the supervisory officers at the capital as well as the regular administrative officers in the provinces imposed further limitations in practice upon the Imperial power. "When I am wrong," one of the model emperors is reported by Confucius as saying, "it is yours to correct me; do not approve me to my face, and when you have withdrawn take up a different tone." The influence of the censors was reënforced by that of the official historiographers, whose duty it was to record without fear or favor the sayings and doings of the emperors. The Son of Heaven was supposed to be ever mindful of the probable verdict of the historiographers upon his conduct, as well as to lend a ready ear to the words of his censors. Chinese history naturally gives a high place to the faithful censors and historiographers who put their lives in jeopardy rather than give false reports to their sovereign or leave false records to posterity. Thus the business of the Emperor was not to enforce his arbitrary will but rather to set a conspicuous public example of right conduct and obedience to law. In the minds of his people he was not merely the mighty lord on the Dragon Throne but also the humble suppliant at the Altar of Heaven.

Such in brief was the traditional political system of the Chinese. Fundamentally it was a system of personal relationships. The relationship between Emperor and subject was one of the five great relationships which all Chinese were taught to respect.

Instead of a written constitution there were the ancient rules of propriety. Like father and son, husband and wife, brother and brother, and friend and friend, the Emperor and his subjects knew their respective rights and duties. The position of the mandarins was more complex. Towards the Son of Heaven they had to behave like subjects. Towards the people they stood in the place of the Emperor. They were not constitutional authorities in the western sense of the term. Yet they were bound by the spirit of the laws.

What this spirit was has been well expressed by one of the early British consular officers, Thomas Taylor Meadows, who wrote a remarkable book on Chinese politics at the time of the Tai Ping rebellion in the middle of the nineteenth century.[1] Meadows was discussing the causes of the long duration of the Chinese Empire. He rejected the notion that the patriarchal family-system was an important cause of the stability of the state. Doubtless the family-system, like the system of land tenure and of cultivating the soil, was a leading factor in the stabilization of Chinese society, but the real causes of the unequalled duration of the Chinese people as one and the same nation were, he believed, of a different kind. "They consist of *three doctrines*, together with an *institution*, by means of which the efficient performance of the work prescribed by two of these doctrines is attained, and by which a living practical belief in all three is maintained in the mind of the nation. The doctrines are:

1. That the nation must be governed by moral agency in preference to physical force.

2. That the services of the wisest and ablest men in the nation are indispensable to its good government.

3. That the people have the right to depose a sovereign who, either from active wickedness or vicious indolence, gives cause to oppressive and tyrannical rule.

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[1] T. T. Meadows, *The Chinese and their Rebellions* (London, 1856), pp. 401–402.

The institution is:

The system of public service competitive examinations." Thus also Meadows explained the apparent paradox that "of all nations that have attained a certain degree of civilization the Chinese are the least *revolutionary* and the most *rebellious*."[1] To these three doctrines and one institution there should perhaps be added one other institution, the censorate, to fill out the form of the unwritten constitution of Imperial China.

3

IMPERIAL CHINA AS A WORLD POWER

Imperial China, however, was something more than the Eighteen Provinces inhabited by the Chinese. It embraced the whole of the Far East with the exception of the islands of Japan and the Philippines. But not all parts of the Empire enjoyed the same status under the Imperial political system. Some of the peoples who yielded to the spell of the Chinese culture adopted the principles and imitated the institutions of the Chinese. Foremost among these were the Koreans and the Annamese. Their emperors too erected temples of Confucius at their capitals and governed through the agency of scholars. They conducted triennial examinations to recruit the official hierarchy, appointed historiographers to transmit the materials for a science of politics to their successors, and listened to the still, small voice of conscience out of the mouths of their censors. At intervals they sent tribute in the prescribed manner to the Dragon Throne and even at times acknowledged a right of investiture on the part of the Son of Heaven. Besides these vassal states others, notably Siam and Burma, sent tribute from time to time to the Emperor of China and were duly enrolled in the list of tributary states. But though they respected the supremacy of the Emperor, they did not set up the institutions of the scholastic empire. In the eyes of the

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Chinese the rulers of these states held the same rank as the governors-general or governors of the Eighteen Provinces. In the eyes of their own peoples they occupied an honorable but not an independent place in the political system of the Far East.

The Japanese maintained their independence of the Far Eastern political system. The Tokugawa Shoguns did indeed endeavor to curb the turbulence of the Daimyos by building a Confucian temple at Tokyo and encouraging the study of the Chinese classics. But the temple fell into neglect and the classical studies produced no such political effects as at Seoul, Hanoi, and Hue. Ruder peoples, like the Manchus, the Mongols, and the Tibetans, also at times maintained their independence of the Empire and the first two on occasion even seized it for themselves. But neither the Mongols nor the Manchus could govern the Empire except upon the principles and by means of the institutions of the Chinese. In practice the Chinese were often involved in difficulties with these outer "Barbarians" and had to submit at times to their sway; but in principle their political system, like that of imperial Rome, was a universal empire.

Like the Roman Empire also, the Chinese was based upon an entirely different order of ideas from that underlying the political system of the modern West. According to recent western political theory no state is worthy of the name unless it be a sovereign state. Such a state is supposed to possess all the powers of government over all the persons within its jurisdiction, and its jurisdiction is limited only by the equal jurisdiction of other sovereign states. In Chinese political theory, when the Dragon Throne first came into contact with the western Powers, there was no room for such a conception of sovereignty, since the unity of the Far East was the first principle of Far Eastern politics. There was only one central authority in the Far Eastern world, if the Japanese be left out of consideration, — as their policy of isolation indicated was their wish, — and, instead of a theory of sovereignty, there was a theory of the proper relations between that central authority and the various subordinate and local authorities. On the eve of the first opium war Commissioner Lin, speaking with the authority of a governor-general for the Son of Heaven at Peking, addressed Queen Victoria as an equal and requested her to have all vessels leaving for China searched for opium; but he refused to address her plenipotentiary except by "mandates," enjoining obedience to his orders, and would receive no communication from him except humbly worded "petitions." Down to the end of the century the mandarins around the Dragon Throne continued to believe that ambassadors and ministers from the western Powers should be received after the manner of deputations from the tributary states and the Son of Heaven maintained his claim to be Lord of the Whole World. It was doubtless a stupid claim under the circumstances, like that so long maintained by the Kings of England to be also Kings of France and Defenders of the Faith, but it afforded convincing evidence of the traditional theory of the Empire.

In short, the scholastic empire was more than a state in the western sense of the term. It was a system of international relations. The Eighteen Provinces of the Chinese, the dominions of the Manchus, Mongols, and Tibetans, the vassal and tributary states, all had their places in the system, which determined their relations with one another. When the system was in good working order, there was peace throughout the Far Eastern world. It was in good working order long enough to justify its inclusion among the institutions which rank as great achievements of mankind. It was in good working order long enough to warrant the assumption that the Chinese possess, or at least have possessed, abundant political capacity.

III

THE OVERTHROW OF THE MANCHUS

1. THE FOUNDATIONS OF MANCHU SUPREMACY

Though the Manchus dominated the Celestial Empire for two hundred sixty-eight years and the last Manchu Emperor still resides on Chinese soil, the dynasty is now as completely defunct as that of the Mings, the last of whom hung himself on the Coal Hill outside the Imperial Palace in Peking in the year 1644. There is therefore no point in investigating Imperial politics under the Manchus except for the light which may be thrown upon the present political prospects of the Chinese themselves. If it should appear that the Manchu Empire fell from causes unknown or beyond human control, one might perhaps conclude that there is little ground for confidence in the stability of the Republic and that the present rulers of China have undertaken a task beyond their strength. But if the Manchus lost their power through faults of their own or errors of the mandarins, which their successors may hope to avoid, there is no occasion, despite the confusion since the collapse of the Empire, for losing faith in the political capacity of the Chinese. In the latter case we may examine their plans for the reconstruction of their state with the expectation that, by taking due pains, they can again establish a serviceable as well as tolerable system of government.

When the Manchus first gained possession of Peking, they found there the stateliest capital in the world. The spacious enclosure of the Chinese City, the Tartar City with its massive walls and towering gates, the inner Forbidden City in its mysterious seclusion, formed altogether a fitting seat for the government of a great empire. In suitability of design, in strength, and in beauty it was matchless. The public buildings were thoroughly worthy of their magnificent setting. The truly imperial grandeur of the palace in the Forbidden City with its vast array of golden-roofed halls and marble courtyards, the graceful proportions and majestic mien of the throne-rooms and audience-chambers, the curious carvings on stairs and balustrades, the lavish display of porcelains and bronzes, the ornamental trees and shrubs, even the tubs of tiny fish in their coats of gold and crimson and purple, arrested the eye and elevated the mind. The gorgeous costumes of the mandarins and courtiers, the rigorous etiquette of the Dragon Throne, filled the tribute-bearers and other casual beholders with a proper sense of awe and subjection. Outside the walls of the Forbidden City were the buildings which manifested more particularly the moral force of the Empire. In one corner of the Tartar City the Temple of Confucius, like the Confucian temples at the provincial capitals but larger and more beautiful, was a splendid expression of the scholastic spirit. In the Chinese City amidst a venerable grove of cypresses stood the graceful Temple of the Happy Seasons and near by, that supreme monument of the classical culture, surpassing all others by the impressiveness of its simple dignity, the Altar of Heaven.

The Manchus, though a ruder people than the Chinese, had sense enough to save this splendid capital from spoliation. They also possessed the intelligence to preserve the institutions which had made such a capital possible. Their real leader, the Prince Regent Durgan, one of the great statesmen of the Far East, recognized that China needed no new political system but merely new vigor in the old. His problem was to infuse this new vigor without jeopardizing the authority of the Manchus themselves.

The first measure adopted by the Manchus was designed to secure the physical basis of their power. They put a strong garrison in Peking, and, as the country was gradually reduced to submission, stationed others at a dozen or so of strategic points in the Eighteen Provinces. These Manchu garrisons were maintained throughout the life of the dynasty, occupying separate quarters in the garrison cities and subject only to the orders of the Emperor at Peking. They formed a permanent armed force entirely independent of the regular military establishment under the direction of the mandarins. Their purpose was not so much to provide for the defence of the Empire against foreign foes as to insure the supremacy of the Manchus over the Chinese. Thus the Manchu policy laid more stress upon physical force and less upon the moral authority of the rulers than had been the Chinese practice. In pursuance of this policy the Manchus tried also to make military officers in general more nearly equal in dignity and prestige to the corresponding grades of civil officers than had been customary among the Chinese. But the attempt to naturalize in China the Manchu idea of an "officer and gentleman" was not a success. The established concept of the "gentleman and scholar" could not be overthrown.

The second important change introduced by the Manchus into the Chinese political system was the appointment of members of the conquering race to civil offices in such a way as to check the Chinese mandarins and bring about a stable balance between the races. While recognizing that the knowledge and prestige of the mandarins were indispensable, the new occupants of the Dragon Throne were determined not to become dangerously dependent upon their loyalty and good faith. The membership of the Grand Secretariat and of the Six Boards was increased in order to make places for guardians of the special interests of the Manchus, and the latter were appointed for their strength of character and reliability regardless of the examinations prescribed for the Chinese. When subsequently the Grand Council was created, the Manchu members, together with their natural allies the Mongols, outnumbered the Chinese at first by two to one. The number of provincial officers was not increased to make room for Manchus, but the latter were introduced into the civil administration in such a way as to check and balance the Chinese as much as possible without ruining the character of the system. Generally a Chinese governor-general would be associated with a Manchu governor and *vice versa*, though, since there were not enough competent Manchus to go around, the lower administrative officers were largely filled by the Chinese.

Other changes introduced by the Manchus into the Chinese political system were of less importance. The Celestial Empire — that is, the part of it inhabited by the Chinese — was, as has been explained, practically a commonwealth of self-governing communities. Village affairs, with which alone the bulk of the people were concerned, were managed by the aldermen and selectmen. The affairs of the more populous centers were managed by the merchants and craftsmen through their guilds and chambers of commerce. The mandarins supervised these local communities and regulated the relations between them, but in general were slow to intervene in their domestic affairs. They were bound to transmit to Peking the customary revenues and to report to the people the Emperor's exhortations to right conduct, but it was not part of their business to meddle in local matters with which they were not concerned. So long as the revenues flowed into Peking regularly and the peace of the Empire was not threatened with any grave disturbance, the mandarins were free to follow the maxim so strongly recommended by western political philosophers in Victorian England, *Laissez faire, laissez aller*, and were generally disposed to do so. To the masses of the people it made little difference in practice whether the Son of Heaven on the Dragon Throne was of Chinese or of alien blood. The process of government remained substantially the same under Mings and Manchus. Chinese with a flair for politics, unable to find places in the official hierarchy, ordinarily were content with the management of public affairs in their own communities. More adventurous spirits could join the secret societies which flourished in all parts of China, but especially in the Yangtze valley and in the South, throughout the Manchu period and kept alive a sentimental prejudice against the House of Nurhachi. The chief concern of the Manchus was to keep the secret societies localized and prevent their organizing conspiracies on any large scale. For that purpose a rigorous censorship of the press and control of communications sufficed. With local freedom of speech and of assembly there was little interference. Eternal vigilance, rather than new institutional arrangements, was the price of Manchu authority.

It was in their extraordinary precautions against palace revolutions and similar causes of the fall of reigning houses that the Manchus showed the most originality. Forewarned by their study of Chinese dynastic history, they tried to guard against every conceivable contingency. To prevent struggles for the throne between sons of an emperor or princely factions in the Imperial household, they abolished the institution of crown prince and excluded all princes from civil offices and military positions in which they might easily get out of hand. They sought to avert the menace of dictatorship by Imperial clansmen by keeping the Imperial clans permanently disarmed. The clansmen were required to reside in Peking, lest they acquire dangerous authority in the Imperial territories and dependencies, and matrimonial and maternal relatives were pensioned and excluded from politics. The house-law of the reigning family guarded against the dangers of petticoat government by stringent provisions which proved adequate for more than two centuries. The usurpation of Imperial power by court stewards and eunuchs, a great evil under the Chinese dynasties, was forestalled by treating them as mere domestics. The danger of disobedience and rebellion by disloyal military commanders was diminished by the separation of the Manchu and Chinese armies and the constant shuffling of their leaders among the garrison towns and provinces. The distribution of power among the Six Boards and the judicious intermingling of Manchu with Chinese officials prevented the authority of ministers from growing too great. Adequate safeguards had apparently been established against all possible risks. For a century and a half the reigning family supplied a succession of masterful rulers, whose sway seemed secure against domestic disorders of every kind.

The Manchu combination of youthful vigor and ancient wisdom gave a new lease of life to the scholastic empire and brought its power and prestige to unprecedented heights. Its boundaries were extended far beyond the limits reached under the Mings; the population increased as never before; industry and trade flourished; tribute missions from distant lands attested the preëminence of the Court at Peking.

When in 1793 the British Government sent Lord Macartney to this proud Court for the purpose of establishing better commercial relations between East and West, it is not surprising that the Son of Heaven utilized the opportunity to impress the King of England with the prosperity of the Celestial Empire and the dignity of the Dragon Throne. "Swaying the wide world," he declared in the mandate which Lord Macartney was instructed to carry back to King George, "I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to despatch them from afar. Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated unto every country under Heaven, and Kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange and ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures. . . . It behooves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter." And in a subsequent mandate he added: ". . . European nations, including your own country's barbarian merchants, have carried on trade with Our Celestial Empire at Canton . . . although Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce.

But as the tea, silk, and porcelain which the Celestial Empire produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to yourselves, we have permitted, as a signal mark of favor, that foreign hongs should be established at Canton, so that your wants might be supplied and your country thus participate in our beneficence. . . . Our dynasty, swaying the myriad races of the globe, extends the same benevolence to all." When the venerable Chien Lung sent this haughty reply to the overtures of the younger Pitt, he could not know that at last among the tributary states and outer "Barbarians" he had met a people who did not understand their place in the Far Eastern scheme of things and would not accept it when it should be understood. He could not guess that a danger to his Empire was imminent against which no provision had been made in the Manchu political system.

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THE CAUSES OF THEIR DECLINE

Despite all precautions the Empire of the Manchus eventually came to as miserable an end as any of its predecessors. The principal causes of their ultimate overthrow are now well understood. Doubtless the inability of the Manchus to keep the western "Barbarians" in their appointed place was an important cause. But other causes were operating which would have surely destroyed the dynasty, perhaps sooner than was actually the case, even if there had been no violent irruption of "Barbarians."

In the first place, the manifest reliance of the Manchus on physical force for the preservation of their power was a standing offence in the eyes of the Chinese. The sight of the Manchu garrisons was a perpetual reminder that the dominant race did not share in the traditional respect of the Chinese for moral authority. Excluded from productive industry and trade, maintained in vicious idleness and ignorance, the descendants of the conquerors were confined to a calling which their subjects were taught to despise. It was impossible for the beneficiaries of such a system to command the ungrudging submission of so proud a race as the Chinese. The mandarins and scholars might be held reluctantly in line by shrewd management of the patronage. The masses might offer a dumb show of consent as long as the country was prosperous. But the dynasty could not hope to become genuinely popular while it continued to offend the people's sense of propriety. The secret societies, despite official efforts at repression, multiplied ominously. The White Lotus, the Triads, the Elder Brothers, the Heaven and Earth Society, and the Society of Heavenly Reason, to mention only a few, were an ever-present refuge for agitators and propagandists desirous of restoring a native dynasty. The Manchus were caught on the horns of an awkward dilemma. Their military system furnished constant incitement to conspiracy and rebellion, but the reigning family did not dare to abate the provocation by abandoning the system. Government, according to the Chinese classical tradition, is but a form of conduct and character is its only firm foundation.[1] The character of the Manchu rulers throughout the first half of the dynasty did not lack force, but from the Chinese standpoint their behavior betrayed a gross disrespect for the first principle of Chinese politics, the principle that the nation should be governed by moral agency in preference to physical force.

Recent events in the western world should give rise to a more sympathetic understanding of the Chinese philosophy of government than formerly. Time was when Manchu militarism made a stronger appeal to the foreign traders in the treaty-ports and to the chancelleries of their governments at home than Chinese pacifism. The foreigner in China wanted so-called "strong" government in order that his treaty privileges might be secure throughout the land. Hence, in conflicts between Chinese and Manchus, he sided with the latter when permitted to do so on acceptable terms. The Taiping rebellion in the middle of the nineteenth century afforded a significant illustration of this partiality. The rebels certainly fell far short of establishing the great peace suggested by their name, but in principle at least their empire was originally designed to rest on the good opinion of the Chinese people. In the beginning there was considerable sympathy with their enterprise on the part of Protestant missionaries, attracted by their manifest response to the influence of evangelical Christianity. But in commercial and diplomatic circles the followers of the self-styled "younger brother of Jesus" inspired nothing but revulsion. The Powers were quick to help suppress the rebellion, once they had obtained, as they supposed, a satisfactory working arrangement with the Manchu Court by the treaties of Tientsin and Peking. But now the Powers have renounced the resort to war against one another as an instrument of national policy, and should be in a mood to appreciate the more pacific traditions of the Chinese.

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[1] See E. D. Thomas, *Chinese Political Thought*, pp. 108–112.

Another cause of the overthrow of the Manchus was their failure to use the best men in the conduct of public affairs. In order to preserve their power, they were constrained to introduce trustworthy members of their own race into the higher ranks of the Imperial hierarchy, but unfortunately they produced few who were both trustworthy and capable of winning appointments in open competition with the Chinese. The overwhelming superiority of the Chinese in numbers and industry compelled the abandonment of the merit system for the Manchu and Mongol candidates for office, and the introduction of a system of favoritism for members of the dominant race impaired the morale of the mandarinate under the most favorable circumstances and under heedless or indulgent emperors was ruinous to the efficiency of the service. The records show that from 1730 to 1875 there were one hundred and fifteen appointments to the Grand Council, of which fifty-nine went to Manchus, nine to Mongols, and forty-seven to Chinese.[1] In general the Manchus were favored in good times, but when things began to go badly the Chinese would be called to the Council in greater numbers. During the Taiping rebellion in the middle of the nineteenth century there were actually more

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[1] See Hsieh, *The Government of China*, p. 11.

Chinese than Manchus appointed, but at the end of the century the proportion of Manchus was greater than ever. In the Six Boards and in the higher ranks of the provincial administrations, the numbers of Manchus and Chinese were more nearly equal, while the inferior ranks of the Imperial hierarchy were necessarily filled by Chinese in consequence of the dearth of available Manchus.

This unmerited preference for members of a privileged race was a flagrant violation of the second principle of Chinese politics, namely, that the service of the ablest and wisest men in the nation is indispensable to its good government. The Chinese classical tradition sanctioned a government of men, invested with wide discretionary authority, upon the understanding that it should be a government of the best men, or, in practice, of men who could at least satisfy the time-honored tests of competency. Racial discrimination in Imperial politics may not have greatly disturbed the masses of the Chinese, who had always been taught to regard the conduct of Imperial affairs as the business of the governing class exclusively, but it was a profound humiliation to the governing class itself. Those scholars who were able to find places in the Imperial hierarchy naturally concealed their dislike of their ignominious situation, but they as well as those out of office, who were far more numerous, must always have resented an abandonment of traditional principles which handicapped them in the pursuance of their official careers. As long as the Manchu dynasty seemed capable of keeping the Empire, their interest would prompt them to support it, but they would turn against the Manchus without compunction, once the latter appeared likely to lose their power, if they could do so without also destroying themselves. Meanwhile the restriction of opportunity for advancement by merit alone encouraged resort to intrigue and corruption and tended generally to lower the morale of the hierarchy. The establishment of the balance between Manchus and Chinese may at first have contributed towards the stability of the Manchu régime, but in the end it tended to produce the contrary effect by lowering the level of official capacity.

The third cause of the overthrow of the Manchus was their failure to maintain domestic tranquillity. In China it is not only successful rebellion that discredits a government. Unsuccessful rebellion is almost equally discreditable, if it occurs frequently or occasions prolonged and exhausting strife. For more than a century and a half after the conquest the Manchus were able to put down local uprisings with sufficient despatch to justify their pretensions to the Dragon Throne, but after the abdication of the venerable Chien Lung, insurrection became more frequent and more difficult to suppress. The greatest shock to the prestige of the dynasty was the terrible Taiping rebellion, one of the most destructive in history. For fourteen years the "Long Hairs," as they were called from their refusal to wear the queue in the prescribed Manchu fashion, challenged the authority of the Son of Heaven at Peking, setting up a rival claim to Heavenly favor which for a time seemed likely to gain universal recognition by the Chinese. Their armies overran sixteen of the Eighteen Provinces and brought the Manchus to the verge of ruin. But they proved incapable of consolidating their gains and in the end their power collapsed and their leaders perished. The desolation of some of the fairest portions of China, the destruction of hundreds of cities and untold numbers of villages, the slaughter of twenty million people, attest both the violence of the rebellion and the injury to the dynasty. Though serious Mohammedan uprisings in Yunnan and Turkestan were subsequently put down by hard fighting, it was evident that the Manchus had lost much of their physical vigor and martial spirit and that their garrisons were no longer capable of maintaining their supremacy. By all the traditional signs their mandate from Heaven was running out.

In fact the great Taiping rebellion was put down by the Chinese themselves, not by the Manchus. In the beginning, patriotic Chinese were disposed to welcome the Long Hairs as harbingers of a native dynasty, but their outlandish religious ideas and indiscriminate opposition to the time-honored customs and institutions of their native land soon alienated the support of intelligent patriots. What might have been a triumphant national movement became a calamitous sectarian disorder.[1] The Triad Society was one of the first to abandon the Taipings, and the scholars and substantial elements among the Chinese were not long in deciding to throw in their lot with the Manchus. When the latter had shown their inability to preserve the Empire, the scholars rallied to their support and organized national armies from the local militia and volunteers. With very little help from the Imperial Government Tseng Kuo-fan and his associates saved the scholastic empire and incidentally the Manchu dynasty. The extent of the aid rendered by foreigners, notably by Ward and Gordon and the Ever Victorious Army, seems to have been exaggerated. The western nations at first were stirred by the news that a Christian state was being set up in the Celestial Empire. Presently they perceived that the self-styled "Second Son of God and Lord of the Whole World" had nothing to contribute either to the advancement of Christendom or to the development of trade. Thereafter they backed the Manchus. But it was the support of the mandarins and scholars and not foreign aid that enabled the Manchu dynasty to survive for another half-century.

Further evidence of the approaching exhaustion of the Heavenly mandate, which vested the authority to rule the Celestial Empire in the House of Nurhachi, was afforded by the dynasty's inability to govern the western "Barbarians." To show outer barbarians of all kinds their proper place in the Far Eastern political system and to keep them in it was as much a part of the duty of the Emperor as to keep the Sons of Han themselves in respectful subjection. For nearly two centuries the Manchus were successful in compelling all comers to accept their appointed station. But in the early nineteenth century western merchants came in increasing numbers and grew more and more restive under the restraints imposed upon their trade. The missions of Lords Macartney and Amherst and Napier betrayed their unwillingness to acknowledge the Imperial pretensions to the overlordship of the world, and their reluctance to acquiesce in irksome restraints of trade. A belated and rather arbitrary attempt to enforce the prohibition of the opium traffic was the immediate occasion of the first open clash between East and West. Unable to repel the attacks of the British fleet, the Manchu government legalized the opium traffic and gave new facilities to the western merchants. Along the South China coast the prestige of the Manchus suffered a severe loss in the eyes of the Chinese, but elsewhere their subjects only knew vaguely that the troublesome "Barbarians" had been pacified by a show of force and some apparently unimportant commercial concessions. The second opium war, so-called, was more serious. The combined British and French forces occupied the northern capital, put the Imperial family to flight, and destroyed their beautiful Summer Palace. Not even by the pretext of going away on a "hunting trip" could they save themselves a grave loss of "face." To pacify the "Barbarians" again they were forced to grant further concessions in violation of the time-honored principles of the Empire, notably by permitting representatives of the Powers to reside permanently in Peking. Though the foreign ministers remained officially on the same level as the envoys from the tributary states, the fact could not be concealed that the Manchus had acted under duress. The ravages of the Allies did infinitely less damage to the country than those of the Taipings, but their humiliation of the dynasty was irreparable.

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[1] See W. J. Hall, *Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion*, p. 365.

The underlying conflict of ideas between East and West persisted, and the dynasty was unable to vindicate its authority, despite the fact that the mandarins, frightened by the Taiping rebellion, rallied around the Throne. The Far Eastern political system began visibly to disintegrate. In 1860 the Russians, taking advantage of the troubles of the moment, extorted from the trembling Manchus the title to vast territories in the northeast. In 1885 the French, pressing their claims in Indo-China to the point of open war, wrenched the tributary state of Annam loose from the Empire, and the English promptly followed the example of aggression by securing control of Burma. Still the fiction was maintained of respecting the sovereignty of the Manchus and in fact there was still a good deal of real respect for their supposed power. But the Japanese put an end to all this by their unexpected and decisive victory in 1895. Formosa and Korea were detached from the now discredited Empire of the Far Eastern World and the way was apparently opened for the partition of China by the imperialist Powers. The Manchus were perplexed and helpless. One faction sought to avert the catastrophe by abandoning their ancient principles and accepting the political ideas of the West. But the Imperial reformers of 1898 overestimated their strength and ruined themselves without advancing their cause. Another faction favored more vigorous resistance than ever to the "dangerous thoughts" of the western "Barbarians" and gave aid and encouragement to the patriotic Chinese militia and trainbands which wished to expel the foreigners by force. But the Boxer insurrection only served to reveal more clearly than before the weakness of the Manchus and the disintegration of their Empire.[1] Fortunately for the Chinese it also revealed the dissensions among the Allies and their inability to partition China without quarrelling disastrously among themselves. Notwithstanding their manifest weakness and incompetence, the Manchus were to have one more chance to save their inheritance. But their dignity was fatally compromised.

The fourth cause of the overthrow of the Manchus was the corruption of the mandarinate. The appointment of Manchus to civil offices without reference to merit was not the only way in which the dynasty impaired the morale of the hierarchy and reduced its efficiency. A more evil practice was the sale of offices for the sake of the revenue. The Imperial revenues were mostly fixed by ancient custom and could not easily be increased, though they would grow automatically with the growth of population and wealth. Both population and wealth did grow extraordinarily during the first two centuries of the dynasty, but Imperial expenditures grew even faster, and extraordinary measures became necessary to keep the Court in funds. Beginning in a small way, the sale of offices attained great proportions during the Taiping rebellion. Mandarins who purchased their appointments at high prices enjoyed little security of tenure and had to recover their outlay before the expiry of their brief terms. Office-holding in China had always been a profession, like engineering or the law in America, which talented men entered in pursuit of fortune as well as fame, and since it was the most important as well as the most learned of the professions, tradition sanctioned the view that it should also be the most lucrative. Though official salaries were modest enough, the fees and other perquisites which office-holders were privileged to retain for themselves enabled those who were well placed to make fortunes rapidly. But custom also imposed limits upon the exactions of the mandarins, and under the supervision of prudent emperors, attentive to their duties, the system probably gave not much less satisfaction than the systems of professional remuneration in vogue in the West. Under imprudent or heedless emperors a system which enabled public officers to charge what the traffic would bear, like lawyers in the West, was certainly liable to grave abuse, especially if those officers secured their positions in the first instance by purchase instead of by merit. Unscrupulous officials would find abundant opportunity to gratify their rapacity, and scrupulous ones would become disgusted with official careers.

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[1] See G. N. Steiger, *China and the Occident, the Origin and Development of the Boxer Movement.*

By all accounts the mandarinate became, after the Taiping rebellion, excessively corrupt. Doubtless some corruption exists in all governments and it is easy to exaggerate its amount, as the amount of corruption in the United States at the present time is exaggerated in many European countries. (This at least is the impression I formed after travelling in a dozen of them during 1927–28.) Great as it was in China before the overthrow of the Manchus, according to common report at the time of my visit to the country it was even greater after their overthrow. In other words, the condition of the mandarinate towards the end of the Empire was not so bad but that it could grow worse. Of the former mandarins whom I met during my visit, one who had been in an excellent position to form an opinion and who appeared to be one of the most reliable put the proportion of corrupt mandarins in his time at about one in three. But precisely what he meant by a corrupt mandarin remained doubtful. Certainly a public service in which such a proportion of the officials were corrupt would be by any test of corruption in a desperate state. Though there were many honest officials in the Imperial hierarchy, some of them highly placed, the general tone of the mandarinate was indubitably low and its reputation bad. Sticky-fingered Li Hung-chang was perhaps a no more typical specimen than clean-handed Tseng Kuo-fan, but long-continued reliance upon high officials of such character could only weaken the dynasty.[1]

Another grave fault in the policy of the Manchu dynasty was the oppression of the censors. According to the classical tradition the independence of the censorate was one of the fundamental principles of government in the scholastic empire. The immunity of the censors against punishment for disagreeable criticism of powerful mandarins or even of the Son of Heaven himself was deemed essential for the maintenance of the tone of the hierarchy. During the first century and a half of Manchu rule the tradition was respected. Down to the end of Chien Lung's reign only four censors were punished. Three of them were dismissed and the fourth was exiled. But under the later emperors the punishment of censors became more frequent. Altogether there were thirty-eight instances of such punishment between 1796 and 1887.[1] Eight censors were demoted, twenty-six were dismissed from the public service, two were exiled, and two were executed. Twenty-one of these cases occurred after 1861 and were presumably the work of the Empress Dowager Tze Hsi. In some of these cases the victims were doubtless corrupt; others were guilty of nothing more culpable than the faithful performance of their duty in matters affecting court favorites. In many cases the assigned causes of punishment seem excessively trivial, as when the Empress Dowager degraded a censor for the purely formal error of writing a character in a memorial to the Throne on the wrong level. Despite such oppression the censorate maintained its dignity to the end of the dynasty more successfully than other branches of the mandarinate. Even oppressed censors could not be unmindful of their great traditions. Nevertheless, as vigorous censorship became more hazardous, the risk of impeachment for erring but powerful mandarins declined. The institution proved incapable of stemming the rising tide of corruption. The greater the need for fearless "eyes and ears officials," the more uncertain became the supply.

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[1] Mr. Charles W. Campbell, who was as well informed as any foreigner concerning the condition of the mandarinate at the end of the Empire, has recorded his estimate of the cost of the Imperial government on the basis of the official accounts. "If the above-mentioned sum," he added, "were a true approximation of the amount exacted from the people of China to support the edifice of government in all its ramifications one would have to conclude that the remuneration of the vast army of officials must have been on a moderate scale. Unfortunately the total of 300,000,000 taels represented only the amount which more or less openly changed hands between private persons and the mandarins in the year. It barely touched the mass of clandestine and corrupt payments which were the bane of the whole political system, and the root cause of the downfall of the Manchus." See Foreign Office Handbooks, no. 67, p. 115. (Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office of Great Britain, London, 1920, vol. XII.)

Thus the Manchu rulers contrived at last to offend against all the fundamental principles of Chinese politics. From the beginning they had seemed to rely too much upon physical force and not enough upon moral agency, and they had systematically displaced the ablest and wisest of their subjects in order to make room for Manchu and Mongol favorites. Eventually they exposed their unworthiness to retain the mandate of Heaven by showing themselves incapable of putting down rebellion without excessive violence and destruction. Their inability to control the western "Barbarians" or to protect the Empire against foreign aggression further demonstrated their unfitness to rule. At the same time they corrupted the mandarinate by the sale of offices and by their indifference to peculation and bribery. They even threatened the independence of the censors. Faults so grave discouraged the best men among the Chinese from embarking upon a political career — according to the Imperial historiographers an accepted sign of the decline of a dynasty. There were other signs, equally unmistakable, of its impending fall. Conspicuous among them was the degeneracy of the reigning family itself.

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[1] See Hsieh, *The Government of China*, p. 95.

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THE DEGENERATION OF THE DYNASTY

The early Manchu emperors were a vigorous breed. Two of them indeed, Kang Hsi and Chien Lung, rank among the greatest rulers of the Far East. Each reigned for sixty years or more, a "cycle of Cathay," and demonstrated extraordinary capacity for affairs of state. Kang Hsi, who mounted the Dragon Throne in 1662, while still a boy, consolidated the Manchu power, displaying that capacity for infinite pains which Carlyle pronounces the essence of genius. Tall, lean, and sinewy, he retained his grasp upon the business of government until old age, never delegating to others what he could do himself. In an autobiographical essay upon the office of emperor, which he composed toward the end of his life, he set forth his attitude toward his work. "Having been on the throne for more than fifty years and almost at the age of eighty, I find that my country is peaceful and my people contented, though not exactly in an ideal condition of economic sufficiency and political satisfaction. I have worked all these long years carefully, patiently, and faithfully, as if for a day. The word 'hard' is not enough to describe the nature of my work. . . . Some hold the theory that the Emperor should attend only to very important affairs and leave the routine to the officials. I do not agree with this theory. For a tiny mistake in a little thing may give troubles to the whole country and a moment's carelessness may bring unhappiness to people of hundreds of generations. Therefore, whenever anything comes to me for decision, I always go over it very carefully. If I leave one or two things undone today, I will have that much more to be done tomorrow. So I always clear it at once. And then whether the thing is important or not, I never handle it carelessly. . . . I never executed a single one of my people without justifiable cause. . . . The silver reserve in the Treasury has never been used by me except for military campaigns and famine relief. . . . Each of my palaces is run with ten or twenty thousand taels of silver, which is less than one per cent of the annual expenditure on reconstruction of dams and dykes. . . . Whenever I read a petition of an old official for the privilege of retirement, I wept. You all have an opportunity to retire, but when can I have mine? . . . Alas! When I look back to my old colleagues who worked with me at the beginning of my reign, none can be found." [1] Chien Lung, who reigned from 1736 to 1796, abdicating voluntarily in order not to surpass his grandfather in length of years upon the throne, was a somewhat different type. Fat, urbane, a patron of the arts, he nevertheless devoted himself to business with an assiduity which, even in his old age, astonished strangers, like Lord Macartney, when they visited his court. Rising at 3 A.M. he held audiences before daybreak and found time for ten or twelve solid hours of work before retiring in the evening. These great emperors set examples of unremitting industry which the practical mandarins did not lack the wit to follow. They made the scholastic hierarchy a powerful political machine.

How different were the later representatives of the dynasty! Chia Ching and Tao Kuang, whose rule covered the first half of the nineteenth century, were weak men, unable to resist the temptations of their luxurious courts. Surrounded by incompetence and corruption, they gave way to gross extravagance and licentiousness. The women of the palace began to meddle in public affairs and eunuchs usurped the powers of statesmen. Then came a succession of children — portentous sign of dynastic decadence. Hsien Feng was nineteen when he mounted the Dragon

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[1] Hsieh, *The Government of China*, pp. 33–34.

Throne after the death of his dissolute father in 1850. Tung Chih followed him eleven years later at the age of five and reigned for forurteen years, dying of smallpox contracted in a disreputable resort outside the palace grounds. Kuang Hsu, who came next, was also chosen from the nursery at the still more tender age of four, and he in turn was followed in 1908 by another infant, Hsuang Tung, who was the last of the Manchus. Infants may doubtless perch on thrones as well as on highchairs but power remains in the hands of adults, and when the infant is surrounded by the women and eunuchs of an oriental court the power is hidden in the profound seclusion of the palace. Statesmen in the outer offices must do the bidding of the invisible government or pay the price of influence in the base coin of intrigue.

For an inglorious half-century the most potent rulers of the Celestial Empire were the ladies of the Imperial household, especially the various dowager empresses. These ladies were cultivated and fastidious, they could be gracious and charming. Some of them were also ambitious and energetic, resourceful and, if need be, unscrupulous. But their horizon was narrowly circumscribed by the walls of the Forbidden City and the Summer Palace. Dependent upon eunuchs and sycophants for their knowledge of the world, they were unable to make good use of real statesmen or to govern wisely themselves. The power which they snatched from the feeble heirs of the founders of the dynasty they squandered in senseless self-indulgence and reckless extravagance.[1] There has been much controversy concerning the character and services of the most commanding of these ladies, the imperious Tze Hsi. Her admirers have called her "a strong character such as history has seldom recorded," and one whom "history will rank among the greatest rulers of mankind," while her detractors have charged her with overweening and purely selfish ambition, unbridled extravagance, gross superstition, unblushing hypocrisy, downright dishonesty both verbal and financial, scandalous immorality, vindictiveness, cruelty, and wickedness not hesitating even at murder, and have compared her to Jezebel, Messalina, Catherine de Medici, and other highly placed women with blasted reputations.[1] It is not necessary to pass judgment upon these charges. It is enough that in Imperial China the virtue of rulers could not be dissociated from the happiness of their people and that under the Empress Dowager the Empire suffered intolerable humiliation and disaster. The lady herself anticipated the verdict of history when, at the end of her career as she lay dying, the watchers by her bedside asked her, in accordance with the ancient custom, to pronounce her last words. "Never again," she said, "allow any woman to hold the supreme power in the state. It is against the house-law of our dynasty and should be strictly forbidden. Be careful not to allow eunuchs to meddle in government matters. The Ming dynasty was brought to ruin by eunuchs, and its fate should be a warning to my people." [2] Yet another empress dowager became the real head of the Court at Peking after Tze Hsi was gone and the nominal prince regent was scarcely more than a puppet in her hands.

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[1] See Backhouse and Bland, *China under the Empress Dowager.*

It would be a mistake to cast all the blame for the misfortunes of the dynasty upon the masterful women who dominated its counsels when it had fallen upon evil days, and upon the ascendancy of eunuchs at court. The system of education in the Imperial household was itself at fault. Though the dynasty was decadent, it still produced some superior men, but the best of them grew up under conditions which were certain to render them unfit for the responsibilities of their inheritance. Prince Kung, for instance, one of the two Manchu princes who refused to sign the paper by which the dynasty eventually renounced the Dragon Throne, is described as "a man with a proud, upright nature, accustomed to command, unapproachable, but also incorruptible." [3] After the overthrow of the dynasty he took refuge under the German flag in Tsingtao. "The experience of exile," we are told, "had a beneficial effect upon the whole nature of the Prince. He became more simple, more human, more accessible, without losing the dignity into which he had been born. There was something straight and uncomplicated about him, which, although it prevented him from being able to cope with the realities of life, often made him quite touching in his almost childish inexperience. This state of affairs was due to the seclusion from the world in which the Prince grew up within the palace walls where they had intimate intercourse with no one but eunuchs and servants."[1] The folly of the women of the palace and the corruption of the eunuchs, when they were permitted to meddle in public affairs, were important factors in the demoralization of the government; but the ignorance of the Manchu princes themselves, the inevitable result of the system of education in the Imperial household in the period of dynastic decadence, was fatal.

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[1] See P. W. Sergeant, *The Great Empress Dowager of China.*

[2] See Backhouse and Bland, *Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking*, p. 46.

[3] See Richard Wilhelm, *The Soul of China*, p. 187.

The beginning of the twentieth century marked a turning-point in the career of the Manchu dynasty as it did also in the history of China. The failure of the Boxers compelled the Imperial Government to come to terms at last with the rest of the world. The old theory of universal empire was definitely abandoned and the Powers were recognized as independent states with the same rights as were claimed for the Celestial Empire itself. In 1901 a foreign office was established upon the western model and the Son of Heaven deigned to treat with the rulers of other states upon terms of equality. But, in ceasing to be the only World Power in the eyes of its own people, the Chinese Empire failed to maintain itself as any kind of World Power in the eyes of the rest of the world. It fell to the level of a state under a tacit, if unproclaimed, guardianship of the real World Powers. But the interests of the Powers required peace and order in China. If they could not partition the country among themselves, they were bound at least for a time to support a government which could protect life and promote trade. The Manchu dynasty was more available than any other and consequently received their support.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

Thus the Manchu dynasty, though its Heavenly mandate was clearly exhausted, obtained a new commission from the earthly Powers.

This new commission gave the Manchus a fresh, though unmerited, opportunity to reform the Empire and perpetuate their own power. At first they were at a loss what to do. They tried fitfully and without any settled plan to improve the organization of the central government, but they did not correct the errors which they had committed in their former management of public affairs. They continued to violate the traditional principles of Chinese politics and to undermine the fundamental institutions of the Empire without substituting better ones of their own. Their chief concern was to provide a new army, organized upon a western model and equipped with western arms and ammunition. Then the Russians and Japanese fought a great war in the Manchus' own home-land, from which they had always jealously excluded the Chinese. The triumph of the Japanese gave a new impetus to Manchu policy. First, they reorganized the government of the Three Eastern Provinces, assimilating it to that of the Eighteen Chinese Provinces, and encouraged the Chinese to settle in the empty territory in order to forestall the Japanese and Russians, if possible. Then they proceeded to reorganize the government of the Empire itself. They now were ready to follow the example of the Japanese in framing a constitution upon western principles and determined to imitate the Japanese in the manner of doing it. Decrees were issued abolishing the examination system for the recruitment of the official hierarchy, which foreshadowed the abandonment of the ancient system of education also and the substitution of a new system based on the science and philosophy of the West, and ordering the gradual introduction of representative government, as had been done in Japan. Thus boldly the Manchus entered upon the path of revolution. The Chinese seemed to respond to the new leadership and the prospects of the dynasty became brighter than for a long time.

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THE COLLAPSE OF ITS POWER

But again the Manchus proved unequal to the occasion. Two mistakes were especially disastrous to their hopes of success in the regeneration of China.

The first of these disastrous mistakes was the further extension of the preference for Manchus in the appointments to the higher offices in the reorganized central government. The Dowager Empress had been clever enough in the initial stages of the reformation, which really began with the close of the Russo-Japanese War, to keep the traditional balance between Manchus and Chinese in the upper ranks of the hierarchy; but the feeble Regent and stupid dowagers who led the Court after her death in 1908 knew no better than to fill the highest offices with the palace favorites. In 1909 the new provincial assemblies met for the first time and in the following year the First National Assembly was convened. Though these bodies were all more or less packed with the henchmen of the dynasty, they quickly became unmanageable, forcing, in 1911, the premature establishment of a cabinet government on the ruins of the ancient system of central boards. At the head of the new Cabinet stood the Manchu Prince Ching, a superannuated reactionary and corrupt courtier, in whom the Chinese in general and the mandarins in particular had no confidence. Among his twelve associates were eight other Manchus, five of whom were members of the Imperial family, and only four Chinese. Several of these Cabinet officers were notoriously incompetent. Two of them, who were appointed to head the War and Navy Departments, were younger brothers of the Prince Regent and especially odious to the Chinese. This packing of the new Cabinet was a colossal blunder. In the first place, it betrayed the bad faith of the Manchus, who were obviously bent on setting up a military dictatorship rather than any genuine constitutional monarchy. Secondly, what was even more serious, it alienated the Chinese members of the mandarinate, without whose support the Manchus would have fallen long before. Nothing remained of the ancient Imperial political machine except the decrepit Manchu garrisons and the more vigorous Chinese armies which had been renovated upon the western models by Yuan Shih-kai.

The second great blunder fell in the field of public finance. Along with the plans for the political reformation of the Empire went far-reaching schemes for economic development. Most important among these were the projects for railroads to bind the Eighteen Provinces more tightly together and facilitate the exploitation of their resources. Prior to the Boxer insurrection railroad construction was largely in foreign hands. The so-called "Battle of Concessions" was fought between the Powers but at the expense of the Chinese. British, French, German, and Russian interests gained possession of important lines and threatened to dominate the regions through which they ran by their control of rates and service. This was one cause of the uneasiness among the Chinese which culminated in the Boxer insurrection. After the insurrection the Imperial Government was determined to keep control of future lines in its own hands but was too poor to furnish the funds for their construction. It therefore sought the necessary loans from foreign bankers and in 1911 the Four-Power Consortium was formed by leading English, French, German, and American interests to finance the projected trunk lines. But the Chinese bankers and business men in the provinces through which the projected lines were to run were then as strongly opposed to Imperial control of railroad development by means of foreign loans as they had been formerly to direct foreign control. They perceived clearly enough that an Imperial railroad system under the control of the reorganized central government would enormously increase the power of the Manchu dynasty. They were determined not to entrust the handling of construction contracts of unprecedented fatness, the distribution of enormous patronage, and the power to manipulate rates and service throughout the country to the incompetent and corrupt Court of Peking. They insisted upon provincial control, despite the poor showing made by the first provincial railroad promoters, and turned definitely against the dynasty when the Manchu Cabinet authorized the Hukuang loan.

The double discrimination against the Chinese mandarins in the reorganization of the central government and against the provincial bankers and business men in the financing of the railroad program were the proverbial last straws which broke the back of the Manchu political system. Deprived of the good will of both scholars and capitalists, the Manchu dynasty could no longer rely upon the fidelity of any of the underlying forces in the Celestial Empire. Even the new Chinese army, in which the Imperial Court was putting so much of its faith, could no longer be relied upon. Nothing remained for the support of the dynasty but the discredited Manchu garrisons. At the first sign of revolt its authority collapsed. The garrisons were slaughtered without mercy and the reign of the House of Nurhachi came to an end.

IV

THE DOWNFALL OF THE MANDARINS

1. THE REVOLUTION IN EDUCATION

The overthrow of the Manchus afforded proof enough of their ultimate incapacity for the government of China. But it did not demonstrate the incapacity of the Chinese themselves for self-government. Only after the Chinese had seized the supreme power, could they be held responsible for the conduct of public affairs. It must be recognized that they assumed that responsibility under circumstances of peculiar difficulty. The morale of the mandarinate itself had been grievously impaired by the incompetence and corruption of the Manchus. The solidarity of the scholars as a class had been undermined by the spread of western ideas, fostered with extraordinary zeal and energy by the Christian missionaries. The Chinese business world, especially that part of it in the treaty-ports, was much shaken by the shock of competition with the modern capitalism of the West, sustained by the modern imperialism of the Powers. Yet there were solid foundations on which to build. In the cities the craft guilds and chambers of commerce maintained their time-honored organization. In the villages the aldermen and selectmen continued to hold sway. Everywhere the patriarchal family-system was as yet scarcely touched by the forces of revolutionary change. Could a modern state be built upon such foundations? And by whom? Were the mandarins and scholars capable of the task of reconstruction? Or must new forces be invoked to bring about the regeneration of the Chinese commonwealth? The problem of China remained still to be answered.

The most disturbing factor in the condition of China at the time of the Revolution of 1911 was the destruction of the ancient system of education. It is a truism that the system of education is the essence of the constitution of any state, and of no state was this more clearly true than of the scholastic empire. For a long time before the overthrow of the Manchus the Chinese educational system had been under attack. The first challenge came from the missionaries. The great Taiping rebellion was one evidence of the spread of their influence. But that came to nothing. After the suppression of the "Long Hairs" the Manchu Court began to take more interest in the western world. The Burlingame mission was the most spectacular expression of the new interest. More important was the despatch of the first lot of Chinese students to the West. Later the remarkable rise of the renovated Japanese Empire attracted the attention of the Chinese and won the enthusiastic admiration of the progressive youth. Since Japan was also more accessible than the West and living there was cheaper, Chinese students eventually thronged the Japanese universities. The Japanese victory over Russia profoundly stirred all China and shortly afterwards, according to a recent estimate,[1] there were 40,000 Chinese students in Japan. The annexation of Korea in 1910, revealing the ascendancy of western imperialism in Japanese politics, produced a revulsion of feeling in China and some decline in the number of students attending Japanese institutions. This became more marked after the oppressive Twenty-one Demands of 1915, but considerations of economy and convenience have kept the number of Chinese students there above that in other countries. Meanwhile the missionaries had established western schools and colleges in China and presently opened them to non-Christian students. The attack upon the Chinese classical education was pressed home with ever-growing vigor.

The force of the attack upon the educational system is reflected in the number of Chinese students in foreign institutions. Dr. Tsao, formerly president of Tsing Hua College and a leading authority on education in modern China, to whose estimate of the number of students training in Japan reference has already been made, has published some figures on the number training abroad at various significant dates in recent years.[1] The following table gives the approximate number in 1875, when the Chinese Government at last had begun to encourage the study of western learning, and a rough estimate for certain later years, which will at least indicate the probable ratios between the numbers studying in different foreign countries.

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[1] See Y. S. Tsao, *A Challenge to Western Learning,* News Bulletin, Institute of Pacific Relations (December, 1927), p. 13.

	1875	1900	1910	1927
America	100	200	500	2,000
Europe	30	100	300	600
Japan	0	300	30,000	5,000

As the number of Chinese in foreign institutions has increased, the character of their training has tended to change. At first they were largely under the guidance of missionaries and, whether in China or abroad, resorted chiefly to institutions where they received a classical education of the orthodox occidental type with special emphasis on Christian doctrine. Even in Japan they were for a time much under the influence of western missionaries. As the Japanese educational system developed and grew in strength, it became more nationalistic in spirit and also more indifferent to the special needs of the Chinese. Eventually the Chinese Y. M. C. A. in Tokyo contended with the patriotic secret societies for the attention of the crowds of young men overflowing from the Japanese universities. In recent years, occidental education everywhere has paid more attention to modern science and less to the ancient classics and medieval theology. In America the Chinese students have registered in growing numbers in the state universities and in the schools of science and technology, and even in China the missionary colleges have laid increasing stress on the scientific and engineering studies. Thereby the influence of western education has been greatly increased.

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[1] Y. S. Tsao, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

The effect of western ideas upon Chinese politics was first revealed in the management of the Chinese army. Li Hung-chang, stimulated by his contact with Ward and Gordon during the Taiping rebellion, was an early and persistent advocate of occidental methods in the Chinese military establishment. He brought western, especially European, military instructors out to China and established a military school in his province of Chihli for the training of officers. His efforts to build up a modern navy were frustrated by the corruption of the Manchu Court under the Empress Dowager and the efficiency of the Japanese fleet in the Sino-Japanese War, but his work on the army was more effective. His principal lieutenant in this work, Yuan Shih-kai, succeeding him as the most powerful of the Chinese mandarins, gave his best thought and energies to the rehabilitation of the Chinese army and put his best officers in charge of military education. Among the Chinese students in Japan after 1905, the proportion was notably large who, despite the traditional Chinese aversion from militarism, chose to study the modern art of war. The Revolution of 1911 was itself in its initial stages mainly the work of returned students, of whom the greater number had studied in Japan in a more or less militaristic atmosphere. Even the Manchu Court was eventually persuaded, as its conduct in the organization of the Cabinet on the eve of the Revolution plainly showed, that its retention of power depended upon the westernization of the army, but it learned the lesson too late.

The next step was to reform the training of civil officers along western lines. This, however, was much more difficult because it threatened to subvert the very foundation of the mandarinate. Scholars who owed their start in life to their knowledge of the Chinese classics could hardly be expected to prefer the classics of Greece and Rome. Officials who had been taught that government was an art, indeed the finest of the fine arts, to be practised in accordance with the canons of taste handed down by Confucius and his disciples, were not likely to grow enthusiastic over the uncertain political science of the West, expounded by such conflicting authorities as Montesquieu, Rousseau, the younger Mill, and Herbert Spencer. An unusually enlightened and progressive mandarin, such as Chang Chih-tung, the energetic governor-general of Hupeh and Hunan provinces and chief rival of Yuan Shih-kai during the last decade of the Manchus, might write an eloquent "Exhortation to Study" with a special eye to the appreciation of western science and technology, and urge the importance of turning useless Buddhist and Taoist temples into modern schoolhouses, but he did not venture to suggest any more drastic reform in the ancient examination system than the abolition of the "eight-legged" essay. The reformers of 1898 put the reform of education and of the examination system in the forefront of their program, but their valor outran their discretion, their edicts were cancelled, and nothing remained of their pathetic vision of a new China except the new university at Peking. In 1901 the examinations were suspended by order of the Powers in districts where foreigners had been massacred by the Boxers, and in 1905 the panic-stricken and bewildered Empress Dowager ordered the abolition of the entire examination system. But she was not prepared to put anything in its place. Instead of improving the supply of mandarins, the educational reforms of the Manchus seemed more likely to stop it at the source. Incapable of mending the mandarinate, the Imperial Court threatened to end it.

The overthrow of the Manchu dynasty put the mandarins in an awkward dilemma. Either they had to rehabilitate the old order in education or assimilate the product of the new. The prominence of the returned students in the Revolution made it practically impossible to rehabilitate the old order, and the character of the returned students made their assimilation not much easier. The men with the new learning were for the most part young, inexperienced, and out of sympathy with their elders. Some of them may have hoped for nothing more than to find places for themselves in the established hierarchy, but the greater number dreamed of creating a new China, equipped with new institutions, in which there would be little room for the discredited survivors of the old régime. They demanded a modern government upon western lines, better suited than the ancient scholastic empire for an age of steam, electricity, and internal-combustion engines. They proposed to transform the inarticulate masses of the Eighteen Provinces into voters and politicians with a fondness for public meetings and a loyalty to political parties such as they had observed in the West. They proposed to substitute for the Son of Heaven on the Dragon Throne a constitutional president with his ear to the ground. They envisaged the whole paraphernalia of the democratic republic, caucuses, conventions, and "bosses," general elections, parliamentary debates, and responsible ministers. The old mandarins could not participate in such visions. Some of the Republicans saw also the necessity of utilizing the materials of the old state in the building of the new. Dr. Sun, the first president of the Republic, understanding both China and the West more correctly than most of his young associates, was one of these, but in the heat of the Revolution he could not make clear the mysterious complexities of his Five-Power Constitution. His followers, flushed with their sudden and apparently easy victory, insisted upon the immediate conversion of their vision into reality. Thus the overthrow of the Manchus precipitated an ominous conflict between the returned students and the mandarins.

2

THE EXPERIMENT WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY REPUBLIC

The Republic was finally established by means of a compromise between the conflicting parties. The mandarins yielded their preference for the ancient trappings and primitive authority of the scholastic empire and retained their offices. The returned students secured the legal recognition of their political party and the promise of a representative parliament, but gave up the control of the army and the revenue. Dr. Sun resigned the presidency to Yuan Shih-kai and turned his attention to schemes of railroad building and general economic development. His followers prepared to run for parliament on the Kuomintang or Nationalist ticket and recover from Yuan Shih-kai by the methods of partisan politics the power they had lost by the practice of diplomacy. They expected to dominate the government through their possession of the authority to make laws, to appropriate money, and to control cabinet ministers, as was done by party leaders in the West. But they reckoned without their host. The Nationalists found their political ideas had failed to take root in the minds of the peasants and workers. Like the "carpet-baggers" in America after the Civil War, who sought to build their political fortunes on the incompetent votes of the Freedmen, or the "bosses" in the cities, where alien immigrants, ignorant of republican institutions, used to give unwitting sanction to their exploiters, they gained their seats without the knowledge or with only the most perfunctory consent of those whom they claimed to represent. Yuan Shih-kai borrowed money from the Five-Power Consortium, strengthened his army, intimidated the parliament, outlawed the Nationalist Party, and seized the supreme power. The Nationalists did not yield without a struggle. But their attempted second revolution in the summer of 1913, unsupported by any substantial element among the people of China, was easily suppressed and their leaders were forced to flee the country.

The subsequent history of the Parliamentary Republic illustrates the immense difficulty of transplanting exotic institutions without first preparing the soil. Twice called back to Peking, twice again the original republican parliament became the tool and then the victim of those who did not believe in parliaments. Though it preserved a nominal existence for a dozen years, it functioned actively for only a small portion of that time. Yuan Shih-kai permitted it to sit for the greater part of a year after its election in the spring of 1913. Then he ruthlessly brushed it aside. After the death of Yuan Shih-kai in 1916 it sat for another year until dissolved again under pressure by the militarists on the eve of China's entrance into the World War, one of the incidental casualties of that conflict. Convened a third time after the *coup d'état* of 1922, it sat again for a while until dissolved forever after the *coup d'état* of 1924. During the first interruption of its sessions some of its members were in exile, while others remained in China, stirring up opposition to the arbitrary rule of Yuan Shih-kai. Still others, however, made their peace with the mandarinate and seemed to abandon their vision of a parliamentary republic after the western fashion. During the second interruption of its sessions at Peking, a majority of the members adjourned to Canton, where under Sun Yat-sen's spirited leadership they tried to set up a Chinese republic of their own. But the people of China were not yet ready to follow such leadership. The Parliamentary Republic at Canton, while it lasted, was in substance a convention of Nationalist politicians, which exercised little actual authority beyond range of the guns employed for their protection. In most of the twenty-two provinces the ancient mandarins, or the more modern army commanders who succeeded them, remained the real holders of power. At Peking a rival parliament, convoked by the mandarins, sat from 1918 to 1922, but, after the *coup d'état* in the latter year, vanished without leaving any trace.

The most important task of the republican parliament was to frame a permanent constitution for the Chinese Republic. Yuan Shih-kai permitted it to frame the articles he needed in order to cloak his seizure of the supreme power with a garb of legality, but no more. In 1917 it again attempted to put down on paper the fundamental laws for the practice of republicanism in China, but was dispersed before it could finish the task. Finally, in 1923, when Tsao Kun wished to sanctify his purchased election to the presidency by the promulgation of a permanent constitution, the draft of 1917 was hastily revised and adopted. But the work was "spoiled," as one of its authors confessed to the writer, in the process. The corruption of the members who elected Tsao Kun president tainted the document which at the same moment they proclaimed the fundamental law of the land. It never was treated with any respect by the government of the day nor acquired any authority among the people. Yet it remains the best exhibit of the political ideas of the returned students and an examination of its leading features ought to throw some light on the causes of their repeated failures to reduce their principles to practice.[1]

The Chinese Constitution of 1923 was modelled largely upon that of the French Republic with variations borrowed from the German and American. It declared that China should be a unified state with a government resting upon the sovereignty of the people. All Chinese were to be citizens with equal rights before the law regardless of religion, race, or class. The rights of personal liberty and private property were expressly guaranteed in accordance with law, and also the duties of tax-paying, military service, and getting an elementary education were specified. All the principal legislative powers were vested in the national government, including the power to tax and to raise and maintain armies, while the provincial and local governments were prohibited from maintaining armies or using their tax power so as to embarrass the revenues of the national government. The parliament was to consist of a senate and house of representatives in accordance with the arrangement originally adopted in 1912, but the lower house was invested with much the more important powers. All adult males who paid direct taxes of at least two dollars a year or possessed at least an elementary-school education were to be qualified to vote directly or indirectly for members of parliament. It was expressly provided that the house might pass votes of no confidence in ministers, in which case the president was bound either to dismiss the ministers or dissolve the house, subject to the consent of the senate. The budget was to be prepared by the executive and no increase in proposed appropriations was to be made in either house. The lower house was to consider the budget first, and the senate might thereafter consider it, but could make no changes without the approval of the lower house. The president was to be elected by the parliament and have power to appoint ministers and veto acts of parliament, but the appointment of the prime minister would require the consent of the lower house and the only effect of the veto would be to suspend the execution of the law pending reconsideration by the parliament. Parliament could reënact any vetoed bill by the ordinary majorities and all presidential acts except the appointment of a prime minister would require the countersignature of a minister. Provision was made for an independent judiciary and it was expressly provided that laws in conflict with the constitution should be void and of no effect. But the power to interpret the constitution in doubtful cases, like that of amendment in all cases, was vested in the parliament, which by a two-thirds vote in each house might go into a joint session for the purpose of exercising these powers. Interpretations of the constitution would require a two-thirds vote of the joint session and amendments a three-fourths vote. Provision was also made for provincial and local self-government, subject to the supremacy of the national constitution and laws. The provinces were to be governed by legislative assemblies, consisting of a single chamber, and executive councils, both elected directly or indirectly by the qualified voters. The local districts were also to possess representative assemblies and executive magistrates elected directly by the qualified voters. The same franchise was fixed for provincial and local elections as for parliamentary elections.

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[1] See *Constitution and Supplementary Laws and Documents of the Republic of China*, translated and published by the Commission on Extraterritoriality, Peking, 1924. See also Hawkling L. Yen, *A Survey of Constitutional Development in China*, New York, 1911; Soumé Tcheng, *Le Mouvement constitutionnel en Chine*, Paris, 1925; James Woo, *Le Problème constitutionnel chinois*, Paris, 1925; Chen Wan Li, *Le Développement des institutions politiques de la Chine*, Paris, 1926.

The influence of the French system of government is plainly apparent. The organization of the central government, both legislative and executive, is thoroughly French, as are also the arrangements for maintaining the supremacy of parliament and the responsibility of ministers. The French influence is equally evident in the centralization of legislative power, but the German arrangement by which the national government might delegate the administration of certain national laws to the provincial governments was also adopted. American political ideas are chiefly evident in connection with the judicial department of the government. Though the courts would have the power to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws, the power of interpreting the constitution, which was vested in the parliament, would have prevented the judicial veto from becoming as important as in the United States. The adoption of the Continental system for guaranteeing personal rights in accordance with law, duly enacted by parliament, would also have tended to reduce the political importance of the judiciary. The American federal system was squarely rejected and power was distributed between the national and provincial governments without much regard to the special interests of different sections of the country or to the local pride of the provinces. Yet the arrangements for popular election of provincial and local executives seemed to contemplate setting up a system of administrative decentralization to counterbalance the centralization of legislative power. In this respect the Chinese Constitution of 1923 was much more like the German than the French.

The modern scholars and party politicians, who conceived this theoretically admirable but practically useless document, were much chagrined that at the end of so long a period of gestation it should have been stillborn. They offer an abundance of reasons both for the special failure of their particular constitution and for the failure of the parliamentary republic in general.[1] Some of these reasons are important and will be duly considered in connection with the eventual explanation of the downfall of the mandarinate, for, if the returned students failed miserably to organize a stable government for their parliamentary republic, the mandarins failed even more miserably to reorganize the scholastic empire. But the chief reason for this failure of the returned students, it may be suspected, was their own lack of understanding of the real condition of China. They knew the constitutions and laws of the western republics, but they did not know the minds of their own people. Their efforts to set up a western parliamentary republic on Chinese soil came to grief, but they salvaged from the wreck of their program that which was most important for the political reconstruction of China, their political party. While the mandarins in Peking made havoc of their constitutional formulae, the Kuomintang found a new base of operations at Canton. There we may leave them while we turn our attention to the political experiment originally conducted by Yuan Shih-kai.

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[1] See, for example, Chen Wen Li, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–63, 138–142.

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THE RISE OF THE MILITARISTS

Yuan Shih-kai first attained prominence as commander of the Chinese garrison in Korea. It was he who ordered the troops to fire on the Japanese, when in 1884 they attempted to force their way into the palace of the king at Seoul, and thereby precipitated the first clash of arms between China and the new Japan. After the conclusion of the agreement between Li Hung-chang and Count, later Prince, Ito, who was then rising to power in Japan, providing for a joint protectorate over Korea, Yuan Shih-kai became the Chinese resident-general at the Korean capital and Li Hung-chang's right-hand man in Far Eastern politics. The defeat of the Chinese in the war with Japan ten years later put an end to their influence in Korea and brought Yuan Shih-kai back to China as grand judge in Chihli province. Here among other duties he took over the direction of the military officers' training school, which Li Hung-chang, who continued as governor-general, had established and devoted himself with great energy to reorganizing the provincial army upon western lines. In 1898 the reformers charged Yuan Shih-kai with the task of modernizing the whole Imperial military establishment and the young Emperor relied upon him to protect the Throne against the reactionary party at Court and among the mandarins. But Yuan Shih-kai preferred to cast his lot with the forces of reaction and supported the Dowager Empress' *coup d'état*. Promoted to be governor of Shantung, he saw the folly of the Boxer movement and protected foreigners in his province from slaughter by the fanatical patriots. In the following year (1901) he succeeded his old master, Li Hung-chang, as governor-general of Chihli and became a star of the first magnitude in the mandarinate.

Yuan Shih-kai was not blind to the necessity of reform, despite his desertion of the reformers in 1898, but put his faith chiefly in the reform of the army and the recovery of China's military strength. He established a new officers' training school at Pao-ting-fu and drew to his side many of the most vigorous and energetic mandarins. Among them were three who subsequently became presidents of the Chinese Republic, Feng Kuo-chang, who was president from 1917 to 1918; Hsu Shih-chang, Yuan Shih-kai's own "sworn" brother, who was president from 1918 to 1922; and Tsao Kun, who was president from 1923 to 1924. One of his closest collaborators was Tuan Chi-jui, who under the Republic became his Secretary of War, and after his death was for a time Prime Minister and leader of the time-serving Anfu faction of the northern militarists. Ousted from Peking by the first Tuchuns' war in 1920 and forced to take refuge in the Japanese concession in Tientsin, Tuan Chi-jui was recalled to the capital after the *coup d'état* of 1924 and held nominal sway under the title of Chief of the Executive Power until Chang Tso-lin's triumph in the spring of 1926. Among the graduates of Yuan Shih-kai's military schools were several younger men who also played leading rôles in the Tuchuns' wars, notably Wu Pei-fu, Sun Chuan-fang, and Feng Yu-hsiang, each of whom afterwards became for a time master of many provinces. In the last decade of the Manchu Empire the vigor of his leadership gave Yuan Shih-kai a matchless influence in the mandarinate. The representatives of the foreign Powers respected his abilities and praised his moderation. But the unfortunate Emperor never forgot or forgave his treachery at the time of the Empress Dowager's *coup d'état*. In 1907 he became a Grand Councillor and President of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, and, though a hostile Court disgraced him after the death of the Empress Dowager in 1908, three years later his Manchu enemies were forced to recall him to Peking to save their tottering throne.

The devious intrigues by means of which Yuan Shih-kai simultaneously deprived the Manchu princes of their ancient empire and the Chinese Revolutionists of their infant republic may be passed over. What matters most in explanation of the eventual downfall of the mandarins is the policy which he adopted in order to rehabilitate the government and consolidate his own power.

In the first place Yuan Shih-kai never believed in the republican form of government. He did not believe that the people of China understood either the rights or the duties of citizenship in a democratic republic. He did not believe that they were capable of asserting such rights or of discharging such duties, even if they should understand them. He did not believe that they would wish to do so, if they could. He spoke of the returned students' political theories with derision and branded their faith in the people as the credulity of gullible inexperience. He visualized the people in terms of peasants and workers, merchants and scholars. He knew that the old scholars for the most part clung to the old learning, the merchants to their trade, the workers to their jobs, and the peasants to their land. They were not interested in partisan politics after the fashion of the West and would not follow partisan leaders into the labyrinth of representative government. They understood the time-honored rights of heads of families, of husbands and fathers, of village aldermen and selectmen, of guildsmen and chamber of commerce executives in the towns and cities, of district "father and mother" officials, but they had no knowledge of the rights of man. They could respect the authority of the mandarins, at least while their own lot was tolerable, but they could not understand the returned student, versed in western political theories, when he told them that the concept of a legitimate party of opposition was the greatest contribution of modern times to the art of government. In 1913

Yuan Shih-kai, strengthened by the great loan from the Five-Power Consortium, was able to defy the unestablished authority of a representative parliament and crush the intractable remnant of the opposition party. Could he have secured such a loan in 1911, when the Revolution first broke out, there would have been no Republic.

At the same time Yuan Shih-kai had lost faith in the traditional institutions of the scholastic empire. Harassed by the parliamentary opposition, vexed by the constant criticism of the Kuomintang, he had no patience with official censors and their respectful but useless complaints. Innocuous desuetude descended upon the censorate. The ancient system of competitive examination for the selection of public officers fared no better at his hands. Though urged by some at least of his advisers to replace the discredited and abandoned system of examinations based on the ancient classics with a fresh system based on the new learning of the West, he preferred a free hand in the filling of the offices and employed the patronage to break down the opposition of the parliament and reward the faithful or the serviceable among his own followers. Thus among all the western political institutions which he might have adopted, he chose that which was most dubious, the system which treats the public offices as the spoils of victory. The returned students found themselves for the most part excluded from the official careers to which they had looked forward. Some of them, to be sure, he utilized in the diplomatic service where their knowledge of European languages and politics stood them in good stead, but the road to power was open only to the men in whom he had confidence, above all to those who had been trained in his own military schools. He built a political machine with men who were strong in the new faith in organized force and official violence but weak in the old reverence for the authority of reason. The mandarins with nothing but the ancient classical training, like the returned students, found themselves in disfavor. Thus he alienated the affections of the old scholars without securing those of the new. If Sun Yat-sen and the other leaders of the Kuomintang were visionary revolutionists, Yuan Shih-kai and his fellow-militarists were no less visionary reactionaries. They looked back to the period more than two thousand years ago when Shih Huang Ti, the great First Emperor, unified the country by the sword and, brushing aside the scholars, sought to establish the Chin dynasty on the basis of a military dictatorship.

The revival of such an ancient form of despotism, though supported by the new military technique introduced from the West, was fatal to the morale of the mandarinate. It was not necessary for Yuan Shih-kai to persecute the classical scholars, as Huang Ti had done. It was enough to ignore their claims for political preferment. The best of the old mandarins strove valiantly to replace the discredited classical system of education with one more modern which would be capable of producing a new supply of effective scholar-statesmen. But the dictator's interest lay in training military rather than civil officers and, though some progress was made in the renovation of Chinese education, it was not enough to rehabilitate the mandarinate. Yuan Shih-kai filled the high offices in the provinces with the graduates of the military schools, vigorous and forceful men doubtless, but in most cases, from the old-fashioned standpoint, uncultivated and rude and incapable of performing properly the duties of their rank. They were mainly a greedy and contentious lot, too often bent on getting rich as quickly as possible and ready to fight one another for power as soon as the heavy hand of their chief should be removed. In view of these conditions it is not surprising that the mandarinate under Yuan Shih-kai rapidly became more corrupt and demoralized than under the last of the Manchus. This disastrous military dictatorship did not even have the compensating value of assuring the independence and territorial integrity of the country. In 1915 the Japanese imposed their notorious Twenty-one Demands by the mere threat of war and Yuan Shih-kai's weakness was exposed to the world. It was evidence that a vulgar military dictatorship alone could not secure the safety of China.

But it was equally evidence that, if long continued, it would complete the ruin of the mandarinate.

Yuan Shih-kai was not much concerned over the fate of the classical scholars in politics, but he was greatly concerned over that of China. Consistently enough with his own principles, he sought to avert the final catastrophe by strengthening his personal power. His method of accomplishing this was to give dignity to his dictatorship by reviving the monarchy and seating himself upon the Dragon Throne. Doubtless pride as well as policy drove him to this unfortunate measure, but upon his principles of government, policy alone would have prompted the measure, since the only cure for a deficiency of power in a government designed to rest upon physical force and violence is more power. No sooner, however, did he begin to dust off the vacant throne than the foundations of his power crumbled beneath him. The returned students and other radical reformers saw their hopes of creating the new China in the image of the republican West threatened with total destruction. The classical scholars and other conservatives were equally opposed to a measure which foreshadowed the same end to their hopes of restoring the moral authority of the government. Even the generals of Yuan Shih-kai's own new model, to whom he had given the government of the provinces and upon whom he relied for the perpetuation of his power, balked at a step which threatened to impose new restraints upon their management of their domains. The attempt to restore the monarchy produced a new outbreak of rebellion, the third in five years. The more remote provinces were soon out of hand and China's plight was quickly worse than before.

Yuan Shih-kai's cup of bitterness, however, was not yet full. Some of the foreign Powers also viewed the revival of monarchy with alarm. Americans, for instance, took a sentimental interest in the republican experiment in China, and their missionaries especially were filled with regret at its imminent failure and extended sympathy and encouragement to the opponents of a restoration of monarchy. Japanese took a more realistic view of the situation. They had no special interest in the republican form of government, but their ruling oligarchy was bent on fishing in the troubled waters and saw with displeasure the prospect of a stronger central government in China, especially one dominated by their inveterate foe, the former garrison-commander in Korea. The European Powers were preoccupied with their own troubles, and Yuan Shih-kai looked around in vain for such help against his new enemies as he had received in his former contest against the Kuomintang and the republican parliament. Too late he tried to retrace his steps. The damage had been done. His credit was irretrievably ruined; as the Chinese say, he had completely "lost face." Overwhelmed with mortification, he raged within the seclusion of the palace, and then after a brief interval Heaven intervened and removed him from the scene. Rarely has the folly and wickedness of a strong man — for Yuan Shih-kai was a strong man and, confident in his strength of intellect and purpose, stopped at nothing to gain his ends — led so fatally to his destruction. His very ruthlessness, a source of power as long as his enemies remained intimidated, instantly became a source of weakness, once they had the temerity to turn openly against him. And his scorn for the moral elements in the foundations of authority left him as helpless as the Manchus when his physical forces were dissipated and spent.

The death of Yuan Shih-kai was followed by the disintegration of his military-political machine. A few of his followers still retained faith in a restoration of monarchy. A year later one of the surviving Manchu generals, Chang Hsun by name, attempted to set the deposed boy-emperor once more on the throne, but there was no support for the venture and the inoffensive youth was soon immured again in the depths of the Forbidden City. No vitality remained in the ancient idea of celestial empire. A greater number of Yuan Shih-kai's followers believed it was still possible to erect a parliamentary republic on the ruins of the mandarinate. Among these were the most cultivated and intelligent of his former associates, notably Hsu Shih-chang and Tuan Chi-jui, men who were instructed in the classical learning and understood its political philosophy. These men had themselves formerly been mandarins of the old school and, although they followed Yuan Shih-kai in his endeavor to restore the strength of China by the reform of the army, they could not share his contempt for the moral foundations of the old order. But they could not agree upon a method of erecting the new political structure upon the old foundations. Tuan Chi-jui at first believed he could force the new political system upon the reluctant people of China and, in order to raise the necessary funds for vigorous military operations in the recalcitrant provinces, he gravely compromised himself with artful Japanese money-lenders and with the aggressive government which stood behind them. Hsu Shih-chang retained more of the traditional scholastic faith in the efficacy of moral suasion. Their differences of opinion prevented effective coöperation between them and greatly reduced the chances for the regeneration of China by the remnant of the mandarinate. Meanwhile the Tuchuns and other military authorities whom Yuan Shih-kai had set up in the provinces remained faithful to their old master's policy and put their trust chiefly in the power of their swords. They set no great store by political theories of any kind and gave their first thoughts to the aggrandizement of their own domains.

The surviving mandarins were slow to learn the lesson that should have been learned from the overthrow of the Manchus and was plainly written by the downfall of Yuan Shih-kai. That was, that a country the size of China, in which the means of communication were as imperfect as they continued to be, could not be held together by military force and violence alone. Certainly it could not be held together by such means in the presence of the disruptive influences resulting from contact with alien and imperialistic Powers. In the past China had many times been plunged into confusion by the degeneration of dynasties and the dissipation of Imperial authority. New dynasties, full of fresh vigor, had eventually been set up by dint of hard fighting, and meanwhile ambitious leaders could contend for mastery with fair hopes of success, since the foundations of the state would remain undisturbed by the change of masters and the mandarins could be expected to honor the credentials of the victorious general to whom the Heavenly mandate might be transferred. But the same thing could not be done by any of Yuan Shih-kai's generals, unless either the old foundations were restored or new foundations put in their place. Military dictatorship might conceivably be established within the narrower limits of a single province or group of provinces, where the dictator's armies could be manoeuvered with the necessary speed for crushing resistance before it should gain too much strength, but for a country-wide dictatorship it was not only modern armies that were necessary but also modern highways, railroads, telegraphs, wireless, and all the other paraphernalia of the modern state by which strong and preponderant force can be quickly mobilized and applied at any desired point. The Tuchuns could neither make themselves dictators of China nor set up by force of arms either a parliamentary republic or any other new kind of government. They could only set up local dictatorships in limited territories. Reliance upon the Tuchuns for the regeneration of the state could only mean under existing conditions the disintegration of China.

The Tuchuns and other militarists who battled for supremacy after the death of Yuan Shih-kai abundantly demonstrated their incapacity to succeed where he had failed. In 1917 the dissolution of the parliament and attempted restoration of the Manchu Emperor not only drove Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang to Canton but provoked dissensions among the militarists themselves. Yunnan, which had led the resistance to Yuan Shih-kai, declared its independence of the Northern Government, and the disintegration of China visibly advanced. In 1920 a combination of northern militarists, among whom Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian "war-lord," Tsao Kun, governor-general of Chihli, and his subordinate General Wu Pei-fu, were conspicuous, forced the Anfu faction out of office and compelled President Hsu Shih-chang to abandon his policy of reconciliation with Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang.

In 1922 Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu quarrelled with Chang Tso-lin and forced the latter back into Manchuria, where he declared his independence of the Peking Government, though not of China. President Hsu Shih-chang was then forced to resign, and Li Yuan-hung, who as vice-president had succeeded Yuan Shih-kai in 1916 and been forced out of office by his generals a year later, was recalled to the presidency in another attempt to unify China by negotiation. A year later Li Yuan-hung for the second time was forced to resign by his generals. In 1924 Tsao Kun, then president of the Republic, and Wu Pei-fu again fought Chang Tso-lin, declaring that at last they would unify China by force, but their powerful subordinate, Feng Yu-hsiang, withdrew his support at a critical moment in the campaign and Tsao Kun in his turn was forced out of the presidency. Wu Pei-fu's plans for the forcible unification of China were abandoned and the attempt was renewed to unify the country by negotiation. Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin recalled Tuan Chi-jui to Peking and invited Sun Yat-sen to join them in the reorganization of the Republic. But Sun Yat-sen soon died, Feng and Chang quarrelled, and Tuan Chi-jui's position again became untenable. In 1926 Marshal Tuan gave up the struggle and retired once more to the security of the Japanese concession in Tientsin, while Feng was driven out of North China altogether and took refuge in the Soviet Union. Ten years after Yuan Shih-kai's death, Chang Tso-lin, the craftiest of his disciples, was master of Peking and much of northern China, but without hope of subduing the rest of the country to his sway.

4

THE DEMORALIZATION OF THE MANDARINATE

The remnant of the mandarinate, which lingered on the stage at Peking long after the destruction of its authority in the provinces, was well aware of the danger to the integrity of the state. Hence its persistent support of the republican idea in the face of the evidence of its lack of vitality in the country at large. The diplomatic corps especially, which was now the most virile element in the mandarinate, clung tenaciously to the fiction that the Chinese Republic still lived. The leading diplomats were able men with western educations. Among them were W. W. Yen, several times Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister of Republican Cabinets at Peking; Wellington Ku, who had brilliantly represented the Chinese government in the Peace Conference at Paris and in the Washington Conference of 1921–22, later several times Minister of Foreign Affairs; C. T. Wang, once a leader of the Kuomintang and its representative at the Paris Conference, later a successful negotiator with the Japanese and Russians and for a time also Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Wang Chung-hui, Chinese representative on the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. These men were eager to keep up at least the external forms of constitutional government in the hope that the political system might somehow be stabilized before the foreign Powers lost all patience with the anarchy of the Tuchuns and intervened to restore order. But one by one they abandoned the Peking government in despair and retired to private life or joined the Revolutionists in the South. When W. W. Yen resigned the premiership in June, 1926, all further pretence of maintaining a constitutional government was cast aside and Chang Tso-lin was permitted to set up a naked rule of force in the northern capital. Only in the Chinese legations abroad and at the seat of the League of Nations in Geneva was there still a show of respect for the sham republic. The mandarins who continued in its service were reduced to helpless impotence.

The disintegration of China went hand in hand with that of the mandarinate. The progress of the latter is best revealed in the diversity of education of the leading men in the country at the height of Chang Tso-lin's dictatorship. Y. S. Tsao, in his article already referred to, "A Challenge to Western Learning," gives a table showing the training received by seven hundred and fifty prominent men as reported in the current Chinese *Who's Who.*[1]

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[1] See News Bulletin, Institute of Pacific Relations (December, 1927), p. 15.

Men with the old classical education comprised barely a quarter of those for whom such training was particularly designed, the experts in government and holders of civil offices, and less than one tenth of the educators, whose influence might be expected to be greatest in determining the future constitution of the country, if the old political philosophy were to retain its traditional credit. In fact these figures would demonstrate clearly, if the course of events had not already demonstrated, that the old order had changed and must give way to the new. The old mandarinate was manifestly disrupted. It could neither assimilate the new elements on the political scene nor prevent the eventual elimination of the old. Its utter downfall was as certain as had been formerly that of the Manchus. Whether or not the fall of the old mandarinate would drag China as a political entity down with it depended on the ability of their successors to avoid their errors, as formerly their own fate had depended on their ability to avoid the errors of the Manchus.

Place and Kind of Training

	Political Science	Military Science	Business	Education	Other	Total
I. Modern Education	299	101	79	65	34	578
A. Abroad	208	38	52	59	25	382
1. Europe	43	7	7	10	8	75
2. America	70	3	37	45	13	168
3. Japan	95	28	8	4	4	139
B. In China	91	63	27	6	9	196
II. Old Education	105	31	23	6	7	172
Total	404	132	102	71	41	750

What those errors were is plain enough. The leaders of the mandarinate after Yuan Shih-kai's death had simply repeated his errors as he had repeated those of the Manchus. The first and greatest of those errors was the excessive reliance upon physical force. Yuan Shih-kai, when he succeeded the boy-emperor at the head of the state — he always regarded his commission from the last of the Manchus as better evidence of his right to rule than his election by the republican parliament — became the virtual chief of the mandarinate, but chose to put his trust in soldiers rather than in scholars. Having begun by betraying both the old Manchu dynasty and the new Chinese Republic, he ended by betraying the mandarinate itself. His successors succeeded to a more difficult task than that which he had failed to accomplish. The fragments of Yuan Shih-kai's military machine were a more serious obstruction to the restoration of authority than the republican armies with which Yuan Shih-kai had to deal. The credit of the mandarinate was more gravely impaired than at his accession to power. The best of his successors, men like President Hsu Shih-chang and Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, eventually understood the nature of their difficulties but failed to find the proper remedy. The latter, when I visited him in his refuge in the Japanese concession at Tientsin in April, 1928, viewed the plight of China with the philosophical resignation of the faithful Buddhist that he was. "These contentious war lords," he said, "are old pupils of mine. They will continue to struggle with one another, until in the fullness of time the sins of China are expiated by her woes. Then they will come back to me, their old master, and ask me to give them peace." But he was not destined to give it to them. The lesser men among the successors of Yuan Shih-kai, men of inferior culture and ignoble character such as Presidents Feng Kuo-chang and Tsao Kun and Generalissimo Chang Tso-lin, were incapable even of understanding the menace of militarism. Perhaps they did not care greatly about the fate of China. Preoccupation with personal fortunes is a characteristic vice of dictatorship.

The second error trod closely on the heels of the first. Excessive reliance upon physical force and violence meant undue preference

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for military men in recruiting the personnel of government. The disproportionate prominence of generals is plainly reflected in the preceding table showing the training of seven hundred and fifty leading men of China in 1927. The best men were no longer drawn in sufficient numbers into the service of the state. Discrimination against returned students, except in the diplomatic corps, begun by Yuan Shih-kai, was continued by his successors. Not enough was done to improve the quality of the supply of domestic-trained men. As the table shows, too much emphasis was laid upon military training. The colleges of the foreign missionaries turned out men of good character but insufficient knowledge of China. The modern Chinese universities turned out rapidly increasing numbers of students who understood China better, but despised the old mandarins and hence were incapable of giving them much help. Modern education in China fell largely under the influence of men trained in America, an important event for the future of China and no less fatal to the prestige of the old mandarinate than the predominance of the military in politics. Thus, though Chinese society remained strong, government grew continually weaker. The significance of this fact was felt most keenly by the students in the Chinese universities. In the first place, they were not ignorant of the old traditions in accordance with which scholars were expected to bear the chief responsibility in affairs of state. Secondly, the disintegration of the state into contentious local dictatorships grievously impaired their own prospects in life. Properly enough, on their principles, they took a leading part in the agitations that more than once in the decade after the death of Yuan Shih-kai put a check on the folly of the old mandarins. By the irony of fate it was a massacre of students before one of the ministries in Peking which, in March, 1926, finally demonstrated the political and moral bankruptcy of the old mandarinate.

The bankruptcy of the mandarinate had been clearly forecast in the time-honored manner by the spread of rebellion. When the Kuomintang politicians fled to Canton after the second dissolution of Parliament in 1917, they had no intention of seceding from the Republic. They meant merely to strengthen their position for bargaining with the government at Peking by challenging the moral basis of its authority. Though the violent vicissitudes of the republican government at Canton weakened the force of this challenge, the third dissolution of the Parliament in 1924 and subsequent failure of Tuan Chi-jui's Reconstruction Conference in Peking, gave it renewed strength. The Tuchuns' wars, the spread of brigandage and banditry in all parts of the country, the alarming increase of kidnapping and blackmail in the great cities, were signs pointing in the same direction. The old mandarinate could not solve the problem of China and the task would have to be entrusted to new hands. The course of events showed that it could not be solved by force and violence alone and the political traditions of the country called for its solution by scholars as well as by soldiers. Since the old classical scholars had proved incompetent, it was necessary to consider the alternative offered by those with a modern education. The increasing violence and disorder of the country was a kind of evidence in the minds of all cultivated Chinese that the new learning of the West should at last have its day. The downfall of the mandarinate did not demonstrate the political incapacity of the Chinese people. It demonstrated merely the necessity for new instruments of government in order to utilize the new principles of politics appropriate for a new age.

When the downfall of the mandarinate was finally imminent, the modern scholars and politicians possessed one important advantage over the surviving old mandarins. They could at last understand the causes of the failure of the Parliamentary Republic. That military dictatorship was likely to fail they had always understood, but their faith in the Parliamentary Republic had been more robust. But when in the spring of 1925 Tuan Chi-jui declared the Constitution of 1923 null and void, they were no longer disposed to protest. They had come to know that China was not yet ready for constitutional government on a western model. In the first place, the habitual indifference of the

Chinese people to all but local politics would have to be overcome. From time immemorial general politics had been the business of the politicians, that is, the classical scholars. They were trained for it, they were compelled to demonstrate their fitness by rigorous examinations, they were generously rewarded for success. Farmers, manufacturers, merchants, and laborers had their own affairs to attend to. They felt no more personal responsibility for the conduct of affairs of state than American farmers, manufacturers, merchants, and laborers feel for the management of the New York stock exchange. That is the affair of the stockbrokers, the members of the exchange. In America a stockbroker buys his way into the exchange, while in China in the best days of the scholastic empire a scholar worked his way into the official hierarchy. But the attitude of outsiders was much the same toward both institutions. Insiders were there to make their fortunes and outsiders saw no harm in that so long as the institution gave satisfactory service at reasonable rates. But constitutional government cannot be operated so easily. Outsiders as well as insiders have their work to do, if it is to give satisfaction. Outsiders as well as insiders must receive appropriate training. The training of modern politicians for the business of operating the institutions of constitutional government is a big task. Still bigger is the task of training the people at large for the duties of citizenship. This was a lesson which the wisest of the Republican leaders had at last learned.

Another lesson taught by the failure of the Parliamentary Republic was the necessity of inculcating respect for law. The scholastic empire was a system of personal government. The mandarins were entrusted with a wide discretion. Their authority was limited by reason, by custom, by the moral law, but not by any law of the land which could be enforced in courts of justice. It was limited also, and very materially, by the patriarchal system; that is, by the rights of heads of families, and by those of the aldermen and selectmen and masters of guilds whose authority so largely depended upon that of the patriarchs. This kind of government, by far the most important in the daily round of ordinary life, was also personal. Patriarchs enjoyed a wide discretion. Their authority also was limited only by reason, by custom, by the moral law, but not seriously by rules enforced in mandarins' courts. In the modern phrase, China had possessed a government of men and not of laws. All this would have to be changed, if constitutional government after the fashion of the West were to be established in China. Or, if it could not all be changed, western ideas of constitutional government would have to be modified before they could be applied to the government of the Chinese with fair prospects of success. This also the Republican leaders with modern educations had at last come to understand. But difficult questions were still to be answered. Could the necessary respect for law be inculcated without breaking down the family-system? Could a constitutional government be established without destroying the authority of the patriarchs? Could there be a successful political revolution without also a great social revolution? The answer to these questions had to be found before any adequate system of education for the duties of citizenship could be devised. Meanwhile, until the necessary respect for law could be developed, personal government must be supplemented by something stronger and more vigorous than any forces at the command of vulgar military dictators, if the rulers of the new China were to become equal to their responsibilities. The wisest of the Republican leaders had learned this lesson also.

Finally, many of the Republican leaders with modern educations had discovered that it would be easier to modernize the government of China if they did not break too violently with the traditions and institutions of the past. At the beginning of the Revolution the returned students and other young Republicans had been disposed to repudiate all the ancient traditions and cast aside all the Imperial institutions. They seemed to expect that the old mandarins and classical scholars would turn at once into regular party politicians and electoral campaigners. They attacked both the Confucian ceremonies and the Confucian political ethics. As late as 1923 when the so-called permanent constitution of the Parliamentary Republic was finally adopted, there was earnest controversy between the remnants of the old mandarinate and the new party leaders concerning the constitutional status of Confucianism. The old mandarins demanded that Confucianism be recognized as the state religion and public officers be required to carry on the ancient ceremonies. In many of the provinces indeed the spring and autumn rites were still celebrated in the temples of Confucius at the provincial capitals, and while Yuan Shih-kai lived the time-honored ceremonies in Peking at the Altar of Heaven had also been observed with the customary ritual. But the radical Republicans opposed a state religion of any kind, and forced a compromise by which the Constitution solemnly authorized citizens to honor Confucius, if they wished, and also to profess any religious belief within the bounds of law, but denied to Confucianism any special privileges. And within the sacred precincts of the Temple of Heaven profane festivals were permitted and strangers, it is said, danced on the platform of the Altar of Heaven. Eventually the widening ravages of political corruption brought a better appreciation of the value of the old morality. Political reformers began to see new uses for old institutions and new possibilities of reconstruction upon the old foundations. After the Constitution of 1923 was set aside in the spring of 1925, it seemed unlikely that another attempt would be made to establish constitutional government upon a western model without any regard for the ancient traditions and institutions of the East.

The political confusion and disorder which followed the nullification of the permanent Constitution and the complete downfall of the mandarinate threatened to pass all understanding. The outlook for constitutional government seemed to be growing hopeless. Foreign observers began to talk more freely than ever before about the innate incapacity of the Chinese for self-government. Social sense, they conceded, the Chinese possessed in a high degree, but political sense, they declared, had been denied to them. The tawdry dictatorship of Chang Tso-lin at the northern capital did not solve the problem of China. It merely encouraged the development of similar dictatorships in other regions. No unity remained in the public services except in those which were administered by aliens. The Maritime Customs Administration continued to collect taxes on trade in accordance with the treaties in order to pay interest on foreign loans, and the customs-surpluses became the most reliable revenues which the masters of Peking possessed. The Postal Administration also continued to function throughout the country under foreign management. But the so-called central government at Peking could not get itself obeyed beyond range of the dictator's guns, and it almost ceased to carry on any services except those relating to the maintenance of his armies. The international conferences at Peking on tariff autonomy and the abolition of extraterritoriality, which had been promised at the Washington Conference, completely broke down. Even the Chinese themselves began to doubt their political capacity. Those who took a short view of the political scene despaired of the integrity of their country. Some seemed ready to acquiesce in its permanent division by local dictators. Others looked for help to foreign Powers and envisaged an extension of the authority of alien administrators over the public services. Foreign observers ventured to suggest that the railroads might well be handed over next, to be administered like the Post Office, and in certain quarters talk revived of an eventual partition of the country among the Powers.

But Chinese who took a longer view of the political scene did not lose faith in the political sense of their countrymen. The failures of the past were explained, they thought, by the errors of the past. Those errors, being understood, need not be repeated. The problem of China might yet be solved by the people of China and there were still foreigners who for various reasons continued to give them encouragement.

V

THE REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS OF SUN YAT-SEN

I. DR. SUN'S LEGACY TO REVOLUTIONARY CHINA

Indestructible faith in the political capacity of the Chinese people was personified in the Cantonese revolutionist, Sun Yat-sen. His last will and testament, signed in the hospital of the Peking Union Medical College on the day before his death, bequeathed this faith as his chief legacy to the people of China.[1] For forty years he had devoted himself to the cause of the people's revolution, the will begins by saying, with but one end in view, the elevation of China to a position of freedom and equality among the nations. The end was not in sight, but the will gives no sign of any loss of faith. Dr. Sun's last thoughts were concerned only with the choice of means. "My experiences during these forty years," the will continues, "have firmly convinced me that to attain this goal we must bring about a thorough awakening of our own people." Dr. Sun was also convinced that there should be an alliance "with those peoples of the world who treat us on the basis of equality." His faith was not confined to his fellow-countrymen. He believed that peoples everywhere who believed in themselves would also believe in China and join "in a common struggle" for the dignity of nations. This is the profession of faith which his followers have been taught to repeat at the opening of every public meeting in Nationalist China. It is recited by public officials at their weekly experience meetings, by party politicians at their conferences and conventions, by school children at the opening exercises of the public schools each Monday morning, by the people at large on all patriotic holidays and "humiliation days." His portrait hangs in the most conspicuous position in every public hall, school-building, and meeting-place in Nationalist China, where all who attend can look upon his face while they repeat the words of his will and devote two or three minutes to silent meditation.

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[1] See Appendix A.

The new faith has acquired not only a ritual but also suitable places for worship. Its temples are the monuments to its late leader, which mark the spread of Nationalism over the land. These monuments have taken characteristic forms. In many places new municipal parks and playgrounds, attesting Nationalist interest in works of public utility, have been named in honor of Sun Yat-sen. In some places also museums and libraries have been established in his name, where collections of patriotic literature and art serve the double purpose of commemorating the founder of the faith and propagating his gospel. One of the most significant expressions of this propensity for combining the sentimental and the practical was the giving of his name to the state universities under Nationalist control. Respect for learning and reverence for the dead reënforced one another, making these in the eyes of patriotic Chinese among the most appropriate memorials to their hero. More satisfactory perhaps in western eyes are the monuments specially designed for memorial purposes, such as the beautiful memorial hall in Canton, built on the site of the presidential yamen formerly occupied by Sun Yat-sen, and the impressive column on the Kuan Yin hill near by.

The most impressive of these memorials is the great mausoleum on the side of Purple Mountain, overlooking Nanking. It was Sun Yat-sen's wish that his body be buried near the city which he hoped would be the future capital of the Chinese Republic. The knoll on the mountainside, which was selected for the site of the mausoleum, offered a splendid opportunity for a monument in the grand manner, prescribed by the traditions of the country. An ambitious plan, designed to stir the pride of patriotic Chinese, was chosen by open competition within a few months after Sun Yat-sen's death, and through all the confusion and disorder of the following years work was never abandoned, though several times interrupted by the fighting in the neighborhood. Hundreds of men were employed, and the monument was completed in time for dedication in a little over four years after the death of Sun Yat-sen. The Memorial Hall and Tomb, which together form the main edifice of the monument, stand at the head of a great flight of stone stairs, bordered with ornamental shrubbery and flowers and approached from the foot of the mountain by a broad highway lined with cypresses. The Hall is a translation of the traditional Chinese memorial architecture from wood into concrete, granite, and marble, and will shelter a heroic statue of Sun Yat-sen, seated, like that of Lincoln in the Memorial at Washington. The Tomb, which the visitor enters from the Hall, seems from the outside to be of the type that is customary in China, but within is so arranged that the sarcophagus can be viewed from above, like Grant's Tomb in New York or Napoleon's in Paris. The mausoleum as a whole is a triumphant expression of the spirit of the new China. The Kuomintang leaders intended to build a monument which could bear comparison with the finest products of patriotic sentiment in the countries of the West, and they accomplished their purpose. It takes its place as one of the greatest and most beautiful of its kind in the world. It is a monument not only to the faith of Sun Yat-sen in the people of China but also to that of the Chinese people in themselves.

It is not surprising that, in a country where reverence for the dead is the first duty of the living, the surviving members of the Kuomintang should have sought without delay to demonstrate the vitality of the new faith by the impressiveness of the memorials to its chief prophet. At the same time they were demonstrating their own capacity to do significant things in a competent way. The splendid monuments at Nanking and elsewhere offer convincing evidence of the constructive abilities of the leaders of the new China. But the construction of monuments in stone and concrete is a simple matter compared with the building of a state. The architects of states work with much less tractable materials than concrete and stone. The foundations of modern free states consist of the purposes of the people who form them. Those who would found a new state or regenerate an old one must operate upon the minds and hearts of their fellow-men. They must find fresh and more vital ideals to replace those which have grown stale and fallen into discredit. They must lead men to a better understanding of common interests, to a more wholesome attitude toward public affairs. Political authority must acquire new charms; political obligation, new sanctions.

Sun Yat-sen was not unaware of the nature of the task which he had attempted. He understood the necessity of giving new meaning to old ideas, of bringing fresh visions of eternal truths. He did not make an end of his last will and testament, when he had recorded his faith in the people of China. He enriched his legacy to the Chinese people with a prescription by which they might know how to justify his faith. "The work of the Revolution," he wrote, "is not yet done. Let all our comrades follow my *Plans for National Reconstruction*, *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, *Three Principles of the People*, and the *Manifesto*, issued by the first national convention of our party, and strive on earnestly for their consummation." In these writings Sun Yat-sen had set forth his political philosophy together with his practical proposals for the elevation of China to a position of freedom and equality among the nations. They have become the sacred writings of Chinese Nationalism. They are the basis of formal instruction in the science of government in all Chinese universities. Textbooks based upon them are utilized for the teaching of civics in all public schools. To finish the Revolution according to Sun Yat-sen's plans is the goal of Nationalist politics.

2

HIS "PLANS FOR NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION"

Sun Yat-sen's writings contain a systematic and remarkably complete program for the regeneration of China. The main features of this program were apparently worked out in his own mind during the years of exile following the failure of the anti-Manchu insurrection at Canton in 1895. Much of it he expounded to the Chinese students and exiles in Japan after the foundation of the Tung Meng Hui in Tokyo in 1905. Some of it he tried to carry into effect after the overthrow of the Manchus and the establishment of the First Republic at Nanking in 1912. But at that time his associates could not grasp the full meaning of his revolutionary politics. They thought the establishment of a republic would be an easy matter, once the Manchus were out of the way. By the time they had discovered their error, it was too late to utilize Sun Yat-sen's political ideas. The opportunity had escaped them. From this experience Sun Yat-sen, if he had not understood before, learned that a revolution must first take place in the minds of the people before it can materialize in the reconstruction of the state. He began to give more thought to the popularization of his doctrines and in 1918 published the first three volumes of his *Plans for National Reconstruction.* These volumes dealt respectively with "Psychological Reconstruction," "Material Reconstruction," and "Social Reconstruction." He had intended to publish a fourth volume on political reconstruction, but circumstances caused delay until in 1922, when Chen Chiung-ming revolted and turned his guns upon Sun Yat-sen's headquarters, much of his library and all his notes and unpublished manuscript were destroyed by fire. In 1924, after the reorganization of the Kuomintang and the adoption of the *Manifesto* referred to in the will, the Russian advisers in Canton insisted that Sun Yat-sen put his ideas concerning political reconstruction into form more suitable for propagandist purposes. This was done in part in the popular lectures which were subsequently published under the title *San Min Chu I*, or in English, *The Three Principles of the People.* This book, though hastily prepared and never carefully revised, has enjoyed a vogue among the Chinese Revolutionists which can only be compared to that of Rousseau's *Social Contract* during the French Revolution or Marx's *Capital* during the Russian.[1]

The first principles of Sun Yat-sen's political philosophy are derived from his moral philosophy and are expressed in his theory of education. He believed that the educational system of a state is the essence of its constitution and that the chief object of education in a rightly organized state is training for public life. To the Chinese this is a thoroughly conservative theory of education. It is the theory set forth in their ancient classics. To inculcate it was one of the principal duties of the mandarins under the scholastic empire. The main purpose of the official ceremonies in the temples of Confucius was to emphasize its importance. Sun Yat-sen was clinging to the best traditions of China when he repeated the familiar exhortation from *The Great Learning* which tells those who would govern others first to learn to govern themselves and those who would govern themselves to begin with the pursuit of knowledge.[2] "Search into the nature of things," the Sage had said, "extend the boundaries of knowledge, make the purpose sincere, regulate the mind, cultivate personal virtue, rule the family, govern the state, pacify the world." This, Sun Yat-sen also believed, was the right order in which to proceed. Effective training for public life, he insisted, should begin with the diffusion of knowledge and the development of character. So he praised the ancient Chinese morality, like any mandarin of the old school, and called upon his countrymen to develop from within outward, to begin with their inner nature and not to cease until the world should be at peace.

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[1] The writings of Sun Yat-sen have not yet been completely translated into English. A part of the *Plans for National Reconstruction*, together with some material of an autobiographical nature, was translated into Russian and then from the Russian into English and published under the title, *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary*. This volume deals mainly with the "psychological" reconstruction which Sun Yat-sen considered necessary for a successful revolution. An appendix contains reports of two speeches delivered in Canton in 1921 in which Sun Yat-sen outlined his "Three Principles of the People." A part of the plan for the material reconstruction of China was published in 1920 under the title, *The International Development of China*. This book discusses the possible utilization of foreign capital for the purpose of developing Chinese industry and commerce, especially by the construction of railroads and harbors. The *San Min Chu I* has been translated into the chief western languages. The best English translation is that by Frank W. Price, published by the China Committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Shanghai, 1927. There has been a multitude of commentaries on Sun Yat-sen's writings in Chinese, and a noteworthy series of expositions, prepared for use in the various grades of the public schools of China, has been published by the Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1928. The most systematic and complete of the commentaries is that by Chou Fu-hai, editor of the *New Life*, a Nationalist organ published at Shanghai, and formerly one of the heads of the Nationalist Political and Military Training School at Hankow. Another important commentary is that on the philosophy of livelihood, by Tai Chi-tao, the first president of the Board of Examiners in the reorganized National Government at Nanking. Unfortunately these commentaries have not yet been translated into English.

[2] See *San Min Chu I*, Price's translation, p. 134.

From this theory of education the classical scholars of old China had drawn conclusions which offer little aid or comfort to the modern advocates of popular government. Believing, as they did, that men were equal by nature in the sense that all men are naturally good, they deemed them very unequal in strength, intelligence, and political capacity. Such natural inequalities of men were the justification of the peculiar institutions of the scholastic empire. Those who could not pass the examinations for admission into the hierarchy were evidently unfit for participation in affairs of state. They were supposed to mind their own affairs, unless perchance they wished to exercise their right of rebellion, while the management of the empire was the business of the emperor and the scholars. When democratic reformers like Sun Yat-sen began to argue that the conduct of public affairs should cease to be the private business of the ruling class and should become a public business, they were told that it would be impossible to transform China into a modern state until the whole Chinese people had received a modern education. "You imagine," the sceptics cried, "that China can immediately at a single jump become a strong and vigorous state, qualified for a place among the Great Powers. But it will take years for the diffusion of universal education among the hundreds of millions of Chinese and meanwhile the state will be ruined by the admission of the unfit to positions of authority and power." The ideals of personal conduct taught by Confucius were well suited, they thought, for people who knew their place, but inappropriate in a modern democracy where the most important places are open to all and no place in particular is reserved for anybody.[1] If the classical theory of education were sound, they concluded, there could be no question of democracy in China until all the people were trained for the practice of democracy. The people must not only understand their rights in a democratic state, but also know how to perform the duties of citizens in such a state.

Sun Yat-sen was in partial agreement with the critics of democracy. Though he had faith in the political capacity of the Chinese people, he did not believe that all possessed equal capacity. He divided mankind into three classes on the basis of differences in natural intelligence and ability.[2] The first class comprises those "who see and perceive first." They are the men of vision and foresight who furnish the discoverers and inventors of human society, the men of superior wisdom who make the world advance and give mankind its civilization. The second class comprises those "who see and perceive later." Their intelligence and ability are below the standard of the first class; they cannot invent or discover but can only follow and imitate, learning from what the first class has already done. The third class comprises those "who do not see or perceive." They have a still lower grade of intelligence and ability and do not understand even though one tries to teach them; they simply act. Sun Yat-sen illustrated his thought by the example of the construction of foreign buildings in Chinese cities by Chinese workmen. The architect, perhaps a foreigner, prepares the plans. The foremen, Chinese, study the plans and direct the workmen. The latter, Chinese also, do not understand the plans, but they can follow the foremen's directions. "The foreign buildings in every city depend upon these groups — architects, foremen, and workmen — and upon their coöperative effort. All the great achievements of the world also depend upon these three groups, but the largest group is the one of practical operators who do not know or perceive. A smaller group are those who know and perceive afterward. The smallest group are those who know and perceive first. . . . The business of the world certainly requires, first, initiators; next, many promoters; and lastly, a large number of operators, in order to be successfully accomplished. The progress of the world depends upon these three types, and not one type must be lacking."

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[1] *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary*, p. 161.

[2] *San Min Chu I*, Price's translation, p. 297.

Despite this concession to the critics of democracy, Sun Yat-sen drew from his theory of education radically different conclusions from theirs. "The nations of the world," he continued, "as they begin to apply democracy and to reform the government, should give a part to every man — to the man who sees first, to the man who sees later, to the man who does not see. We must realize that political democracy is not given to us by nature; it is created by human effort. We must create democracy and then give it to the people, not wait to give it until the people fight for it." By the expression "create democracy," Sun Yat-sen evidently means to devise a plan for a democratic state; and by giving it to the people, he means teaching the people how to operate according to the plan. The political architects or engineers must reveal their vision to all and inspire confidence on the part of all in the practical utility of their vision. To attract the attention of the multitude and inspire the necessary confidence is the first task of those who see and perceive first. To train the political "foremen" and "bosses" who can direct the multitude is their next task. "If you are striving for the regeneration of the state," Sun Yat-sen once declared, "especially if by means of a revolution, to act before your actions are fully understood is a matter, not only of possibility, but also of necessity." He was writing at a time when the northern militarists were strengthening their grip upon the government at Peking.[1] "The majority of countries whose power has flourished, as for example the Great Powers, first acquired their strength, and only then began organizing the education of their people. Speaking of China, we can say that our intelligence is quite sufficient to enable us to take our place at one bound in the ranks of the Great Powers. The obstacle to this lies, not in the fact that without learning you cannot act, but in the worthlessness of our Government and our officials." The people need not wait for democracy, he thought, until they have learned how to act like democrats. Those who wish to become swimmers do not stay out of the water until they know how to swim.

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[1] *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary*, p. 163.

Sun Yat-sen's strategy of revolution was embodied in the famous aphorism, "Understanding is difficult, action easy." Most Revolutionists, he had discovered, held precisely the contrary opinion. They believed it was action that was difficult, whereas understanding was easy. In the first part of his *Plans for National Reconstruction* Sun Yat-sen was at great pains to controvert this notion. He cites numerous examples of the truth that, though some first learn to understand and thus know how to act, a greater number, without understanding, can also act. For instance, few persons could devise a serviceable standard of value and medium of exchange, nor do many understand the theory of money, but everybody can use it. Few understand the processes of nutrition nor many the principles of dietetics, but all can ordinarily choose their food so as to sustain life. Likewise the coming of democracy need not wait until the science of government is widely understood, nor even until there is general knowledge of the principal features of a democratic constitution. For the masses of the people, he believed, it is enough to desire that kind of government and to be willing to do what is required of them in order that it may be maintained. The agitator in the first place, and the educator subsequently, will try to spread among the people those attitudes which make them suitable material for democratic states. They will cultivate the disposition to demand popular government and to imitate the behavior of those who are showing them the way to operate such a government. Sun Yat-sen in his writings lays great stress on three characteristics of good citizenship in a democracy, wisdom, courage, and love of one's fellow-men. But not all these qualities are equally necessary for all classes of people. All the people certainly need the third. The political foremen or ordinary politicians need the second as well. The political architects or state-planners are most in need of the first. Doubtless the possibilities of training for citizenship in a democracy are infinite, but, where the spirit of democracy is strong, the establishment of democratic institutions need not wait upon the universal diffusion of knowledge.

Holding such views as these, Sun Yat-sen consistently devoted himself to the training of leaders for the revolution, leaving the education of the masses mainly for others. Indeed he believed it impossible to give any thorough education to the masses, until there was a material as well as a spiritual reconstruction of China. This thought he elaborated in the second part of his *Plans for National Reconstruction*. He also outlined a grand design for the development of the natural resources of China and the improvement of the means of communication. Much of this was done over for foreign governments and investors in his book, *The International Development of China*, written after the end of the World War, when it seemed that foreign capital would again be ready for investment in China. Sun Yat-sen had devoted much attention to the economic development of the country since his resignation of the presidency of the First Republic in 1912 and acceptance from Yuan Shih-kai of the office of Director of the Railroad Bureau, which was to plan a modern transportation system for the whole country. The defeat of the Kuomintang in the civil war of 1913 put an end to that particular activity, but not to Sun Yat-sen's interest in the subject. "Chinese aspirations," he wrote, nearly a decade later, "can be realized only when we understand that, to regenerate the state . . . we must welcome the influx of foreign capital on the largest possible scale, and also must attract foreign scientists and trained experts to develop our country and train us. Then in the course of a few years we shall create our own powerful large-scale industry and shall accumulate technical and scientific knowledge. . . . If industry is developed, the full development of the economic resources of China is possible; and only then will it be possible to carry out the universal education of the people."[1]

Sun Yat-sen recognized the importance of the material reconstruction of China, but he did not believe that changes in the economic life of the people alone would determine the course of political development. That an untutored but prosperous people could more easily become an intelligent people than one which was both ignorant and poor, he understood, but he was never much interested in western attempts to demonstrate a necessary relationship between the mode of producing wealth in a country and its processes of government. The doctrine of Marx and Lenin, that "in every historical epoch the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch," ran counter to his way of thinking. He did not deny that there is an economic basis of politics, but he rejected the notion that it is the only basis or even the most important of the bases of politics. Despite his western education he clung to the traditional Chinese point of view which regarded forms of government as rational systems of human behavior, which men by taking thought can mould nearer to their hearts' desire. His was not a materialistic interpretation of history. The classical political philosophy of China seemed to him to offer a much more profound theory of the state and of government than that of the self-styled scientific socialists. Sun Yat-sen believed with Confucius that men should be governed by moral agency in preference to physical force, or, he might have added, even to the kind of force which is at the disposal of those who are the chief beneficiaries of "the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange." He believed also, again following China's great teacher, that the essential factor in good government is the utilization of the services of the wisest and ablest persons to be found among the people, regardless of wealth, class, or original condition. The regeneration of the state, as he visualized the problem, was primarily a task for statesmen rather than for captains of industry or organizers of the proletariat.

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[1] *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary*, pp. 174–175.

The third part of Sun Yat-sen's *Plans for National Reconstruction*, dealing with what he called social reconstruction, is of less importance than the preceding parts. It might be supposed from the title that he was about to discuss the reconstruction of Chinese society, but this was not a subject to which he ever gave much thought. His followers are still disputing whether he considered the patriarchal family-system incompatible with the formation of a modern state in China. Holding the views which he did with respect to the relations between an economic and a political revolution, it was unlikely that he would be greatly concerned about a social revolution. He was bound to believe that a strong and intelligent body of rulers would be capable of guiding the development of society and could take due heed of the influence of impersonal social forces upon the evolution of the state. In his treatment of social reconstruction, therefore, he discussed certain educational problems which he deemed too urgent to be postponed until the establishment of a system of universal education. He was particularly concerned about the methods of public discussion, especially the organization of public assemblies and the conduct of debate. It was necessary that at least the active Revolutionists should be familiar with the best procedure for the management of meetings of all kinds. To this end he studied the rules of order in western deliberative bodies and prepared a treatise on parliamentary law. The Chinese now possess better treatises on the subject than his, and this part of his *Plans* is chiefly significant because it attests the genuineness of his faith in the reasonableness of men. A knowledge of parliamentary law would be lightly esteemed by revolutionists who intended to rely largely on physical force and violence for the attainment of their ends. Such revolutionists would be more concerned with the methods of stirring the emotions of the people and with the technique of dogmatic propaganda than with the methods of forming rational opinion and the technique of government by discussion. Perhaps no part of Sun Yat-Sen's *Plans* is more characteristic of the man or more symptomatic of the grip which rationalistic political philosophy retained upon his mind.

3

HIS "THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE"

Sun Yat-sen's plans for the political reconstruction of China were not published with the rest of his plans for national reconstruction nor fully explained in any of his writings. The greater part of them, however, are set forth in his *Three Principles of the People.* Because of the renown which this book has attained and its influence upon the Chinese Revolution, it is worth while to note the author's comment at the time of its publication. "It now happens," he wrote, "that the Kuomintang is being reorganized and our comrades are beginning to engage in a determined attack upon the minds of the people. [This was one of the first consequences of the intervention by the Russian Communists in the Chinese Revolution.] They are in great need of . . . material for propaganda. So I have been delivering one lecture a week. . . . In these lectures I do not have the time for careful preparation nor the books necessary for reference. I can only mount the platform and speak extemporaneously. . . . Although I am making additions and corrections before sending the book to the press, yet I realize that in clear presentation of the theme, in orderly arrangement of the discussion, and in use of supporting facts, these lectures are not at all comparable to the material which I had formerly prepared. I hope that all our comrades will take the book . . . and make it a perfect text for propaganda purposes."[1] Every reader of the book can easily perceive the shortcomings mentioned by the author, but those who are duly forewarned should be sufficiently armed against the error of permitting the book's imperfections to blind them to its real significance. It would be a mistake to conclude, as one important critic of the book has suggested, that its imperfections may be ascribed to the baneful influence of the Communists.[1] The political principles advocated in Sun Yat-sen's *San Min Chu I* and the constructive proposals embodied in his Five-Power Constitution, were fully matured in his mind long before he had any contact with Russian Communists. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary politics was his own creation, if a new combination of old ideas can ever be said to be the creation of any man.

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[1] Preface to *San Min Chu I,* Price's translation, pp. xi, xii.

The political ideas which Sun Yat-sen chose to designate by the expression, "Three Principles of the People," were in their main outlines of American origin. During five of his most impressionable years, he lived in Honolulu, where he graduated at the age of eighteen from a missionary high school. He had breathed the atmosphere of American life and absorbed the spirit of American government. Returning to China, he studied for a time at Queen's College in Hongkong and subsequently completed the course of training for the medical profession at the Hongkong Medical College, but he never forgot his early contact with American culture nor lost his taste for American literature. Professing Christianity, he always maintained friendly relations with American missionaries, and, though in later life he acquired a better understanding and appreciation of Chinese literature and philosophy, his political thought retained its predominantly American character to the end. The immediate inspiration of the "Three Principles of the People" was Lincoln's Gettysburg address. In that address Lincoln pronounced his famous eulogy of the men who had died in order that a nation "conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal" might live. That was the kind of nation Sun Yat-sen wished to help bring forth in China. He wished to secure for his own countrymen the blessings of "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." A government of the people meant to Sun Yat-sen a government based upon the principle of national independence. A government by the people meant to him one based upon the principle of popular sovereignty. A government for the people meant one designed to promote the general welfare or, as he put it, based upon the principle of popular livelihood. These were his "Three Principles of the People."

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[1] See Hiram Bingham, "New China's Political Bible," *Foreign Affairs*, VI (January, 1928), 216.

Each of these three principles was associated in Sun Yat-sen's mind with a political ideal and an organized political movement. The principle of national independence, as he understood it, sustained the ideal of states the boundaries of which coincide with the areas inhabited by peoples of like nationality. This ideal seemed to him to have inspired the nationalistic political movements which fill so many of the pages of modern history. The principle of popular sovereignty sustained the ideal of states the governments of which rest upon the expressed consent of the peoples who constitute them. This ideal seemed to inspire the democratic movements of modern times. The principle of the people's livelihood suggested to him the ideal of states which use their power to the end that the needs of all may be supplied by the efforts of all. This ideal, he believed, was the inspiration of modern socialistic movements. On the authority, therefore, of the "Three Principles of the People" Sun Yat-sen built his revolutionary platform, consisting of three planks, Nationalism, Democracy, and Socialism. But he put his own interpretation upon these planks. Chinese Nationalism, he knew, could not be identical with the simple nationalism of the West. The five-bar flag of the First Republic suggested that Manchus and Mongols, Tibetans and Mohammedans, should have the same rights in the state as the Sons of Han. Although Sun Yat-sen never liked the five-bar flag and the Republic which now stands upon his platform has abandoned it for the red, white, and blue banner which he ultimately preferred, he recognized that the revolutionary movement in China must satisfy the aspirations of more than one nationality or renounce its claim to the empire of the Manchus. And so it was too with democracy and socialism. Chinese democracy and socialism could not blindly follow in the path trod by the democrats and socialists of the West. Democracy and socialism in China must gather meaning from the traditions and circumstances of Chinese life.

To understand Sun Yat-sen's interpretation of nationalism it is necessary to emphasize the distinction between a nation or nationality and a state. The former may be defined as a body of people united by a common sentiment of cultural unity. The sentiment of nationality is fostered by consciousness of blood relationship, use of a common language, dependence upon common sources of livelihood, devotion to a common religion, and other circumstances such as common habits and modes of life. Such a sentiment, if strong enough, may cause those who share it to desire to form a state of their own, and, if they succeed, nation and state will be composed of the same body of people. But a state is not necessarily a nationalistic state, and it is always something essentially different from a nation. It is a body of people politically organized, that is to say, organized in order to accomplish certain purposes, such as those set forth in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States, which its members may cherish in common. The corporate sentiment which binds together those who are strongly attached to a particular state we call patriotism. It may be strengthened by national sentiment in a nationalistic state, or it may be weakened by national sentiment in a state composed of different nationalities. Patriotism means loyalty to the state regardless of its composition. It means devotion to the welfare of all the people without fear or favor on account of differences of nationality. Sun Yat-sen's lectures on Nationalism were designed to promote patriotism among the Chinese rather than what the West calls nationalism. The Chinese people, he pointed out, had always shown great loyalty to the family and the clan, but had hitherto manifested little regard for the state. They were, so to speak, state-blind. Though well aware of their cultural unity and proud — perhaps too proud — of their cultural achievements, they underestimated the importance of political unity and of political affairs. To make the state the foremost object of popular devotion was, to Sun Yat-sen, the first aim of the Revolution.

Sun Yat-sen's plea for more patriotism in China was partly rational and partly emotional. He dwelt upon the unparalleled growth of the Chinese people, arguing that the safety of the Chinese in the past had lain in their isolation and in their superiority of numbers. But future safety, his argument ran, could not be predicated upon either of these factors. The isolation of the East had been destroyed by western cupidity, religious zeal, and applied science. The superiority of numbers was threatened, he feared, by the growth of population among other nations. Future safety, as the example of Japan showed, lay in the organization of a strong state after the western fashion. To arouse his countrymen to the efforts and sacrifices necessary for making the state strong, Sun Yat-sen cited the wrongs which China had suffered from foreign Powers. He dwelt upon the evidence tending to show that the Powers were still bent upon aggression at the cost of China. He pointed to the foreign possessions on the Chinese coast, to the foreign settlements in her cities, to the foreign consular jurisdiction over her people, to the foreign control of her customs revenue, to the foreign administration of her postal service, to the foreign gunboats on her rivers, and to the foreign soldiers on her soil. At the same time he did not blame the foreigners alone for the degradation of China. He blamed the Chinese themselves, whose lack of patriotism made a strong state impossible and whose lack of self-discipline invited interference by the foreigner. No foreigner has uttered harsher criticisms of the Chinese than Sun Yat-sen, but he knew how to speak unpleasant truths so as to stimulate and not merely to hurt. He believed in his countrymen and justified his criticisms by his faith. They could easily establish their equality with the foreigner, he declared, if they only would, since they possessed not only an equal political capacity but also a political philosophy superior to that of the West. The lectures on Nationalism close with a stirring appeal to national pride in the lofty political ideals of classical China.

Sun Yat-sen's discussion of nationalism does not escape the pitfalls which beset the authors of patriotic propaganda in western countries. He views with characteristic alarm adverse balances of trade, the circulation of foreign bank-notes, and the operations of foreign bankers in general. He is especially disturbed at the thought of a "white peril" from the rapid growth of population in the West during the nineteenth century. He notes that the Americans in particular increased more than tenfold and suggests that in another hundred years they may number a billion and treat the Chinese as they treated the Indians. Economic fallacies concerning international trade and foreign money and credit are too familiar among protectionist writers in all countries to attract special attention when adopted by a Chinese, and Americans above all others, having shuddered in their turn at "the rising tide of color" and "the passing of the great race," can afford to look upon Sun Yat-sen's demographic errors with an indulgent eye. Even when he proposes that China shall eventually take up the "white man's burden," he does it in the approved occidental manner. "If we want China to rise to power," he remarks near the close of his last lecture on Nationalism, "we must not only restore our national standing, but we must also assume a great responsibility towards the world. . . . The road which the Great Powers are traveling today means the destruction of other states; if China, when she becomes strong, wants to crush other countries, copy the Powers' imperialism, and go their road, we shall just be following in their tracks. . . . Only if we 'rescue the weak and lift up the fallen' shall we be carrying out the divine obligation of our nation. We must aid the weaker and smaller peoples and oppose the great powers of the world." And he mentions Annam, Burma, and Korea, as weak and fallen states which China is morally bound to rescue and lift up. This sounds suspiciously like the rationalizations current in western countries, when aggressive foreign policies are to be justified in the eyes of the public, but there can be no doubt that in the China of recent years it has been highly effective propaganda.

Sun Yat-sen's interpretation of democracy is more original than his interpretation of nationalism. He begins, however, with the usual explanation of popular sovereignty as a general principle of politics and of democracy as a system of government and defends them with the arguments which are familiar in the West. "When the masses were unenlightened . . . autocracy was of considerable value. . . . But . . . with the rapid advance of civilization people are growing in intelligence and developing a new consciousness of self. . . ." Democracy seemed to him, as to the liberal-minded westerners with whom he came in contact, a natural product of political evolution. Next comes the more specific question: Is China today ripe for democracy? Sun Yat-sen gives no direct answer to this question. Instead of trying to prove that the Chinese were actually capable of performing the duties of citizenship in a satisfactory manner, he digresses from the course of his argument in order to expose the weakness of monarchy as exhibited in Chinese history. When Yuan Shih-kai was plotting to seize the supreme power for himself and found a new dynasty, he procured an opinion from one of his political advisers, Dr. Goodnow of Johns Hopkins University, setting forth the theoretical advantages of the monarchical form of government. A principal advantage, as alleged by Dr. Goodnow, was the settlement in advance of the succession to the throne so as to avoid struggles for the supreme power between ambitious men and the concomitant civil wars. This opinion, coming from an American and presumably a republican, made a great stir in China and gave the dictator aid and encouragement in his scheme to put an end to the Republic. Sun Yat-sen takes great pains to prove that Imperial China did not escape wars over the succession to the throne but that on the contrary Chinese history is full of the disorders caused by rival claimants to supreme power. It was in order to avert further civil war, he declared, that "we, as soon as we had launched our revolution, proclaimed that we wanted a republic and not kings." This was an argument for a republic but not necessarily for a democratic republic.

Specially significant is Sun Yat-sen's discussion of those watchwords of western democracy, liberty and equality. Liberty, he pointed out, is a word with many meanings. In the first place, it means freedom from foreign domination. The demand for liberty in this sense of the term is the essence of the first of the "Three Principles of the People," the principle of national independence. Sun Yat-sen strongly favored that kind of liberty, but it has no necessary connection with democracy. Liberty also means the right to do as one pleases. This, he thought, was the commonest sense of the term among peoples who had suffered from oppression by privileged classes, as in the states of the West where feudal institutions formerly flourished. Europeans have often fought for liberty of this kind, he said, because they have had little of it until recent times and consequently have prized it highly. They have even developed the doctrine that all men are naturally free to do as they please and should be as free as possible in organized states as well as in a state of nature. But this kind of liberty, he declared, has little meaning for the Chinese, who got rid of the feudal system two thousand years ago. They have long enjoyed a large measure of freedom in the management of their personal affairs, and such interferences as the individual has to submit to come from the family or the guild rather than from the state. He recalled the ancient Chinese folk-song:

> When the sun rises, I toil;
> When the sun sets, I rest;
> I dig wells for water;
> I till the fields for food;
> What has the Emperor's power to do with me?

The Chinese have not suffered like the Europeans from the lack of personal liberty, Sun Yat-sen argued, and therefore have given it little consideration. The language does not even possess a word for it. He rejected as unsound the doctrine of natural liberty and denounced as unsuited for China the maxim that the liberty of each man to do as he pleased should be limited only by the liberty of others to do the same.

The kind of liberty which Sun Yat-sen thought the Chinese needed most is that which is based on the recognition of duty, especially the duty of sacrificing the interests of the individual in order to promote the general welfare. The individual in China has long been accustomed to subordinating his personal interests to those of his family, but not to those of the whole body of people who constitute the state. This indifference to social interests wider than those of the family was one of the greatest obstacles which Sun Yat-sen encountered in his efforts to build a new China. To overcome it he advocated the kind of liberty which consists in doing as one ought in matters of public concern. That is the kind which sees no impairment of the rights of good citizens in obedience to just laws. It is the only kind which is compatible with the development of strong states.

Sun Yat-sen's attitude toward equality is similarly at variance with the traditional ideas of revolutionary democracy in the West. Having rejected the doctrine that all men are naturally free, he rejects also the companion doctrine that they are created equal. "Nature originally did not make men equal," he declared, "but when autocracy developed among mankind, the despotic kings and princes pushed human differences to an extreme, and the result was an inequality far worse than Nature's inequality. . . . So the scholars who were supporting revolution had to invent the theory of nature-bestowed rights of equality and liberty in order to overthrow the despotism of kings. Their original purpose was to break down artificial man-made inequalities. . . . . Finally, when the belief that man is born free and equal and that the struggle for freedom and equality is the duty of everybody had permeated the masses, the emperors and kings of Europe fell automatically." Here, incidentally, is not only a clear recognition of the natural inequality of mankind but also a part of the evidence which gave Sun Yat-sen his great faith in the power of ideas over the course of events. "But after their downfall [that is, emperors' and kings' downfall]," he continued, "the people began to believe firmly in the theory of natural equality and kept on working day after day to make all men equal. They did not know that such a thing is impossible. . . . This brings us to the true principle of equality. If we pay no attention to each man's intellectual endowments and capacities and push down those who rise to a high position in order to make all equal, the world will not progress and mankind will retrocede. When we speak of democracy and equality but yet want the world to advance, we are talking about political equality. For equality is an artificial not a natural thing, and the only equality which we can create is equality in political status." Human equality in general remains to Sun Yat-sen, as to Lincoln, not a fact but an aspiration, "the highest of moral ideals," towards which men should earnestly strive. This ideal he expresses very beautifully at the end of his lecture on equality.[1]

In modern states the immediate problem is to bring about the most harmonious coöperation between men of different capacities in the service of the common good. Sun Yat-sen thought that the West had had only indifferent success in the solution of this problem. He examined the history of democratic movements in western countries in recent times and observed how far the leading states fell short of genuine democracy. The best of them, he found, had representative governments in which all adults, or all adult males, might vote for public officers and be themselves candidates for public office, but the people at large had little or no direct control over the conduct of public affairs. He noted the development of processes for direct legislation by the people in Switzerland and in some of the states of the American Union, but concluded that the problem of securing both the control of public policy by the people and the efficient conduct of affairs had not yet been solved in the West. The reconciliation of democracy and efficiency seemed to be a task beyond the powers of western political science. He remarked that in Russia a new type of government had been recently developed, which seemed promising, but there were not many data, he added, by which its real value could be appraised. Representative government on the standard western model had been tried in China and, as in many western states, had worked badly. It was evident that something better would have to be devised. That, he declared, was the problem the leaders of the Kuomintang were seeking to solve in order to give effect to the second of the "Three Principles of the People." "If we can find a solution, China will be able to outstrip Europe and America." [1]

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[1] See *San Min Chu I*, Price's translation, pp. 244–245, and cf. Lincoln's address at Springfield, Illinois, June 26, 1857.

Sun Yat-sen discusses in a most interesting way the comparative state of the natural and social sciences in the West. In the natural sciences, he points out, the West has made amazing progress, and man's command of nature has been enormously increased. Through the development of mechanical power not only rich men but also average men have secured the equivalent of the services of a multitude of slaves. The average citizen, therefore, in the modern state has the independence and leisure which only the rich possessed in the aristocratic republics of ancient times. But while such great improvements have been made in the natural sciences and in their application to the problems of life, there has been no corresponding advance in political science. On the contrary the science of government has lagged far behind the other sciences. Westerners, Sun Yat-sen notes, still read Plato's *Republic* with interest and profit. If it were possible to increase the power of the state as mechanical power available for the service of man has been increased, and still keep this highly-developed political power under popular control, the capacity of such a powerful state to enrich the life of the people would outstrip the imagination. But people fear that such power would get out of control and be used for their oppression, and hence prefer old-fashioned and comparatively weak forms of government to the powerful political machines which they might possess, if they dared to build them. Government, Sun Yat-sen said, is "a kind of invisible machine . . . visible machinery is built upon the laws of physics, while the invisible machinery of government is built upon the laws of psychology. Discoveries have been made in the field of physics for several hundred years, but the science of psychology began only twenty or thirty years ago and is not yet very far advanced. Hence this difference; in ways of controlling physical objects and forces we should learn from the West, but in ways of controlling men, we should not learn only from the West. The West long ago thought through the principles and worked out the methods of physical control, so we can wholly follow Western material civilization. . . . But the West has not yet thought through its principles of government, and its methods of government have not yet been fundamentally worked out; so China today, when putting democracy into operation and reforming its government, cannot simply follow the West. We must think out a radically new method."[1]

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[1] *San Min Chu I*, Price's translation, p. 279.

Sun Yat-sen's contribution to the theory of democracy is his emphasis upon the distinction between sovereignty and political ability. The sovereignty, that is, the control of public policy, should be vested in all the people, but the public offices should be filled by those only who are able efficiently to perform their duties. The value of this distinction, Sun Yat-sen points out, depends upon the adoption by the people of the appropriate attitude towards the business of government. It should be like the attitude of the owners of a private business towards the management which they entrust with the actual conduct of affairs. They engage men of superior ability to operate the enterprise, while they retain the control or sovereignty. "Within the factory only the general manager gives orders; the shareholders simply keep supervision over him. The people of a republic are shareholders . . . and should look upon the government as an expert." With such an attitude, Sun Yat-sen argued, public as well as private business can be efficiently administered. "But in none of the democratic states of the West do the people have such an attitude towards government, hence they cannot make use of gifted men to direct the government. As a result the men in public life are generally incompetent, and democratic government is developing very haltingly."[1] Sun Yat-sen thought that democratic states had progressed less rapidly than autocratic states like Germany and Japan. "Japan has been modernized for only a few decades and is now wealthy and powerful." People in western democracies know that they ought to use experts in government as in private business, but they have not succeeded in doing so, "because they are not able to change their old deep-rooted habits" of thought. Wealthy owners of automobiles employ expert chauffeurs to keep their cars in good running order and to drive them. The chauffeurs can do this better than the owners, though the owners retain control and direct the movements of their cars. So it should be, Sun Yat-sen argued, in government. When the people have the correct attitude towards their public servants, democratic states can be well governed. It is not necessary to sacrifice the advantages of genuine aristocracy in order to enjoy the blessings of democracy.

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[1] *San Min Chu I*, Price's translation, pp. 291–292.

Sun Yat-sen's plan of government was based upon this distinction between sovereignty and ability. "The government of a nation must be built upon the rights of the people, but the administration of public affairs must be entrusted to experts." The rights of the people, which were in his opinion necessary and proper for maintaining due control over their government, were four in number: the popular election and recall of public officers, and direct legislation by the people by means of the so-called initiative and referendum. With these four powers, he believed, the people could control directly the government of their state. It would then be safe to construct a "high-powered strong government," broad in scope and capable of accomplishing great things. "If a powerful government should be installed in the largest state in the world," he exclaimed, "would not that state outstrip all others? Would not that government be unequalled under heaven?" Here was a project which made a strong appeal to the imaginations of patriotic Chinese. It was effective propaganda. And so Sun Yat-sen proposed his own scheme of a "five-power" constitution. Besides the usual three departments of government, recommended by Montesquieu and sanctified in the Constitution of the United States, there were to be two others, the examining department and the supervisory department or censorate. No one was to be deemed qualified for a place in the judiciary, in the executive, or even in the legislative department, unless his probable competence was attested by the examiners, and no one was to remain in any public office, if found to be actually unfit by the censors. Examiners and censors were to be as independent of one another and of the other departments of government as judges are of executives and legislators under the best western constitutions. It was a combination of the best features of the constitution of the old scholastic empire with what Sun Yat-sen believed to be best also in the constitutions of the West.[1] "Such a government," he declared in a final burst of enthusiasm, "will be the most complete and the finest in the world, and a state with such a government will indeed be of the people, by the people, and for the people."

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 312.

Sun Yat-sen's interpretation of socialism remains incomplete. Perhaps his Russian advisers, finding it less serviceable for the purposes of their propaganda than they had hoped, discouraged the completion of the lectures. Be that as it may, there is a gap of several months between the delivery of the first two parts of the lectures and that of the third part, in which he expounded the implications of the principle of the people's livelihood, and the exposition of the principle breaks off abruptly without developing all its implications. It will be recalled that the principle of livelihood meant that the power of the state should be used to the end that the needs of all should be supplied as far as possible by the efforts of all. Such a principle might lead to one of the Utopian socialisms of the pre-Marxian period, or to the rigorous Marxism of the modern Communists, or to the more moderate socialism favored by the social-democratic and independent labor parties of the West. In fact Sun Yat-sen's social policy is identical with none of these, and he deliberately rejected the word "socialism" on account of the many different meanings which have been attached to it and the quarrels among those who use it concerning its proper interpretation. As a result, "the common people," he declared, "feel that there is nothing definite to follow in socialism." [1] Yet there seems to be no better word in English to describe the kind of social policy that is consistent with the principle of livelihood.

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[1] *San Min Chu I*, Price's translation, pp. 356–358.

In the first place, Sun Yat-sen makes a vigorous attack on the theories of Marx. Having brushed aside the Utopian socialists as "persons who would make a peaceful and happy state simply out of their imagination," he pays a tribute to Marx's methodology and to his extraordinary knowledge. But Marx's conclusions he declares to be unsound. He flatly rejects the doctrine of historical materialism, which Marx makes the foundation of his social philosophy, and the doctrine of the class-war, which is the essence of Marx's system of politics. The Marxian economics fares no better at Sun Yat-sen's hands. He cites the example of the Ford Motor Company to show that capitalistic profits may grow at the same time that wages are raised, hours of labor are reduced, and prices of the product are lowered. So Sun Yat-sen, like capitalistic economists the world over, finds no merit in Marx's doctrines of the appropriation of surplus value by the capitalists and the progressive impoverishment of the workers. Sun Yat-sen, on the other hand, praises the policies of the moderate social reformers in western states. He particularly mentions legislation for the improvement of working conditions and for the better education of the workers, the nationalization of telegraph and telephone services and of railways and steamship lines, progressive income and inheritance taxes, and the encouragement of consumers' coöperative societies. This program may doubtless be fairly described as socialistic, but it certainly cannot properly be labelled, "made in Moscow."

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[1] *Ibid*, pp. 369–371.

Sun Yat-sen was especially interested in the improvement of the livelihood of the peasants. In a country like China, where the people who live by the cultivation of the soil greatly outnumber those who dwell in cities, agrarian problems are much more important than the problems of urban industry. The most important of his policies, designed for the betterment of rural conditions, was that which he called the "equalization of land ownership." By this he meant a modified form of what westerners call the "single-tax." He had read, while still a young man, Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*, and had been captivated by George's analysis of the land problem. Rejecting the single-taxers' panacea, confiscation by the state of the economic rent of the land, Sun Yat-sen favored a more moderate proposal for the appropriation by the state of what economists have termed "unearned increment." He suggested means for accomplishing this, which he believed would promote a more equitable distribution of agricultural land in China without injustice to vested interests. In addition he advocated the regulation of private industrial capital, when necessary to protect the public against oppression, and the promotion of industry also by direct governmental enterprise. But he recognized the necessity of attracting private capital from abroad if the industrial development of China was to proceed as rapidly as was desirable, and insisted that foreign investors should be treated with due respect. He pointed out that, if the Russian Communists had had to abandon militant communism and adopt a new economic policy more hospitable to foreign capital, there could be no question of an unfriendly economic policy in China, where modern capitalistic industry was even less advanced than in Russia. There is no evidence in these lectures that Sun Yat-sen modified his economic and social program in any respect in order to make it more attractive to his new Communist allies, Russian or Chinese. On the contrary, he remained to the end definitely opposed to dogmatic or so-called scientific socialism. He should be described as a social reformer with a disposition to favor socialistic measures or, better, as a social revolutionist with a disposition to temporize with capitalism.

The later lectures on the principle of livelihood were planned to treat of the four necessaries of life, food, clothing, shelter, and means of travel. Only the two former had been reached when the series ended. Sun Yat-sen makes it clear that in his opinion agriculture must remain a capitalistic industry. He evidently took no stock in grandiose schemes for the socialization of agriculture by the electrification of farms, such as were proposed by Lenin and others in Russia. Sun Yat-sen's mind was full of schemes for the reforestation of China's denuded hills and mountainsides, for the construction of irrigation and drainage works, for the improvement of canals and roads, in short for the prevention of flood and drought and famine and for the promotion of productive industry. He was a student and a dreamer, not what westerners like to call a practical man, and was more interested in stirring the imaginations of his followers and showing them the vision of a land flowing, so to speak, with milk and honey, than in producing what the West calls "results." Believing, as he did, that understanding is more difficult than action, he acted consistently with his belief and devoted himself to pointing out the way that others might go forward.[1] Modern westerners call such a man visionary. From the Chinese standpoint his is the greatest of vocations in the life of a people, that of the great teacher. It is not surprising that after his death his followers should have sought to sanctify his memory by the celebration of such rites as had previously been accorded to no mortal save Confucius.

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[1] This was the object of the second part of his *Plans of National Reconstruction*. His third "Principle of the People" must therefore be construed in the light of his *International Development of China*. See *ante*, pp. 130–131.

4

HIS "FUNDAMENTALS OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION"

Sun Yat-sen, though a visionary, had had too much experience in the organization of revolution to expect that his plans for the regeneration of China could be carried into effect in any short period of time. He conceded particularly that his plan of political reconstruction, calling for a stronger and more vigorous government than the most advanced western states enjoyed, subject to a more effective popular control, was manifestly too ambitious for immediate realization. Neither the revolutionary leaders nor the masses of the people were prepared for the tasks which the operation of such a government would impose upon them. The leaders had only a theoretical knowledge of the Five-Power Constitution and the masses of the people had no knowledge whatever of the four popular rights. Much practice in the art of politics would be necessary before the leaders could safely undertake to set up a five-power constitution, subject to popular control, and long training in the technique of democracy would be necessary before the masses of the people could make effective use of the initiative, referendum, and recall. Even the members of the revolutionary party itself had much to learn about the processes of popular government. The government of the party had never been put upon a genuinely popular basis, and its leaders had never held any meeting which they ventured to call a representative party convention until the party congress which met in January, 1924, shortly before the delivery of the lectures designed to popularize the "Three Principles of the People." When Sun Yat-sen finished the delivery of his lectures on democracy, he recognized that it would be necessary to supplement his plan for political reconstruction with some practical program for carrying it into effect. This was the occasion of the *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, sometimes called in English the "Outline of Reconstructive Policies," which is mentioned in his will as one of the guides to be followed by his revolutionary comrades.

The *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* consists of twenty-five separate propositions, summarizing Sun Yat-sen's whole revolutionary program and outlining a method for carrying it into effect.[1] The method marked a reversal of policy in the Chinese revolutionary movement. Previously the revolutionary leaders had sought to begin by reforming the central government at Peking and thereafter reforming the provincial and local governments. Now Sun Yat-sen proposed to begin at the bottom and work up. Furthermore, he proposed to divide the process of reconstruction into three stages, each of which should be undertaken in its proper order. The first stage would be the establishment of order, which would have to be accomplished by military force and violence. During this stage there would necessarily be a period of military government. The next stage would be the training of the people in the rights and duties of citizenship and of the leaders in the practical art of politics. During this stage the government would be in the hands of the revolutionary leaders without direct control by the people. This would be the period of political tutelage. The final stage would be marked by the establishment of a constitution. The revolutionary leaders would become constitutional rulers and the people would exercise the rights necessary for the maintenance of their sovereignty. Thus the period of constitutional government would be inaugurated. But it would not be inaugurated everywhere at the same time. When any province should be reduced to order, military government would give way to political tutelage in that province. When any administrative district within such a province should become fit for popular government, tutelage would yield to self-government in that district. When all the districts in a province should enjoy self-government, a five-power constitution would be ordained for the government of that province. When tutelage should have yielded to a constitutional régime in a majority of the provinces, the country as a whole would be ripe for constitutional government, and a national constitution should be established, based upon the experience of the provinces during the period of tutelage under their provincial constitutions.

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[1] This document is dated April 12, 1924, and like the famous will is attested by his wife. It was published in a German translation in the *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin*, XXVIII (1927), 48–57. It was not translated into English until 1929. See Appendix B.

The *Fundamentals* contains much curious detail concerning the ways and means of effecting the transition from one stage to another in this process of political reconstruction. Throughout the whole process all were to be ever mindful of the "Three Principles of the People," which would give sense and direction to the course of the revolution. Specific instructions are furnished for the guidance of self-governing districts in the equalization of the land and the regulation of capital. The division of local revenues between the local and provincial authorities is arranged for, and provision is made for the representation of self-governing districts in the provincial governments during the period of tutelage in the province as a whole. All candidates for office, both provincial and local, are to be tested and their fitness approved by the provincial examiners before they can qualify for the public service. Matters of general concern are to be dealt with by the national government and matters of local concern by the provincial and district governments. During the period of tutelage in a province the heads of the provincial government are to be appointed by and responsible to the heads of the national government and, after constitutional government shall be established for the whole country, the heads of the national government may continue to utilize the provincial governments for the administration of national laws, if they wish, though the heads of the provincial governments would now be appointed by and responsible to the representatives of the people of the provinces. Such a consummation of the revolutionary program was evidently a long way off. Meanwhile general knowledge of the aim of the revolution and of the direction which its future course should take would facilitate the task of the revolutionary leaders. Such at all events was the conviction of Sun Yat-sen.

5

THE "MANIFESTO" OF THE KUOMINTANG

The fourth and last of the documents recommended in Sun Yat-sen's will for the guidance of his comrades in revolution is the *Manifesto*, issued by the Kuomintang at its first party congress or national convention in 1924. This document consists of three parts. The first rehearses the history of the Chinese Revolution and extols the record of the revolutionary party. The second outlines the "Three Principles of the People" (which had not then been expounded in detail in popular form) and emphasizes the importance of imparting a knowledge of the principles to the people. The third sets forth the "fighting" platform, the program of measures to be played up in the partisan propaganda. The domestic policy embodied in this "fighting" platform was thoroughly in harmony with the views of Sun Yat-sen as subsequently elaborated in his lectures on the principle of livelihood and in the *Fundamentals*. The foreign policy was based on the same vigorous nationalism that appears in his lectures on the principle of national independence. The *Manifesto* concludes with a strong demand for the recovery of jurisdiction over the foreign settlements in the treaty-ports and for the abolition of the rights of extraterritoriality which foreigners enjoyed in all parts of China. Though the acceptance of aid from Soviet Russia was formally approved by the convention which adopted this *Manifesto*, and Communists who were willing to subscribe to the rules of the party were admitted to membership, no concessions were made by the convention to the creed or practice of communism. The *Manifesto* squarely committed the revolutionary party to the kind of nationalism that President Wilson's "Fourteen Points" encouraged in all parts of the world, to the kind of democracy that could tolerate no dictatorship by a privileged class, not even if that class were the proletariat, and to the kind of social amelioration that is anathema in the eyes of the followers of Marx and Lenin. It bears the stamp of the personality of Sun Yat-sen and breathes his spirit.

The will itself ends in the same spirit as the *Manifesto.* "Above all," run the concluding lines, "our recent declarations in favor of the convocation of a national convention and the abolition of the unequal treaties should be carried into effect with the least possible delay. This is my heartfelt charge to you." The unequal treaties referred to were all the treaties which gave rise to encroachments on the sovereignty of China. Opposition to these treaties was certainly encouraged by the Communists among the followers of Sun Yat-sen, but it was not peculiar to them, nor to his followers. It was strong among all articulate Chinese except those personally interested in the maintenance of foreign privileges. It was the declaration in favor of a national convention that was most characteristic of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary politics. Notwithstanding his perennial efforts to overthrow his enemies by force of arms, he never abandoned hope of a settlement by consent. He had gone to Peking on the mission which ended with his death in the expectation that a national convention would be assembled, representing the people of China as a whole, which would put a stop to further fighting and provide a basis for political reconstruction along the lines he had always advocated. He evidently set no great store by fighting, except as a temporary expedient, and contemplated no dictatorship of the Kuomintang, except such as might be sustained by the consent of the governed. His theory of revolution was not based on the Communist assumption that a political revolution is a mere incident of a more fundamental and much more important social revolution. It was on the contrary more nearly in harmony with the classical Chinese tradition which sanctions the kind of revolution that results from successful rebellion against discredited rulers but leaves the foundations of the state intact. In short, Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary politics were not Bolshevistic but Chinese.

Yet Sun Yat-sen was no ordinary Chinese rebel. Unlike all his predecessors, he dreamed of a sovereign people instead of another dynasty upon the Dragon Throne. But that he recognized to be only a formal change without much real importance by itself. More significantly, he dreamed of a new learning for the people, that they might be fit for the part he would have them play in the new state. He dreamed also of a new learning for the politicians and statesmen, based on the practical sciences of the West, that they too might be more fit for the management of public affairs than the former mandarins with their ancient and inadequate classical scholarship. It was his passionate conviction of the necessity of a revolution in education as well as his invincible faith in the political capacity of the Chinese people that had inspired his forty years of devotion to the cause of the people's revolution. On this platform he took his stand, and nothing could dislodge him. In his *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary* he said that neither the might of the Manchu dynasty nor all the misfortunes of his life were able to turn him aside from the course he had set himself. "I strove for what I aspired to; and the more failures I experienced, the more I yearned for the struggle." He reflected upon the success of the Revolutionists in overthrowing the Manchus and upon their failure subsequently to establish a sound republican government and concluded that the explanation was to be found, not in any innate political incapacity of the Chinese people, nor in any indisposition on their part to do what might be required of them in order to enjoy the blessings of good government, but solely in the great complexity of the problems of reconstruction which their leaders had to solve. "Understanding is difficult, action easy." So he proposed to crush his opponents with a theory and to regenerate the state by refurnishing the minds of statesmen.

VI

THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC

1. THE *ENTENTE* BETWEEN MOSCOW AND CANTON

"Revolution," Napoleon is reported to have said, "is an idea which has found bayonets." In China the revolutionary idea took its most compelling form in the mind of Sun Yat-sen. But Sun Yat-sen had little talent for finding the bayonets. It was Bolshevists from Russia who showed his followers how to transform his idea into a revolution which could take the field in force and rout its enemies.

The Bolshevists began to show their interest in China as soon as they had seized power at home and established their Soviet Republic. Chinese were invited to attend the First Congress of the Communist International at Moscow in the spring of 1919, and two months later a center of Communist propaganda was discovered by the police of the international settlement in Shanghai. In July, 1919, the Soviet Government issued a "Manifesto to the Chinese People," in which it offered to return all territory wrongfully taken from China by the Russian Imperial Government, to restore to China the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, to renounce its claim to any share in the Boxer indemnity, to give up the rights of extraterritoriality enjoyed by Russians on Chinese soil, and to abandon all other special privileges inconsistent with the equality of nations. Though the Chinese were then smarting under their failure at the Paris Peace Conference, this generous offer did not receive serious consideration. The Peking Government was not ready to recognize the Soviet Government or even to break off relations with the representatives of the former Czarist régime. The Soviet Government itself was preoccupied with the civil war in Russia and threatened invasions by western Powers and had little leisure to develop an aggressive oriental policy. "For the present," Lenin had said in 1919, "Communism can achieve success only in the West. The occidental Powers enrich themselves by the exploitation of the weak countries in the Orient. At the same time, however, they arm their oriental subjects and give them military training. The West is digging a grave in the East for its own burial."[1] And so the Bolshevist leaders were content for the moment to leave the imperialist Powers largely to their own devices in China, as well as in other eastern countries.

This comparative indifference to oriental affairs came to an end in the summer of 1920. The aggressive policy of the Soviet Government in the West was checked by the defeat of the Red Army in Poland and by the collapse of urban industry at home. The Soviet leaders lost some of their enthusiasm for the early conquest of power by the workers of the world and gained a new solicitude for the immediate conquest of bread by the workers of Russia. The destruction of the capitalist system by military operations on the western front was perceived to be incompatible with the procurement of capital for the development of domestic industry, and militant communism presently gave way to the New Economic Policy. This did not mean the end of the effort to extend the dictatorship of the proletariat, but it did mean the abandonment of direct frontal attacks upon the capitalist Powers and a search for new routes towards world revolution. It meant a quickened interest in the spread of Communist propaganda everywhere and especially in the East, where the imperialist Powers were more exposed to attack and less capable of defending themselves. Although modern capitalism could not be destroyed by attacks upon its outposts in the East, its strength might be sapped and its eventual destruction thereby made easier. The new oriental policy was aimed particularly at Great Britain, which had greater interests in Asia than any other Power and which, the Bolshevist leaders thought, could be more gravely injured than any of the others by operations in that quarter. Also, they believed, the defeat of Great Britain, the foremost capitalistic state, would do more harm to capitalism everywhere than that of any other one state.

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[1] K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), p. 2.

The Congress of the Oriental Nations at Baku in September, 1920, was an early and important manifestation of the new policy. More than thirty nations, including the Chinese, were represented and a permanent committee for propaganda in the Orient was organized. This was the beginning of more vigorous efforts for the bolshevization of Asiatic countries. The work was entrusted to the Third International, in order not to embarrass too much the official diplomacy of the Soviet Government, and thereafter its agents pushed their activities in Turkey, in the Mohammedan countries of the Near East and of central Asia, in India, and in China. At the same time a note from the Soviet Foreign Office, dated September 27, 1920, renewed the earlier offer to put an end to all unequal treaties between Russia and China.

The growing concern of Soviet policy with the Orient was accompanied by a significant modification of the Soviet political system. Lenin perceived that he must take into account the principle of national self-determination in dealing with such diverse peoples as those of the Near, Middle, and Far East. He insisted therefore not only upon the equality of all races in the proceedings of the Communist Party but also upon the largest practicable measure of racial autonomy in the organization of the Soviet state. The Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic was reconstructed so as to provide for autonomous republics of all the important self-conscious races within its limits and the principle of racial autonomy was carried to its logical conclusion in the subsequent organization of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Any recognized independent Socialist Soviet republic which may be admitted to the Union is authorized by the constitution to withdraw at pleasure — a provision clearly designed to encourage non-Russian races to associate themselves with the Soviet political system as closely as possible. The collaboration of the Socialist Soviet republics in the Caucasus in the formation of the Union in 1922 and the adherence of the Uzbek and Turcoman Socialist Soviet Republics two years later afforded striking evidence of the sagacity of this policy. At first Lenin encountered strong opposition to his racial policy among the Bolshevist leaders but in the end it was generally recognized to have been an indispensable element of the new Soviet policy in the Orient. In dealing with a people of such distinctive culture as the Chinese the task of the Communist propagandists was immeasurably facilitated by the flexibility of the soviet political system.

The new oriental policy of the Soviet Government brought immediate results in the Far East as well as in other parts of Asia. In 1921 a successful revolution in Outer Mongolia resulted in the establishment of the Mongolian Soviet Republic, although the Soviet leaders deemed it prudent, in view of their interests in other parts of the former Chinese Empire, not to admit this republic into the Soviet Union. In the following year the evacuation of Siberia by the Japanese made possible the formal incorporation of the Far Eastern republic into the Soviet political system. The time was then ripe for a more aggressive policy in the territories of the Chinese Republic. Adolf Joffe, an experienced Bolshevist diplomat, was sent to Peking in the summer of 1922, where he made some progress among the Chinese intelligentsia but had no success with the Government. In January, 1923, he went to Shanghai and had a conference with Sun Yat-sen, who had taken refuge there when driven out of Canton by Chen Chiung-ming the previous year. Sun Yat-sen was then extraordinarily eager for aid from abroad in his struggle with the anti-revolutionary forces in China. He had long hoped that the necessary aid might come from America, which, he used to say, should give the Chinese Revolution its Lafayette. But America continued to disappoint him. After the close of the World War his hopes were directed also towards Germany, since the new republic, having been deprived by the victorious Powers of all its special privileges in China, had become the first of the Great

Powers to deal with the Chinese Republic on terms of full equality. But the German Republic was preoccupied with its own troubles. Now, when his fortunes seemed to be at their lowest ebb, Russia was showing a sympathetic interest in his revolutionary aims. Dr. Sun saw at last a fair prospect of obtaining the aid he needed to regenerate the Chinese Republic and the Soviet leaders saw a chance to strike a shrewd blow at the imperialist Powers.

The Shanghai conference between Joffe and Dr. Sun proved to be a turning-point in the history of the Chinese Revolution. At its close a joint statement was made public which served as the basis of the subsequent *entente cordiale* between Moscow and Canton. This statement affirmed in the first place that Dr. Sun believed that neither communism nor the soviet political system could be successfully introduced into China, because in his opinion the conditions for their successful establishment did not exist in China. In this belief Joffe concurred, declaring that China's first task was to establish its national independence. Secondly, Joffe reaffirmed the Soviet Government's willingness, as set forth in the note of September 27, 1920, to renounce all the special privileges which had been exacted from China by the diplomacy of the Czarist Government. The statement contained further declarations relating to the controversies between Russia and China over the status of Mongolia and of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, with respect to which the signers believed that temporary arrangements could be made to the satisfaction of both parties. Specifically, Joffe stated that it was not the purpose of the Soviet Government to pursue an imperialist policy in Outer Mongolia or to induce the Mongolian Republic to secede from China, and Dr. Sun stated that he had no objection to the temporary occupation of Outer Mongolia by Soviet forces, especially as the Peking Government was unable to prevent counter-revolutionary activities on Mongolian soil. The statement closed with an assurance that the two men parted on the most cordial terms, and that Joffe would visit Sun Yat-sen again after his return from a trip to Japan. Nothing was said about sending political and military advisers from Russia to South China, but such a mission was doubtless in the minds of both. It was to be the most important consequence of the new *entente cordiale.*

It may seem strange in the light of later events that Sun Yatsen should have entered so readily into a compact with Soviet Russia. Both parties knew that their ultimate aims were irreconcilable and that their *entente cordiale* could not last very long. But both could also distinguish clearly between their ultimate aims and their more immediate objectives, and they knew that in the pursuit of these more immediate objectives they might hope to travel the same road not only without conflict but also with much mutual benefit. The Chinese Revolutionists wanted help in the military stage of their movement and were willing to take the chance that Communist propaganda might eventually prove more seductive than their own among their own people. The Russian Revolutionists wanted help in their Far Eastern campaign against the outposts of capitalism and were willing to take the chance that the regenerated Chinese Republic might prove at last to be an enemy to their World Revolution rather than a friend. Each party stood to gain at the outset by utilizing the aid of the other, and each might hope that in the end the cost of that aid would not be too high. Indeed each doubtless expected to convert the other to his own way of thinking. Neither was deceiving the other. Neither was intentionally deceiving itself. Both parties knew what they wanted. Both knew what they were likely to get, at least for a time. Both were willing to play with fire, since both expected to be warmed, but not consumed, by the conflagration.

The first fruit of this compact was the despatch to South China of the man who must be pronounced the most remarkable of all the agents whom Moscow has employed in its revolutionary activities. Joffe himself went back to Russia, broken in health, without seeing Dr. Sun again, and was succeeded in Peking by Leo Karakhan, the foremost Soviet expert in oriental diplomacy.

It was he who actually sent Michael Borodin to Canton, whither Dr. Sun had returned shortly after his conversations with Joffe. Borodin had borne the name of Grusenberg when as a small boy he was brought from his native Russia to the United States. He had shortened his name to Berg when as a young man he operated a business school in Chicago. He changed his name to Borodin, after the fashion of the Bolshevist leaders, when he abandoned teaching for revolutionary politics. He served for a time as an agitator in Mexico and eventually turned up in Turkey as the principal representative of the Third International in the camp of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. In Chicago he seems to have become acquainted with the realities of American politics as practised among the immigrant masses in great cities. In Mexico and Turkey he acquired an intimate knowledge of the processes of revolution. Though the Turkish Revolution was not an unqualified success from the Communist point of view, its leaders had understood how to establish their national independence despite the hostility of the Powers and to secure a position of equality among the nations. These were accomplishments the secret of which the Chinese Revolutionists wished to discover. Borodin was supposed to understand those secrets. He was also qualified by nature as well as by experience for the part which he was about to play in China. At all stages of his career he had manifested extraordinary energy and intelligence. He was in addition a man of unusual personal charm, poise, and force of character. It seemed that Moscow could not have sent to Canton a man better equipped for obtaining the confidence of the Chinese Revolutionists.

2

THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS

Borodin came to Canton in the autumn of 1923 with a double mission. First, he was to give Dr. Sun and the other Chinese Revolutionists the benefit of Bolshevist experience in the management of revolutions. Secondly, he was to get the Chinese Communists into the Kuomintang.

Borodin with characteristic ability quickly saw that the immediate problem at Canton was one of organization. He began in Bolshevist fashion with the party. He insisted that there be a definite body of party principles, unity of party organization, and strict party discipline. Dr. Sun was persuaded to prepare a systematic summary statement of his program for adoption by a party convention and a more elaborate exposition for the use of the party propagandists. The former became the *Manifesto* of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang; the latter, the famous *Three Principles of the People.* Unity of party organization was secured by establishing "Locals," wherever there were enough members, which were empowered to elect delegates to an annual "Congress," which in turn was empowered to elect the Central Executive Committee. The latter was vested with complete authority over the party between sessions of the Congress and was authorized to choose the Standing Committee to direct the Revolution when the Central Executive Committee itself was not in session. Strict party discipline was secured by a new enrolment of party members, which excluded those who were out of sympathy with the policy of accepting aid from Soviet Russia, and by giving the Central Executive Committee the exclusive right to speak for the party in all matters of general concern. At the same time a political training institute was established in which party organizers and propagandists could be instructed in the technique of their professions, especially in the modern art of fabricating and "accelerating" opinion. Borodin helped to establish also a military training institute, the Whampoa Academy, where German and Russian officers and Chinese who had visited Russia taught the elements of the art of war and reproduced the discipline of the Red Army.

While Borodin was planning the reorganization of the Kuomintang, he was not unmindful of the second part of his mission. The policy of getting the Chinese Communists into the Kuomintang was expressly authorized by the Central Executive Committee of the Communist International when Borodin was sent to China, but the general policy of getting Communists into non-Communist parties under certain circumstances had been approved by the Second Congress of the International as early as 1920. Ordinarily Communist strategy favored independent action by Communist parties in all countries where they were strong enough to stand alone, even though there might be no immediate prospect of getting into power. But in countries where the development of modern capitalism was backward, where the economic and social conditions were unfavorable to the bare existence of an independent Communist party, to say nothing of overt revolutionary action, Communists were advised to enter any revolutionary party which would accept them, and to try to convert the members to communism, while aiding them in their revolutionary activities. The "theses," to use the word employed by Communists to designate the strategical and tactical principles underlying the planks in their platforms, which were adopted by the Second Congress of the International for the guidance of Bolshevist agents outside of Russia, had been drafted by Lenin, and were designed to give the agents of the International power to follow an opportunistic policy in what were called "colonial and semi-colonial" countries. China was a semi-colonial country, because, while nominally independent, it was actually, in the opinion of the Bolshevists, dominated by the great imperial Powers, at least as far as their own interests were concerned. A Communist party existed there, but it was too weak to come out into the open, and its members seemed more likely to injure capitalistic interests by aiding the Chinese Nationalists than by trying to bring about an independent Communist revolution. In China, therefore, as in other countries in the same stage of economic development, the policy of the Communists was to encourage the Nationalist movement and coöperate with it, while biding their time for the promotion of communism.

Borodin was as successful in getting the Chinese Communists formally admitted into the Kuomintang as in the first part of his mission. At the First National Party Congress, held in January, 1924, it was resolved that all Communists should be permitted to enroll in the party who were willing to take the oath of obedience to the party authorities. They were not required to renounce their belief in communism. It was enough that they professed their willingness to support the program of the Kuomintang as a first step towards their goal. Thereafter the Chinese Communists were in a position to "bore from within," as the phrase ran, without abandoning their own separate party machinery. Though at first greatly inferior to the regular members of the Kuomintang in numbers, they possessed the advantage of superior organization in the struggle with other factions of the Kuomintang for influence within the party. At the same time the Kuomintang was persuaded to adopt the methods of agitation and propaganda which had proved most efficient in the experience of the Communists elsewhere. These methods are based upon careful analysis of economic and social conditions and are designed to facilitate a direct appeal to the special interests of each recognizable group among the "oppressed masses." The machinery of agitation and propaganda is constructed in accordance with this analysis and put into the hands of party workers who are intimately acquainted with the needs of the groups with which they deal. In China the principal groups to which the Communists might look for support were the urban industrial wage-earners, the poorer peasants, educated young men of the more idealistic sort, young women who had escaped from the toils of the old family-system, Chinese overseas who sympathized with the Revolution and were dissatisfied with the slow progress that had been made, and soldiers and sailors both in the revolutionary forces and in those of the ordinary militarists. The administrative system of the Kuomintang was accordingly reorganized and special bureaus were established at the party headquarters to conduct revolutionary propaganda along class-conscious lines. Thus the Chinese

Communists not only got into the Kuomintang but also brought with them their revolutionary methods and machinery.

The results of the new order in the Kuomintang depended in part upon the size and responsiveness of the classes at which the propaganda of the party was directed. The most important class from the standpoint of the organizers of a Communist revolution is that of the industrial wage-earners. But in China that class was comparatively weak. China is predominantly an agricultural country and a great majority of the population live in the villages. There are to be sure many large cities and, if all the seats of authority in the administrative districts be included, the total number of cities would mount up towards two thousand. But the organization of industry in these cities is for the most part essentially medieval. Goods are produced in small shops under the eye of the master with the aid of a few apprentices and journeymen. The master himself is an artisan or craftsman who works with his own hands and belongs to the local guild by means of which he and his fellow masters regulate the conditions of their work. The apprentices and journeymen look forward to becoming masters and guildsmen in their turn and taking their part in the control of industry. Such shops offer poor soil for the growth of socialist ideas. Neither masters nor men can be aroused by the prospect of a dictatorship of the proletariat. They do not tremble at the mention of the class-struggle. But they were concerned at the rising tide of foreign machine-made goods. While Communist propaganda would doubtless leave them cold, Nationalist propaganda, vigorously disseminated by the efficient Communist methods, might be expected to meet with a ready response.

It was only in the larger cities where the industrial revolution had already begun that strictly Communist propaganda could be expected to produce much effect. The available information concerning the growth of modern capitalism and of a permanent industrial proletariat in China is far from satisfactory. The Peking Government formerly maintained a Bureau of Economic Information which published some interesting material on the development of factories and the volume of production in the principal factory-industries. Significant investigations have been made by economists and sociologists connected with missionary colleges, but systematic information, in default of a national census, remains unavailable. The most comprehensive data relating to the industrial wage-earners that I have seen were in Moscow, but I had no means of judging of their reliability. It is clear that factory-industry developed slowly prior to the World War and hardly at all outside the larger treaty-ports. Since the war the development has been more rapid. The most important of the factory-industries is the cotton textile industry, which has grown with special rapidity in Shanghai and Hankow, though not confined to those centers. In the North flour-milling is the leading factory-industry. It has made remarkable progress in the cities of the grain-growing regions, notably in Harbin, Tientsin, and Tsinanfu. Labor organization seems to have begun in the transport industries, particularly among the waterside workers in the larger treaty-ports, at the close of the World War and spread rapidly among the factory workers, whose conditions of employment, judged by western standards, were very bad. The first national labor conference met in Canton in 1922, when some two hundred unions in twelve different cities, with a membership on paper of three or four hundred thousand workers, were represented by delegates. In the same year the railway workers attempted to organize in North China. A strike broke out on the Peking–Hankow line which was suppressed with great brutality. Wu Pei-fu, who then dominated that region, caused the leaders to be executed. A strike of seamen at Hongkong was more successful, resulting in the recognition of the Seamen's Union. This was the beginning of a new era in the history of Chinese labor.

The peasantry, though much more numerous than the workers in urban industry, were also much more difficult to organize. Mostly illiterate and moving far from their ancestral homes reluctantly, if at all, they could hardly be reached except by personal contact in the villages. Here the weight of custom, seldom challenged since time immemorial, lay heavily upon them. New ideas penetrated slowly. Foreign missionaries had done something to stir their imaginations and change their ways. Oil and tobacco salesmen had awakened some new desires and introduced some new habits. But for the most part the "farmers of forty centuries" remained as they had been. Yet there was widespread and growing discontent in the rural districts. The dense population pressed closely upon the means of subsistence. The mud walls which surround Chinese villages, like the walls of stone around the cities, betray the insecurity that prevailed in the open country in the best of times, but now the walls themselves were insecure. Disorder and violence had increased since the beginning of the Revolution in most parts of the country. The soldiery of the contending militarists and the local banditry combined to make the life of the villagers uncommonly miserable. Information concerning the distribution of land among the peasantry is even less satisfactory than that concerning the workers in urban industry. Again the most comprehensive data seem to have been gathered by the Communists after their appearance upon the revolutionary scene. The collective ownership of lands by families and villages and its management by the trustees of the family and village temples produce a type of tenancy which makes it difficult to estimate the true condition of the actual cultivators of the soil. The comparative scarcity of large individual landlords in China does not demonstrate the absence of excessive inequality among the people of the villages. But the family-system stood in the way of revolutionary organizations other than the indigenous secret societies.

In recent years, nevertheless, peasant leagues and unions have sprung up in many regions. The Red Spears, a militant organization of peasants which originated in the province of Honan, were a characteristic development. In Honan, I was told during my visit to that province, there were districts in which the land taxes had been collected for as many as twenty years in advance by rapacious or hard-pressed militarists. Arbitrary and excessive taxation became intolerable, and the peasants combined in order to expel the tax-gatherers. Sometimes they preferred to pay tribute to local bandits who could give them protection against the squadrons of the tax-gatherers. Rising prices in some localities produced much the same effects as heavy taxation and the depredations of soldiers and bandits in others. In Canton the ricsha coolies received at the time of my visit twice as much as in the cities of Indo-China, but the cost of living was also higher. The organized workers in cities like Canton were able to force the grant of higher wages, but the peasants found greater difficulty in readjusting their affairs to changes in the level of prices. The introduction of the Communist methods of agitation and organization into the Kuomintang was quickly followed by a rapid growth of peasants' unions in South China. The most remarkable results were obtained in Kwangtung and Hunan provinces. Colonel Malone has published a full description of the methods of organization together with some account of the extent of the peasant union movement.[1] The poorer peasants in the villages were organized into "Locals," which were grouped together by districts and finally combined into a provincial federation. In Kwangtung the provincial federation seems to have developed considerable vitality, but at greater distances from the headquarters of the Kuomintang the organization was looser and more uncertain.

The youth movement has been a more important asset for the Revolution in China than in any other country where revolutionary activities have flourished in recent years. The explanation lies in the privileged position accorded to students in Chinese society. Under the scholastic empire the students were destined to replenish the governing class and all candidates for the higher degrees basked in the reflected glory of the scholars who were in power. Though only a small portion of the students could become mandarins, they all were engrossed in the professional study of political affairs and were deemed much more competent to form opinions on political questions than the people at large. Belonging to a class which monopolized both classical learning and political power, they felt a personal responsibility for the critical examination of such questions and a confidence in their fitness for the business of politics which only long-established tradition could sustain. After the overthrow of the Manchus, when political affairs became for the first time a public rather than a private business, the students assumed the right of expressing public opinion and the interested public did in fact look to them for leadership to an extent that is unparalleled in the West. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the students have exercised an influence in Chinese politics out of all proportion to their numbers or to their apparent importance under the political system which was presently established in the name of the Republic. As modern educational institutions spread in China the number of students grew until the total enrolment was in the millions and the number in the colleges and universities was measured by the tens of thousands. As their opportunities for public employment diminished, their capacity and disposition to criticize the conduct of public affairs increased. Until the admission of Communists into the Kuomintang, the students were a much more important source of revolutionary material than either the workers or the peasants.

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[1] See C. L'Estrange Malone, *New China; a Report of an Investigation*, Pt. II (London, 1926).

The part which has been played by students in Chinese politics in recent years is much better known than that of the workmen and peasants.[1] The idealism that is associated with all revolutionary movements makes a strong appeal to the imaginations of students everywhere, and in China their patriotism would not let them rest until their country should have become more worthy of their love and devotion. They responded in large numbers to the leadership of Sun Yat-sen and furnished the Kuomintang with its most loyal and ardent members. They appeared on the political scene in force after the entrance of China into the World

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[1] See T. C. Wang, *The Youth Movement in China* (New York, 1927).

War. The relations between the Anfu clique, which was then in power in Peking, and the Japanese caused much uneasiness among patriotic Chinese. The Nishihara loans were particularly objectionable. They not only created a heavy debt without any visible public benefit, but also threatened the independence of the Government. The National Student Federation was formed to protest against this apparent subservience to Japan and the students stirred up a good deal of resentment against the Government. In the following year the transfer of the German sphere of influence in Shantung to Japan by the treaty of Versailles caused a great explosion among the students. They protested so vigorously that the Government did not dare to accept the treaty and finally instructed the Chinese delegates at the Peace Conference not to sign it. At the same time the students organized a boycott against Japanese merchants and goods which did considerable damage to Japanese trade. This success encouraged them to take a livelier interest in politics and the growing demoralization of the Peking Government gave them plenty of opportunities for criticism of the conduct of affairs. The student bodies in the national universities, especially at Peking, became China's most active and persistent advocates not only of better government but also of reforms of all kinds. They demanded not only a new birth of freedom but also a general literary and intellectual renaissance.

The rising tide of "dangerous thoughts," as they seemed to conservative Chinese, caught the young women as well as the young men.[1] The leaders of opinion among the youth of the land were interested only in what they believed to be the latest improvements in western culture. In art and literature and philosophy as well as in science they had no more patience with old-fashioned views from the Occident than with the discredited classical culture of their own country. They listened with enthusiasm to the lectures of John Dewey and Bertrand Russell.

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[1] For a memorable picture of typical emancipated young women and a vivid account of the part they played at this stage of the Revolution, see Anna Louise Strong's *China's Millions*, Pt. I (New York, 1928).

They thronged the salons of Adolf Joffe and Leo Karakhan. They demanded the new freedom for men and women alike. If they favored democracy at all, they favored it without distinctions of sex. The idea of equality between the sexes, not only in politics but also in all the relationships of life, made a specially strong appeal to those young women who had begun to throw off the shackles of the traditional Chinese social code. Having once rejected the notion that woman's place was in the home and nowhere else, and having repudiated the time-honored authority of grandfathers and mothers-in-law, the modern young woman in China had already asserted herself to an almost incredible extent and needed little further encouragement to take her place at the front of the fight for the rights of her sex as understood in New York or in Paris or even in Moscow. She claimed the same right to choose her costume or her husband as to choose her political party. Incidentally, because the new interest of women in politics developed when it did, bobbed hair became the badge of the Chinese young woman's political coming of age. It is no accident that so many young women have taken a conspicuous part in the Nationalist movement in recent years. There was no miscalculation by the Communists when they entered the Kuomintang and insisted upon the establishment of a special Women's Bureau at party headquarters alongside the Youth Bureau and the Bureaus for Workmen and Peasants.

The Bureaus for Overseas Chinese and for the Army and Navy were also logical applications of the Bolshevist political tactics. The overseas Chinese were Sun Yat-sen's chief support after the failure of the Canton insurrection of 1895 and his flight from the country. Many of them remained faithful to him to the end. I found his portrait on sale in Chinese shops in Annam and Tongking at a time when well-informed members of the ruling class in those former tributary states of the scholastic empire saw no prospect of success for the Nationalist Revolution within fifty years. The extraordinary prosperity of the Chinese merchants in Indo-China and Indonesia enabled them to give liberal help to the cause of revolution and many of them continued to do so through all its vicissitudes. The Communists did not share Sun Yat-sen's gratitude toward his benefactors among the wealthy Chinese merchants abroad, but they were shrewd enough propagandists to exploit this source of strength for what it was worth. The soldiers and sailors, on the other hand, offered a most attractive field for the operations of their political agents. Too much neglected by the Nationalists, who could not wholly shake themselves free from the inveterate prejudices of cultivated Chinese against men who live by force and violence, the soldiers and sailors had become more than usually discontented, as their pay on account of the prolonged disorder in the country became more and more uncertain. In Russia the Bolshevists had found the soldiers and sailors ready to listen to their arguments and had made of them efficient tools in their struggle for power. In China they hoped, by subverting the morale of the opposing armies, to win victories which would be unattainable by weight of armaments alone. While Borodin promised to furnish munitions and equipment to the Nationalist forces, he undoubtedly set great store upon the demoralization of the mercenary troops of the northern militarists through the skilfully directed propaganda of the Kuomintang political agents.[1]

Both the Communist International and the Soviet Government followed the Chinese Revolution with the closest attention and gave their agents in China all possible support. In 1922 the former organized at Moscow a First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, which pushed with vigor the policies outlined two years earlier at the First Congress of the Nations of the Orient. At Moscow also a Communist University for the Toilers of the

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[1] The distribution of the membership of the Kuomintang among these various classes is shown in a report of the Organization Bureau for October, 1926, as follows:

Workmen 29%
Liberal professions 25.7%
Soldiers 23%
Students 10.5%
Peasants 7.5%
Merchants 4.3%.

See T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution*, p. 247.

Orient was established in order to train party organizers and propagandists for Asiatic service. Like the similar Communist University for the Oppressed Minorities of the West, it offered instruction in the languages understood by its students and did much to stimulate revolutionary activities in the regions from which they came. In 1925 the growing interest at Moscow in the Chinese Revolution resulted in the organization of a special training school for Chinese Revolutionists, the Sun Yat-sen University, where young men and women of Communist sympathies could reside together and get the benefit of the best instruction the Soviet capital afforded. Karl Radek was the founder of the institution, and Bukharin, the head of the Institute of the Red Professors and foremost Marxian theoretician in the Soviet Union, was among the lecturers. At its period of greatest prosperity there were nearly a thousand students in attendance, and even when I visited it in the summer of 1928, though the prospects of the Communists in China had greatly altered and also many students were absent on vacations, there were several hundred young men and women in residence. The research bureau operated in connection with the University seemed to be better informed concerning conditions and events in China than any similar institution in the Far East. The students of the Sun Yat-sen University generally had connections with the Revolutionists in China, and its existence contributed greatly for a time to the influence of the Communists in the Kuomintang.

The Soviet Government was theoretically careful to keep its hands off the activities of the Communist International. In practice the system of interlocking directorates maintained by the Communist Party of Russia enabled its leaders to dominate both the International and the Government of the Soviet Union.[1] But officially the Foreign Office of the Union dealt only with its public representatives in the Far East, while the Far Eastern

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[1] The expenses of the Communist universities, for instance, were covered, at least in part, in the budgets of the Commissariat of Education, and the estimates were reviewed like those of any Government educational activity by the educational division of the all-Russian Gosplan.

Section of the Comintern Secretariat conducted the subterranean activities designed to lead towards the World Revolution. In 1924 Karakhan succeeded in negotiating a treaty with the Peking Government by means of which he obtained official recognition for the Soviet Government, while promising in return that it would make good the offers originally tendered in 1919–20 to renounce all special privileges in China. The Russian legation in Peking was thereupon raised to the dignity of an embassy, and Karakhan, as the only ambassador accredited to the Peking Government, became the dean of the diplomatic corps. The promotion of Soviet interests of all kinds was greatly facilitated by his skilful diplomacy and the Soviet Union acquired in the eyes of the Chinese Revolutionists the favored position of a country which treated the Chinese Republic on terms of full equality. The Russian concessions in Chinese cities, like the former German concessions, were formally placed under Chinese control and Russians of all kinds became subject to the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts. This evidence of faith in China also strengthened the hands of the Communists in the Kuomintang and aided their efforts to transform the Chinese Revolution into an episode of the Bolshevist World Revolution.

3

THE GROWTH OF THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT

By the time that the Communists, having gained admission to the Kuomintang, had reconstructed the machinery of the party and introduced their methods of propaganda, circumstances conspired to give them an unparalleled opportunity to promote their cause.

The first of these circumstances was the death of Sun Yat-sen. As long as he lived, his personality dominated the party and his ideas determined its strategy and tactics. It was certain that he would never regard the Communists as anything but temporary auxiliaries and possible converts to the "Three Principles of the

People." They could never be sure but that his confidence in the reasonableness of mankind and his belief in the superiority of conciliation to force and violence would lead him to seize an opportunity for ending the military period of the Revolution at a people's convention of some sort, as he had hoped to do on his last mission to Peking, and thereby to leave his Communist auxiliaries in the lurch. The Communists, however, fully appreciated the possibilities of exploiting his reputation for propagandist purposes, which they could do better after his death than while he still lived. They knew they could build up a kind of religion about his name as they had done with Lenin's in Russia.

Practical politicians who were not Communists could also understand the advantages of substituting a hero to worship for a dictator to obey. Many such had hesitated to commit their fortunes to his care, though they sympathized with his aspirations, fearing lest they wreck their careers in visionary enterprises without hope of material compensation. The little band of idealists who clung to him to the last were able to leave their mark upon the city of Canton. At the time of his death it was to all outward appearances the most progressive large city in China under exclusively Chinese control. But the power of its rulers scarcely extended beyond the range of the guns by means of which their local authority was secured. As soon as he was dead, however, there was no ground for further fear of his errors of judgment in practical politics. There remained only the ideals he had taught, which seemingly, with the removal of the physical barrier when his spirit was released from the bondage of the flesh, found readier access than ever before to the minds of his countrymen. Wang Ching-wei and Tai Chi-tao, two of his favorite disciples, brought their late leader's will back from Peking and showed it to the faithful in Canton, where it soon became the most popular symbol of the Nationalist creed. Among scholars and leaders of opinion who had been too independent to be bound by personal loyalty to the man, while living, devotion to Dr. Sun's ideals brought new recruits to his cause after his death. Among the masses, as they became better acquainted with his plans, death transformed him, as the party leaders had foreseen that it would, into a veritable object of political worship.

The second of the circumstances, which gave a fresh impulse to the revolutionary cause at this time, was the Shanghai massacre of May 30, 1925. The extraordinary effect which this unfortunate affair produced among the people of China regardless of their differences among themselves cannot be explained by the bare facts of the case, taken by itself. There had been labor-trouble in a Japanese cotton mill and a street demonstration was organized by strike sympathizers. The police lost their heads and fired on the crowd. Twelve were killed and seventeen wounded. This slaughter was the proverbial last straw which made the burden imposed upon the Chinese by the aggressive policies of the foreign Powers seem intolerable. Ever since the beginning of the World War the relations between China and the Powers had been growing more vexatious. In 1914 Japan waged war against Germany on Chinese soil without anything more than a perfunctory asking of leave. In the following year the Japanese exploited their victory by presenting the Twenty-one Demands, which went far beyond all previous aggressions of the imperialistic Powers. Though the Japanese withdrew the most extreme of these demands, the action of the Peace Conference in 1919 seemed to set the approval of the principal Powers upon the general policy of aggression. In 1922 the Washington Conference attempted to redress the balance in the Far East, but three years passed and the Nine-Power Treaty remained unratified. The French, who were the last to act upon it, were disputing with the Peking Government whether Boxer indemnity payments should be made in gold or paper francs, and suspicion grew that the Powers did not wish to deal justly with China. The Lincheng bandit case in 1923 brought down upon the Peking Government an avalanche of diplomatic notes which seemed to sensitive Chinese unduly offensive, and now came the shooting of innocent people at Shanghai. A wave of hot resentment swept over all China.

The feeling was specially bitter against the British. The government of the international settlement at Shanghai, where the shooting took place, was dominated by the British and the police officer who gave the order to fire was an Englishman. This played into the hands of the Communists, whose policy from the beginning had been to make the British the principal object of their attack in the Far East. Communist agents apparently took part in arranging the demonstration which ended in the Shanghai massacre, and certainly participated in the subsequent demonstration at Canton which ended in the Shameen massacre. This was one of many demonstrations throughout China to protest against the shooting at Shanghai. On June 23 a procession of students and workmen marched along the water front across the creek from the foreign settlement. Again there was shooting, and forty-four of the demonstrators fell dead or dying. Among them were four university students and twenty-four from the Whampoa Military Academy. The resentment of the Chinese grew exceedingly bitter. In Hongkong their trade unions called a general strike against British employers of all kinds and at Canton a boycott was declared against Hongkong and the British which lasted until October of the following year. The injury to British trade was very great. The publication of commercial statistics was suspended by the Hongkong Government on grounds of "economy," but deserted wharves and empty counting-houses afforded evidence enough of the extent of the disaster. In vain the British pleaded self-defence in justification of the shooting. The facts were difficult to ascertain and each side believed what it wished to believe. At last the Revolutionists had caught the ear of the people of China and they made the most of their opportunity to denounce imperialistic aggressions. They discovered for the first time the tremendous possibilities of the new revolutionary technique which they had learned from the Communists, while the British perceived too late that violence, however justified, had become unprofitable.

A third circumstance, which contributed to the unparalleled development of the Nationalist movement at this time, was the renewal of the fighting among the militarists. The breakdown of Marshal Tuan Chi-jui's Constitutional Conference at Peking after the death of Dr. Sun demonstrated the fruitlessness of the campaign of 1924, when Feng Yu-hsiang combined with Chang Tso-lin to defeat Wu Pei-fu, and foreshadowed a new outbreak of civil war, if the intermittent hostilities between the rival Tuchuns can be dignified by such a term. Feng Yu-hsiang would not cooperate with Chang Tso-lin, except for the purpose of establishing a central government resting upon something more decent than military force and corruption, and Chang Tso-lin had no confidence in anything but corruption and force. Wu Pei-fu was biding his time to regain power at Peking and, as the event proved, was less hostile to Chang Tso-lin than to Feng Yu-hsiang. Meanwhile, lesser militarists were quarrelling over lesser spoils. In October, 1925, Sun Chuan-fang, one of the most competent of the provincial chieftains, who had already gained control of Fukien and Chekiang provinces, attacked Shanghai and drove Chang Tso-lin's garrison across the Yangtze. By the end of November he had expelled the Fengtien forces from Kiangsu province but Shantung was held for Chang Tso-lin by the "super-bandit," Chang Tsung-chang. In December Kuo Sung-lin, one of Chang Tso-lin's principal commanders in the North, revolted against him and nearly put an end to the Manchurian dictator's career. His failure precipitated the expected clash between Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang, and the year closed with faint prospects for the restoration of domestic tranquillity.

The threatened collapse of the Peking Government in 1925 cast grave doubt upon the ability of the militarists to maintain the integrity of China. There was a general belief that certain of the Powers had selected their favorites among the warring generals and were supporting them in their struggles for supremacy. The Japanese had intervened in Manchuria during Kuo Sung-lin's rebellion in order to prevent injury to their interests there and had thereby saved Chang Tso-lin from ruin. Suspicion grew that they had an understanding with him prejudicial to the independence of the Three Eastern Provinces. Feng Yu-hsiang, after his defeat by Chang Tso-lin in the spring of 1926, went to Moscow and spent the summer there as a guest of the Soviet Government. Suspicion branded him a tool of the Communists. Wu Pei-fu was manifestly the favorite of the British merchants in the Far East. The French, who apparently had no favorite among the leading generals, were known still to covet the rich provinces of South China.[1] The long-postponed partition of China seemed at last on the verge of the possible. Or, if somehow averted, would not the general who succeeded in bringing the whole country under his sway be under such obligations to some foreign Power as to enjoy a no more than nominal independence of his foreign protectors?

The final circumstance which gave the Revolutionists their big opportunity to seize power was the failure of the measures taken at the Washington Conference of 1922 to bring about more satisfactory relations between China and the Powers. The Nine-Power Treaty, which finally became effective in the summer of 1925 when the French compromised their dispute with the Peking Government over the gold-franc question, provided that special conferences should be held in Peking to settle the tariff and extraterritoriality problems. The tariff and extraterritoriality conferences actually assembled in the winter of 1925–26, but their deliberations were interrupted by the fighting around Peking and after the fall of Marshal Tuan Chi-jui in April the conferences broke down altogether. No definite conclusion was reached with respect to tariff autonomy, and the decision on the abolition of extraterritoriality was negative. In defence of the refusal of the Powers to renounce their treaty rights at that time they could cite the patent facts that China had no central government capable of making its authority felt throughout the country, that such governments as existed rested on military force, and that there was no assurance of uniform treatment for Chinese and foreigners alike. The Revolutionists could cite the same facts in support of their claim that the Peking Government was incapable of protecting China against the Powers and that only the Revolution could save China. They could cite the further facts against the principal Powers that Germany and Russia no longer possessed the special privileges for which the other Powers were contending, and could argue that if equality of status was acceptable to Germans and Russians it should be acceptable to other foreigners also. Although this argument was not convincing to the foreign merchants against whom it was directed, it sounded plausible enough in the ears of the Chinese. By the summer of 1926, when Peking politicians had at last abandoned the pretence that a representative government existed there, the hopes of the politically minded people of China were turning definitely in the direction of Canton.

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[1] See Georges Maspéro, *La Chine* (1925 ed.), II, 241.

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THE REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT

Meanwhile the leaders of the Kuomintang, having reorganized their party in accordance with the advice of their Russian associates, had been engaged in reconstructing their government and consolidating their power. The first step was the remodelling of their army. As the graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy became available, it was possible gradually to dispense with the mercenary troops upon whom Dr. Sun had been dependent for military protection, and to replace them with genuine Nationalists. The former had never been thoroughly reliable, as Dr. Sun discovered to his cost more than once. The latter possessed an excellent *esprit de corps* and were soon strong enough to become an efficient political weapon. In October, 1924, they were ready to match their strength with the Merchants' Guard, which had been organized by the conservative elements at Canton to protect their interests against an excess of radicalism on the part of the Revolutionists. The Merchants' Guard was overpowered and the Canton merchants offered no further resistance to the authority of the Nationalists. In June of the following year the authority of the party leaders was challenged again by their mercenaries, chiefly Yunnanese, who were then in Canton. The "new model" army attacked the mercenaries and after some hard fighting drove them from the city and destroyed their power. At the same time the Kuomintang received substantial reënforcements from an unexpected quarter. Thousands of Chinese workmen, who had joined the anti-British strike at Hongkong, removed to Canton and put themselves at the disposal of the revolutionary government. The strikers maintained an independent organization of their own and proved a tower of strength to the Cantonese in the enforcement of the boycott against Hongkong and the British. Together with the local labor leaders, whose organizations and power grew prodigiously with the development of the anti-British policy, the strike leaders became for a time an important adjunct to the Whampoa graduates in sustaining the cause of the Revolution.

The success of the "new model" army paved the way for the reconstruction of the Nationalist Government. The party leaders began work on a new frame of government after the death of Dr. Sun had put an end to all hopes of early reconciliation with Peking. On July 1 it was ready for promulgation. At the head of the central government there were to be two councils, the Political Council and the Administrative Council. The former was designed to be the principal deliberative organ of the government, and to include in its membership all the important party leaders. The latter included the heads of the executive departments and was entrusted with the actual conduct of public affairs. At the head of each department there was to be a committee, consisting of the minister in charge and several associates, and the minister would ordinarily be expected to act by and with the advice and consent of his associates. The Department of War was to be in charge of the Military Council, consisting of the executives of the usual branches into which the administration of military affairs is divided. In addition there was the very important Political Department of the military establishment. This Department was designed to be the instrument by means of which civilian control of the army would be maintained. It was to have control of the political agents to be attached to each army and to each unit above the company within each army for the purpose of observing the commanding officers, reporting upon their activities, and transmitting the orders of the party leaders relating to matters of political importance. The supervision of party activities among the rank and file would also fall to the Political Department. To these departmental committees and the Military Council, there was added later a Supervisory Committee, which was charged with the audit of public accounts and exercised a general control over financial affairs.

A similar system of administrative councils and committees was provided for the provincial and local governments. The only city of importance to which the new plan would apply in the first instance was Canton, but the form of government in that city would of course serve as a model for adoption elsewhere, if the Revolution were successful. Also the only provincial government at first was that whose seat was at Canton, and the provincial and national governments exercised jurisdiction over the same area — an arrangement not conducive to a clear distinction between their respective functions. But, if the Revolution increased its area of authority, the field of operations of the proposed central government would of course become more extended. All the members of the provincial and municipal councils were to be appointed by the central government. The method of appointment insured a highly centralized political system under which those who controlled the Political and Administrative Councils would dominate the government from top to bottom. The members of the Political and Administrative Councils were to be appointed and removed by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang or, if this Committee were not in session, by its Standing Committee. Thus, the Government was ultimately the creature of the party and responsible to it for its management of public affairs. Such a political system clearly had nothing to do with democracy. No such claim was made for it by the Nationalist leaders. They claimed merely that a party dictatorship was superior to a military dictatorship, and much more appropriate for the period of political tutelage which, in accordance with Dr. Sun's revolutionary politics, they proposed to inaugurate in that part of China under their control.[1]

The new political system established in Canton in the summer of 1925 contains many features suggestive of the institutions of Soviet Russia. The Central Political Council suggests the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union. The Administrative Council occupies much the same position as the Council of People's Commissars. The provincial and municipal councils are the Chinese counterparts of the soviets which administer regional and local affairs in Russia. The members of the Russian soviets, to be sure, are elected, directly or indirectly, by the qualified voters. Hence local self-government should be on a much more solid basis in Russia than it could be under the system proposed in 1925 by the Kuomintang for China. But in the higher soviets of the Soviet Union the Communist Party is able to establish its supremacy through the manipulation of the elections, and the central government, under the conditions which have existed in Russia since the Bolshevist revolution, is as much a party dictatorship in practice as that proposed by the Kuomintang in Canton. The Party Congress and the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang had, at least in principle, the same functions as the Communist Party Congress and Central Committee in Soviet Russia. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communists, the practical head of the whole soviet system, had its counterpart in the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. The latter, in fact, held regular weekly meetings at the seat of government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and, together with the Central Political Council, directed the conduct of affairs of state. But comparisons can easily be carried too far.

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[1] For a translation of the Kuomintang Constitution, see Appendix C.

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THE PARLIAMENTARY VS. THE SOVIET REPUBLIC

The partial adoption of the soviet political system by the Kuomintang put an end to the last vestiges of the parliamentary system of government in Nationalist China. The authority of the parliament at Peking had been finally repudiated at Canton in 1923 and the parliament itself had been dispersed by the *coup d'état* of 1924. After the suspension of the Constitution of 1923 by Marshal Tuan Chi-jui in May, 1925, the failure of the parliamentary system at Peking was generally recognized, though the collapse of representative government was not formally acknowledged until June, 1926. Meanwhile, the failure of the parliamentary system in the provincial governments was also manifest. The parliamentary leaders had shown themselves incapable of asserting their theoretical authority over the provincial executives. When the provincial parliaments were first established under the last of the Manchus, neither the members of the parliaments nor the civil and military governors with whom they had to deal understood how to make the system work. Probably the latter for the most part did not wish to make it work, certainly not after the European fashion. Subsequently the Tuchuns and Tupans, who held sway in the provinces, managed the provincial parliaments in the time-honored manner of military dictators. They permitted the parliaments to busy themselves with trivial matters, while getting their own way in matters of importance by intimidation and corruption. Nevertheless, the parliamentary system continued to function in most of the provinces until the Nationalists put an end to it. In Manchuria at the time of my visit there was a parliament in session in one of the provinces and the system was not formally abolished until the end of 1928. But under the political system established by the Kuomintang there was no scheme of representation in the western sense of the term except in the government of the party itself. The Nationalists generally seized the provincial parliament buildings for party purposes. In six of the provinces which I visited early in 1928 the parliament buildings were occupied by the provincial party executive committees and furnished headquarters for the administrative bureaus and party secretariats.

There can be no doubt of the superiority of the modified soviet system adopted by the Kuomintang over the parliamentary system of government under the conditions then existing in China. The parliamentary leaders, both at Peking and in the provinces, failed to obtain sufficient power to justify their pretensions because they did not really represent the people of China. Few of those who could qualify as voters under the election laws were sufficiently interested to take an intelligent part in the elections. Most of the legal voters were not only not active participants in politics, but also not even interested spectators of the political game. They were absorbed in their private affairs and were content to leave politics, except village or guild or secret society politics, to the politicians. It is not surprising that those politicians who founded their careers on their armies were more successful than those who sought to build up their power on the contents of the ballot-boxes. The ballot-box operators contrived too easily to get themselves elected, and politicians with more substantial claims to power than those derived from purely perfunctory elections obtained the spoils of victory. But within the Kuomintang there was a growing body of men with political experience, and also a growing body of interested spectators of political affairs. After the death of Dr. Sun the struggle for power in the party was real and the leaders had to represent something besides themselves. The system of representative government adopted by the party possessed vitality and through the party's control of the political and administrative councils that vitality was transmitted to the whole government. Though the soviet system was a sham, regarded as a system of representative government, there were no false pretences about it, and the centralization of power in the hands of the standing committeemen of the party made for much greater efficiency and much less corruption and intimidation than under the defunct parliamentary system.

The decisive test of the new political system was neither the semblance of democracy nor the degree of efficiency to be expected from it, but its ability to maintain the supremacy of the civil over the military authorities. Mindful of the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, the Nationalist leaders at Canton were not trying to set up at once the aristocratic democracy which was the political objective of the Revolution. They were trying merely to establish a government suitable for the period of political tutelage which they believed was about to begin in the province of Kwangtung. Their task was to devise institutions which would prevent successful generals from seizing power and transforming themselves into military dictators. It was not necessary that there be a constitutional government of any kind at the beginning of the period of tutelage. It would be enough that the government which they established be stable and responsive to the leadership of the Nationalist Party. The chief difficulty arose from the fact that, though the period of tutelage had begun theoretically in Kwangtung, the rest of China was still in the period of military operations. It was necessary to establish a political system strong enough to sustain vigorous warfare against the militarists, but not so strong as to get out of control by the Nationalist politicians. It was clear that vigorous warfare required powerful generals and that successful campaigns would make those generals popular. Evidently the dictatorship of the Kuomintang could not rest upon new-modelled armies alone. Whoever controlled those armies would be master of the state. If the party dictatorship was to accomplish its purpose, it must have independent means of support. It was necessary to call in new political forces to redress the balance between the old. It was partly for this reason that the leaders of the Kuomintang were so eager to organize labor and peasant unions and to get their members to join the Revolution. They expected the organizations of workers and of peasants to help the party drive the old-fashioned mandarins and corrupt militarists from power. They also looked to these organizations for support in a possible contest with the new militarists of their own making.

The new political system was completed at the Second National Party Congress, held at Canton in January, 1926. The admission of Communists into the party was confirmed. The adoption of Communist methods of agitation and propaganda was approved. The establishment of the soviet form of government was ratified. The organization of the party itself was perfected.[1] In its final form the Central Executive Committee consisted of thirty-six regular members and twenty-four alternates, or, as the Russians call them, candidates, with power to attend plenary sessions of the Committee but not to vote unless chosen to fill vacancies. The Standing Committee consisted of nine regular members together with a lesser number of alternates. In addition to the Standing Committee there was the Supervisory Committee or Control Commission, which was charged with the duty of inspecting the work of the party officers, of passing on their competence and impeaching them, if necessary, and also of judging the qualifications of members generally. Besides the party Secretariat there were eight bureaus at party headquarters, dealing respectively with organization, propaganda, workers, peasants, women, youth, merchants, and overseas members. At the same time a new party platform was adopted.[2] It supplemented but did not supersede the old. There were many additional planks dealing with new problems. Most of these planks were directed specifically to the various economic groups which the leaders wished to attach to the party. The special interests of the manufacturers, merchants, students, peasants, workers, soldiers, and overseas Chinese all received careful attention. The general principles of the party, however, remained the same as before. It was still the instrument of the kind of revolution advocated by Dr. Sun.

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[1] See *Chinese Correspondence,* weekly organ of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, vol. II, no. 8 (May 15, 1927), p. 3.

[2] See Léon Wieger, *La Chine moderne*, VII, 97–100.

Borodin had greatly influenced the organization and methods but not as yet the goal of the Kuomintang.

The chief weakness of the new political system lay in the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. In the first place, these relations were ill defined. The resulting uncertainty was a likely cause of future disputes and dissensions within the Kuomintang. The Communists were supposed to register as such when they joined the party, but there was no adequate system of registration and no means of knowing how effective the Communist proselytizing within the party might be. The secret conversion of Nationalists to communism, however, was not the principal menace which arose from the alliance between the two parties. The greatest danger sprang from the dependence of both parties upon the labor and peasant organizations. The Nationalists needed the support of these organizations in order to counterbalance the growing political strength of their military leaders. The Communists needed their support in order to maintain their own position both within the Kuomintang and as the independent Far Eastern branch of the Communist International. The leaders of the workers' and peasants' unions were bound to discover that, by playing off the two parties in the revolutionary movement against one another, they could enormously increase their own power. Might they not take the balance of power within the Kuomintang away from the party politicians and give the Revolution a new and undesired turn? Might they not even turn over the control to the Communists? The regular Kuomintang leaders, on the other hand, were committed to the policy of organizing the workers and peasants, and of coöperating with the Communist Party. Could they successfully play off the leaders of these three forces against the party generals? If so, they might hope to maintain the party dictatorship. If not, that dictatorship was likely to give way to a dictatorship of some other kind. If it gave way, would it be to the new militarists or to the new labor and peasant leaders and their Communist allies? It was an awkward dilemma.

VII

THE TRIUMPH OF THE NEW MILITARISM

1. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AT CANTON

The death of Sun Yat-sen put the *entente cordiale* between Canton and Moscow to its first severe test. While Dr. Sun lived, those members of the Kuomintang who opposed the acceptance of aid from the Soviets either acquiesced in his measures or left the party. When he was gone, there was no longer the same disposition to abide by his policies among those who doubted their wisdom. Personal rivalry for the leadership of the party exaggerated the differences springing from the clash of opinion. Factions developed and the friction between them began to generate heat. Wang Ching-wei, who had accompanied Dr. Sun on his last journey to Peking, was the leader of those who expected the most from the connection with Moscow. Hu Han-min, who was left in charge at Canton during Dr. Sun's absence, was chief among those who viewed the new departure with less enthusiasm. At the reorganization of the Canton Government in July, 1925, the office of chief of the party, which Hu Han-min had hoped to inherit from his late leader, was abolished. Under the system of government by councils and committees, which upon Borodin's advice was adopted at that time, the importance of Hu Han-min and the other moderate leaders was reduced. In August Liao Chung-kai, one of the principal radical leaders at Canton, was assassinated and a violent struggle broke out between the moderates and the radicals for control of the party. The radicals or Left Wing succeeded in strengthening their hold on the organization and in September they were able to drive Hu Han-min into exile. He was sent to Moscow, where, it was hoped, he would gain a better understanding of the soviet system and form a more favorable opinion of its usefulness in China. It was a great triumph for the

Left Wing of the Kuomintang. Wang Ching-wei became the official leader of the party, while Borodin began to loom up as the "boss" of the "machine."

The defeat of the moderates at Canton alarmed the more conservative members of the party in other parts of China. They had always opposed the Nationalist–Communist *entente* and had not hesitated to give voice to their opposition when Dr. Sun's firm leadership came at last to an end. The struggle at Canton for control of the party organization and of the government which it dominated spurred them to fresh efforts. After the ostracism of Hu Han-min they took their turn at challenging the supremacy of the radicals. They arranged a meeting near Peking in December, which was called, from the place where it was held, the Western Hills Conference. At this meeting it was resolved: (1) that the Communists should be expelled from the party; (2) that the Political Bureau of the party should be abolished; (3) that the political adviser of the Canton Government, Borodin, and the Russian military advisers should be dismissed; and (4) that the seat of the Central Executive Committee should be removed from Canton to Shanghai. The leaders of the conservatives hoped to get this program adopted at the Second National Congress of the Nationalist Party, which was then about to meet in Canton. But they failed. The Congress rejected the policies of the Western Hills faction and reaffirmed the *entente cordiale* with Moscow. Those Conservatives who would not submit were read out of the party. The Central Executive Committee was dominated by the radicals. Though the avowed Communists were in a small minority, the Left Wing of the party was clearly in the saddle. Thereafter the Western Hills faction had little to do with the Soviet Republic at Canton. The rout of the Right Wing of the Kuomintang was complete. Within a year of Dr. Sun's death the Left Wing leaders, together with Borodin and the Russians, were in full command of the Revolution.

The first year of the Soviet Republic at Canton was a year of unparalleled revolutionary progress. The Russian methods proved well suited to the circumstances and the vigor of the new party leadership brought impressive results. At Whampoa, Chiang Kai-shek was rapidly turning out earnest and resolute young officers. While Galens and the other military advisers were instructing the cadets in the art of war, Borodin and the politicians were instilling the proper attitude toward the party. At the political training institute in Canton the same care was devoted to the development of agitators and propagandists and political agents, the sappers and miners, so to speak, of the revolutionary forces, as to that of the military officers at Whampoa. Great pains were taken to prepare suitable textbooks for the instruction of political agents. One manual for propagandists, published about this time, gives the most specific directions for spreading the gospel of the Revolution. The propagandists were to go directly to the masses, especially to the industrial wage-earners and the peasants, and stimulate by all means their class-consciousness. They were to explain the menace of imperialism, of official corruption, and of unregulated militarism and capitalism. The coining of effective slogans was especially emphasized. It was at this time also that the portraits of Marx and Lenin began to make their appearance at party headquarters and in public places beside that of the late leader, Dr. Sun. In speaking before soldiers the political agents were instructed always to tell them that they represented the workers and peasants of China and must not think of themselves as merely the hirelings of their general. The political agents who were attached to armies were to address the men for five minutes every morning and also to provide libraries and entertainments for both officers and men. Except in military matters they were to obey their superiors in the Political Department of the Nationalist Army and ultimately the Political Bureau (Standing Committee) of the Kuomintang. Meanwhile, within the party organization the influence of Borodin was steadily growing greater.

The prestige of the Soviet Republic grew steadily also. At Canton the municipal authorities were laying out broad roads, putting up fine buildings, and carrying out public improvements on every side. Though they ran the city with a high hand, they got results such as no other Chinese government could match. A young brother-in-law of the late leader, T. V. Soong, took over the management of the public finances. A graduate of Harvard University, he introduced the systematic fiscal practices which he had learned in America and, putting a check on official fraud and corruption, he caused the revenues of the Republic to flow into the treasury in unprecedented abundance. Armed with men and money as never before, the leaders of the Revolution acquired new authority in the eyes of non-Nationalist China and of the world. At the Foreign Office, C. C. Wu, son of Sun Yat-sen's old friend, Wu Ting-fang, who had been educated in Washington and London, utilized the boycott of Hongkong and a wide knowledge of Anglo-American law and politics, to obtain respectful treatment from the Powers for the Canton Government, if not legal recognition. While British trade languished and the wharves at Hongkong were nearly deserted, the roadstead at Canton was thronged with shipping and Canton merchants enjoyed an unaccustomed prosperity. Young Chinese with modern educations and the requisite national spirit began to flock in from all parts of the country and the revolutionary leaders could learn afresh the old truism that nothing succeeds like success. Public works, public health, public education, public activities of every kind were developed with feverish haste. Doubtless much was begun which could not be finished with the means at the command of the Government; much was planned which could not even be begun. Like boom-towns in the American West, Canton was the scene of overextended enterprise. Speculation, political as well as economic, ran wild. But through it all the political advisers of the Soviet Government kept their heads. The training of the new Nationalist army, the organization of the workers and peasants, proceeded steadily. In the government as well as in the party Borodin's influence continued to increase.

Despite the political sagacity of the Russian advisers their growing prominence continued to cause uneasiness among the Revolutionists at Canton. In December, 1925, when the Western Hills faction was demanding the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang, Wang Ching-wei had thought it expedient to make a speech publicly denying that he was a tool of Moscow. The alliance between Nationalists and Communists, he declared, rested on a sound basis. Both were pursuing the same immediate objects and by similar means. Both were aiming at the overthrow of aggressive imperialism in China and hoped to accomplish their purpose through the dictatorship of the revolutionary party. To be sure, there were important differences in their conceptions of party dictatorship. The Communists hoped eventually to convert the dictatorship of the party into a dictatorship of the proletariat. The Nationalists intended to use it as a means of educating all classes of people in the art of democratic self-government. The dictatorship of the proletariat would be the prelude, according to the Marxian political philosophy, to the abolition of government, as practised in modern capitalistic and nationalistic states. The education of the people, according to the political philosophy of Sun Yat-sen, would be the prelude to the establishment of constitutional government under which the rights of the people would be reconciled with the authority of a powerful and vigorous political hierarchy. But disputes concerning the compatibility of the ultimate aims of Nationalists and Communists, Wang Ching-wei urged, could safely be put off until the attainment of their more immediate objects. Both Communists and Nationalists were practical revolutionists, he argued, and could work well together for the equality of China among the nations. That was enough for the time being. And Borodin supported his argument by publicly discountenancing all purely Communistic propaganda.

While Wang Ching-wei and the Left Wing leaders of the Kuomintang were disposed to accept the aid of the Communists without questioning their good faith, the moderates were more circumspect. They saw that, although Borodin and the other Russian advisers of the Canton Government took no open part in Communist activities, the Chinese Communists were pushing their special propaganda with the utmost zeal. This propaganda exerted a powerful fascination over the minds of the politically inexperienced members of the party, especially the revolutionary youth of both sexes. The latter were strongly attracted by the idealism associated with the Russian Revolution, which, viewed from the distance of Canton, was more enchanting to many than the less exalted idealism embodied in the "Three Principles of the People." In December, 1925, a large group of young people had left Canton for Moscow to study at the Sun Yat-sen University, and increasingly the idea spread at the capital of the Chinese Soviet Republic that the Chinese Revolutionists would be wise to accept the aims as well as the political forms and methods of their Russian comrades. The moderates did not know how many members of the Kuomintang had become Communists, but they suspected that the number was dangerously large. Though few of the party leaders acknowledged conversion to communism, there were grounds for believing that others were secretly favorable to the principles of the Third International. The moderates therefore demanded a clearer understanding between Moscow and Canton.

In February, 1926, Hu Han-min wired back to Canton from Moscow that he had been discussing with high officials of the Third International the question of participation by Communists in the Chinese Revolution. His object was clearly to get them publicly committed on the main issues arising out of the collaboration of Communists and Nationalists in China. They agreed, he declared, that it was proper for Communists to join the revolutionary party and to subscribe to the "Three Principles of the People," despite the ultimate incompatibility between Marxism and Sunyatsenism, for the purpose of presenting a united front to western imperialism in the Far East. They agreed, he added, that China was not ripe for communism, that the economic and social conditions of the country made a successful revolution of the Russian type impossible. They agreed, in short, to help the Chinese Revolutionists on the latter's own terms. If so, of course, there was little reason for Chinese Nationalists to become Communists.

In April Hu Han-min was back in Canton, explaining to his comrades what he had learned in Moscow. The ideals of the Soviet leaders, he admitted, were excellent. It was a shrewd admission, well calculated to appease the radicals within the party. But their realization, he added, was remote. The Marxian ideal of internationalism might be bigger and better than the ideal of nationalism, to which the followers of Sun Yat-sen were committed, but it could be attained, he argued, only by peoples who had first realized the more modest nationalist ideal. A sound world state, he believed, could be built up only on the basis of strong self-respecting national states. Likewise the Marxian ideal of government resting upon opinion alone without any employment of force, or philosophical anarchy, was unattainable by peoples who could not first make a success of self-government under the form of a democratic republic, and the Marxian ideal of communism was out of the question for peoples who had not yet mastered socialism of the limited kind advocated by Sun Yat-sen. The "Three Principles of the People," he insisted, must be put into effect before there could be any useful discussion of the loftier ideals propagated from Moscow. Thereafter the different kinds of Revolutionists might profitably consider what next.

But distrust between the factions of the party at Canton could not be dispelled. In March Chiang Kai-shek had suddenly appeared in the city at the head of his most trusted recruits and arrested several prominent Revolutionists of Communist proclivities whom he charged with conspiracy against the Nationalist Government. The moderates were encouraged to believe that the spread of communism would be checked. They shut their eyes to the ominous significance of military intervention in politics in the expectation that their influence in the counsels of the party would be strengthened. But they reckoned falsely. Borodin, who had been out of the city, presently returned, and it soon appeared that the position of the Russian advisers was not to be shaken so easily. Some of the leading moderates, alarmed at the turn of events, abandoned the Government and took to flight. The tension between the factions of the party became greater than ever. Shortly afterwards Hu Han-min arrived in Canton from Russia and there was hope that he would be able to restore harmony. But Hu Han-min's policy of pouring oil on the troubled waters was no more effective than Wang Ching-wei's of ignoring the signs of storm. Early in May both Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min suddenly fled, the latter to Shanghai, the former all the way to western Europe. The complete disruption of the party seemed imminent. Again Chiang Kai-shek intervened. Supported by the veteran Nationalist politicians remaining in Canton, he called a special plenary session of the Central Executive Committee for the purpose of reconciling the contending factions.

It was evident that the party leaders were losing their grip on the organization and that the control of the Revolution was on the point of slipping from their feeble grasp into the hands either of the military leaders or of the leaders of the labor and peasant unions. But neither the labor and peasant union leaders nor the new militarists were ready for a trial of their strength. The former had made much progress in the preceding twelve months. At the third national congress of the All-China Federation of Labor, held at Canton in May, 1926, the delegates claimed to represent upwards of a million and a quarter members as compared with less than half a million at the second congress a year earlier. But the organized labor movement was developing rapidly and its leaders looked forward to much greater strength in the near future. Also the organization of the peasant unions had just been gotten well under way, and important accessions of strength in that quarter were confidently expected in a short time. It was too soon to challenge the military leaders to a contest for the domination of the Soviet Republic. The latter also were making rapid strides in the organization of the Nationalist armies. They expected soon to get the Northern Expedition under way. They hoped for such victories as would give them the prestige they would need in order to make sure of their supremacy in the revolutionary movement. Meanwhile, like the labor and peasant union leaders, though they were getting too strong for the party leaders, they were not yet strong enough to control the Canton Government without help from their rivals. And so the way was open for a compromise between the various revolutionary forces.

The plenary session of the Central Executive Committee, the second since its election in January, opened at Canton on May 15, 1926. For several days previous the greatest excitement had reigned in the city. The wildest rumors had been circulated concerning the plans of the Communists. That they would dominate the Committee and seize power, converting the Soviet Republic into a Socialist Soviet Republic under instructions from the Third International, was widely believed. But more moderate counsels prevailed. Both the party leaders still on the ground and their Russian advisers perceived that the usefulness of the Soviet Republic depended upon keeping the peace between Communists and Nationalists. If the labor and peasant union leaders were not strong enough to dominate the Government, still less were the Communists able to do so, whose power depended so largely upon the organization of the workers and peasants. On the other hand, if the Kuomintang leaders were not going to throw themselves into the arms of the new militarists, whom they had trained to take command of their armies, it was necessary not to antagonize the Communists, without whose aid they could not confidently count on the support of the organized workers and peasants. The compromise, therefore, had to take the form of a fresh understanding between the Nationalists and the Communists.

The necessary agreement was duly reached. In the first place, the Communist Party was to instruct its members to behave more respectfully towards the Kuomintang. It was expressly provided that a member of the Communist or any other party, who should join the Kuomintang, should refrain from unfriendly criticism of the "Three Principles of the People." Secondly, the Executive Committee of the Communist Party was to give the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang a list of all its members who had joined the Kuomintang and should keep the latter informed of further additions of Communists to its ranks. Thirdly, no Communists or members of any other party should be eligible for election to the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and the number of Communists who might become members of the governing bodies of the Nationalist Party or of the Soviet Republic should not exceed one third of the total in any case. Other provisions of the agreement were designed to prevent the Communists within the Kuomintang from forming an organized faction or otherwise acting independently of other members of the party. Finally, it was agreed that the Communist Party should submit to a Joint Committee of Communists and Nationalists for approval all orders to be issued to its members before they were actually despatched to the membership. The Joint Committee was to consist of five Nationalists and three Communists and was to engage a representative of the Third International as its political adviser. It was to examine all matters threatening the friendly relations between the two parties and adjust disputes between them or any of their members. Thus it was hoped that the suspicion of Communist purposes and activities which had so disturbed the moderate Nationalists would be allayed and that harmony within the Kuomintang might be restored.

The significance of this agreement was quickly apparent. On the one hand, Borodin remained high political adviser to the Chinese Soviet Republic. On the other, Chiang Kai-shek became chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and acting leader of the party in succession to Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min. While Borodin and Chiang Kai-shek continued to coöperate with one another, there would be harmony within the party. But the price of harmony was the abdication of the leadership by the regular Nationalist politicians and the surrender of the management of the Revolution to those who could control the workers' and peasants' unions and the Nationalist armies. The government of the Soviet Republic continued to be a party dictatorship in form, but in fact it had become a dictatorship of union organizers and army commanders. For the moment the balance was fairly even between the two rival forces. But any change in their relative strength would inevitably precipitate a fresh struggle between them for the supremacy, and the result, unless somehow the party could find other sources of new strength, would be either a dictatorship of the proletariat, as the Communists hoped, or a dictatorship of the new militarists. The latter would be the better choice of the two evils from the standpoint of the more moderate Nationalists. The most important of the possible sources of new strength for the party was the merchant class, but in Canton that class had been crippled politically by the destruction of the Merchant Guard a year and a half before and could not be utilized in 1926 to counterbalance the growing influence of the workers and soldiers. Meanwhile the supremacy of Chiang Kai-shek and Borodin put power in the hands of the Revolution's most politic and vigorous men. For a period of active military operations this was an auspicious result. But the regular Nationalist politicians could not fail to ask themselves whether it would be possible for their new Soviet Republic to escape the fate which had already befallen the First Chinese Republic, the Parliamentary Republic of 1912.

2

THE NORTHERN PUNITIVE EXPEDITION

The fruits of the armistice between the Communists and the Nationalists at Canton were harvested with spectacular speed. Shortly after the adjournment of the second plenary session of the Central Executive Committee Chiang Kai-shek was appointed commander-in-chief of the Northern Punitive Expedition, organized to overthrow the Government at Peking and unify the country under Nationalist rule. The time was ripe for such an audacious enterprise. At Peking the government of Marshal Tuan Chi-jui had lately collapsed after forfeiting the last shreds of its prestige by the appalling massacre of students on March 18. Dr. W. W. Yen, the last representative of the lost cause of the Parliamentary Republic, was trying in vain to restore the name, if not the substance, of constitutional government. In June his government also collapsed, and Chang Tso-lin set up an undisguised military dictatorship over the northern provinces occupied by his armies. Elsewhere lesser militarists were following his example. Chang Tsung-chang was despot of Shantung. Yen Hsi-shan held on in Shansi. Feng Yu-hsiang had given up the struggle for Chihli and retired across Mongolia to Moscow, but he did not surrender the leadership of his forces in China. At Nanking Sun Chuan-fang was already posing as the dictator of five great provinces along the lower reaches of the Yangtze and the adjacent seaboard. In central China Wu Pei-fu still claimed the mastery, but in Hunan a new adventurer, Tang Sheng-chi, had suddenly emerged from the ruck of obscure generals and, gaining possession of the province, was challenging the former's supremacy. Seeking aid in the impending struggle, he professed interest in the revolutionary program of the Kuomintang and invited Chiang Kai-shek to come up from the South with his Punitive Expedition. Borodin and the Communists were loath to accept this invitation until the new régime at Canton should have been more firmly established, but Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist leaders were eager to come to grips with the northern militarists, and the invitation was accepted. This was the beginning of a campaign which made the second year of the Soviet Republic as remarkable for the success of its military operations as the first year had been for its work of organization.

Early in July, 1926, the Northern Punitive Expedition was formally launched with appropriate ceremonies. The blue flag of the Nationalist Party with its big white sun in the middle and the red, white, and blue flag of the Nationalist Government were solemnly handed over to the commander-in-chief at a great public gathering in Canton. Chiang Kai-shek made a well-advertised speech, declaring that the object of the expedition was to overthrow Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin and all other militarists and oppressors of the people, to unify China and secure for her an equal position among the nations of the world, and to establish soviet governments in all the provinces upon the model of that at Canton. He turned over the nominal leadership of the party to Sun Yat-sen's old friend, Chang Ching-kiang, while another veteran politician of the Kuomintang, Tan Yen-kai, became head of the Administrative Council of the Nationalist Government. The Foreign Office, recently abandoned by C. C. Wu, who had fled to Shanghai in the wake of Hu Han-min, was entrusted to Eugene Chen, a radical journalist from Peking, who had been born in the British West Indies and educated under the British flag and had narrowly escaped death at the hands of Chang Tso-lin not long before. Chen possessed a rare talent for diplomatic correspondence which he skilfully used to arouse the national spirit of the politically minded Chinese to an unparalleled pitch of anti-imperialist and especially anti-British fury. Covered by a cloud of revolutionary propagandists and agitators, the Nationalist armies were actually under way before the end of the month on the long road to the Yangtze river and to Peking.

The extraordinary achievements of the Nationalist forces in the following months are well known. In August the province of Human was overrun and a soviet government was set up at the provincial capital, Changsha. Early in September Hankow fell, and a month later, after a long siege and a desperate resistance, the adjoining city of Wuchang, the capital of Hupeh province, also capitulated. The possession of the Wuhan cities, as they were called, gave the Nationalists control of central China and cut off all the southwestern provinces from Peking. Wu Pei-fu was ruined and presently disappeared from the political scene. Meanwhile the province of Kiangsi had also been invaded and, before winter compelled a suspension of active hostilities, Nanchang, the capital of that province, had also been occupied, having thrice changed hands during the course of the fighting between the Nationalists and the forces of Sun Chuan-fang. When spring made the resumption of military operations possible, the Nationalists invaded Anhui and Kiangsu provinces, and on March 24 reached Nanking, which was hastily abandoned by the demoralized troops of the northern militarists. At the same time other Nationalist armies, which had been advancing up the coast from Canton, swept the northern forces out of Fukien and Chekiang provinces and entered Shanghai. By the end of March the remnants of Sun Chuan-fang's troops south of the Yangtze, together with reënforcements under Chang Tsung-chang, had been driven across the river and were in full retreat towards the north. Meanwhile Feng Yu-hsiang had returned from Moscow, had raised the siege of Sian, which had been held for him by one of his generals against tremendous odds from April to November, 1926, despite pestilence and famine, and had driven the northerners from Shensi province. In the following spring he hurled his forces against the flank of the northerners in Honan province, while a Nationalist army came up from Hankow, driving Chang Tso-lin's troops across the Yellow river and adding another great province to the area under Nationalist control. In less than a year the Revolutionists had overrun half the provinces of China and, including what they had possessed at the outset, dominated the greater part of the country.

These amazing successes were not won without hard fighting. The Nationalist officers trained at Whampoa showed themselves to be brave and efficient leaders, and the armies comprising the original Punitive Expedition which set out from Canton never failed to give a good account of themselves in battle. The mercenary troops against whom they fought, though often greatly superior in equipment, were greatly inferior in morale, and, unless they enjoyed a big advantage of position, were no match for the Nationalists, man for man. As the Nationalists advanced, however, they incorporated masses of disorganized northern soldiers into their own ranks. This was done partly to replenish their losses, but chiefly because it was the easiest way to dispose of the broken remnants of the defeated armies. Such dilution of the Nationalist forces could not fail to impair their quality. But along with the progress of the Nationalist arms went a corresponding growth of their prestige. This was skilfully exploited by the revolutionary propagandists and agitators. While political agents penetrated the northern lines and undermined the morale of the soldiers, labor- and peasant-union organizers thronged the cities and villages, subverting the established order in the workshops and fields and breaking down the resistance of the civil authorities to the political program of the Revolutionists. What the Russian political advisers called revolutionary mass action, was the order of the day. The class-consciousness of the poorer peasants and workers was stimulated by all the arts and artifices known to the veterans of the Russian Revolution, and the struggle against militarists, imperialists, and oppressors of the people was pressed with the utmost vigor and spirit. Hard fighting by the Nationalist armies alone does not account for the debacle of the northerners in that first campaign. No less important was the purposeful and systematic organizing and disorganizing by the revolutionary propagandists and agitators.

3

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AT HANKOW

The capture of Hankow and Wuchang by the Nationalist armies precipitated a crisis, not only in the affairs of the northern militarists, but also in those of the Nationalist Party itself.[1] The Wuhan cities were the seat of a highly developed capitalistic industry. Many textile mills were located there, and at Hanyang was the largest iron and steel plant in China. The British, Russians, French, Germans, and Japanese had formerly possessed concessions along the river-front, and, while the German and Russian concessions had been surrendered to the Chinese, the others continued under foreign control and sheltered business properties of great value. There was a much larger body of industrial wage-earners at Wuhan than at Canton, larger indeed than anywhere in China outside of Shanghai. It offered an extraordinarily favorable field for the operations of revolutionary agitators of all kinds, especially labor organizers. Both the Russian political advisers and the Chinese Communists were well aware of the possibilities ahead of them in Wuhan and were eager to remove the capital of the Soviet Republic from Canton in order to exploit to the utmost the opportunity for the political development of the Wuhan proletariat. But Chiang Kai-shek could understand the significance of moving the capital to Wuhan as well as Borodin. He knew that the workers would be immediately organized, that their leaders would aspire to a decisive voice in the counsels of the party, that the influence of the Russian political advisers and of the Communists over the Government would be greatly strengthened, and that the control of the Nationalists over their own Revolution would be in jeopardy. At a special party conference held in Canton in October, the Left Wing leaders urged the immediate removal of the capital. Chiang Kai-shek and the moderates opposed it and for the moment with success. But in November it was decided to make the change, and before the end of the year the seat of the Nationalist Government was established at Hankow. It was a great triumph for Borodin over Chiang Kai-shek, but it dangerously disturbed the balance of forces within the party.

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[1] For a well-balanced and detailed account of conditions at Hankow under the Chinese Soviet government by an eye-witness, see H. Owen Chapman's *The Chinese Revolution 1926–27* (London, 1928). The aims and attitudes of the radical Nationalists are set forth with admirable lucidity in T. C. Woo's *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution* (London, 1928).

The Left Wing leaders rapidly consolidated their position at Hankow. When the Hupeh government was reorganized after the defeat of Wu Pei-fu's forces in September, General Tang Sheng-chi had been appointed head of the provincial soviet or, in Russian parlance, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars for the province. The interests of this ambitious recent convert to Nationalism were thus bound up with those of the party leaders at Hankow, while Chiang Kai-shek, whom Tang Sheng-chi came to look upon more and more as a rival, proceeded with the campaign against Sun Chuan-fang in Kiangsi province and presently established his headquarters at Nanchang, the capital of that province. Hupeh, like Hunan, was soon flooded with revolutionary propaganda. Peasant unions sprang up in the villages on every side, threatening wealthy landlords with the reduction of rents or even the confiscation of property, challenging the authority of village elders and selectmen, and aiding, according to their capacity, the workers' unions in the provincial capitals, upon whom fell the chief burden of supporting the Nationalist Government in its new quarters. The influence of the Russian advisers became more and more conspicuous in the activities of the Soviet Republic.

The character of the Hankow régime is perhaps best reflected in the list of revolutionary holidays officially promulgated soon after its establishment. They were as follows:

January 15. Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg's Day (anniversary of assassination of two prominent German revolutionists, 1919).
January 21. Lenin's Day (anniversary of Lenin's death, 1924).
January 27. One-Two-Seven Day (anniversary of massacre of Peking-Hankow railroad workers by Wu Pei-fu, 1923).
March 8. International Women's Day.
March 12. Sun Yat-sen's Day (anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's death, 1925).
March 18. Three-One-Eight Day (anniversary of massacre of students in Peking by Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, 1926).
March 18. Paris Commune Day (anniversary of Paris Commune, 1871).
March 29. Huang-hua-kang (anniversary of execution of the seventy-two heroes at Canton, 1910).
May 1. Labor Day.
May 4. Students' Movement Day (anniversary of organization of students to protest against Japanese aggressions, 1918).
May 5. Inauguration Day (inauguration of Sun Yat-sen as president of Nationalist Government at Canton, 1921).
May 5. Marx's Day (anniversary of Karl Marx's birth, 1818).
May 7. National Humiliation Day (anniversary of Japanese twenty-one demands, 1915).

May 30. Shanghai Massacre Day (1925).
June 23. Shameen Massacre Day (1925).
August 20. Liao Chung-kai's Day (anniversary of assassination of the Left Wing leader at Canton, 1925).
September 5. International Young People's Day.
September 5. Chungking Bombardment Day (1926).
September 7. Humiliation Treaty of 1901 Day (anniversary of signing of treaty following suppression of Boxer insurrection).
September 21. Chu Chi-hsin's Day (anniversary of death of Dr. Sun's old revolutionary comrade at hands of militarists in Canton, 1920).
October 10. National Revolution Day.
November 7. Russian Revolution Day.

In January a mob of workmen, incited by revolutionary propaganda, rushed the British concession at Hankow, and the British marines on guard withdrew to their ships rather than provoke another "incident" by repelling the invaders by force of arms. Shortly afterwards the British concession at Kiukiang, an important port some distance down the river, was rushed in a similar way. But the Nationalists were careful that the French and Japanese concessions at Hankow should not be rushed at this time. And the Russians and Germans continued to do business unmolested by mobs in their former concessions, now under Chinese control. The Nationalist Government at Hankow, as at Canton, had singled out the British to bear the brunt of their attack upon western imperialism and seemed to have their forces, workmen as well as soldiers, under effective control.

The first few months of the Soviet Republic at Hankow revealed a consciousness of power such as no Chinese had felt since the Sino-Japanese War finally exposed the rottenness of the Manchu Empire. The British Government sent out a new minister to China, Sir Miles Lampson, with instructions to visit Hankow before proceeding to Peking. This he did in December, 1926. At the same time the British Government published a "Memorandum on Policy in China," stating that in its opinion the time had come for the Powers to show more sympathy with the Nationalist movement and "to pursue a constructive policy in harmony with the spirit of the Washington Conference but developed and adapted to meet the altered circumstances of the present time." In evidence of its sincerity of purpose an agreement was presently negotiated with the Nationalist Government for the formal rendition of the ex-British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang and for their government by local councils under the authority of the Soviet Republic. The signing of this agreement in February was the greatest diplomatic victory yet won by the Revolutionists. It was a heavy blow not only to British prestige but also indirectly to the prestige of imperialism in general. It was above all a heavy blow to the prestige of the Peking Government, which could no longer maintain the fiction that it spoke for the whole of China. It was a recognition of the temporary disintegration of China but also a tribute to the capacity of the Chinese to govern themselves. It presaged, if not the eventual unification of China under the leadership of the Nationalists, at least the acceptance of the Soviet Republic by the Powers and respect for the right of the Chinese to govern themselves in their own way.

Nothing perhaps better illustrates the consciousness of power at the new capital of the Chinese Soviet Republic than the activities of the Kuomintang's coöperating organizations, the associations of workers and of peasants and the Communist Party. The All-China Federation of Labor removed its headquarters to Hankow shortly after the Nationalist Government went there, while its organizers pervaded the provinces under Nationalist control and its locals multiplied in all industrial centers, above all in Wuhan. By the spring of 1927 it claimed two and a half million members, double the number reported at the Canton convention the previous year. It felt strong enough to call a pan-Pacific labor conference, to meet at Hankow in May, which was attended by representatives of the Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Javanese, and Indian revolutionary labor movements. A delegation, representing the Communist International Federation of Labor and consisting of leading members of the radical wing of organized labor in Great Britain, France, and the United States, also visited Hankow at this time and lent such encouragment as it could to the radical element in the Chinese labor movement. The peasants' unions developed even more rapidly than those of the workers, though their leaders did not attempt anything so ambitious as a pan-Pacific conference. By the spring of 1927 the Federation of Peasant Unions in the province of Hunan claimed five million members and the total membership in the peasants' unions in all the provinces under Nationalist control was estimated at twelve millions. Conventions of peasant unionists were held at the capitals of several provinces, including a great conference of the Hupeh Provincial Peasant Association at Hankow in April, in order to give voice to the demands of the poorer peasantry and proclaim their support of the Soviet Republic. The Nationalist leaders attended these meetings and made every effort to demonstrate the revolutionary solidarity of organized labor and peasantry.

The Communist Party of China also established its headquarters at Hankow. Its official leader, Chen Tu-hsiu, was closely associated with Borodin and with Roy, the Hindu Communist, who was sent out by the Communist International as its special representative at the seat of the Chinese Soviet Republic. In May, 1927, the party held its fifth national convention, at which the delegates reported a total membership of over fifty thousand. At the last previous convention, held at Canton early in 1925, the party had claimed less than one thousand members. Despite this rapid growth the Communist Party was still a small organization compared with those of the workers and the peasants. But its importance was not measured by its numbers. Through the alliance with the Kuomintang the Communists gained an easy entrance into the workers' and peasants' unions and also into the Political Department of the Nationalist army. The energy and determination of the Communist leaders combined to give them a disproportionate influence upon the revolutionary masses, soldiers as well as workers and peasants. But they were careful to maintain at least the outward appearance of harmony with their Nationalist comrades. At the Hankow convention Wang Ching-wei, former chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and leader of the Left Wing Nationalists, who had returned by way of Russia from his exile in western Europe in time to be present, welcomed the delegates on behalf of the Nationalist Government and repeated the familiar arguments in favor of coöperation between all the revolutionary forces in China. Roy, who took a leading part in the convention, spoke in the same vein. "The Communist Party," he said, "is going to work with the Kuomintang, not only to share responsibility, but also to share power. In this stage of the Revolution, therefore, it is very necessary that our conceptions of the Revolution be made mutually clear. The task which the Communist International has put before the Communist Party of China is not the struggle for the immediate realization of Socialism. . . . The Kuomintang is a revolutionary organization . . . because it struggles against imperialism. And it is because of this that the proletariat will coöperate with the Kuomintang till the final victory is won." At no time had the relations between the Nationalist and Communist Parties seemed more intimate and cordial than in the early spring of 1927.

The consciousness of power at Hankow was felt most strongly by the Left Wing politicians at the head of the Nationalist Government. The moderates, on the other hand, became more and more uneasy. Chiang Kai-shek from his headquarters at Nanchang viewed the development of the labor and peasant movements and the growing influence of the Communists with special alarm. He even ventured to question whether the time had not come to terminate the alliance between the Nationalists and the Communists. This precipitated the struggle for control of the party organization between the radical and moderate elements within the Kuomintang. The radical faction was strong enough to call a meeting of the Central Executive Committee — its third plenary session — at Hankow in March. Chiang Kai-shek and other prominent moderates refused to attend. The radicals elected a new Standing Committee in place of that chosen at the second plenary session, held in May of the previous year. Chiang Kai-shek was deprived of the chairmanship of the Committee, though not deprived of membership altogether. His friend, Chang Ching-kiang, who had been acting as chairman in his place, was removed from the Committee, together with other moderate leaders, to make room for more radical committeemen. Four of the nine members of the new Committee were reputed to be Communists. Wang Ching-wei, though not yet back from exile, was chosen again to be chairman. The reconstruction of the Standing Committee gave the Left Wing of the Kuomintang complete control of the Nationalist Government. Two Communists were appointed to the Council of People's Commissars and the influence of the leaders of the workers' and peasants' organizations and of the Communist Party became greater than ever. Su Shao-chen, chairman of the All-China Federation of Labor, who was now also the Commissar for Labor; Chen Kung-po, chief of the Workers' Bureau at party headquarters; and Teng Yen-ta, chief of the Peasants' Bureau and head of the Political Department of the Nationalist army, formed a powerful triumvirate within the government of the Soviet Republic which even threatened the supremacy of the official party leaders. At no time had the prospects for the radical element within the Kuomintang seemed brighter than in the early spring of 1927.

Six months later these bright prospects had utterly vanished. The Soviet Republic had collapsed. The Nationalist Government at Hankow had been dissolved. Borodin had been sent back to Russia. Teng Yen-ta, Eugene Chen, and Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, to mention only some of the more conspicuous of the Left Wing leaders, had also fled the country and found refuge at Moscow. Others had made their peace with the moderates and joined the government which the latter had set up at Nanking. The labor and peasant associations had been ruthlessly suppressed and many of their leaders had been executed. The Standing Committee elected at the third plenary session of the Central Executive Committee, in March, had ceased to function, and in many places the local organizations of the Kuomintang had been disbanded. Everywhere the militarists seemed to be in the saddle. At Hankow General Tang Sheng-chi was master. At Canton General Li Chi-sen was master. At Nanking Chiang Kai-shek for a time was master. In the north Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang and Sun Chuan-fang had recovered from the crushing defeats inflicted upon them in the first months of 1927 and resumed the offensive. The Nationalist army had been driven back upon Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek had presently resigned his command and left the country, and his subordinate generals had barely succeeded in holding their own south of the Yangtze river. In September these generals were on the point of waging war against Tang Sheng-chi for the control of the headquarters of the Revolution, while only Feng Yu-hsiang's forces in Honan prevented the northern militarists from regaining possession of central China. The militarists, old and new, seemed to have won a complete triumph over the radical politicians who had lately dominated the Kuomintang. It was a heavy blow to those who had hoped to demonstrate by means of the Soviet Republic the political capacity of the Chinese people.

It was a heavier blow to those who had hoped to demonstrate by means of the Chinese Revolution the capacity of the Third International to bring about a successful world revolution.[1] In March, 1927, the World Revolution had seemed to many Communists by no means a remote possibility. Shanghai, for example, the greatest outpost of western imperialism in the Far East, was captured by the Nationalist forces almost without firing a shot. The revolutionary propaganda of the political agents of the Kuomintang had destroyed the morale of the anti-revolutionary armies which had previously occupied the city and at the same time had inspired the toiling masses with a spirit of proletarian class-consciousness that had never been known there before. A series of sudden and well-organized strikes crippled the industries of the city and paved the way for the seizure of power in those sections under Chinese control by the leaders of the revolutionary workers' unions. The city surrendered to the Revolution before the Nationalist army appeared on the scene. In all these activities Communist agitators took a leading part, and there is ground for the opinion, some Communists have claimed,[1] that, had they played their hand only a little more skilfully, they might have won the city for themselves instead of for the Nationalists. To be sure, the International Settlement was held by the troops of the Powers, and could not have been overrun by mobs of revolutionary workmen as were the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. But incidents might have been provoked which would have caused the defending forces to seem the aggressors, and all Nationalist China would have burst into flame. The position of the imperialistic Powers would have become very difficult, if not untenable. The protagonists of the World Revolution might well have celebrated an impressive triumph. But only a few months later it was the position of the Communists which had become untenable. Everywhere in Nationalist China they were driven to cover. Their leaders were forced to carry on their work underground or to leave the country.

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[1] The extent of the blow is measured by the collapse of the Trotzky opposition at Moscow and the triumph of the Stalin faction. See L. Trotzky's *La Révolution Défigurée* (Paris, 1929), pp. 131, 150–154, 159, 162, 170.

The retreat of Borodin, High Political Adviser of the Nationalist Government, to Moscow gave a dramatic touch to the downfall of the Communists. Shaken in body by the fever which attested to his three years' sojourn in the Chinese tropics, broken in spirit by the failure of his carefully laid plans, he took a chilly leave of the disillusioned politicians at Hankow, and set out on the long and painful road across the Mongolian desert to the bitter safety of the Soviet dominions. When I visited Moscow a year later, he was there, unhonored and without employment, a virtual prisoner in the Soviet capital. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists had played a desperate game. In December, 1927, they rose suddenly at Canton, seized the city, and for a day or two were masters of the original home of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Overpowered by the forces swiftly mustered against them, their reign was soon at an end. Members of the Russian consular staff were implicated in the uprising, the vice-consul being killed in the street fighting with arms in his hands. Thereupon the Russian consulates were closed throughout Nationalist China, the representatives of the Soviet Union were expelled from the country, and the alliance between the Communists and the Kuomintang was shattered beyond repair.

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[1] See Yan Lyan-jen, "Shanghai Events in the Spring of 1927," in the *Materials on the Chinese Question*, published by the Institute of Scientific Research on China, no. 13, Sun Yat-sen University, Moscow, 1928.

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THE CAUSES OF ITS COLLAPSE

What is the explanation of this extraordinary change in the state of revolutionary China between the beginning and the end of 1927? How can we account for the astonishing reversal in the fortunes of the Communists? Why should there have been such an unanticipated and rapid collapse of the Chinese Soviet Republic?

In the first place, the activities of the workers' associations, though conspicuously helpful in paving the way for the advance of the Nationalist armies, proved a tremendous obstacle to the success of the Nationalist Government. The union organizers, who preceded the armies, aroused extravagant hopes which it was impossible to fulfill. The Communist agitators were especially culpable. They distributed copies of the Russian labor code wherever they went and created expectations of increases of wages and improvements in the conditions of employment which were impossible of realization in a country as poor and disorganized as China. In the urban centers industry was thrown into confusion by strikes and lockouts before the Nationalist Government arrived on the scene, and the politicians were unable to restore order. The disorder was most injurious at the principal seats of the Nationalist Government. In Canton the unions in the period of their power made intolerable demands upon the unprotected employers, and in Hankow, after the northerners had been driven out, they repeated the same tactics. Sometimes, after calling a strike and demanding preposterous concessions from the employers, the union would settle for an increase of wages of a few dollars a month. Again, they would not settle except on terms which made the operation of the business hopelessly unprofitable. The union leaders were inexperienced and slow to learn the fine art of squeezing out of their employers what their businesses would bear without breaking.

The results were disastrous. First, there was a great increase in the cost of living. This was vexatious to the workers themselves and also to their allies, the peasants. Secondly, there was a rapidly growing volume of unemployment. At Hankow in April, 1927, a quarter of a million wage-earners were reported to be out of work. This was partly the result of lockouts in foreign-owned mills, ordered for political rather than economic reasons, just as the rise in the cost of living was partly the result of speculation by foreign and native capitalists, but the improvident tactics of the union leaders were the chief factor in the demoralization of trade and industry. Finally, the economic disorder stopped the principal revenues of the Nationalist Government at their source and prevented the politicians from carrying out their promises to the people. They could not improve the living conditions of the workers as they had planned; they could not reduce the taxes by which the militarists had made life miserable for the peasantry; they could not even finance the military campaign upon whose success they depended for their very existence. At last even the radical politicians at Hankow perceived that the Nationalist movement and the labor movement could not survive together. By the end of May, 1927, they were ready to jettison the workers' associations in order to salvage their own sinking craft.

Secondly, the activities of the peasants' associations, though indispensable for the success of the labor movement in the cities, proved ruinous in the end for the Nationalists. The revolutionary propagandists had worked out an attractive program for the redress of the peasants' grievances and the amelioration of life in the villages. Even the Communists had laid aside their own special ideology and joined in the organization of peasant unions according to the Nationalist program. But as the peasant movement developed, the peasant leaders tended to get out of hand. They demanded not only the reduction of rents but also the redistribution of lands. They demanded not only the limitation of the authority of the landed gentry but also all power for the peasant unions. Finally, they demanded arms in order that they might make good their claims to power. These demands meant the destruction of the old order in the country. No general redistribution of lands could be accomplished without confiscating the properties of the village and family temples as well as of the wealthier landlords and more prosperous peasantry. The seizure of all power in the villages by the peasant unions involved the overthrow not only of the aldermen and selectmen, but also that of the whole patriarchal system. The arming of the peasantry threatened the foundations of all existing law and order. Such demands went far beyond the program of the Nationalists. They could not be granted without jeopardizing the control of the Revolution itself.

The excesses into which the peasant unions inevitably fell brought their own cure. Under the Chinese patriarchal system it was impossible to confiscate temple-properties or even the lands of the rich without offending large numbers of people. Many of those offended were in the revolutionary armies of the Nationalist Government. Influential army officers and party leaders could not stand by and watch the spoliation of their relatives without protest. When peasant unions began to demonstrate their own authority by the execution of unpopular landlords, there was bound to be a reaction. The peasant movement made the greatest headway in Hunan province, and here also the reaction was greatest. It began in the latter part of May, when the Nationalist troops at the provincial capital, Changsha, attacked the headquarters of the workers' unions, massacred the leaders, whom they denounced as Communists, and destroyed their organization. This was quickly followed by a general attack on the peasants' unions throughout the province. The whole region was plunged into indescribable confusion and many an unhappy peasant leader paid for his brief spell of power with his life. In no other province did either the development of peasants' unions or the reaction against the abuses to which they led go as far as in Hunan. But everywhere the miscarriage of the peasant movement gravely impaired the prestige of the Kuomintang.

The disorder in Nationalist China resulting from the activities of the workers' and peasants' associations was enhanced by the accompanying attack upon religion. The Nationalist leaders were not originally concerned with religious matters. The revolution which they had in mind was primarily political, and only incidentally, if at all, religious. Some of them indeed were active Christians and many of them acknowledged their indebtedness to Christian schools and colleges in China or abroad for their modern educations. At all stages of the Nationalist movement its leaders had received much encouragement and moral support from Christian missionaries in China and from their friends in the countries from which they came. In some countries, particularly the United States, the friendly attitude of the Christian missionaries had exerted an important influence upon the policy of the government towards China. But not all missionaries were equally sympathetic with the aspirations of the Nationalists and there was some impatience among the latter when the missionary bodies, including the most sympathetic, hesitated to give formal endorsement to the Nationalist cause and plunge actively into revolutionary politics. The admission of the Communists into the Kuomintang accelerated the development of anti-religious opinion among the Revolutionists. The Communists were hostile to all churches, regarding religion as the "opium of the people," to use Lenin's phrase, and attacked the Buddhists and even the Confucianists as well as the Christians. Buddhist temples were frequently confiscated by the Revolutionists, as their arms advanced, and in Changsha the beautiful Temple of Confucius was destroyed. But the Communists were especially hostile to Christianity on account of its connection with the imperialistic Powers. They stigmatized the missionaries as "hunting dogs of the imperialists" and, though they were careful to distinguish between missionaries from countries whose governments recognized the equal station of China among the Powers, like Germany, and other missionaries, their propaganda proved very injurious to missionary activities of all kinds.

The anti-religious movement developed rapidly after the Nationalists reached Hankow. By the late winter of 1926–27 central China was growing too hot for those missionaries who were most closely associated in revolutionary eyes with the imperialistic Powers and not a few had been forced to evacuate their stations. The retirement of the missionaries was accelerated by the Nanking incident [1] on March 24 and by midsummer five thousand out of the eight thousand persons estimated to have been connected with Protestant missions in China, had left the country. Of the rest, one thousand five hundred had taken refuge in Shanghai, one thousand in other treaty-ports, and not more than five hundred remained at their posts. Three of the thirteen Protestant mission colleges, and fifty-five out of one hundred seventy hospitals in thirteen provinces were closed.[2] The Protestants suffered on the whole more than the Catholics, and among the Protestants the Y. M. C. A., which had been foremost in the show of sympathy with the Revolution, was perhaps the worst sufferer. Its buildings in several cities were occupied by the Nationalists and its membership greatly declined. After the collapse of the Hankow Government and the suppression of the Communists the missionaries resumed their work but it was impossible to carry it on precisely as before. In some localities the management of missionary enterprises had been turned over to Chinese and everywhere the question arose, whether the work of the foreign missions had been as effective as it should have been. The efficacy of Communist propaganda, measured by its immediate effect on Chinese opinion and practice, was a rude shock to the more complacent of the missionaries. Eventually it will perhaps appear that the disaster to the Christian missions in China in 1927 was a blessing in disguise. Be that as it may, the attack upon religion increased the dissensions among the Nationalists. It was a symptom of the growth of an intolerance within the revolutionary movement which increased the dissatisfaction with the leadership of the Left Wing politicians and further weakened the foundations of the Soviet Republic.

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[1] A graphic account of the attack upon the foreigners in Nanking by an eyewitness will be found in Mrs. Alice Tisdale Hobart's *Within the Walls of Nanking* (London, 1928).

[2] See K. S. Latourette, *A History of the Christian Missions in China*, p. 820.

The final cause of the collapse of the Chinese Soviet Republic was the failure of the policy of coöperation between Nationalists and Communists. Borodin, who was extraordinarily well informed concerning Chinese economic and social conditions, was of the opinion that there could be no genuine social revolution in China for many years. Before there could be a dictatorship of the proletariat, to say nothing of the workers' coöperative commonwealth, of which the Communists dream, there would have to be an industrial revolution which would bring into existence the indispensable masses of class-conscious wage-earners. This, he believed, would require a long time. Meanwhile, he could see no prospect of maintaining an anti-imperialistic government in China, capable of aiding the Soviet Union in its struggle against the capitalistic Powers, without securing the support of the peasantry. The peasants had suffered enough at the hands of usurers, bandits, and soldiers to desire such a government as was promised them by the revolutionary propagandists, but the organization of the peasantry into economic and political unions, which he deemed necessary for the preservation of such a government, would inevitably bring the government into conflict with the patriarchal system, which was the very substance of Chinese society. In order to enter such a conflict with any hope of success, it was necessary to avoid conflict with other social forces as far as possible. The enmity of the greater capitalists was unavoidable upon his principles, but for that reason he was all the more eager to conciliate the lesser bourgeoisie. Hence he stood fast in support of the policy of coöperation between Communists and Nationalists originally agreed upon with Dr. Sun, and resolutely opposed all attempts by Communists to undermine the authority of the the Left Wing politicians in the Hankow Government and seize power for themselves. As long as this policy worked smoothly, the Soviet Republic seemed to be a great success.

Not all the Communists in China shared Borodin's moderation. Some of them were convinced that a social revolution could be brought about in a comparatively short time, and that, the sooner the Communists took control of the Nationalist Government, the sooner they would get the kind of revolution they wanted.[1] They believed that it was possible to pass directly from the medieval industrial system, which prevailed generally in China, to a socialistic organization of industry without going through the intermediate stage of capitalism, and that the patriarchal family-system would quickly give way under the pressure of the peasants' and workers' unions. Boring from within the Kuomintang, they hoped presently to capture the party organization and thereby to dominate the Government at Hankow and direct the Revolution along the lines they wished it to follow. These differences among the Communists in China reflected the similar differences among the Communists at Moscow. While Trotzky and his followers argued that they must stake the future of the Soviet Union on the success of the World Revolution, Stalin and the majority of the Russian Communists believed that socialism might be maintained in Russia despite the existence of capitalism elsewhere. Zinovieff, the original head of the Communist International, and Radek, the founder of the Sun Yat-sen University at Moscow, who among the Soviet leaders were most interested in the Chinese Revolution, eventually joined the Trotzky faction, but by the spring of 1927 the Stalin faction had gained the upper hand at Moscow and Zinovieff had been replaced by Bukharin at the head of the Communist International. There was a growing disposition at Moscow to direct the attention of Communists towards more immediate objectives than World Revolution and to let the Revolution in China take the course desired by the Chinese Revolutionists. If all had gone well with Borodin's plans for coöperation between the Nationalists and the Communists, the differences of opinion among the Chinese Communists would have been unimportant.

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[1] This view is reflected in Trotzky's letter of May 28, 1927, to the Executive Committee of the Communist International. See *La Révolution Défigurée*, p. 153. Trotzky's Chinese policy, which the Stalin faction resolutely rejected, was as follows: (1) repudiation of the Kuomintang Left Wing leaders and immediate establishment of Councils of Workmen and Peasants; (2) arming of workmen and peasants by these Councils (Soviets); (3) complete independence for the Chinese Communist Party, together with its own press; (4) immediate confiscation of estates of landed proprietors; (5) immediate abolition of reactionary bureaucracy; (6) prompt punishment of treacherous generals and counter-revolutionists (i.e., Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang, *et alii*); and (7) the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat by means of the Councils of Workmen and Peasants. Far from approving such an intransigent policy, the Stalin faction at Moscow, according to Trotzky, had committed the Communist International as early as October, 1926, to a policy of discouraging the agrarian revolution in China, lest the Kuomintang leaders be embarrassed in their management of the Revolution. Such temporizing seemed to him ruinous to the cause of the World Revolution. *Ibid.*, pp. 151, 155.

But when the excesses of the workers' and peasants' unions provoked the militaristic reaction against them, the policy of cooperation was subjected to a strain it could not stand. The Nationalist Government was forced to choose between the organized workers and peasants, on the one hand, and the new militarists on the other. This was a hard choice, since the abandonment of either of these main props of its power would make it dangerously dependent upon the other for its existence. At first the Left Wing leaders at Hankow chose to depend upon the workers and peasants rather than the militarists. Hence in March, 1927, they deprived Chiang Kai-shek of the chairmanship of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee rather than acquiesce in his repression of peasant unions in the territories under his command, and in April, when he crushed the trade unions in

Shanghai, they deposed him from his military command and expelled him from the party. This action was officially endorsed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which had its headquarters at Hankow at that time. It was a bold decision, but it did not deprive the Hankow Government of all military support, since Tang Sheng-chi, commander-in-chief of the Nationalist forces in Central China, still professed loyalty to the Soviet Republic. In June, however, when Tang Sheng-chi also turned against the labor and peasant unions, the Kuomintang politicians at Hankow did not dare to treat him as they had treated Chiang Kai-shek. They had by then discovered that they could not maintain their government with the support of labor and peasant associations alone. Militarists of some sort were indispensable. The Hankow Government reversed itself and, abandoning the labor and peasant unions to their fate, staked its future upon the loyalty of Tang Sheng-chi. But when the Hankow Government abandoned the workers and peasants, it practically abandoned the Communists also, since the fortunes of the latter were largely dependent upon those of the workers and peasants. It was the end of coöperation between the Nationalists and the Communists.

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THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS COLLAPSE

The failure of the policy of coöperation threw the Communists into confusion. They had received much of the blame for the excesses of the workers' and peasants' associations and their own organizations were attacked even more violently than those of the workers and peasants. They were faced with a choice as difficult as that which had confronted the Nationalist leaders at Hankow. Either they had to abandon their separate existence and merge themselves completely with the Kuomintang, thus submitting to the frustration of all their hopes, or they had to fight the Left Wing Nationalists for control of the party with a view to saving the Soviet Republic for the World Revolution.

Borodin and the opportunistic Communists preferred to confess defeat. They were convinced that their opportunity was irretrievably lost. The more radical Communists preferred to fight. They believed that there was still a chance of success. Each faction had its way. Borodin left Hankow in July. The radical Communists staged their insurrection at Canton in December. What the head men of the Communist International thought of these events was shown by the debates at its Sixth Congress, which took place at Moscow the following summer (July–August, 1928). The Communists at Hankow were condemned for their failure to resist with all the force at their command the betrayal of the workers and peasants by the Nationalists. The Communist uprising at Canton was described as the attempt of "the heroic Canton proletariat . . . to link up the agrarian revolution with the overthrow of the Kuomintang and the establishment of the dictatorship of the workers and peasants."[1] The Congress discussed at length what it termed its "theses on the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi-colonies," and ended by reaffirming the "theses on national and colonial questions," originally drafted by Lenin and adopted by the Second Congress in 1920. But it was evident that the leaders were much chastened in spirit by the failure of their policy in China. The abandonment of the Soviet alliance by the Hankow Government they ascribed to (1) the independent action of the workers in the struggle for power and (2) the development of the peasant movement into an agrarian revolution. But whatever the causes the effects were incontestable. The World Revolution had suffered its greatest defeat. The revolutionary philosophy of International Communism would require further revision.

The end of the *entente cordiale* between Nationalist China and Soviet Russia was fatal to the Chinese Soviet Republic and nearly fatal to the Kuomintang. The loss of the Russian political and military advisers was itself serious. Deprived of the support of workers, peasants, and Communists also, the Hankow government became wholly dependent for its further existence upon the support of its armies. The generals of these armies, especially Tang Sheng-chi, the principal remaining Nationalist commander in central China, were the real masters at Hankow and the politicians could no longer challenge their authority. It was not long before Tang Sheng-chi openly asserted his supremacy, and the Soviet Republic gave way to a vulgar military dictatorship. The Kuomintang was already reduced, as far as Hankow was concerned, to a rump consisting of the Left Wing alone. When Borodin left Hankow, the Left Wing itself was split. The confusion among the Communists only added to the confusion among their former Nationalist comrades. Mrs. Sun Yat-sen's flight to Moscow, followed by that of Eugene Chen, was the final demonstration of the demoralization of the Left Wing politicians. Some of those remaining behind were still loyal to the idea of a Sino-Russian *entente*, even if coöperation with the Communists was no longer possible. Wang Ching-wei, the leader of the Left Wing Nationalists, was the most influential leader of this way of thinking. But the Communist insurrection at Canton finally discredited that policy and forced him also to flee the country and take refuge in Europe. The Left Wing of the Kuomintang, which had been the stoutest supporter of civil supremacy over the military, was reduced to impotence. The Nationalist generals stood alone at the head of the revolutionary movement. Could they lead it to victory by force of arms alone? And if so, would the result not be merely the exchange of the old militarism for a new which would still be the same? Or would they have to revive the credit of the party in order to give the necessary power to their arms? And if so, might not the new militarism yet be different from the old?

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[1] See *International Press Correspondence*, no. 88 (Dec. 12, 1928), p. 1660.

VIII

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE KUOMINTANG

1. THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE NATIONALIST PARTY

The break-up of the government of the Chinese Soviet Republic in the summer of 1927 was the signal for a fresh struggle among the militarists, old and new. Never had there been a better opportunity, as it must have seemed to more than one of them, to gain power by force of arms, if not over the whole of China, at least over one of the regions into which the country was then divided. The Communists were outlawed, the peasants' and workmen's associations were disorganized, the Kuomintang was in a state of great confusion. Before proceeding with the story of the struggle among the militarists, it may be well to pause for a moment and consider what were the principal factions in the Kuomintang at that time and what was the nature of the differences between them.

In the first place, there were the various brands of radicals, who together formed the Left Wing of the revolutionary party. They had supported Dr. Sun in his reorganization of the party in 1924, had assisted in the establishment of the Soviet Republic after Dr. Sun's death, and had shared its fortunes at Canton and Hankow. But the failure of the Hankow Government compelled some revision of their platform, and in the process the radicals became badly divided against themselves. Originally they had been united upon five policies of major importance: (1) the alliance with Soviet Russia; (2) the admission of the Communists into the Kuomintang; (3) the maintenance of strict party discipline; (4) the creation of a partisan army; and (5) the organization of the peasants and workmen. It was the decision to abandon the last of these policies which caused the rupture between the

Left Wing Nationalists and the Communists. This rupture eventually led the majority of the Left Wing to join the less radical Nationalists in excluding the Communists from the revolutionary party. The exclusion of the Communists led in turn to the final break with Soviet Russia. But not all the radical leaders concurred in any of these decisions. On the contrary at each step some of them "bolted," and the resulting dissensions among them were ruinous to the morale of their followers. Thus the Left Wing of the Kuomintang was gradually split into factions and the question arose whether it was practicable to maintain any longer the strict party discipline originally introduced by their Russian political advisers. This caused new dissensions and further demoralized that wing of the party. Moreover the collapse of the Hankow Government had carried down with the rest of the soviet political system the political departments of the Nationalist armies, and all the Kuomintang generals were resolved to permit no more political interference with military discipline. This made it impossible to employ the former methods of keeping the military subordinate to the civil authorities and raised the further question how, if at all, the supremacy of the civil over the military was to be restored. Thus all five of the major policies of the radicals became bones of contention. The demoralization of the Left Wing was complete.

The most conspicuous opponent of all these changes of policy was the widow of the founder of the Kuomintang, Mrs. Sun Yat-sen. Actively connected with the Soviet Government, both at Canton and at Hankow, she had won a high place in the hearts of all Chinese Revolutionists and was widely respected as the special guardian of the honor of their late leader. Resigning her membership in the Central Executive Committee on the eve of her departure from Hankow in July, 1927, she published her reasons for leaving her party and her country. In the first place, she declared, the abandonment of the organized workers and peasants was a repudiation of the third of her husband's "Three Principles of the People." He had sprung from the plain people himself and had intended that the Revolution should promote their welfare. He had approved the organization of workers and peasants and believed that their active coöperation in the work of the Revolution was essential for its success. She was convinced that the Hankow leaders, by permitting the destruction of the workers' and peasants' unions, were betraying their trust. Secondly, she clung to her husband's faith in the Russian alliance. Though never a Communist herself, she believed that the Communists should be permitted to remain in the Kuomintang in order that the advantages of the Russian alliance might be secured. Reiterating these views in a second statement, issued as she left Vladivostock for Moscow, she declared that she had lost confidence in the radical leaders at Hankow, but not in the ultimate triumph of the Revolution. These statements produced a profound impression in those parts of China in which their publication was permitted. They made it impossible for the Left Wing of the Kuomintang to present a united front in the following stages of the Revolution.

The most influential among those radical leaders at Hankow, who agreed to the suppression of the workers' and peasants' unions, was Wang Ching-wei. In April, 1927, when he first returned from exile in Europe, he had stood fast against the exclusion of the Communists from the Kuomintang, as proposed by Chiang Kai-shek and the other anti-Communist Nationalists, and had joined with Chen Tu-hsiu, the Chinese Communist leader, in issuing a public statement calling upon all Chinese Revolutionists to maintain the agreement between the two parties. In July, he would let the Communists go rather than bear with the workers' and peasants' unions longer, but he clung to the alliance with Russia and hoped the break with the Communists was not final. In October, after the collapse of the Hankow Government, he had come round to the view that the Communists should be put out of the party, whether they wished to go or not. The official policy of the Communist International, as he understood it, was that the two parties had different aims but could coöperate temporarily for the overthrow of western imperialism in China. This, he said, was the teaching of the Sun Yat-sen University at Moscow. But the question remained, when should the alliance between the two parties come to an end? Opinions, he found, had differed on that question even in Moscow. Trotzky and Radek had favored an early termination of the agreement between Communists and Nationalists; Stalin and Bukharin, on the other hand, told him that they believed the Chinese Communists should stay in the Kuomintang until all the Nationalists were converted to their faith. Among the Chinese Communists also there were different opinions, but the majority agreed with Stalin and Bukharin. He had thought, he declared, until recently, that the Communists might be retained within the Kuomintang as a kind of vaccine against virulent revolutionary propaganda, but to harbor the Communists further would be like using vaccine after the disease had broken out. Still he clung to the alliance with Russia. In December, 1927, when the Russian consular officers were involved in the Communist insurrection at Canton, Wang Ching-wei was finally convinced that the Russian alliance must be abandoned along with the Communists and the workers' and peasants' unions. It was then too late to salvage the other policies of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang. Wang Ching-wei acknowledged his errors of judgment and in January, 1928, voluntarily left China for a second term of exile in Europe. The remaining radicals who had not made their peace with the anti-Communist factions of the Kuomintang, were divided into as many factions as Wang Ching-wei had had minds, and for the moment were without influence in the counsels of the party.

The Right Wing of the Kuomintang had meanwhile been almost as badly broken up as the Left Wing. On the extreme right were a number of prominent Revolutionists, once active members of the party, who had practically abandoned it in order to work with the Peking Government. In the autumn of 1924, when Dr. Sun started for Peking after Feng Yu-hsiang's *coup d'état,* there still seemed to be a possibility of saving China by means of the

Parliamentary Republic. When Dr. Sun died, the Nationalists at Canton pronounced the Peking Government hopeless, but a few Nationalist leaders continued to coöperate with Marshal Tuan Chi-jui until the outbreak of hostilities between Feng and Chang Tso-lin at the end of the year 1925 made further efforts along that line useless. Among these were such outstanding Revolutionists as Wang Chung-hui, Huang Fu, and Wang Cheng-ting (C. T. Wang). They had not had any connection with the Soviet Republic either at Canton or at Hankow and apparently had little faith in the Russian policy of regenerating the state by means of a dictatorship of the Kuomintang. The Western Hills faction had more faith in the Nationalist Party as the instrument of the revolutionary purposes of the Chinese people, but they distrusted the Communists and were read out of the party at the special convention held in Canton in November, 1926. A third element which was added to the Right Wing of the Kuomintang during that year consisted of those members of the Canton Government who took alarm at the progress of the Communists and withdrew at the time of the reconciliation between Borodin and Chiang Kai-shek. Prominent among these were Hu Han-min and Wu Chao-chu (C. C. Wu). The various elements of the Right tended to draw together in Shanghai, since neither Canton nor Peking was safe for them, and by the spring of 1927 they were anxiously watching the course of events at Hankow, fearing lest the Revolution be fatally compromised by the activities of the Communists or hoping that the mistakes of the radicals would give them a fresh opportunity to take the leadership again, according to their several dispositions.

Between the Right and Left Wings of the Kuomintang there gradually developed during the course of 1927 a separate faction of the Center. The leaders of the Center were a group of veteran Revolutionists who had never fully shared the enthusiasm of their younger comrades for the new policies emanating from Soviet Russia. Prominent among them were such men as Tsai Yuan-pei, former chancellor of the National University of Peking and a great figure in the Chinese literary and educational renaissance, and Wu Tze-hui and Chang Ching-kiang, old friends of Dr. Sun and companions in his revolutionary activities before the overthrow of the Manchus. Acquiescing in the alliance with Russia and the admission of Communists to their party in deference to the wishes of their late leader, these veterans surrendered the control of the Central Executive Committee and the active management of the Revolution to the younger men, while reserving to themselves a paramount influence in the Central Supervisory Committee. During the conflict between the moderate and radical elements within the party at Canton in the spring of 1926 they took the former side but opposed the disruption of the party. They helped to bring about the reconciliation at the second session of the Central Executive Committee in May of that year, being careful to retain control of the Supervisory Committee. But the growing power of the Communists after the removal of the seat of government from Canton to Hankow in the autumn of 1926 stimulated a fresh reaction against the radicals among the more moderate members of the party who had not already "bolted," and the use which the radicals made of their supremacy at the third session of the Central Executive Committee in March, 1927, caused the moderates as well as the various elements composing the Right Wing of the party to repudiate their leadership. But unlike many of the conservatives, the moderates were unwilling to give up their standing as regular members of the party.

The third session of the Central Executive Committee marked a graver crisis in the affairs of the Kuomintang than those at the first and second sessions. The workers' and peasants' movements were growing rapidly and the Central Executive Committee gave them an unqualified endorsement. The Committee also emphasized the attack upon British imperialism as the head and front of western imperialism in the Far East, the overthrow of which, it was hoped, would bring down the whole imperialistic system in that part of the world. It declared in favor of the unification of all revolutionary forces and proposed that the Kuomintang hold a joint conference with the Chinese Communist Party in order to bring about more effective coöperation with the organized workers and peasants. At this conference the Nationalists were to be represented by the chiefs of the five bureaus at party headquarters, over whom the Russian political advisers had obtained the greatest influence, namely, those dealing with organization, propaganda, peasants, workers, and youths. The Committee favored also the admission of more Communists into the Nationalist Government and even ventured to suggest that the party consider sending a delegation to the next World Congress of the Communist International. There was much discussion of plans for strengthening the influence of the Political Department over the Nationalist armies and in general for further centralization of power in the party committees. These were policies which, the moderates feared, portended the imminent exploitation of the Chinese Revolutionists in the interests of the Communist World Revolution. And so they appealed to the Supervisory Committee to make use of its authority in order to keep control of the Revolution in the hands of the Chinese. It was again the irrepressible conflict between nationalism and communism.

The position of the Supervisory Committee in the political system of the Chinese Soviet Republic had never been clearly defined. In Russia the Supervisory Committee, or Control Commission, was an important organ of party government. It had a general power to inquire into the conduct of party affairs and a special duty to investigate the activities of individual Communists, whether employed upon party or public business. It was the judge of the elections and qualifications of members of the party and could recommend the expulsion of those deemed unfit for further membership. It operated in close harmony with the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, which had charge of the enforcement of labor laws in the Russian Soviet Republic and was in a position to render valuable aid to the Supervisory Committee in the maintenance of party discipline. The combination of these two agencies, one partisan, the other governmental, formed a powerful instrument of Communist supremacy in Soviet politics. But in China there was no Council of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to coöperate with the Supervisory Committee as in Russia. Moreover the functions of the Supervisory Committee were confused in the minds of many Chinese with those which tradition assigned to the time-honored institution of the censorate. Could the supervisors or, as the Chinese generally preferred to call them, the censors impeach members of the Nationalist Government at Hankow or of the various party committees and councils for disloyalty to the "Three Principles of the People"? Could they suspend such persons from their offices for conspiring with Communists to change the character of the Revolution? Could they expel such persons from the party altogether? One result of the break between the Center and the Left Wing of the Kuomintang was to give an unanticipated importance to these questions. If the censors could exercise the powers of impeachment, suspension, and expulsion, they could purge the party of the Communists and put the moderates in control of the organization. The Center faction, despite its defeat at the third session of the Central Executive Committee, might thus regain the ascendancy over the Left Wing. It was a prospect not conducive to the restoration of harmony within the party.

2

THE PARTY "PURIFICATION"

The disintegration of the Kuomintang gave the new militarists a choice of policies. On the one hand, they might take advantage of the dissensions among the factional leaders to cast off the authority of the party and set up purely military governments over such provinces as they might be able to occupy with their troops. They might even try to cause further dissensions in accordance with the maxim, "Divide and rule," in order the more easily to establish their dictatorships. Or they might continue to render lip service to the cause of the Revolution, while sedulously pursuing their private schemes. But in all these cases the new militarists would not differ appreciably from the old. And could any new militarist hope for better success than the old militarists had achieved, if they fell back upon the old methods? The ease with which Wu Pei-fu, Sun Chuan-fang, and Chang Tsung-chang had been driven across the Yangtze river and out of central China in the campaigns of the fall of 1926 and the spring of 1927 betrayed the weakness of generals who relied on nothing but military power in the face of revolutionary propaganda. But now, on account of the dissensions within the party, perhaps the revolutionary propaganda had spent its force and the new militarists might at least hope to keep what they already held. Some of them thought so, and acted accordingly. Others thought differently. They believed that no military leader could long be successful under the conditions which had been brought about by the Revolution without the support of the moral forces which had given the Revolution so much of its strength. They believed it would be necessary to rehabilitate the party and, taking its leaders under their protection, revive the program of national reconstruction.

Chiang Kai-shek was the first of the new militarists to raise the cry, "Back to the Three Principles of the People." While still at his headquarters in Nanchang before the third session of the Central Executive Committee, he had denounced the Communists as a menace to the Chinese Revolution and had condemned the excesses of the workers' and peasants' unions. The International Trade Union delegation, which at this time visited Kiangsi province, where Chiang Kai-shek's influence was predominant, reported that the portraits of Marx and Lenin were not displayed at party meetings alongside that of Dr. Sun, as in other Nationalist provinces which they had visited. They denounced him bitterly for his alleged betrayal of the Revolution. Upon his defeat at the third session, Chiang Kai-shek hastened to Shanghai. Arriving immediately after the expulsion of the northern forces, he bent all his energies to prevent the exploitation of the victory by the radicals and Communists. The great revenues obtainable there made it the most important base in China for revolutionary action, and its control bade fair to be decisive in the struggle between the Center and the Left. The workers' organizations, which were apparently on the point of seizing supreme power, were forcibly put down and Communists were ruthlessly suppressed. Strongly supported by the leading censors and other veteran Nationalists, he issued early in April his ultimatum to the Hankow Government. First, there should be a complete cessation of Communist propaganda. Secondly, the orders of the Hankow Government would not be accepted until the relations between the Nationalists and the Communists should have been satisfactorily adjusted. Thirdly, the Nationalist armies should be under the exclusive control of the regular military officers and interference by political agents should no longer be tolerated. The importance of this last demand had been sensationally demonstrated by the recent "incident" at Nanking. Fourthly, labor organizations should be subject to the orders of the military officers in command of the districts in which they might be located. This was especially to prevent the situation from getting out of hand in Shanghai. Thus the anti-Communist Revolutionists definitely committed themselves to the so-called "purification" of the party.

The party purification movement quickly culminated in the establishment of an independent Nationalist Government at Nanking. The Hankow Government would grant none of the demands of the anti-Communists and, as has been mentioned, replied by depriving Chiang Kai-shek of his command and expelling him from the party. Meanwhile, the Central Supervisory Committee had been summoned to meet at Nanking, and the Hankow Government had been formally repudiated. A series of open letters was published, addressed to the Nationalist armies, to all Nationalists, and to the Chinese people. The differences between the Nationalists and Communists were strongly emphasized. In the first place, it was pointed out, the former were working for the emancipation of all the people, whereas the latter cared only for that of the proletariat. Secondly, the former wanted real self-determination for the people of China, including the right to enter the World Revolution of their own free will, if at all. They were opposed to all kinds of foreign dictation, whether by the imperialist legations at Peking or by the Communist missions at Hankow. Thirdly, the Kuomintang was intended to be a revolutionary, but not a destructive, party. It should oppose unnecessary injury to the people such as had been caused by the workers' and peasants' unions under Communist incitement in Central China. Special pains were taken to make clear the distinction between the communism preached by the agents of Moscow and the socialism sanctioned by the third of Dr. Sun's "Three Principles of the People." Only a revolution animated by the "Three Principles of the People" could save China, the Nanking leaders declared, and only the expulsion of the Communists could make China safe for such a revolution. On this platform most of the Right Wing Nationalists could join the Center in its attempt to rehabilitate the Kuomintang and reconstruct the Nationalist Government.

The Nationalist Government at Nanking was accordingly formed by a coalition of the Center and Right Wing. Revolutionists who had been active in the Soviet Government at Canton until the split in the spring of 1926 were conspicuous members. Hu Han-min was the chairman of the Council of Civil Administration, or, in the Russian terminology, Council of People's Commissars, and Wu Chao-chu (C. C. Wu) was in charge of the Foreign Office. Both these men had once held the same offices at Canton. In general the organizers of the Nanking Government took care to preserve the forms of the Soviet Republic, as originally established by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, in order to give color to their claim of party regularity. The Government at Hankow had lost its authority, they argued, on account of the impeachment of its leaders by the censors, and they hoped to give evidence of their good faith by reviving its forms at Nanking. Since they had been constrained to abandon several of the major policies of the party, as finally sanctioned by Dr. Sun, they were all the more eager to hold fast to the rest. But despite the efforts of the leaders, it was difficult to maintain the fiction that the Nanking Government, as organized in April, 1927, was the lineal sucessor of the government at Canton. The Left Wing refused to have anything to do with it. The censors conferred upon it such moral authority as it was theirs to bestow, but manifestly it owed its existence to Chiang Kai-shek as well as to the censors, and visitors at Nanking found that the new capital resembled the headquarters of an army much more than the seat of a government. Nor was the authority derived from the support of Chiang Kai-shek's army sufficient to give it at once the prestige that had for a time been enjoyed by the Government at Hankow. The army was flooded with Left Wing propaganda, which under the circumstances was ruinous to discipline, and the representatives of the foreign Powers, though they had ceased to deal with Hankow, were far from ready to recognize Nanking as its successor, either in law or in fact.

The deadlock between Hankow and Nanking gave exceptional importance to the attitude of Feng Yu-hsiang. Rapidly consolidating his recent conquests in the northwest, he established his headquarters in Honan province and made it clear that he must be reckoned with in all plans for the further development of the Nationalist Revolution. He agreed with Hankow in opposing the disruption of the revolutionary party and with Nanking in opposing the activities of the Communists. In his own territory he had suppressed the peasants' associations and tolerated no political interference in the management of his armies, but he liked the vigorous patriotic propaganda and the aggressive foreign policy of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang and would hear of no compromise with the northern militarists. In June he helped to persuade the Hankow politicians to turn their backs on the peasants' and workers' unions, even at the cost of a break with Borodin, and in return undertook to protect them against a counter-attack from Peking. This left them free, as they thought, to deal with Nanking at discretion. Immediately, however, he made a separate agreement with Chiang Kai-shek by which he pledged himself to join in purifying the party of Communists and to support the "Three Principles of the People" as understood at Nanking. This left Chiang Kai-shek free, as he thought, to continue the Northern Expedition. But neither the Hankow politicians nor the Nanking militarists gained the expected fruits of their agreement with Marshal Feng. Chiang Kai-shek, weakened by the Left Wing propaganda within his own ranks and threatened with attack in the rear by Tang Sheng-chi, was unable to repeat on the northern side of the Yangtze the phenomenal successes he had gained on the southern side and by the beginning of August was forced to acknowledge defeat. By that time also the Hankow politicians had discovered that they could not permit Tang Sheng-chi to attack Chiang Kai-shek in the rear without setting up a new militarism worse than the old. The time had come for Feng Yu-hsiang to insist on a reconciliation between the warring factions of the Kuomintang.

Marshal Feng's plan of reconciliation had already been formulated. After his conference with Chiang Kai-shek in June he had communicated with Wang Ching-wei, Teng Yen-ta, and the other leaders at Hankow, recommending the following terms: (1) that Borodin leave the country at once; (2) that those members of the Central Executive Committee at Hankow who wished to go abroad "for rest" should be allowed to do so; and (3) that the others should be permitted to join the Nanking Government, if they desired. But the Hankow leaders could not forgive Chiang Kai-shek for bringing about the schism in the party and refused to join the Nanking Government while he remained at the head of its forces. Some of them accepted exile, when it was finally settled that Borodin should go, and the others preferred to submit to Tang Sheng-chi rather than to Chiang Kai-shek. At this point (August 8, 1927) Chiang Kai-shek suddenly resigned his command, explaining that he was unwilling to be the sole obstacle to party unity. He confessed that he could not win the war against the anti-revolutionary forces without greater moral authority than the Government at Nanking could give him, and that it would be necessary to strengthen the Nanking Government by attracting to it a larger number of the leading Revolutionists. He recommended that the Left Wing leaders, still remaining at Hankow, come to Nanking and take over the Nationalist Government established there, that all factions of the party unite in prosecuting the campaign against the Northern militarists, and that the Communists be entirely eliminated from the revolutionary movement. Thereupon, without waiting for an answer, he abandoned his army and presently retired to Japan.

The elimination of Chiang Kai-shek gave the Nationalist politicians another opportunity to establish their supremacy over the new militarists. In August the principal remaining leaders of the Left Wing at Hankow came down the river to meet the leaders of the Center and Right Wing and in September an arrangement was formally concluded at Nanking for the unification of the party and the consolidation of the two Nationalist governments. It was agreed: (1) that all members of the party should be faithful to the principles and policies set forth in Dr. Sun's will; (2) that all should obey the decisions of the regular party authorities; (3) that the Communists should be excluded; and (4) that the Northern Punitive Expedition should continue until the whole country should be brought under Nationalist rule. The Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees were reorganized and a special committee was formed, representing all factions of the party, to reconstruct the government. The soviet system was retained in superficially the same form as that originally set up at Canton two years earlier, and places were found for the principal factional leaders on the various councils and committees. But the special bureaus at party headquarters for peasants, workmen, youth, women, etc., were abolished, and the spirit of the former system was destroyed. The office of commander-in-chief of the Nationalist armies was placed in commission and, though the Political Department of the Military Council no longer had power to intervene in military affairs, it was hoped that the Nationalist generals would respect the authority of the party, at least in principle. At the same time the Nationalist forces at Nanking beat off the anti-revolutionary armies which had taken the offensive in the expectation that the factional dissensions among the Revolutionists would have destroyed their morale. Shortly afterwards Tang Sheng-chi, who also had endeavored to exploit these dissensions for his private ends, was defeated and forced to flee. The Nationalist armies regained all the ground that had been lost to the old militarists through the defection of Tang Sheng-chi and the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek. The party leaders found it possible to hope that the Nationalist Government also would regain the ground it had lost to the new militarists.

The permanent seat of government was fixed at Nanking. Dr. Sun's well-known preference for the ancient southern capital furnished a strong sentimental reason for the choice. There were other reasons of a more substantial character. In the first place, there were no foreign concessions in Nanking. At Hankow the French and Japanese concessions still remained under foreign control and the presence of these vexatious fruits of the unequal treaties, as at Peking, humiliated the Government in the eyes of patriotic Chinese. At Nanking it would be possible for the Revolutionists, one of whose principal objects was to do away with the servitudes imposed upon their country in the time of the Manchus, to put a much better "face" upon their diplomacy. In a country where time-honored moral forces are as strong as in China, this was a consideration of no small importance. Secondly, Nanking was nearer to Shanghai. Since the latter city was the greatest center of modern industry in China, it seemed likely to furnish a more convenient base of operations for Revolutionists, who, having turned their backs on the workers' and peasants' associations, were more dependent than ever before on the support of the business interests. As long as the Nationalist Government looked to the workers and peasants as the mainstays of its power, Hankow was an excellent base of operations, but when the Soviet

Republic exchanged its proletarian character for that of a capitalistic state, a city whose merchants and other capitalists had been nearly ruined by an aggressively class-conscious proletariat was no longer a suitable seat of government. Proximity to the point where capitalists were most prosperous and powerful was a consideration of the greatest importance. Thus the reconciliation between Hankow and Nanking was no ordinary compromise between the different factions of a political party. It marked the triumph of a revolution in the policy of the Revolutionists.

The results of the reconciliation between Hankow and Nanking proved in the end disappointing. There was no Nationalist general who possessed the confidence of the Nationalist officers to the same extent as Chiang Kai-shek. After his retirement, though the Nationalist armies held their own in central China by dint of hard fighting, no further progress was made with the Northern Expedition. The prospects for a successful campaign in the spring of 1928 began to fade away and the unification of China seemed more remote than at any time since the capture of Hankow the year before. The political outlook was no better than the military. Among the Left Wing leaders who remained at Hankow after the collapse of the Soviet Government there was none more important than Wang Ching-wei. No party leader indeed had such a following among the revolutionary masses as he. But he refused to join the unified Nationalist Government at Nanking and, despite all appeals, persisted in holding aloof. At the same time he did not leave the country "for rest" like the more radical Left Wing leaders. The dissensions within the Kuomintang continued and the efforts of the Nanking Government to present a united front could not succeed. In November, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek returned from Japan and opened negotiations with Wang Ching-wei for a reconstruction of the Nanking Government on a broader basis. They hoped to strengthen its credit both with the Nationalist army officers and among the revolutionary masses. The Nanking leaders were not strong enough to oppose their efforts. This further impaired the prestige of the Nationalist Government among the Revolutionists. Then came the Communist insurrection at Canton. The Left Wing policies fell at last into complete discredit and Wang Ching-wei was involved in their ruin. The ensuing reaction put a stop to the plans of Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek for the rehabilitation of the Nanking Government. The discomfiture of the Nationalist politicians seemed complete.

The failure of the attempted reconciliation between the Left and Right Wings of the Kuomintang brought about a new crisis in the revolutionary movement. At the beginning of 1928 the Nanking Government began to break up. Its principal leaders left the country. Hu Han-min, who had been chairman of the Administrative Council since the organization of the government in April, 1927, went to Europe, together with C. C. Wu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Sun Fo, who had been Minister of Finance since the consolidation of the two Nationalist governments in September. Wang Ching-wei had already started for the same destination. These men were the most prominent politicians in the revolutionary movement and their inability to carry on a government, to say nothing of maintaining the supremacy of the civil over the military authorities, was profoundly depressing to their followers. There seemed little prospect of the unification of the country, or even of any early end of the disorder and violence with which it was filled. Everywhere the credit of politicians, revolutionary or otherwise, was low, whereas the militarists seemed stronger than ever before. The party leaders remaining at Nanking, convinced at last that they could not create a satisfactory civil government during the military stage of the Revolution, resolved to put their trust in their best generals and stake everything upon the success of the Northern Expedition. But the Northern Expedition could not even start without the rehabilitation of the Nationalist Government. In the emergency Nanking turned again to General Chiang Kai-shek and offered him once more the supreme command of the Nationalist forces and the leadership of the Revolution.

Chiang Kai-shek, like the civil leaders of the Nationalist Government, had learned much about the politics of revolution since the first establishment of the Soviet Republic at Canton and the organization of the Northern Expedition. He knew that he could not get to Peking by force of arms alone, but would need the moral support that could be provided only by a revival of the original revolutionary spirit. His first problem, therefore, was to restore at least the semblance of harmony within the party. Thereafter he could impart new vigor to the Nanking Government. Thus reënforced, he might hope to reorganize the Northern Expedition and conclude the military stage of the Revolution. When the Expedition started out from Canton in the summer of 1926, the revolutionary leaders were deeply persuaded of the interdependence of their objectives. It was not only the equality of the Chinese people among the nations that they sought, but also a government by the people and for their benefit. They believed that no one of these objectives could be secure without the others. They believed that no one of them should be lost from view while pursuing the others. But in 1927 they had been forced to abandon for the time the attempt to bring about a social revolution in order to continue the pursuit of their military and political objectives. Now they were forced to abandon also, at least temporarily, the attempt to maintain the superiority of the civil over the military authorities, in order to achieve national unity and an equal station among the Powers. Being convinced that they must make their revolutions one at a time, they were ready to accept Chiang Kai-shek's policy of winning the war against the northern militarists first and then turning their attention to the political and social revolutions to which they were committed. In the emergency they were ready to accept also his assurance that, at the conclusion of the military operations, he would resign his command and join in peacefully inaugurating the second stage of the revolution, the period of political tutelage.

Chiang Kai-shek was greatly aided in his efforts to strengthen the morale of the Kuomintang by the generals upon whose cooperation he was most dependent for the success of the Northern Expedition. Feng Yu-hsiang, who had helped to make his position untenable the previous summer, now declared himself in full agreement with Chiang Kai-shek. He urged all who professed to believe in the Revolution to lay aside their differences of opinion, until the war against the northern militarists should be won, and promised to lead the direct attack upon Peking with his armies, while Chiang Kai-shek tried to turn the flank of the Mukden forces by a drive through Shantung to Tientsin. Yen Hsi-shan, who had hoisted the Nationalist colors the previous summer and declared war against Chang Tso-lin in the autumn, concurred in these plans and promised to help the drive against Peking by a flank-attack from the west. These generals, to be sure, had every interest in encouraging the rehabilitation of the Nanking Government, since without help from Chiang Kai-shek they would have to meet Chang Tso-lin alone. Their resources in men and munitions were greatly inferior to his, and their position, if not supported either by the Nationalist forces at Hankow and Nanking or by the Russians, was strategically bad. The military aid to be expected from the other Nationalist generals, especially those in command at Canton and Hankow, was uncertain. Chiang Kai-shek's experiences taught him not to expect much help from generals unless it should be to their interest to give help, and these generals did not have the same interest in the vigorous prosecution of the Northern Expedition as Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. But the prospect of a united front on the part of Chiang, Feng, and Yen helped the Nationalist politicians who remained in China to drop their dissensions, at least temporarily, in order to give their generals in the decisive campaign of the civil war their undivided support.[1] It was agreed that further reorganization of the party should wait until the end of the war.

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[1] This was the period in the Revolution when China had reached the state of political disorganization described in Chapter I, *ante.* For a spirited study of the revolutionary movement at this time from the radical point of view, see T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution*, London, 1928.

3

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NATIONALIST POLITICAL SYSTEM

Chiang Kai-shek's first move, after his restoration to the supreme command of the Northern Expedition, was to convene the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. This was the fourth plenary session of the Committee and the first since the inauspicious session at Hankow in March, 1927. A quorum was obtained early in February and the Committee proceeded at once to confirm the new leadership of the party and to approve the changes of policy which had been made since the previous plenary session. All resolutions of the Committee relating to the alliance with Soviet Russia and the participation of Communists in the Revolution were rescinded and provision was made for a fresh registration of members of the party in order to complete the elimination of the Communists. The Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee was reorganized and Chiang Kai-shek's friend, Chang Ching-kiang, was again appointed to the chairmanship. The majority of the new Committee belonged to the Center faction of the party and were favorable to Chiang Kai-shek's leadership. They could be trusted to carry out his policies in the reorganization of the party and in the reconstruction of the Nationalist Government. Through his control of this most important organ in the revolutionary political system he could dominate the conduct of affairs at Nanking and maintain the fiction of a party government while preserving in fact the substance of power. He was both a military dictator and a party "boss." It was an arrangement that made for efficiency in the management of the Northern Expedition without destroying the hope of the Revolutionists to transform the military into a partisan dictatorship at the close of the campaign.

In general, as at previous reorganizations of the Nationalist Government, the forms of the Soviet Republic, as established at

Canton in 1925, were carefully preserved. The Political Council, to which, it will be remembered, the responsibility for the policies of the Nationalist Government was largely entrusted, was also reorganized and Chiang Kai-shek himself took the chairmanship. Representatives of Feng Yu-hsiang and of Yen Hsi-shan as well as of Chiang Kai-shek were included in the new Political Council and representatives of the same triumvirate found places in the reconstructed Government or Administrative Council, to which the actual conduct of civil affairs was confided. Tan Yen-kai, the chairman of the Administrative Council, was the man whom Chiang Kai-shek had chosen for that position when he reorganized the Nationalist Government at Canton after the second plenary session of the Central Executive Committee in May, 1926. Though Tan Yen-kai had remained at Hankow when the Nanking Government was first organized in April, 1927, he had taken a leading part in the consolidation of the two governments in the following September. The Ministry of Finance, a most important administrative post in view of the financial requirements of the Northern Expedition, was filled by the appointment of T. V. Soong. He had previously held that position in the Canton Government and for a time also at Hankow and had recently become Chiang Kai-shek's brother-in-law. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs was Huang Fu, formerly one of Feng Yu-hsiang's advisers in Peking and subsequently mayor of the Chinese municipality of Shanghai. He, like T. V. Soong, possessed the confidence of the Chinese bankers and merchants in Shanghai, and helped to win for the new Nationalist Government the support of the moneyed interests without which the Northern Expedition could not be financed. Thus, though the new Government was based primarily upon a combination of the Center and moderate Left factions of the Kuomintang, the dominant forces at Nanking were militaristic and capitalistic.

Chiang Kai-shek's position was further strengthened by the arrangements which the Central Executive Committee sanctioned for the reorganization of the military branch of the Nanking Government. The Military Council, like the Political Council, was reconstructed in order to give suitable representation to Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan as well as to Chiang Kai-shek, and it was further provided that the commander-in-chief of the Nationalist forces might act concurrently as its chairman. It was to be the supreme military organ of the Nationalist Government and was authorized to issue its orders directly to the provincial and local governments in Nationalist China and to enforce them by the means at its command. It was to meet at least once every two months and in the intervals between its sessions a Standing Committee of eleven was appointed to exercise its powers. Chiang Kai-shek became chairman of this committee. These changes greatly enhanced the importance of the Military Council. According to the plan of organization originally adopted at Canton the Military Council was on substantially the same level as the Administrative Council. It conducted military affairs as the Administrative Council conducted civil affairs, under the direction of the Political Council in matters of general policy. But now it was raised to the level of the Political Council itself. Though the relations between these various councils were ill defined and were deliberately left so by the Central Executive Committee, there could be no doubt of its purpose to give the military authorities a greater importance in fact than it cared to acknowledge in formal terms. Thus the most important of the checks upon the power of the Nationalist generals, originally adopted at Canton, was finally abandoned and the new militarism was embodied in institutions better suited than the old to its true character.

There remained, however, two significant limitations upon the power of the Nationalist commander-in-chief. The first was provided by the decision of the Central Executive Committee that a party congress should be held as soon as possible after the close of the period of military operations. Tentatively the date was fixed at August 1, 1928, so sanguine were the Nanking leaders of the success of the Northern Expedition. This decision was intended to place a time-limit on the military dictatorship. Chiang Kai-shek could not prolong his power beyond the date of the party congress without the consent of the party leaders and he could not dispense with the congress without defying the party and forfeiting the confidence of those Revolutionists who believed in a party dictatorship during the second or tutelage period of the Revolution. Meanwhile, by conforming to the established processes of government in his conduct of affairs at Nanking, he was helping to build up habits of political behavior more favorable in the long run to a party than to a personal dictatorship. Before the Revolution the nature of procedural limitations upon the power of public officers had been well understood at the Imperial Court and among the mandarins. The traditions of the governing class regarded the practice of the official rites in much the same way as public opinion in western countries with systems of constitutional government regards compliance with the requirements of due process of law. By submitting to prescribed forms for the exercise of his power, Chiang Kai-shek was transmuting the dictatorship, in a way politically minded Chinese would understand, from a personal enterprise into a public institution. Such an institution falls far short of satisfying those who understand also the western methods of deriving governmental power from the consent of the governed. But it was an appreciable advance over the crude type of military dictatorship maintained by Chang Tso-lin at Peking.

The other limitation upon the power of Chiang Kai-shek was of a more substantial nature. When he resumed command at Nanking at the beginning of 1928, there were no more than five provinces which could be said to be under the direct authority of the Nanking Government. The other provinces over which the Nationalist colors were flying at that time lay within the spheres of influence of other Nationalist generals whose relations to the Government at Nanking remained to be determined. Each of these generals professed, like Chiang Kai-shek himself, to be a disciple of Sun Yat-sen whose loyalty to the Revolution was not to be questioned. Each made at least an outward show of respect for the authority of the Kuomintang. But each depended for continuance in power primarily upon the support of his armies. Like Chiang Kai-shek they observed the forms of government prescribed by the framers of the soviet system and conducted their affairs through the councils and committees which had been set up throughout Nationalist China. Li Chi-sen at Canton, for instance, was not only commander of the Nationalist forces in Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces but also Chairman of the Branch Political Council, which directed the policies of that section of Nationalist China, and of the Administrative Council, which was charged with the actual conduct of affairs in the important province of Kwangtung. Cheng Chien and Pei Chung-hsi, and later Li Tsung-jen, occupied similar positions in the provinces ruled from Hankow. In the northwestern provinces the dominant personalities were Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. All these generals claimed a place in the Nationalist system of government, but none would submit to dictation by the Government at Nanking. They readily accepted appointments from the Central Political Council as heads of the Branch Political Councils at their respective seats of government, but they nominated themselves to these appointments and the authorities at Nanking dared not refuse to confirm the nominations. If they dominated the Branch Political Councils as Chiang Kai-shek dominated the Central Political Council at Nanking, what would be the relationship between them and Chiang?

The most doubtful feature of the Nationalist political system was in fact the Branch Political Council. The members of these Councils, like their chairmen, were nominally appointed by Nanking. In reality they were selected by the chairmen themselves. Thus at Canton, Hankow, Kaifeng, and Taiyuanfu, as at Nanking, the Political Council covered with a garment of revolutionary respectability the otherwise naked figure of military dictatorship. The true character of the Branch Political Councils depended upon the attitude of the militarists who served as their chairmen towards the Nationalist party organization to which the Political

Councils formally were responsible for their direction of political affairs.

In Canton at the time of my visit the provincial party organization had been smashed by the Communist insurrection. Local organizations survived in the administrative districts but they were greatly demoralized and without influence at the seat of government. General Li Chi-sen was preoccupied with the extermination of Communists and the restoration of order. His Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Chu Chao-hsin, admitted frankly that the government was a thinly veiled dictatorship and thought there was little likelihood that the party would recover its former authority in that section of Nationalist China in the near future, if ever. The Kuomintang in his opinion was dead, and the unification of China was a task which could be finished only by a strong man, using the time-honored methods of such men. Mr. Chu, who had been the Chinese Minister to Italy and had observed the work of Mussolini at close range, was convinced that the methods of Fascism were better suited to China than those of Bolshevism. But he had no faith in the crude form of dictatorship practised at Peking. This he had demonstrated the previous year by resigning his appointment as Chinese delegate in the Council of the League of Nations rather than recognize the authority of Chang Tso-lin. On the other hand, the secretary of the Canton Political Council, a veteran revolutionist with much experience in party affairs, was confident that the party could be revived and would eventually regain control of the Revolution. The "Three Principles of the People," he believed, could save China, but the Chinese Revolutionists would have to develop their own technique. The methods of Fascism, he feared, would prove as disappointing in the end as those of Bolshevism. He agreed that the Branch Political Council was a sham at the moment, but he hoped that at the right time it would supply a serviceable connection between Canton and Nanking. Meanwhile, the party would be reorganized in accordance with the decisions of the Central Executive Committee and its members would continue to educate the people in the principles of the Revolution, even if they could not dictate to the generals whom the Revolution had put in power.

In Hankow, which I visited a month after my departure from Canton, I found the same differences of opinion concerning the problems of revolutionary politics. The provincial party organization had been disrupted by the collapse of the Soviet Republic in the previous summer and by the time of my visit it had ceased altogether to function. The local organizations also had been largely destroyed in the course of the campaign for the elimination of the Communists. The Branch Political Council, as at Canton, though nominally appointed by the Nanking Government, was actually dominated by the local militarists. I talked with several of its members, but whether the Council would ultimately become a vital link with Nanking or a mere bit of camouflage upon the local dictatorship they could not tell. The Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Hankow was as candid as the one at Canton. The dictatorship was masked behind the same array of councils and committees, but the dictators looked to their armies as the mainstays of their power. They all professed devotion to the "Three Principles of the People," but none would submit to any authority which spoke only in the name of the Kuomintang. Hu Tsung-tu, the Wuhan garrison-commander, though preoccupied like Li Chi-sen with the suppression of Communists, granted me an interview. He said that the party would be reorganized when the Communist menace should be ended, and that he would look to the party leaders for the definition of the aims of the Revolution. But he was opposed to political interference with the management of the Nationalist armies and strongly denounced it as formerly practised by the agents of the Political Department of the Nationalist Military Council. He did not make clear what he would do, if the aims of the Revolution, as defined by the party leaders, should not please him. But it was clear enough that it was the Revolution, not the party, in which he put his faith, and that he believed much more in the Nationalist armies than in party committees or even in political councils as embodiments of the revolutionary idea.

At Kaifeng and at Taiyuanfu the Branch Political Councils were as patently the creatures of the new militarists as at Canton and Hankow. It was not practicable to reach Taiyuanfu from Hankow at the time of my visit but I was able to meet Feng Yuhsiang at his headquarters in Hsin-hsiang on the Peking–Hankow railroad north of the Yellow river. It was shortly before the opening of the spring campaign and opinion among Marshal Feng's *entourage,* in marked contrast to that at Hankow and Canton, would hear of nothing but victory. When I asked Marshal Feng what he would do, after he had captured Peking and driven Chang Tso-lin from power, he replied that he would carry out the "Three Principles of the People." When I remarked that I had visited various parts of Nationalist China and found much disagreement concerning the application of those principles, he declared that he would accept the interpretation which should be put upon them by the leaders of the Kuomintang. Then I recalled that the party leaders whom I had met had seemed to owe their authority largely to the support of successful generals, and I suggested that militarists who listened to the counsels of such leaders might be in danger of hearing only the echoes of their own voices. To this the Marshal replied: "Professor, you have not been in China long enough to understand." As this was the answer which I was accustomed to receive to many of my questions, especially those which I put to foreigners, both "old China hands" and others with less experience, I was at first disappointed with the Marshal's seeming lack of originality. But since he was manifestly a man who was anything but unoriginal, I felt encouraged to inquire further. "Who," I asked, "are the party leaders to whom you would listen?" He replied by naming a number of prominent Revolutionists, including the leaders of all the principal factions of the Kuomintang. Among them were men who had been foremost in the party purification movement and others who had resolutely opposed it; men who were prominent members of the Nationalist Government at Nanking and others who had left the country rather than submit to that Government. I began to see that political councils might perhaps take on a new importance after the completion of the military stage of the Revolution. But what would be the relationship of the Branch Political Councils to the Central Political Council at Nanking? Would they make for union or division in the Nationalist political system?

4

EDUCATION AND PROPAGANDA IN NATIONALIST CHINA

The best evidence concerning the probable development of the Nationalist political system was furnished by the Nationalist universities and political training institutes which were training not only party propagandists and agitators, but also the political leaders and public officers of the future. I visited four Nationalist universities at as many provincial capitals and found that great emphasis was laid in all of them upon instruction in the revolutionary politics of Sun Yat-sen. The greatest emphasis was laid upon the importance of establishing and maintaining the unity of China. There was much vagueness concerning the relations between the future central government and the governments of the various sections of China and it was plain enough that sectionalism would be a powerful factor in Chinese politics. But all instruction in history and politics was based upon the assumption of the permanent unity of China.

The teaching of politics in the political training institutes was especially significant. I visited both the Central Political Training Institute at Nanking and the Honan Institute at Kaifeng. In the former there were about three hundred students who had been selected from some eight thousand applicants for admission. Two thirds of them were high school graduates and ten per cent had graduated from a college or university. About ten per cent also were women. The principal subjects of study were: (1) the political theories of Sun Yat-sen and the program of the Kuomintang; (2) modern history since 1789, especially that of the Far East; (3) geography, especially the economic geography of China; and (4) the organization of the Nationalist Government and of the party. The students lived on the premises and a kind of military discipline was maintained. Instruction was by means of lectures, to which the students listened for several hours a day. There was an excellent library of political literature and systematic reading was required. There were ten full-time lecturers, and occasional lectures were delivered also by prominent members of the Nationalist Government. Chiang Kai-shek, who was the nominal president of the Institute, addressed the students from time to time and no pains were spared to impress upon them the importance of the fundamental principles of Chinese politics as understood by the Revolutionists. It was evident that, wherever the influence of these students might be felt, political and military leaders who acted upon those principles would have a source of strength which other leaders who might defy them would be unable to turn to account.

The Honan Political Training Institute was broader in scope. It consisted of five divisions, one for district magistrates actually in office, a second for police officers, a third for candidates for appointment as district magistrates or police officers, a fourth for public health officers, and a fifth for municipal self-government leaders. There was also a separate village leaders' training institute at Chengchow, where Marshal Feng's military base and officers' training school were located. The district magistrates and police officers were brought in from the Hsien or administrative districts, of which there were more than a hundred in the province, in groups of a score or two at a time, so as not to derange the system of administration, and received a short intensive course of instruction in the duties of their offices. The other students were selected, as at Nanking, from the qualified applicants, and numbered several hundred altogether at Kaifeng. The village leaders' training school contained over six hundred pupils, six being chosen by the district magistrate in each of the administrative districts of the province. The weekly program began with a Sun Yat-sen commemoration service on Monday mornings, at which there was the usual three minutes of silence, followed by recital of the will, and the shouting of revolutionary slogans. Then there were speeches by prominent provincial officers and members of the Headquarters staff. The program was varied for the different sets of pupils, but in all cases there was systematic instruction in the "Three Principles of the People," in the strategy and tactics of revolution, in the organization and procedure of the provincial and district governments, and in the general principles of Chinese law with special emphasis on the new codes. Marshal Feng was particularly interested in the practical applications of modern science and laid great stress on instruction in road building, forestry, public sanitation, popular education, and rural sociology.

In connection with the village leaders' training institute at Chengchow a village near by was utilized as a kind of laboratory. It was named the Five-Power Village in allusion to the type of constitution favored by Dr. Sun and was designed to exhibit all the improvements in village life which Marshal Feng wished his village leaders to introduce throughout the province. The village was surrounded by a high mud wall, like all villages in central China, mute evidence of an age-long struggle against brigands and bandits. Over the main gate its name was painted in bold characters, bright blue on a white background, and on each side of the entrance were suitable exhortations, similarly inscribed. "Down with the bad old customs!" was painted on one side, and on the other, "Build up a fine new village!" Within was a broad main street, leading through the center of the village, a model of cleanliness and order. The village temple had been converted into a community hall and coöperative store, where modern household appliances were on view and arrangements could be made for procuring tools and farm equipment of the latest design. Not far away was a model schoolhouse, where two young men taught the older children while two young women cared for the younger ones and for infants whose mothers were engaged in the fields outside the wall. Marshal Feng, though engrossed in preparations for the spring campaign, was greatly interested in the Five-Power Village and determined that it should be in every way a model for the province. "Our people," he said, "are chiefly employed upon the land and the success of the Revolution largely depends upon its services to those who dwell in the villages."

Marshal Feng did not believe in waiting for the end of the military stage of the Revolution to begin the demonstration of the benefits which the Revolutionists had promised to the Chinese people. Although his energies were devoted primarily to the training of his armies and other preparations for war, he insisted that the civil government in his provinces should bear witness to his purpose to improve the condition of the people. It was not easy to do. In some localities taxes had been collected from the peasants by the militarists who preceded him in power for twenty years in advance, and the plight of the peasantry was deplorable. But his provincial governments were composed of vigorous and intelligent men, who surrounded themselves with honest and public-spirited assistants. They imparted to the administration of affairs a degree of enterprise and efficiency which could not be matched anywhere in China. In an earlier stage of the Revolution the Canton Government had set up new standards of service, though circumstances prevented their full realization, and at the time of my visit to Nationalist China several of the provinces were administered by men of patriotic vision and large capacity. The Chekiang Provincial Government was perhaps the most competent and effective of those whose activities I had an opportunity to observe. The Administrative Council had formulated farsighted plans for the improvement of the government, especially by a better selection and more thorough training of district magistrates. Hangchow, the capital, was, if not the best-managed, certainly one of the best-managed cities in China. In Fukien also the new provincial government, which had been established by the Nationalists, was locally considered the best the province had ever had. The credit which such governments obtained for their good intentions was an important asset to the Nationalists in the final campaign against the northern militarists. Leaders like Feng Yu-hsiang understood this and made effective use of it in their propaganda. They skilfully combined the vision of a united China with that of a busier and better commonwealth.

The work of the Nationalist propagandists was made easy by the character of the governments which held sway at Peking and Tsinanfu. There were still some capable and public-spirited men connected with these governments, but the principal northern militarists were thoroughly mercenary adventurers with no thought for the future of China other than to hold by force what their arms had already acquired. Chang Tso-lin was shrewd and resolute; Chang Tsung-chang, bold and vigorous; but their rapacity and sensuality afforded a pernicious example which too many of their followers were ready enough to emulate. Shameless corruption abounded and the morale of the public services was incredibly low. Chang Tso-lin harbored for a time a chief of police who headed an organized band of blackmailers and murderers. Chang Tsung-chang had the chief justice of his province shot for the offence of considering how to maintain law and order in the event that the Tupan should lose his power. The venality of these militarists had a particularly bad effect upon the local governments. Appointments as district magistrates were commonly sold for cash, often for excessively short terms of office, in many cases for no more than three months at a time. The purchaser recovered his outlay by the embezzlement of taxes, by the sale of justice and of police protection, and by the sale of permits to plant opium or to dispose of the crop when grown. Such ruthless exploitation of the peasantry was by no means unknown in other parts of China. The methods of unscrupulous militarists were much the same everywhere. But nowhere had these oppressive practices been developed so systematically as in the provinces under Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang. On the other hand, private organizations, notably the China International Famine Relief Commission and the China Foundation for Education and Culture, were carrying on promising experiments for the amelioration of the lot of the peasants, as by establishing credit unions and operating village leaders' training institutes and encouraging education, but these enterprises only emphasized the contrast between the tyranny of the northern militarists and the program of the Kuomintang.

5

THE TRIUMPH OF THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION

The final campaign of the Northern Expedition was short and decisive. At the end of March, 1928, Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang, and Yen Hsi-shan set their armies in motion. The forces of Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang met the attack on ground of their own choosing and for a time the fighting was sharp and the issue hotly contested. Then the northern armies began to fall back and the retreat soon turned into a rout. Two months after the opening of the campaign the northern militarists were thoroughly beaten and the Nationalists entered Peking. Military observers were puzzled to account for the swiftness of the victory. The northern armies were apparently strong enough to hold the defensive lines which they had chosen. They had the advantage of fighting near their bases of operations. They were superior to their opponents in equipment and supplies. The occupation of Tsinan by the Japanese at the critical moment of the campaign stopped the advance of Chiang Kai-shek's forces and threw the whole burden of the fighting upon Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. Under ordinary circumstances the northern militarists should have won an easy victory. But the circumstances were not ordinary. The propaganda of the Nationalists more than offset all their disadvantages of *matériel* and position. The northern militarists could not trust their soldiers. The soldiers had no confidence in their officers. The ruin of their morale was completed by the intervention of the Japanese. Thereafter no patriotic Chinese could give aid or comfort of any kind to the northern militarists without seeming to be in league with the foreign invaders. It was not necessary for the Japanese to advise Chang Tso-lin to give up Peking and retire to Manchuria. It was no longer possible for him to remain. The foundations of his power had been as thoroughly undermined as those of the Manchus seventeen years before. It required much less effort than Chiang and Feng and Yen were capable of exerting to bring about his collapse.

The period of military operations, envisaged in Dr. Sun's *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, was brought quickly to a close. Chiang Kai-shek resigned his command, as he had promised to do, and received it back again from his party associates. On June 19 the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang instructed him to go to Peking and visit the temporary resting-place of the body of Sun Yat-sen in order to inform the spirit of the departed leader that the Nationalist forces had gained the victory in the name of the principles which he had taught. Early in July Chiang Kai-shek, accompanied by the other leading Nationalist generals, performed the prescribed ceremony with impressive pageantry. It was a characteristic demonstration of Chinese belief in the superiority of moral forces over purely physical force and violence. It was convincing evidence — for those militarists who had the wit to comprehend — of the fundamental truth in Sun Yat-sen's dictum: "Understanding is difficult, action easy." It was the formal inauguration of the dictatorship of the Kuomintang.

IX

THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL TUTELAGE

1. THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE PARTY DICTATORSHIP

THE capture of Peking by the Northern Punitive Expedition brought the military stage of the Revolution theoretically to a close. The period of tutelage, which came next, was to be devoted, according to the revolutionary politics of Sun Yat-sen, to the political education of the people and the gradual establishment of constitutional government. According to the will of their late leader the Revolutionists were to convoke a national convention of the people of China and abolish the unequal treaties with the least possible delay. A national people's convention might be expected to give a kind of consent to the dictatorship of the Kuomintang, pending the education of the people and the establishment of constitutional government, and, fortified by such an expression of consent, the Revolutionists could bring forward their demand for the revision of the treaties with fresh hopes of success. But the Revolutionists were as a matter of fact still far short of attaining their immediate objectives. Their flag was flying over all the Eighteen Provinces but the authority of their Government had not followed the flag. In far-away Szechuan, Kweichow, and Yunnan, to say nothing of less distant provinces, there had been a revolution of colors without much real change in the political practices of the militarists who actually held sway. In Manchuria there had not been even a revolution of colors. The five-barred flag of the First Republic was still flying and it was uncertain when, if ever, it would come down. Chang Tso-lin was dead, but neither his military nor his political organization had been destroyed. His armies had been driven beyond the Great Wall but the Nationalists were forbidden by the Japanese to pursue them into Manchuria. Chang Tso-lin's son was proclaimed governor-general and his followers continued to display their authority. It was evident that there could be no people's convention to sanction the unification of China under the Nationalists until the latter should have given further evidence of their political capacity. The first task of the period of tutelage, therefore, was to put the dictatorship of the Kuomintang upon a solid and durable basis.

To this end a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee was called to meet on August 1, 1928. The party leaders had hoped that it would be possible to hold a party congress as soon as the period of military operations came to an end. They had intended to give the Nanking Government the sanction at least of the highest organ of the Revolution. But they had been unable to complete the elimination of the Communists in time to reconstruct the local and provincial organizations. There was no machinery for the choice of delegates to a party congress. There was difficulty even in gathering a quorum of the Central Executive Committee and the fifth plenary session actually opened a week after the appointed date.

The difficulties arose out of the dissensions between the different factions of the party. The leaders of the Left Wing contended that the success of the Northern Punitive Expedition made it possible to resume the original revolutionary program. No longer, they argued, should the needs of the workers and peasants be neglected upon the plea of military necessity. They demanded that the workers' and peasants' unions be revived and that the social revolution proceed along with the political. There could be no successful rehabilitation of the state, they insisted, without the simultaneous reconstruction of society. The Right Wing leaders, on the other hand, were reluctant to attend the plenary session if the radicals were likely to dominate the proceedings. They were not sure that the Communist menace was ended and feared lest the Left Wing program bring back the troubles which had wrecked the Soviet Republic at Hankow. Even if the workers' and peasants' unions should not again get out of hand, their revival would strengthen the Left Wing and jeopardize the leadership of the Revolution by the ruling factions at Nanking. Chiang Kai-shek, who continued to lead the Center faction, pursued his usual policy of compromise. He persuaded the most radical leaders to stay away by promising them such freedom of speech and of the press as might be necessary to enable them to propagate their views among the rank and file of the party. They proceeded to utilize their new freedom with a vigor that seemed likely in the end to give them a greater influence than if they had captured control of the party at the plenary session. Meanwhile a quorum was obtained and the session, though much shaken by the factional dissensions, lasted long enough to do the work that was immediately necessary.

The most important result of the fifth plenary session was to give a fresh vote of confidence in the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and to confirm the supremacy of the Center faction in the counsels of the party. A new Standing Committee was elected, consisting of nine members, among whom were Hu Han-min and Sun Fo, recently recalled from abroad and invited to take an active part again in the Nationalist Government, Wang Chung-hui and Tai Chi-tao, two prominent moderates, Tan Yen-kai and Yu Yu-jen, veteran Revolutionists who had been influential at Nanking since the establishment of the National Government there, Ho Ying-ching, Chiang Kai-shek's chief of staff, and Li Chi-sen, head of the government at Canton. These men were all experienced politicians and the Committee as a whole could be trusted to keep the Nanking Government in power and support its principal policies. Chiang Kai-shek himself took the chairmanship of the Committee and assumed full responsibility for the further reorganization of the party and reconstruction of the Government. The principal weakness of the new Committee from the political standpoint was the lack of any prominent Left Wing leader among its members. If that defect cost the Nationalist Government its hope of regaining the enthusiastic support of the radical element in the party, there was some compensation in the greater unity of purpose and administrative efficiency thereby achieved. A new Central Political Council was also elected to serve as the instrument of the party in the actual direction of the policy of the Nanking Government. It was a body which was expected to be able to command the confidence of the new Standing Committee. Its election consolidated the position of Chiang Kai-shek and the Center faction and insured the continuation of their power at Nanking.

The Nanking leaders, however, failed to gain their other objectives at the fifth plenary session. They would have liked also to bring about the abolition of the Branch Political Councils in order to strengthen the central government. The Canton and Hankow leaders strongly opposed this move and were supported by the conservative elements in the party. A compromise was eventually adopted by which the question was referred to the next party congress for a final decision and meanwhile the Branch Political Councils would be permitted to continue. It was a defeat for the Nanking leaders and for the radicals who also favored a policy of centralization. But the decision that the party congress should be held as soon as possible took away some of the sting of this defeat, since such a congress, if it should meet at all, was expected to strengthen the authority of the central government. The question of calling a national people's convention was also referred to the next party congress. The Nanking leaders were especially eager to secure action which would reduce the size of the Nationalist armies and enable the Government to balance its budget. The necessity of cutting down expenses, if the Government was to maintain its credit, had been clearly exposed by Finance Minister Soong at an economic conference which he had convened immediately after the capture of Peking. But the reduction of the various revolutionary armies required a unity of command which did not exist and which the Central Executive Committee was powerless to bring about. The whole problem was postponed for consideration by a subsequent conference on the limitation of armaments to which the leading militarists in Nationalist China were to be invited. Meanwhile the dictatorship of the Kuomintang was to be put upon a more solid and durable basis by the further reorganization of the central government.

2

THE INAUGURATION OF THE FIVE-POWER REPUBLIC

The decision to reorganize the central government was the one which bore the earliest fruit. The Nanking leaders were resolved to give their régime a form which would serve as an object-lesson in the political education of the people during the period of tutelage and which would facilitate as much as possible the gradual establishment of constitutional government. To this end they brought forward Dr. Sun's scheme of a five-power constitution. It was not desirable, according to his plans, to begin by setting up at the national capital the institutions by means of which the people were eventually to control their rulers. In his judgment the beginning should be made locally in the Hsien or administrative districts. National elections and the direct popular initiative, referendum, and recall would have to come last in the process of constitutional development. Hence there could be no question of a genuine constitutional régime at Nanking at this time. But it was not impracticable to introduce Dr. Sun's principle of the separation of powers into the central government and establish at least the outward form of the five-power constitution. Thus the processes of government best suited to such a form could gradually be developed and the politicians could build up the political habits requisite for the operation of a true five-power constitution. The people also would gradually absorb the spirit of the new régime and learn what would be required of them in order to maintain similar forms of government in the local districts and provinces. The Nanking leaders were beginning to appreciate Sun Yat-sen's dictum, "Understanding is difficult, action easy."

Shortly after the adjournment of the fifth plenary session the new Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee appointed a special committee to design the new form of government. The principal authors of the plan which this committee presently reported were Hu Han-min, Wang Chung-hui, and Tai Chi-tao. The plan was next submitted to the Central Political Council by which after careful deliberation it was formally approved. It was then reviewed and finally sanctioned by the Standing Committee, and duly promulgated by the Government Council. On National Revolution Day, October 10, 1928, its adoption was solemnly celebrated at Nanking with an impressive service in which the leaders of the party and of the Government took part. Thus the new plan was embodied in an organic law which was framed and put into effect with all the deliberation and formality that was possible under the circumstances. The importance of the event was emphasized by changing the title of the Nanking Government from Nationalist to National so as to read the "National Government of the Republic of China." It marked an epoch in the history of republican government in China as clearly as the report of the Nationalist generals to the spirit of Sun Yat-sen at the resting-place of his body in the Western Hills the previous July marked the end of a stage in the Revolution. If the Parliamentary Republic founded at Nanking in 1912 was the First Chinese Republic and the Soviet Republic set up at Canton in 1925 was the Second, the Five-Power Republic inaugurated at Nanking in 1928 may fairly be described as the Third. In fact, the Chinese do not recognize such distinctions and it is not necessary to insist upon them. It is enough that at last the Chinese Republic received a form consciously based upon a Chinese rather than a foreign model.

The Standing Committee prepared the ground for the new organic law by adopting a set of "guiding principles of the period of tutelage," which were officially promulgated on October 3, 1928.[1] The purpose of this declaration of principles was to give greater stability to the government of the Republic under the dictatorship of the Kuomintang by defining the terms of its rule as well as to provide for setting up the kind of political system which the people of China were to learn to operate during the period of tutelage. In the first place, the Kuomintang was formally charged with the political education of the people until the adoption of a democratic constitution. The party, therefore, was to act in lieu of a national representative body and sovereign power was to be vested in the Party Congress during the period of tutelage. Secondly, the supreme power was to be delegated during the intervals between meetings of the Party Congress to the Central Executive Committee. Thirdly, the people were to be trained in the exercise of the four rights assigned to them in accordance with the revolutionary politics of Sun Yat-sen in order to supply the basis of constitutional government. Fourthly, the Five Powers were to be vested in the national government at once in order to facilitate the eventual establishment of a democratic five-power constitution, when the people should have learned the use of their Four Rights. Fifthly, the Political Council was to be charged with the duty of supervising and directing the national government on behalf of the party. Sixthly, authority to interpret and, if necessary, to alter the organic law was to be granted to the Political Council. This declaration of principles constitutes the general plan of the new political system which the so-called organic law partially carries into effect.

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[1] See Appendix D.

The organic law itself provides that the National Government shall be composed of five departments or Yuan, namely, the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan, together with a council of state consisting of from twelve to sixteen state councillors and a chairman.[1] The chairmen and vice-chairmen of the five Yuan are chosen from these state councillors. The chairman of the State Council acts as president of the National Government and represents the Republic at state functions and in the reception of foreign diplomatic representatives. He is also commander-in-chief of the land, naval, and air forces of the Republic. The president of the Executive Yuan serves in case of need as his substitute. The National Government conducts national affairs through the State Council and the five Yuan. The State Council decides all matters which cannot be disposed of by one of the Yuan or by two or more of them in agreement with one another. All laws promulgated and all mandates issued by virtue of a decision of the State Council are signed by the president and countersigned by the presidents of the five Yuan. Each of the Yuan has power to issue orders in accordance with law. The National Government as a whole has power to declare war, negotiate peace, conclude treaties, grant amnesties, pardons, and reprieves, and order the restitution of civic rights. Other powers, which presumably are vested in the National Government, are not expressly granted. However, the powers to tax and to make such laws as may be necessary and proper may be implied from the provisions which determine the procedure to be followed with respect to legislative bills and the budget. Both originate with the Executive Yuan and are submitted to the Legislative Yuan for approval. So too are proposals for amnesties, declarations of war, and treaties of peace, as well as ordinary treaties and other important international matters.

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[1] See Appendix E.

The Executive Yuan is the highest executive organ of the National Government. It has a president and a vice-president. It establishes ministries to which are entrusted the various executive duties and may appoint commissions for special matters. Each ministry has a minister, a political vice-minister, and an administrative vice-minister, and each commission has a chairman and a vice-chairman. The ministers and the chairmen of commissions attend meetings of the State Council and of the Legislative Yuan, when necessary. Meetings of the Executive Yuan are attended by its president and vice-president, the ministers, and the chairmen of commissions. The Legislative Yuan is the highest legislative organ of the National Government. It is composed of a president, a vice-president, and from forty-nine to ninety-nine members, who are appointed by the National Government upon the nomination of the president of the Yuan for terms of two years. The Judicial Yuan is the highest judicial organ of the National Government and takes general charge of the administration of justice, including the disciplinary punishment of officials and the trial of administrative cases. Proposals for granting pardons and reprieves and the restitution of civic rights are submitted by the Judicial Yuan to the State Council for approval and action. The Judicial Yuan is also empowered to introduce bills relating to matters within its competence into the Legislative Yuan. The Examination Yuan is the highest organ of the National Government for the examination of public officers and has power also to determine the qualifications for the various offices in the public service. Public officers are to be appointed only after having passed the prescribed examinations and satisfied the Examination Yuan of their fitness. The Control Yuan is the highest supervisory organ of the National Government and has power to impeach public officers and to audit public accounts. The members of the Examination and Control Yuan are appointed by the National Government, and, like the Executive and Judicial Yuan, have power to introduce bills into the Legislative Yuan on matters within their competence. The organization of all five Yuan is to be determined by law and in general it is intended that orderly processes of government shall be duly established and regularly observed.

The omissions in this part of the plan are manifest and significant. There is no provision for the popular election of any of the members of the National Government and no rights of any kind are reserved to the people. There are no fixed terms for members of the National Government except members of the Legislative Yuan, and no security of tenure for any of them, not even for members of the Judicial and Control Yuan, except such as may be provided by ordinary laws. The relations between the different Yuan are left indeterminate and there is no provision for settling conflicts between them except by reference to the State Council. The relations between the central government and the provincial and local governments are also left indeterminate. There is no provision governing the distribution of power between them and there are no limitations of any kind upon the power of the central government. It might be supposed that the distribution of power between five separate Yuan would bring into operation a system of checks and balances tending to prevent the abuse of the unlimited authority of the central government. The organic law provides that the details of the organization and procedure of the Yuan shall be determined by special laws and it was doubtless the intention of its framers that a settled course of action in public affairs, a kind of due process of law, should thereby be established. But the power of the State Council to decide conflicts between the Yuan would prevent such procedural limitations from serving as important checks upon the abuse of power. The balance of the system is upset by the preponderance of the State Council. Substantial limitations upon the power of the latter are not provided by the organic law. Finally the organic law contains no provision for its own revision or amendment. It is evident that the supreme power in the new political system lies outside the government created by the organic law.

The highest organs in the Chinese political system continue to be the governing bodies of the Kuomintang. They are the Central Political Council, which, strictly speaking, is an instrument of the party but not one of its governing bodies, the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, the Central Executive Committee itself, and the Party Congress. By a separate act of the Standing Committee, adopted after the promulgation of the organic law, the Central Political Council was formally charged with the direction of the National Government during the period of tutelage, subject to the responsibility of its members as Revolutionists to the regular governing bodies of the party. The members of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees were declared members of the Political Council *ex officio*, and were authorized to add to their number other influential political and military leaders not to exceed one half of the total *ex officio* membership. State councillors, if not party committeemen, are members during their continuance in office. All Revolutionists who have served the party for more than ten years or who have held public offices of high importance are also eligible for election as additional members of the Political Council. By the same act the duties and powers of the Political Council were more precisely defined than before. It was to have jurisdiction over general problems of national reconstruction, the principles of legislation, administrative policies, and important military matters. In addition it was to have the power to amend or revise the organic law, and also to appoint the members of the State Council, the heads of the Yuan, the chairmen of special administrative commissions, the ministers, the chairmen and members of the provincial government councils, the heads of departments in the provincial governments, the mayors of special administrative districts, and all ambassadors, envoys, and other officials of the highest rank. Thus the regular party committees were formally relieved of all governmental duties and became free to devote themselves exclusively to the management of party affairs. Behind them all stood as before the Party Congress, the ultimate authority in the Republic.

3

THE CHARACTER OF THE NANKING POLITICAL SYSTEM

It is evident that the political system inaugurated on October 10, 1928, is not fundamentally different from that established at Nanking by the anti-Communist leaders the previous year. The so-called National Government, authorized by the organic law, is in fact little more than the former Government Council, sometimes called in English the Administrative Council, now divided into a State Council and five Yuan. The new National Government in its entirety consists of this so-called National Government, together with the Political Council and the Party Congress and committees. It is in effect a system of interlocking directorates dominated by a narrow oligarchy of party politicians and generals. This becomes clear upon examination of the personnel of the first five-power government. Not only were all the members of the Central Executive Committee, including *ipso facto* the standing committeemen, members of the Political Council, but also eight of the nine standing committeemen were state councillors. Among these eight were the chairman of the State Council, that is the president of the Republic of China, and the presidents of four of the five Yuan. Thus the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, after the establishment of the five-power government as before, was the nucleus of the political system. Its members possessed all the powers of the Central Executive Committee itself, when the latter was not in session; they were the leaders of the Central Political Council; they controlled the State Council. Their agents manned the ministries and carried on the central government of the Republic and, nominally at least, their representatives also composed the Branch Political Councils and carried on the provincial governments. In short, the organic law does not create a complete frame of government. It merely regulates the internal structure and processes of a bureaucracy.

That the original features of the five-power government are much less important than those derived from previous revolutionary institutions is a sign of the political maturity of its framers. The meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee on October 9, 1928, at which the organic law was put into effect by the appointment of state councillors, a president of the Republic, and presidents of the five Yuan, was the 173d meeting of that body. It had been meeting once or twice a week with little interruption since the committee system was first established at Canton, and it continued to meet in the same way for the consideration of party affairs after the creation of the five-power government at Nanking. The meeting of the Political Council at which the organic law was formally adopted was the 157th. It also had been meeting with fair regularity once or twice a week since the establishment of the soviet system at Canton and continued to do so after the inauguration of the five-power government at Nanking. The last regular meeting of the Government or Administrative Council, which was held on October 6, 1928, for the purpose of approving a thirty-million-dollar loan and organizing a central bank, was the 99th. Its work was picked up by the new State Council and carried on in much the same way as before. The Executive Yuan carried on the work of the former Council of Ministers and for the most part the ministries continued to be held by the same men as before. The Legislative Yuan was an extension of the former Law Codification Bureau, which was transformed into a bill drafting bureau and continued to form its principal division. Since the supreme legislative power was vested in the Political Council, the Legislative Yuan could not be greatly different from its predecessor. The Judicial Yuan was the former Ministry of Justice, reorganized and strengthened but confined to much the same work as before. The Examination Yuan was based upon the former examining committees of the various ministries and the Control Yuan was practically identical with the Supervisory Committee which formerly audited the public accounts. The organic law certainly fell far short of being a five-power constitution such as Sun Yat-sen had recommended for the period of constitutional government but at least it sanctioned working arrangements to which the party leaders were already accustomed and thereby tended to stabilize the process of government during the "tutelage" period of the Revolution.

The most significant feature of the new five-power government was the reassertion of the principle of civil supremacy over the military. During the latter part of the period of military operations the Central Military Council had been an important instrument of the supremacy of the new militarists. By the organic law the importance of the Military Council was greatly diminished. The power to supervise and direct the military policy of the National Government was vested in the Political Council and the ordinary administration of military affairs was entrusted to a newly created Ministry of War. The war minister became one of the ten ministers composing the Executive Yuan. The position of commander-in-chief of the Nationalist armies was retained, and Chiang Kai-shek, who had held this position during the period of military operations, continued to hold it as one of the attributes of his office as president of the National Government. Since he was also chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee and usually acted as chairman of the Political Council as well as of the State Council, the diminished importance of the Military Council made little difference in his actual authority. Of greater moment was the appointment of Feng Yu-hsiang to the Executive Yuan as Minister of War. The military power was thus divided between the two foremost generals of the Revolution and the possibility of military dictatorship was materially lessened as long as these two leaders remained on good terms with one another. To be sure, while the military chieftains at Canton, Hankow, Kaifeng, Peiping (as Peking was now called), and Mukden retained command of their armies and control of the Branch Political Councils and provincial governments in their respective sections of the country, there could be no certainty that the period of military operations had really ended. The uncertainty would necessarily persist until the relations between the Central Political Council and the Branch Councils were definitely settled. Nevertheless, since room had been found in the State Council for the chairmen of the Branch Political Councils, the opportunity for government by discussion instead of by fighting was distinctly better than before. This was an indispensable condition for the survival of the dictatorship of the Kuomintang.

Another significant feature of the dictatorship of the Kuomintang was its interest in the reform of local government. Since the organic law dealt only with the organization of the central government at Nanking, it was necessary to supplement it with other acts providing the framework for the provincial[1] and local governments. Of these the most important is that containing the plan of government for the Hsien or administrative district. This measure had been prepared by the Law Codification Bureau prior to the establishment of the five-power government and was duly promulgated on September 15, 1928.

By the law for the better government of the Hsien the administrative district becomes the principal area of operations for the political education of the people. Its boundaries are defined by the provincial government, in accordance with the traditional practice, subject to the approval of the Minister of the Interior at Nanking. The district magistrate remains as before the principal executive officer and is appointed by and responsible to the government of the province, but the policy of the provincial government with respect to such appointments requires the approval of the minister of the interior. The design appeared to be to preserve as great a measure of central control as had existed, at least in name, after the overthrow of the Manchus. This, as elsewhere explained,[2] was a more decentralized system than that under the Empire. There is to be an administrative council, appointed by the district magistrate, to assist in the management of district affairs. There is also to be a political council, elected by the people of the Hsien, to advise the magistrate in matters of policy. The district budget and proposed by-laws are to be submitted to the political council for discussion and are not to go into effect without its approval. The Hsien is to be divided into urban and rural subdistricts, based upon the distribution of population between towns and villages, for administrative purposes. The ultimate unit of organization is the family, and groups of families will continue to be utilized in accordance with time-honored customs as organs of administration. Thus the family-system will remain an important factor in the process of government. But participation in the election of the political council is not to be confined to heads of families. All the people, when the new system is in working order, are to take part in the practice of representative government in the Hsien.

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[1] See Appendix F.

[2] See *post*, p. 290.

The introduction of representative government into the Hsien is the most radical innovation in the new political system of the Kuomintang. If the Nanking leaders do no more than bring into office a new set of district magistrates schooled in the new learning of the West, they will accomplish a veritable revolution in the government of China. By also providing that these new magistrates shall establish political councils elected by the people of their districts, they are at last opening up a road for the eventual introduction of popular government along which the Chinese people may be induced to travel. It is an open road toward self-government, because it is based upon the customs of the people and upon their traditional attitude toward all government. In China politics used to be left to the heads of families and to those who made a business of the management of public affairs. The Revolution caused the discomfiture of the professional statesmen of the old régime and created unusual opportunities for military adventurers and political agitators. But it did not immediately alter the habits of the Chinese people or their traditional attitude toward their rulers. They were slow to acquire such a sense of responsibility for public affairs as is requisite for the operation of representative political institutions. They continued to regard the district magistrate, the "father and mother official," as the leading actor in affairs of state and to look for the emergence of a new set of scholars to take over the business of statesmanship. The district magistrate, regarded as the symbol of authority and the substance of organized government, provides leadership which they can follow. When the Nanking leaders decided to put the responsibility for the political education of the people upon the shoulders of the district magistrates, they were building with the strongest available materials. The law for the reform of the government of the Hsien was not only a very radical measure but also one that was fundamentally sound.

The interest of the Nanking leaders in the reform of local government is strictly in accordance with the revolutionary politics of Sun Yat-sen. The program of national reconstruction, as set forth in the *Fundamentals*, called for the establishment of self-government first in the Hsien, then in the province, and last in the country as a whole. The establishment of representative institutions in the Hsien was the leading feature of the program for the period of tutelage. Though the measure which opens the way for this reform was not inaugurated with the same pomp and ceremony as the five-power government, its importance in the political education of the people was well understood at Nanking. The Nationalist leaders sought to give it due emphasis by authorizing the creation of a model Hsien out of the district in Kwangtung in which Sun Yat-sen was born and by designating the veteran Revolutionist, Tang Shao-yi, as its first magistrate. This action marked the return of the Chinese Revolution to its original program. The founders of the Soviet Republic at Canton, like the founders of the earlier Parliamentary Republic, offered the people of China a written description of the government of a foreign country in lieu of a constitution. But a constitution is something more than a piece of literature. It is a systematic mode of action which the people of a country are habitually disposed to pursue in those branches of human behavior which we call political. Constitutions are not made by the fiat of the temporary leaders of men. They grow through the development of the attitudes and habits, which give character to political behavior. This takes time, though political behavior, like manners of all kinds, may be cultivated, if people are not too heedless, and the growth of a constitution may be hastened thereby. Dr. Sun's program for the period of tutelage was based upon a correct understanding of the nature of constitutional government. That at last his followers were beginning to carry it out according to his specifications showed that they had not failed to profit by their experience as well as by his instructions.

The return to the revolutionary politics of Sun Yat-sen is an auspicious sign for the stability of the Five-Power Republic. Dr. Sun may have begun his revolutionary career without practical experience in Chinese politics but he eventually learned to understand the time-honored political habits of his countrymen and knew what to expect from their traditional attitude toward their rulers. He ended by rejecting the western assumption that man is by nature a political animal which, given the opportunity, will take to politics as readily as to social activities of any kind. It was enough for him that man is a social being. In China the people, he knew, are as sociable as anywhere in the world, but he realized that politics, as the art has developed in the constitutional republics and monarchies of the West, is a special kind of sociability which requires the appropriate attitudes and habits. These had not been cultivated in China, and their cultivation would require, Dr. Sun perceived, the tutelage of leaders who understood what they wished to accomplish. He recognized that a knowledge of this art would be necessary for the operation of the Five-Power Constitution and justified a dictatorship by the Revolutionists on the ground that they alone could teach the art and would be disposed to do so. But a dictatorship by a class-conscious proletariat after the fashion of the Soviet Union was no part of his plan. The proletarians, like other Chinese, must first learn how to govern themselves. Only then would they be fit to join in the government of the whole people for the common good. It has sometimes been suggested that the kind of dictatorship Dr. Sun had in mind for the period of tutelage was more like that of Mussolini over the Italians. Fascist Italy, it is alleged, sets an example of submission to a strong man which the Chinese, since their repudiation of the Communists, would gladly follow. But such a dictatorship was also no part of the plan of Sun Yat-sen. The kind of dictatorship he had in mind was not a copy of any foreign model. It was the kind which fitted the political habits and traditional attitudes of the Chinese people. Dr. Sun's theory of dictatorship was thoroughly realistic.

The Five-Power Republic gives greater promise of stability than either of its predecessors, the Parliamentary and Soviet Republics. The Soviet Republic, like the Parliamentary Republic, never took root on Chinese soil. After the dissolution of the workers' and peasants' associations there was no soil in which it could take root. The Russian political advisers tried to introduce the strange forms and uncongenial authority of a political system utterly alien and hostile to that of China. They were able to establish the forms, but the practice of party dictatorship as developed in the Soviet Union was rejected by the Chinese. The forms were carried along from Canton to Hankow and from Hankow to Nanking with the other impedimenta of the revolutionary armies, but the substance of the Nationalist Government always remained essentially Chinese. When the period of tutelage succeeded that of military operations, it was not necessary for the Nationalist leaders to modify greatly the political system originally set up at Nanking, because it had never functioned as a genuine soviet government. The soviet system is constructed upon the assumption that man is a class-conscious worker and nothing else that the architects of states need to take into account. This is an assumption which was no less improper in China than that upon which the founders of the Parliamentary Republic had proceeded. The time-honored political habits of the Chinese and their traditional attitude toward their rulers made the Soviet Republic as unreal as the Parliamentary Republic had been before it. The Five-Power Republic possesses reality, because it is based upon a form of dictatorship with which the Chinese are familiar and is operated by methods which they can understand. The form of dictatorship is that which is symbolized by the district magistrate and the operating methods are the bureaucratic methods which district magistrates have always employed. This is the Chinese kind of dictatorship which Dr. Sun had in mind, and these are the time-honored methods which afford the best prospect for the gradual introduction of genuine constitutional government.

The dictatorship of the Kuomintang is not a party dictatorship in the western sense of the term. Parties may be defined in the language of Burke as bodies of men united to promote the national interest upon some principle in which they are all agreed. The Kuomintang probably fits this definition of party as well as any party anywhere. But in western practice parties are bodies of men united primarily in order to get control of a government by procuring the election of their members to public office. Since there are no such elections in the present Chinese political system, there is no room for the western kind of partisanship. The nearest approach to partisanship as understood in the West is afforded by the struggles of the factions within the Kuomintang for control of the party organization. The establishment of the so-called party dictatorship at Nanking represents in reality a political achievement of a very different order. What the Revolution has actually accomplished is the reëstablishment of ancient Chinese institutions under modern forms.

In the first place, the Revolutionists have given the people of China an acceptable substitute for the Son of Heaven who used to sit upon the Dragon Throne. They have replaced the Manchu emperor with the spirit of Sun Yat-sen. That is the meaning of the three bows which all good Revolutionists make before the portrait of their late leader in accordance with the prescribed rites. It is the homage which they pay to the new symbol of national unity. They have exchanged their former anthropomorphic conception of sovereignty for one more compatible with the idea of the reign of law in affairs of state. The dictatorship of the Kuomintang means that the authority of men who are bound by the conditions of their political existence to look forward to the ultimate establishment of constitutional government throughout China is substituted for that of an hereditary monarch with his face necessarily turned towards the past. The actual dictatorship of the party leaders, moreover, is tempered by the limitations contained in Sun Yat-sen's theory of tutelage. The principles of his revolutionary politics have become the supreme law of the land.

It is this which distinguishes the dictatorship of the Kuomintang from that of the Fascists in Italy. In Italy there is a king who reigns but does not govern. The government is entirely in the hands of Mussolini. The existence of a king makes no appreciable difference in the character of his rule. But in China deference to the revolutionary spirit of Sun Yat-sen makes a great difference in the character of the dictatorship. The fact that the spirit of Sun Yat-sen is a disembodied spirit increases its authority. Living men upon thrones can change their minds, they can repudiate their past, they can play the tyrant, if they have the power, instead of the philosopher-king; but dead men live in the hearts of those who cherish their memory and their character can not be changed without the consent of those who believe in them. The authority of rulers, who govern in their name, no matter how irresponsible in appearance, is derived in greater measure from the consent of the governed than can ever be the case with that of dictators like Mussolini who make no pretence of submission to any will but their own. A dictatorship like that which the Chinese Revolutionists seek to establish is consequently more favorable to the development of what the West calls a reign of law than any that might be established upon the Fascist model. It is a reversion towards the ancient imperial type of government but it nourishes the germs of a new freedom.

Secondly, the Revolutionists have given the people of China a new mandarinate in place of the old. They have brought forward a body of new men, trained in the new learning of the West, more capable than the classical scholars of the *ancien régime* of creating a government equal to the opportunities and responsibilities of the modern state. The extent of the change in this respect is revealed by an examination of the personnel of the principal governing bodies in the first National Government at Nanking. Of the members of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, which inaugurated the five-power government, two were scholars of the old school, three were generals with a modern military education, and four were graduates in law or politics from the universities of Japan, England, or America. In the State Council the proportion of men with modern educations was about the same. Among the ministers, charged with the actual conduct of affairs, the proportion was higher. Five were graduates of American colleges or universities, of whom two had earned the degree of master of arts and one was a doctor of philosophy. A majority of the others were educated in Chinese or Japanese institutions of modern type. Similar conditions obtained in the more advanced of the provincial governments. The men with modern educations were far from monopolizing the important offices, but for the first time since the beginning of the Revolution they were in a position to set the pace in all branches of the public service as they long had been doing in the field of education. They could at last introduce modern ideas and modern methods of procedure into the bureaucratic system. But the system itself remained essentially bureaucratic. The Revolution had changed the men but not the thing. The old mandarins had gone or were going. The mandarinate stayed.

These were epoch-making contributions to the development of Chinese political institutions. The sanctification of the "Three Principles of the People" and the seizure of power by men with a knowledge of modern science marked the crisis of a revolution in the traditional attitudes toward the state, the government, and the law. The old view that China was the center of a universal empire finally gave way among the masses of the population to a correct idea of its real position in the family of nations. The view of government as the private business of the official class began to yield to the modern conception that it is a business so affected with a public interest as to justify the participation of the public in the management of the business. The view of law as a rule of conduct for the guidance chiefly of scholars and patriarchs, heaven-sent dictators to the rest of mankind, also began to yield to the modern conception of a universal reign of law. At last it was becoming possible to break down the barriers which the dominant family-system had interposed between the individual and all wider forms of community. At last a modern spirit of patriotism could challenge the ancient claims of piety to dominion over the minds of the people. The seizure of power by men with a knowledge of modern science was complicated by the circumstance that too many of these men knew modern military science much better than they knew its other branches. Nevertheless it was a turning-point in the rehabilitation of China. The importance of modernizing the education of the mandarins had been recognized by the first generation of Chinese reformers, but they had failed until too late to convince the Imperial authorities of the soundness of their views and it had been necessary for reform to wait upon revolution. Now the supreme power was in the hands of men who had not forgotten the old truth that the system of education is the essence of the constitution and who were committed to the task of building the new constitution upon the basis of the new learning. It was a great advance in the readjustment of China's ancient polity to the modern world.

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THE UNFINISHED WORK OF THE REVOLUTION

But these institutional developments were only the beginning of the work of national reconstruction. Much remained to be done before the dictatorship of the Kuomintang would be a satisfactory instrument for the rehabilitation of China. In the first place, it was necessary to strengthen the moral force of the Nanking Government in order that the new rulers of China might get themselves obeyed without excessive dependence upon soldiers and generals. One obvious method of enhancing the prestige of the Government was to complete the reorganization of the party which controlled the Government so as to command the confidence of the rank and file of the membership. Another was to reduce the size of the armies in the service of the Revolution so as to diminish the influence of their leaders in civil affairs and remove the threat of a revival of military dictatorship. Secondly, it was necessary to secure greater numbers of suitably trained and efficient men for the public service in order that the new government might be competent for its new tasks. This called for the recruitment of the new mandarinate exclusively on grounds of merit and fitness without fear of political interference and without favor for family's sake. It called also for the introduction of the most modern methods of work into every branch of the service. Finally, it was necessary to break the habit of rebellion, which had grown so strong since the decline of the Manchus, in order that the provincial and local governments might become reliable instruments of the National Government in the work of reconstruction. This meant the establishment of a definite and durable relationship between the central and provincial governments so that the party leaders could put down the local militarists and establish law and order throughout the land. It meant also the development of the productivity of the country so that the people could bear the expense of a modern government, for such a government is a high-powered and costly one which offers much service to the people but demands lavish support in return. The stabilization of the Five-Power Republic was manifestly a task which would still require heroic efforts and consume much time.

That the nation must be governed by moral agency in preference to physical force was the first principle of the Confucian politics. It was placed first also in the revolutionary politics of Sun Yat-sen. It was the first objective of the revolutionary leaders at Nanking in the period of tutelage. The means relied on by Dr. Sun for giving moral sanction to the dictatorship of the Revolutionists was a national convention of the people of China. The convoking of such a convention was one of the measures specifically commended to his followers in the famous will. Such a body, if fairly representative of the organized opinion of articulate China, could give a mandate to the Kuomintang to carry on the government of the country until the people should be prepared to carry it on for themselves. Dr. Sun thought it would be fairly representative, if composed of delegates from such organizations as the universities, the chambers of commerce, and the merchant and craft guilds in the principal cities, in addition to those accredited by the regular provincial authorities. He thought it could easily be convoked when the reasonableness of the aims of the Revolutionists should be generally recognized.

The triumph of the Northern Expedition in the summer of 1928 compelled the leaders to consider whether the time had come for such a convention. They were forced to admit that it had not. It was evident that in the existing state of the country they could not organize a people's convention which would endorse the dictatorship of their party in such a manner as to strengthen its credit in the eyes of the country. They could not expect the people at large to show great respect for their dictatorship until they had demonstrated their ability to compel respect from their own soldiers and generals. It was necessary to demonstrate that it was a genuine civil government, which the people were asked to sustain, and not a military dictatorship in disguise. In short, it was necessary to hold the party congress which had been promised for the beginning of the period of tutelage, and to put the new militarists definitely in their proper place.

These were the considerations which made the calling of a party congress one of the first measures to be authorized at the fifth plenary session of the Central Executive Committee in August, 1928. Subsequently the Standing Committee appointed the fifteenth of March, 1929, for the opening of the congress and prepared the following program for its deliberations: (1) questions of party discipline; (2) the relations between the party, on the one hand, and the Government and the people, on the other; (3) the obligations of the party to its own members; (4) the civil rights of the people; (5) the structure and processes of government and the methods of administration; (6) the education of the people and of public officers; (7) foreign relations and national defence; (8) economic reconstruction; (9) party activities and programs for future party congresses; and (10) any business that might be submitted by the Central Political Council. This program reveals the important position of the party congress in the new political system as well as the variety of problems awaiting solution by the highest authority in the revolutionary government.

It proved much easier to lay out such a program than to carry it into effect. The machinations of the Communists had thrown the party into great confusion. The "purification" of the previous year had brought further disorganization and the dissensions between the Left and Right Wings made it impossible to get the party machinery into good working order again. The radicals were eager to take part in the congress, if they could hope to regain power, whereas the conservatives were opposed to their participation, unless they would acquiesce in the conservative turn which the Revolution had taken. The members of the Center faction sympathized in various degrees with the desire of the Left to lay more stress upon the social aspects of the Revolution, but were reluctant to jeopardize their control of the party organization. Under these circumstances the election of a fairly representative congress was difficult. Many observers doubted the ability of the party leaders to get together any kind of congress. Nevertheless the congress was held at the appointed time.

The election of the Third Party Congress throws much light on the condition of the revolutionary movement in the spring of 1929. Under the influence of the faction in power at Nanking the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee adopted rules for the re-registration of the members of the party and for the choice of delegates which insured the continuance of its control of the party organization. The returns of the new party registration, which were published on the eve of the congress, showed a total membership of over four hundred and twenty thousand. Of these a little over two hundred thousand were described as members of ordinary party units, while one hundred and seventy-five thousand belonged to special military units, that is to say, were officers or soldiers in the Nationalist armies, and nearly forty-five thousand were credited to the overseas units. Thus the ordinary members of the party were in a minority. They were also largely concentrated in a few provinces. More than a quarter of them were credited to the single province of Kwangtung, chiefly in the city of Canton. Half a dozen of the provinces claimed less than a thousand members each, and one province reported none at all. The total number of regular delegates to the congress was three hundred and sixty six. Of these, eighty odd were representatives of the military units and nearly as many others were representatives of the overseas units. The military delegates were chosen in such a manner as to insure their support of the commander-in-chief, but a majority of the overseas delegates seem actually to have been elected by those whom they purported to represent. Less than one quarter of the representatives of the ordinary party units in China were elected directly by the members of the party. The rest either were appointed outright by the Standing Committee or were appointed from candidates nominated by provincial or local organizations in such a way as to secure their subserviency to the party leaders at Nanking. Of the whole body of delegates about one fifth seem to have been freely elected by the members of ordinary civilian or overseas units. It was a packed congress, but it was a far more representative body than either the First or the Second Party Congress.

The moral effect of the Third Party Congress was impaired, not only by the manipulation of the elections, but also by the lengthening shadow of a fresh civil war. The manipulation of the elections resulted in the practical exclusion of the Left Wing leaders from the congress. Wang Ching-wei remained in Europe, and his principal lieutenants in China had no part in the proceedings. This alienated many of the more radical Revolutionists. Though unable or perhaps unwilling to resort to arms, they could not give the Nanking leaders the ungrudging support which the occasion required. On the contrary, they issued a manifesto, signed by fourteen members of the Central Executive Committee, headed by Wang Ching-wei himself, denouncing the conduct of affairs at Nanking and promising to continue their struggle for the realization of what they believed to be the true principles of the revolutionary party. This manifesto was widely circulated among the radical members of the party and insured the maintenance of strong opposition to the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. But the Left Wing politicians did not wish to play into the hands of the new militarists by repudiating altogether the authority of the party and of the government which the party had established. An open break between Chiang Kai-shek and his principal rivals among the new militarists had been threatening ever since the close of the Northern Expedition. The so-called Kwangsi clique, who dominated the governments at Canton and Hankow, had watched the packing of the congress with growing uneasiness. Relying mainly upon their armies for the maintenance of their power, they professed to defend the privileges of the provincial governments against the centralization of authority at Nanking and appealed to the most conservative elements in the revolutionary movement for support against the dominant faction in the party organization. They perceived that the success of the congress would greatly strengthen the Nanking Government and that the impending abolition of the Branch Political Councils would make their own position more difficult and insecure. Li Chi-sen, the Canton leader, attended the congress with great reluctance, and was promptly arrested by Chiang Kai-shek. The Hankow leaders, more cautious or more conscious of disloyalty, stayed away altogether. Feng Yu-hsiang also stayed away. He, too, though without sympathy for the Kwangsi clique, was dissatisfied with the conduct of affairs at Nanking. He had already resigned his position as Minister of War and retired to his provinces in the northwest. The carefully designed arrangements for establishing the supremacy of the civil over the military authorities seemed on the verge of collapse.

Under the circumstances the Third Party Congress could do little more than give a formal approval to the conduct of the Revolution by the faction in power. The principal acts of the party leaders since the establishment of the Nationalist Government at Nanking were duly ratified. The organic law was specifically approved, new Central Executive and Supervisory Committees were elected, which could be trusted to maintain the form and policies of the five-power government, and the control of the party organization by the Center faction was made secure. The Branch Political Councils were disposed of in accordance with the wishes of the Nanking leaders and the supremacy of the Central Political Council in the revolutionary political system was reaffirmed. Provision was made for the holding of another party congress after two years and the authority of the party to govern the country during the period of tutelage was solemnly proclaimed. Wang Ching-wei was censured for his offences against party discipline and his principal lieutenants in China were expelled from the party. Chiang Kai-shek was instructed to punish the Kwangsi clique for their insubordination and restore the authority of the central government over the provinces which they commanded. The delegates listened to the reports of the Nanking ministers and endorsed their projects for national reconstruction. The negotiations by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, C. T. Wang, for the abolition of the unequal treaties,[1] the efforts of the Minister of Finance, T. V. Soong, to strengthen the public credit, and the plans of the Minister of Transportation, Sun Fo, for the construction of railways and the improvement of highroads attracted the most attention. The two weeks' session was crowded with activity and under other circumstances would have greatly enhanced the prestige of the party and of the Government. But the impending resumption of military operations threw a pall over the proceedings. No one could be certain whether the period of tutelage was a fiction or a reality.

The most searching test of the moral authority of the National Government was afforded by the problem of disarmament. The importance of reducing the swollen military establishments which had been built up in all parts of China during the protracted civil wars was clearly understood by the revolutionary leaders. The defeat of the northern militarists by no means solved the problem. It was the Nationalist policy to incorporate defeated troops in the armies of the victors rather than to disband them without provision for their legitimate employment. The Nationalist generals were not unmindful of the Chinese proverb that bandits are merely soldiers without regular jobs and they knew also that one of the best ways of breaking the military power of their opponents was to offer better terms to the mercenaries in their employ. The first step toward disarmament was taken by Finance Minister Soong. He had the most urgent reason for desiring disarmament, since he had to find the money to pay the soldiers, unless the generals were to be left to their own resources. But the latter alternative meant that the new unity of China would be a fiction, since generals who financed their own armies would be as independent of the central government as before. In June, 1928, immediately after the capture of Peking, he summoned an economic and financial conference at Shanghai, which was attended by the leading Chinese bankers, business men, and financial experts, and set forth the necessity of a reduction of military expenditures in order to balance the national budget and safeguard the public credit. His vigorous leadership gave fresh confidence in the Nanking Government to Chinese capitalists but brought no immediate reduction of military expenditures. In January, 1929, a second conference was held at Nanking, the so-called Military Reorganization and Disbandment Conference, which was attended by all the leading Nationalist generals. Agreement was reached on a constructive program for the limitation of armaments, but its execution was interrupted by the outbreak of hostilities between Nanking and Hankow. The immediate occasion of these hostilities was the defiance of the authority of the central government by the new militarists at Hankow, but this was merely a symptom of a deep-seated constitutional malady. The problem of establishing the supremacy of the civil over the military authorities had not been solved.

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[1] See Appendix G.

That the services of the ablest and wisest men are indispensable for the good government of the state was the second principle of the Confucian politics. It was also a leading principle of the revolutionary politics of Sun Yat-sen. To secure such men is one of the main objectives of the revolutionary leaders in the period of tutelage. The means recommended by Dr. Sun for recruiting the best men for the public service and for maintaining suitable standards of governmental competence were the reëstablishment of a competitive examination system and of a system of censorship. He proposed the substitution of tests based upon modern science instead of the ancient classics for determining the merit and fitness of candidates for office and the introduction of methods of administrative control based upon the use of modern accounting and statistics instead of those employed by the Imperial censors, in order to secure economy and efficiency in the public service. The framers of the organic law designed the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan to accomplish these objects. To the same end the Nanking leaders invited technical experts of different kinds from abroad to give advice and assistance in the work of reconstruction. This of course was merely the revival of the policy adopted at Peking at the beginning of the Revolution and continued by Sun Yat-sen at Canton. The political and military adviserships, which had been vacant since the rupture between Hankow and Moscow, were filled by the appointment of men from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany, and specialists of many kinds were retained to aid the various ministries at Nanking. Particularly noteworthy among them were the eminent architects and city-planners engaged to aid in building a suitable capital at Nanking and the financial advisers who were called in to help put the fiscal system of the Republic on a sound basis. These appointments were evidence of a purpose to make the National Government equal to the responsibilities of authority in a modern state as quickly as possible, but the continued preoccupation of the Nanking leaders with military affairs was a great obstacle to the achievement of satisfactory results.

That the people have a right to good government, which they may enforce, if necessary, by the threat or the practice of rebellion, was the third of the leading principles of the classical politics. It was a principle to which Sun Yat-sen had appealed in justification of his own refusal to submit to the authority of Peking, both under the Manchus and again under the successive militarists who seized power there. It was a principle which compelled the Revolutionists to clear their title to the government of China by breaking the power of the insubordinate militarists produced by years of civil disorder and strife. This involved something more than putting down the various regional and local dictators whose existence was a perpetual challenge to the authority of the Nanking Government. It involved the permanent readjustment of the relations between the central government and the governments in the provinces. Those relations had never been satisfactory since the beginning of the conflict between Imperial China and the western Powers. The Powers acted upon a theory of sovereignty utterly alien to the traditions of the Chinese and hostile to the spirit of their institutions. They sought to force upon the Manchus a degree of centralization in the government of the Empire to which the Chinese were not prepared to submit. The resistance of the Chinese to the imprudent measures eventually taken by the Manchus to meet the pressure from the Powers was one of the causes of the overthrow of the Empire. The subsequent downfall of the old mandarins demonstrated that no Chinese government could assume the new functions of a modern state without a large measure of decentralization. The old Imperial rule against the appointment of inhabitants of a province to positions in the government of the province broke down. The new tendency is for the provincial governments to fall more and more into the hands of their own inhabitants. Decentralization verges upon disintegration. The restoration of the political unity of China requires putting the provincial governments as well as the militarists in their proper place.

But what is the proper place of the provincial governments in the new political system of revolutionary China? The general nature of the solution of the problem is suggested by the attitude of Sun Yat-sen, when at the head of the republican government of China at Canton, toward Peking. Like Chang Tso-lin for a time at Mukden, he declared the independence of his government, while continuing to proclaim the indivisibility of China. National unity became a fiction in domestic affairs, and yet remained a fact in foreign relations. There was a division of sovereignty that is irreconcilable with western ideas of the nature of the state. Yet it seemed not at all incomprehensible to the Chinese. Sun Yat-sen was strongly urged by some of his most capable followers to abandon the struggle for the unification of the government of the country and content himself with setting an example at Canton of a model province for the admiration of his neighbors. The institutions of the Revolution, these advisers believed, would be imitated in other provinces and would gradually spread throughout China. But to this policy Sun Yat-sen would never consent. He insisted that the Republic should become a political entity in the eyes of the world as well as of the Chinese and would tolerate no thought of independence except that which was truly national. At the same time he insisted upon the right of each province to manage its own affairs in its own way. The platform of the Kuomintang adopted at the First Party Congress declared that matters of general concern should be under the jurisdiction of the central government and matters of local concern under that of the provincial and local governments. "No excessive centralization at the capital! No arbitrary separatism of the provinces!" These maxims revealed Sun Yat-sen's devotion to the general principle of local self-government, but afforded no precise rule for the guidance of his followers in the present crisis.

The Nanking leaders were keenly aware that the existing situation was unsound. The report of the Minister of Finance to the

Military Reorganization and Disbandment Conference, held in January, 1929, showed that not more than five provinces made any pretence of remitting revenue to Nanking, apart from that pledged by treaty for the service of foreign loans, and two of them furnished the bulk of the money available for the support of the National Government. The rest was diverted by the rival militarists to the support of their armies or retained by the various provincial and local authorities more or less under their control. In Manchuria, where the Nationalist colors, despite the objections of the Japanese, had been hoisted at the end of 1928, the government operated in the name of the son of Chang Tso-lin continued to absorb all the available revenues. The regional governments operating at Canton, Hankow, Kaifeng, and Peiping professed greater respect for the claims of the central government, but followed the Manchurian practice. The northwestern and southwestern provinces did the same. The central government seemed to have no other plan in view than to submit to the flouting of its claims, as long as submission should be unavoidable, and to assert its authority by force when circumstances should make it possible. The necessity of further centralization in the military administration of the country, if national unity was to be maintained, was permitted to obscure the importance of decentralization in the administration of civil affairs. The Third Party Congress was committed to the abolition of the Branch Political Councils but had no satisfactory formula for the redistribution of power between the central and the provincial governments. The gravest and most urgent of the problems of political reconstruction remained unsolved.

The final task of those who wish to make the dictatorship of the Kuomintang a serviceable instrument for the government of China during the period of tutelage is to improve the condition of the people. No government can become or remain popular unless it brings about some tangible betterment in the lives of the common people. In China this involves, as the Left Wing Revolutionists have continually insisted, the amelioration of the lot of the workers and peasants. It is not possible for the Nanking Government to ignore their claims and maintain its character as a revolutionary government. But it is possible to argue that for the present the wisest method of improving the condition of the people is to promote an industrial rather than further political revolution by encouraging the introduction of machinery, the development of factories, and the rise of modern capitalism. Forewarned by the experience of the West concerning the abuses of the capitalistic system and armed by Sun Yat-sen with a "principle of the people," calling for due regulation of private capital devoted to public use, the Chinese might hope to gain the advantages of modern capitalistic technique at a reasonable cost. An industrial revolution would absorb the surplus soldiers, give unprecedented employment to labor, and multiply the fruits of the toil of the peasants. It was the lack of capital which caused Sun Yat-sen the most concern when he was planning the improvement of the people's livelihood. It was the lack of capitalists and consequently also of a proletariat which embarrassed Borodin and, as he believed, wrecked the prospects of the Soviet Republic. It is still the lack of capital and capitalists that hampers the five-power government in the execution of its plans for works of internal improvement. It is the weakness of the Chinese capitalist class that prevents the revolutionary leaders from putting the new militarists more promptly in their place. The development of modern capitalism, the stabilization of the revolutionary government, the improvement of the condition of the people: all are bound up together.

The stabilization of the Five-Power Republic thus involves in the last analysis the modernization of Chinese industry and the scientific development of the natural resources of the country. Without a material increase in the tax-paying capacity of the people China cannot support a modern government, and there can be no such increase in tax-paying capacity without greater individual productivity throughout the country. The reduction of armaments would help. A reorganization of the fiscal system, such as has been proposed by Finance Minister Soong, and the improvement of fiscal administration, such as he once brought about in Canton, would also help. But at bottom the problem is one of economics. The character of the measures which would most rapidly strengthen the economic basis of Chinese politics is well understood by the revolutionary leaders. Some of them are being carried out. But rapid progress waits upon the cessation of military operations. It is not the size of the armies that is most injurious. An orderly country could easily sustain larger forces than those now in existence. It is the commotion they produce which agitates the people and the uncertainty of their movements which disturbs the prospects for the success of the Revolution. In order to gain the advantages promised for the period of tutelage it is necessary that there be a period of genuine tutelage. A disguised prolongation of the period of military operations can have only the natural effects of such a period. Lawless force and violence may be effective in the destructive stage of a revolutionary movement. But reconstruction requires disciplined force and good will. The course of the Chinese Revolution has abundantly demonstrated the unsuitability of military dictatorship of the vulgar type to the conditions of the country. Something better is required. This the civilian revolutionary leaders understand and are teaching the people to understand. The militarists, old and new, are slow to learn the lesson. How best to teach the lesson is the most urgent of the problems awaiting immediate solution.

5

THE STABILIZATION OF THE DICTATORSHIP

It is too soon to know how much progress has been made toward the stabilization of the dictatorship of the Kuomintang. The Third Party Congress did not fulfill all the hopes of its organizers, but the fact that it met at all, despite the obstacles in its way, should tend to strengthen in some measure the moral basis of the Nanking Government. The personnel of the Government and the political practices and methods of work which have been adopted leave much to be desired, but the utilization of the foreign experts who have been called in by the revolutionary leaders is an earnest of further improvement. The insubordination among the new militarists continues to impair the prestige of the party dictatorship, but the prompt suppression of the Wuhan insurrection in April, 1929, the defeat of the Kwangsi clique, when it organized a new insurrection in the south and attempted to seize Canton in May, and the simultaneous crushing of Chang Tsung-chang, who had tried to regain control of the province of Shantung under cover of the Japanese occupation, showed that the authority of the party leaders at Nanking could not be challenged with impunity.

It may be, however, that the tangible achievements of the new National Government are not the most important of the recent developments in the revolutionary movement. Particularly noteworthy developments of a different order are: first, the growing respect for modern scientific methods in the conduct of public affairs, and secondly, a better appreciation of the permanent values in the ancient political philosophy. The Nationalists could never be accused of neglecting the third of the classical political principles, the principle that the people have a right to good government which they may maintain even at the cost of rebellion. But the recent establishment of the five-power government reflects a new estimate of the importance of the first two, the principles that the nation should be governed by moral agency in preference to physical force and that the service of the ablest and wisest men is indispensable for good government. In abandoning the revolutionary strategy and tactics introduced by the Communists, the Chinese Revolutionists have fallen back upon their own original program, based upon the politics of Sun Yat-sen. They have renewed the effort to reconcile the best modern political practices with the fundamental principles of the Confucian politics. The revival of faith in the old principles, which Sun Yat-sen encouraged, and in the possibility of giving them new vitality by adding the spirit of modern science may yet prove to be the most significant recent development in Chinese politics. If the revolutionary politics of Sun Yat-sen is sound, the authority of the particular central government which has been set up at Nanking is of less consequence than the outlook for the Five-Power Constitution, the establishment of which, Sun Yat-sen believed, would bring to an end the period of political tutelage.

But is the revolutionary politics of Sun Yat-sen sound? Is the Five-Power Constitution a practicable synthesis of the modern political science of the West and the ancient political philosophy of the Far East? And if so, can the dictatorship of the Kuomintang last long enough to usher in the period of constitutional government in accordance with the revolutionary program, or must some other instrument be found for the rehabilitation of China? These are the questions that remain to be considered before attempting to pass judgment upon the Chinese Revolution.

X

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FIVE-POWER CONSTITUTION

1. THE PROBLEM OF CHINA RESTATED

HAS the Chinese Revolution now gone far enough to disclose the answer to the problem of China? Are the Chinese people capable of building a modern state and governing themselves so as to secure both order and progress? And if so, how should they go about it?

In the first place, it is necessary to dispose of the objection that the Chinese are disqualified on account of their race for the government of a modern state. The disorders and violence which have accompanied the revolution in China, it may now be admitted, do not prove anything about the political capacity of the race. They reveal the breakdown of an obsolete system of education and the collapse of an effete dynasty. They throw much light on the theory of revolution and the principles of revolutionary politics. But the character of a race is not to be discovered in the events of a few decades which happen at the moment to be the latest in a series extending over many centuries. The judgment of history must be based upon the whole record. What is political capacity? The answer which history gives is not easy to read. But this much is clear. Political capacity is not a racial trait. The vicissitudes of states as well as of races explode that myth. Political capacity is an attribute of personality. If states have their ups and downs, the explanation does not lie in any mysterious racial capacity or incapacity, determining the political behavior of peoples, though doubtless the character of the individual men and women who compose the peoples has some effect on the rise and fall of states. Different proportions of persons with natural talent for politics may well exist among different peoples, but the present technique for the measurement of intelligence does not permit the accurate determination of the number of persons with natural aptitude for statesmanship in any existing state, much less in any state at different stages of its development. Easy generalizations about the character of races are a poor substitute for careful study of the knowable factors in the rise and fall of dynasties and states.

What, then, of the political capacity of the Chinese? We know that at least there were enough capable statesmen among them to create the scholastic empire and to operate it in such a manner as to justify its inclusion among the great institutions of mankind. Its existence proves as much or as little about the political capacity of the Chinese as that of, say, the Holy Roman Empire proves about the political capacity of the peoples of Western Europe. But the government of a modern state, it may be said, makes greater demands upon the political capacity of its people than the working of the institutions of the former Chinese Empire or of the Holy Roman Empire or any other comparable political organization. This fact, however, need not discourage the Chinese. The history of their system of competitive examination for admission into the governing class shows that there were many more trained men, suitable for the conduct of public affairs, than could be used in the government of the Empire. How many others might have been trained so as to become serviceable public officers, if their services had been needed, must remain unknown. The rulers of the scholastic empire put their faith in their system of education and never questioned the abundance of natural political capacity among their people. Although in the end that faith proved misplaced, the eventual ruin of the Empire did not indicate any dearth of suitable material for training for the public service. The overthrow of the Manchus demonstrated well enough their own ultimate incapacity for the government of China, but not that of the Chinese. The downfall of the old mandarins demonstrated the unsuitability of their training for the government of a modern state, but not the impossibility of establishing a system of education which would produce a supply of new mandarins capable of governing the new China. It is enough to know that there is a stock of uncultivated talent in China from which presumably greater numbers of statesmen might be drawn than the scholastic empire ever needed to use and which by modern methods of training for statesmanship might furnish a new mandarinate immeasurably more serviceable than the old.

The lessons that may properly be drawn from the confusion and disorder of recent years have nothing to do with the character of the race and derive no authority from racial interpretations of history and politics. They relate to the problems of education and of government, which the ruin of the Empire has produced, and derive their authority from the soundness of the methods by which they have been extracted from the observable facts. The evidence is clear that the Chinese lack the political capacity at the moment to work the institutions of either a parliamentary or a soviet republic. But the explanation does not lie in any alleged racial deficiencies. It lies in the first instance in the lack of experience with those forms of government and of facilities for supplying the training which might in some measure make good the lack of experience. It lies also in the persistence of habits of thought and settled courses of action which were suited to the requirements of the institutions formerly established in China but which are not suitable for the people of a modern state. These facts illuminate the theory of revolution. If the development of political capacity is largely a matter of training, whether by formal education or by the harsher discipline of experience, it follows that there can be no sharp break with the past without confusion and disorder. The art of government is the most intricate and difficult of the practical arts and requires much study and practice. If the technique is to be radically changed, there must be opportunity for the appropriate training, which will take a long time if left to experience or great efforts if the teachings of experience are to be anticipated. If rapid changes are desirable, such as the radical Nationalists and the Communists tried to bring about, the confusion and disorder will have to be borne. If greater stability is desirable, as the more conservative Revolutionists think, more room must be found in the new order for the serviceable parts of the old.

The problem of China, it may be unnecessary to reiterate, is not a problem of racial capacity. It is a problem, so to speak, of political engineering. It is also a problem of political education. A modern system of training for the public service in China must impart a scientific knowledge of the modern world. But it cannot stop there. It must also teach the traditional principles of Chinese politics, since they still determine in great measure the political behavior which may be expected from the people of China. Such a system will explain not only the causes of the strength of the western Powers in modern times, but also the causes of the weakness of the Manchu Empire in its later years and of the subsequent failure of the classical mandarins. The reasons why the House of Nurhachi finally lost its power and why the mandarins of the old school were unable to carry on after the proclamation of the Republic are becoming well enough understood. The overthrow of the former and the downfall of the latter furnish a sufficient warning to those who wish to profit by their experience. Their errors need not be unwittingly repeated. But while greater numbers of Chinese are learning what they need to know in order to take advantage of their opportunities in a modern state and perform the duties which the government of a modern state will require of them, the leaders of the Revolution must solve their problem of political engineering. Does the new political structure, which they have established, derive enough support from the old foundations to bear the inevitable strains and stresses arising from the strenuous conditions of the modern world, or must there be a further reaction toward the ancient political system, if the dictatorship of the Kuomintang is to attain the desired degree of stability?

It might, however, be argued -- indeed the Left Wing Revolutionists do argue — that it is possible to pay too high a price for political stability. The need for a new economic and social order in China is so great, they assert, that every effort should be made to hasten the process of change and any sacrifice would be justified which would sustain such effort. The object of the Revolution, they remind their opponents, is not only the establishment of a strong government, capable of preserving China for the Chinese, but also the development of a popular government and the promotion of the welfare of the masses of the people. The Chinese Revolution is not only a revolution in politics, but also an economic and social revolution. Great social and economic changes cannot be brought about, they admit, without a sharp clash of interests and ideals, but the incidental confusion and disorder, they contend, is a cheap price to pay for the progress which is to be expected. The Chinese should resign themselves, they conclude, to the continuance of political disorder until the economic and social revolutions have proceeded far enough to stabilize the political structure upon new foundations. Governments derive their stability, according to this view, from the association of interests which may be gathered around them. If the interests which desire the permanence of a government are more powerful than those which oppose it, the government may stand; but if the balance of interests is unfavorable, its equilibrium will be destroyed. The most stable government would be one which represented all substantial interests in the state in due proportion to their strength, but during a period of revolutionary change in the relative strength of different interests a stable government is not to be expected. In such a period the possibility of rapid change is more important than political stability. This is the situation, the radical Revolutionists believe, which now exists in China. Hence, if the price of stability is reaction, it is necessarily too high.

Some of the radicals go further in their opposition to efforts to stabilize the government at the cost, as they believe, of social and economic progress. They are convinced not only that the price of political stability in a revolutionary age is reaction, but that in the end the price will have been paid in vain. Adopting the Marxian philosophy of history, they hold that stable governments are those which are so constructed as to serve the interests of the dominant class in the state and that political instability is ordinarily a sign of economic instability and can be cured only by the emergence of an indubitable victor from the struggle of classes. To stabilize a government, therefore, it is necessary either that the dominant economic class seize the supreme political power or that it be seized by a class which, by the use of the power the control of the government gives them, can make itself the dominant economic class. When these radicals are reproached by other Revolutionists for wishing to put the interests of the workers and peasants ahead of all others, their reply is, for the benefit of what classes do you propose to sacrifice the workers and peasants? The communist propaganda has left its mark in China. Though the Russian Communists have been expelled and the Chinese outlawed, their opinions are still to be reckoned with. By their principles of economic determinism there can be no peace without victory for the proletariat. The Revolutionists who are still of this way of thinking affirm that there can be no permanent political stability upon the basis of reaction, that permanent stability cannot be bought at any price but their own. The dictatorship of the Kuomintang, they conclude, cannot endure except upon conditions favorable to the progress of economic and social revolution.

The stabilization of the five-power government at Nanking is made much more difficult by these differences of opinion within the Kuomintang. The Nanking leaders recognize that their power rests largely upon the favorable opinion of the politically minded portion of the people. They know that they cannot expect much better success than the former Peking governments by relying upon military force and official violence to make good their claim to supremacy throughout the Republic. They are aware that the moral basis of their authority must be strengthened by meeting their critics on their own ground and justifying their management of the Revolution. It is this consciousness of responsibility for the justification of their measures which chiefly distinguishes them from the old militarists whom they overthrew and gives them in the eyes of politically minded Chinese their title to the government. But it is not easy to put an end to the factional dissensions by ordinary argument. The Nanking leaders cannot dispose of the case for a more radical social and economic policy by saying that the issue is wrongly put by the radicals. The real issue, the Nanking leaders may assert, is not between progress and reaction, but between the rate of social and economic change, on the one hand, and the degree of political stability, on the other. So be it. The radicals, being out of power, want more rapid change at the cost of less stability, if necessary; whereas the conservatives, being in power, want greater stability even at the cost of less rapid change. There are not only the conflicting viewpoints of men in power who wish to stay in and men out of power who wish to get in, but also the temperamental differences between men of sanguine and of unsanguine dispositions. The tendency is to fall back upon authority and settle their dispute, if possible, upon the principles which it sanctions. In revolutionary China the highest authority is the late leader, Sun Yat-sen, and the principles of his revolutionary politics furnish the essence of the law and the gospel. It is not surprising, therefore, that the interpretation and vindication of the "Three Principles of the People" become a matter of increasing importance in the conduct of the Revolution.

2

DR. SUN'S REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS RECONSIDERED

It is not necessary to discuss in detail the various interpretations of Sun Yat-sen's political philosophy which have been advanced by different factions within the Kuomintang. It is enough to consider its general implications and to form an opinion concerning its fundamental soundness or unsoundness.

The high importance which Sun Yat-sen attached to the proposition, that the system of education is the essential element of the constitution, has already been noted.[1] This is a proposition which is as old in the western world as the political thought of Plato and Aristotle. It has often been challenged and is still far from commanding universal acceptance in the West. Adherents of the various theological schools of political thought would put the chief emphasis upon religion rather than upon education. They may differ in many of their religious opinions but they are bound to agree that what men believe is more important than what they know, that faith is of greater value than reason. But the distinction between spiritual and temporal affairs, which is the supreme achievement of Christian statesmanship, and more recently the separation of church and state, which is its logical corollary in modern times, have made it possible for churchmen to recognize the truth of this principle of politics, though not all have actually done so. Socialists also, especially the adherents of the Marxian "scientific" socialism, are prone to depreciate the importance of education as a constitutional element, though they give it a foremost place among the functions of government. The character of a state, they think, is determined in the last analysis by the system of producing wealth which obtains among its people, and education can affect the constitution in the long run only by affecting the economic system or the opinion which people hold of it. But in the modern nationalistic states of the West economic interpretations of history have to contend with racial and other interpretations, and educational policy, broadly interpreted, is the foremost affair of state. Freedom of speech and of the press become cornerstones of the constitution, and the public schools set the standard of training for citizenship. It was in such an atmosphere that Sun Yat-sen formed the opinion that the choice of the right system of education is the first duty of enlightened statesmanship.

Sun Yat-sen's chief contribution to the theory of education in the modern state is his distinction between education for citizenship and education for statesmanship. In western democracies that distinction is not recognized, since democracy is understood to mean that everyone may rule and be ruled in turn. But Sun Yat-sen did not accept the western theory of democracy without qualification. Commenting on the disposition of the Chinese since the Boxer movement to imitate western countries in everything, he reproved his countrymen for their lack of discrimination.[1] It was proper to accept the material science of the West, he said, because it was manifestly superior to that of China, but it was a mistake to suppose that western political science was equally superior. The Chinese tried to copy the parliamentary system, he observed, and found that it worked badly, and, if he could revise his book today, he might add that they had had the same experience with the soviet system. In fact, he believed, westerners have not yet solved the problem of democracy. "The science of government has lagged far behind the other sciences." The explanation lay, he was convinced, in the imperfections of the science of psychology, as developed in the West, and in the false notions of equality which its defective psychology fostered. "Visible machinery is built upon the laws of physics, while the invisible machinery of government is built upon the laws of psychology. Discoveries have been made in the field of physics for several hundred years, but the science of psychology began only twenty or thirty years ago and is not yet very far advanced. Hence this difference: in ways of controlling physical objects and forces we should learn from the West, but in ways of controlling men we should not learn only from the West." Sun Yat-sen's views on the natural basis of political equality, like his comparison of the three types of citizens to political architects, foremen, and workmen, recall the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle rather than that of the revolutionary period in the West. They are more in line with the latest tendencies in western psychology than with the assumptions about human nature which were acceptable to Rousseau and Karl Marx. They led him to the conclusion that, while all citizens should be educated for citizenship, only those who are naturally fit should be educated for statesmanship.

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[1] See *ante*, Chapter V.

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[1] See *San Min Chu I*, Price's translation, pp. 283–290.

The practical effect of this theory of political education was the revival of interest in the political ideas of Confucius and Mencius and in the venerable political institutions which those ideas supported. Rejecting the conventional western doctrines of natural and equal rights, Sun Yat-sen insisted upon the difference between the organization of the state and the administration of the government. The function of the people in a democracy, he reiterated, was to control the government, and that of the most capable men to operate it. There is nothing new perhaps in Sun Yat-sen's distinction between the exercise of sovereign power and the employment of political ability. Western democracies have rarely ventured to practise what the more radical democratic theorists have preached. Everywhere we now find efforts to separate politics from the technical administration of public affairs and the study of the proper relations between the permanent administrative officers and the representatives of the people has an important place in the science of popular government. The service of Sun Yat-sen was to give new emphasis to an old truth, which the Chinese discovered long ago, and to create new respect for old institutions, which the Chinese could more easily adapt to modern needs than replace by strange ones introduced from abroad. This was a service of inestimable value to the Chinese Revolution.

The second leading principle of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary politics is that there is an intimate connection between the political and the material rehabilitation of a state. The advantages of a revolution in industry were as clear to him as those of a revolution in politics. The industrial revolution in the West seemed to him wholly admirable in its technical aspects and he recommended the application of the natural science upon which it was based to the problems of material reconstruction in the East with a degree of confidence which he was far from feeling in western political and social science. He was eager that the spirit of modern applied science should be blended with that of the classical political philosophy throughout the process of reconstruction. But the significance of this principle of his politics does not stop there. He recognized that the material development of a country is one of the important conditions upon which the political organization of its people depends. There are some valuable observations upon this point in a recent publication by the American commercial attaché in China, Julean Arnold.[1] "It is difficult to conceive of political unity in China," he writes, "without at least the skeleton of a system of trunk railways. . . . Basically, China's ills are economic. Thus, little headway will be possible in improving the social and political conditions of the people without attacking the great fundamental economic problems." He emphasizes the most important of them in his summary of what he calls the American "Three Principles of the People," which he recommends to the Chinese. The first two of these principles are: (1) a system of economic transportation, and (2) the increase of individual productivity through education and the use of labor-saving and labor-aiding devices. This is a weighty testimonial to the soundness of Sun Yat-sen's method of planning the reconstruction of China by taking into account the material as well as the psychological basis of politics, and to the importance of his emphasis upon modern science.

A big obstacle to the material development of China and hence to its political regeneration also has been the lack of available capital. Sun Yat-sen recognized the magnitude of this obstacle, but, knowing the matchless opportunities for the profitable investment of capital in China, he had no doubt that it would be forthcoming in abundance from abroad, if the national credit were satisfactory to the foreign investor. Sun Yat-sen understood the implications of the connection between the material development of a country and its political stability. Capital, proverbially timid, would be disposed, he perceived, to wait for the rehabilitation of the Chinese political system. But if the national credit could not be revived without the rehabilitation of the state, neither could the state be effectively unified and its government strengthened without the material reconstruction which would wait upon an improved national credit. Hence in part his insistence upon the close relation between his plans for the political and for the material reconstruction of China. There was nothing novel from a western standpoint in his emphasis on the importance of foreign capital for the work of reconstruction, though, when he first formulated his plans, it required courage for a Chinese to insist that the political and industrial revolutions should go hand in hand. Foreign capitalists, as well as mandarins of the old school, were reluctant to believe that the obstacles to the material development of the country were so formidable. But time has shown that Sun Yat-sen's favorite maxim, "Understanding is difficult, action easy," is as sound in economics as in politics. It has proved as difficult to discover how the capital which modern applied science demands can be obtained without revolutionizing the government as to reconstruct the government without restoring the public credit.

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[1] *Some Bigger Issues in China's Problem* (The Commercial Press, Sanghai, 1928), p. 3.

The radical innovation in Sun Yat-sen's theory of the international capitalistic development of China is his insistence upon the participation of the state in the control of the capital. In other countries where there has been a great demand for foreign capital, the problem of the government has been to furnish acceptable security for the payment of interest and the eventual repayment of the principal. The obligations imposed upon debtor states in the interest of their creditors have done their part to give modern imperialism its unpopularity in what the Communists call the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Sun Yat-sen believed that the best security for a foreign loan is a strong popular government, that where such security exists no other is necessary or proper, and that the inconsiderate grant of improper security impedes the creation of security of the right kind. Hence his opposition to concessions likely to get out of control by the people of China or their representatives. His was a theory of public credit which may properly be described as anti-imperialistic but not as anti-capitalistic. After his death the prevalent suspicion of uncontrolled economic imperialism among his followers was exploited by the agents of the Third International to give the Chinese Revolution an anti-capitalistic and anti-foreign bias radically different from its original anti-imperialistic tendency. The western Powers won their first encounter with communism on Chinese soil, but they cannot expect to enjoy the fruits of their victory without coming to terms with the Revolutionists who have revived the original principles of Sun Yat-sen. Adherents of modern capitalism in the West seek to justify it on the ground that it produces capital when and where it is needed in greater abundance and at less cost than any other economic system. It is necessary that the capitalistic system be justified in China by its works or the struggle with communism will blaze up again. Sun Yat-sen's emphasis upon this desirability that capital be the servant and not the master of the state is a service to modern capitalism as well as to the Chinese Revolution.

Sun Yat-sen's theory of public credit calls for the elaboration of a practicable plan for financing constructive enterprise on a great scale by foreign loans without compromising the independence of the state or the authority of its government. This is a problem which he himself never succeeded in solving. In his *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* he suggests that the central or provincial governments shall lend their credit to the local governments, but he gives no special attention to the arrangements between the general government and the foreign creditors. In his *International Development of China* he seemed so absorbed in the physical problems of material reconstruction as not to perceive that there is a psychological basis of economics as well as of politics. Perhaps he thought that the political reconstruction of China would of itself dispose of the intangible factors in economic reconstruction, that the development of a new sense of Chinese patriotism would bring with it the subsidiary corporate loyalties so necessary for the efficient functioning of modern capitalistic enterprise. But western experience indicates that patriotism is not enough to establish the credit of the modern state, not even when combined with modern methods of economy and efficiency in the management of public business. There are other vital factors in the morale of modern capitalism, which apparently will remain indispensable for the material development of the country, whether or not the state participates in the control of capital. Sun Yat-sen approached this aspect of the problem in his discussion of that part of his plans for national reconstruction which he called social reconstruction. He emphasized the importance of orderly processes of government and in general of what westerners term due process of law. He made it clear that the new China of his dreams was to be a state founded upon a blend of ancient Chinese political philosophy and modern western applied science not only, but also one characterized by what the West knows as a reign of law. The emphasis upon patriotism and respect for law is the third of his important services to the Revolution.

But how to develop the morale appropriate to modern capitalism, whether private or state, is a problem the solution of which will cut deeply into the foundations of social order in China. Julean Arnold has illustrated the nature of the difficulty in a striking passage not too long to be quoted here. "There is an important invisible factor which is an indispensable contributing factor to America's success," he writes.[1] "In changing from an individual to a corporate society, we are confronted with a new conception of man's relations to his fellow man. I recall an instance when some years ago a Chinese put up a considerable sum of money to meet the obligations of his brother, who had failed in a business project in which this man was not an interested party. I asked him why he felt himself duty-bound to meet the obligations of his brother, when he had no legal connections therewith.

[1] *Some Bigger Issues in China's Problem*, p. 8.

He stated that the good name of his family was at stake, hence there was no other course of action possible so long as he was in a financial position to do so. This same man was at the same time a director in a private Chinese railway. The shares in this railway had been quite widely distributed among the members of the Chinese community. Each of the directors took advantage of his place on the board to help his own financial position to the detriment of both the railway and the shareholders. In other words, where corporate had replaced individual responsibility, the man, who had been very meticulous in regard to his individual or family obligations, failed to show an appreciation for his responsibility as a trustee for a larger and less personal group. An obstacle of commanding significance to any efforts to establish among the Chinese a proper conception of the responsibility of trusteeship, is the nepotism which is associated with the Chinese family system. . . . It will require herculean efforts to infuse in the Chinese mind the proper relationship between family obligations and the responsibility of trusteeship in a modern corporate society."

Thus the same old family-system, which Borodin found such an obstacle to the success of communism in China, lies in the way also of the successful introduction of modern capitalism. It appears to be the greatest of all the obstacles to the political reconstruction of China. It not only hinders the introduction of modern forms of business enterprise but also that development of the functions of the state which is so important a feature of Sun Yat-sen's plans of national reconstruction. The Communists ventured to attack the problem by attempting to destroy the family-system itself. Sun Yat-sen was more conservative. He subscribed to the Confucian doctrine that a rightly governed state necessitates a well-regulated family, and that the latter in turn depends upon the culture of its individual members. He preferred to leave to the individual, therefore, the reconciliation of family obligations with those to the business corporation and to the modern state, and the policy which should be pursued in his name is still a matter of dispute among his followers. Julean Arnold meets the difficulty by proposing the third of his American "Three Principles of the People," namely, the appreciation by the individual of the responsibilities of trusteeship in the conduct of modern business. It is an important contribution to the philosophy of the Chinese Revolution and one which Sun Yat-sen in all probability would have warmly endorsed. The latest Nationalist law-codes foster the substitution of legal concepts based upon the western principle of personal responsibility rather than the Chinese principle of family responsibility. This is what the spirit of modern politics as well as of modern capitalism requires. It is what the spirit of Sun Yat-sen's political philosophy also seems to require. But if so, the period of political tutelage is likely to be much more protracted than sanguine readers of Sun Yat-sen's writings would suppose to have been his expectation. To convert the Chinese from a family-conscious to a business-corporation-conscious and state-conscious people is an educational enterprise of colossal magnitude.

3

THE FUNDAMENTAL SOUNDNESS OF HIS PLANS

What then is the final judgment upon Sun Yat-sen's plans of political reconstruction?

In the first place, it is evident that his distinction between the different stages of the revolutionary process is sound. It is not necessary to insist upon the sharpness of the division between the three periods of military operations, political tutelage, and constitutional government. Sun Yat-sen himself made it clear that the third stage of the process would only gradually emerge from the second. The establishment of the supreme Five-Power Constitution of the whole Chinese Republic, which is the final objective of the Revolution, becomes possible, according to his program, only when a majority of the provinces have adopted separate five-power constitutions of their own, and each province must first create suitable representative institutions in the Hsien. The dictatorship of the Kuomintang may conceivably linger in some provinces long after the establishment of constitutional government in others and in the central government of the Republic. The logic of events has made it equally clear that the transition from the military to the political stage also takes place by degrees. Dramatic episodes, like the pilgrimage of the Nationalist generals at the close of the Northern Punitive Expedition to report their victory to the spirit of Sun Yat-sen in the Western Hills or the formal inauguration of the Five-Power Government at Nanking on the seventeenth anniversary of the Revolution, emphasize the character of the transition, but the revolutionary process is one of many complications and the military stage may continue in some provinces, despite the beginning of the political stage in others. The significant difference between these two stages in the revolutionary process is not that in the form of the government, but rather that in the nature of its activities. If these are predominantly of a military character, the military period has not ended. The decisive test of the period of tutelage is the predominance of educational activities among affairs of state.

The chief value of the distinction between the different stages of the revolutionary process results from its effect upon popular understanding of the nature of revolution. It emphasizes the fact that revolution is a continuous process, and not merely a violent cataclysm, and the further fact that successful revolution is also a constructive process, which must set up a new order as well as overthrow the old. Hence the dictatorship of the Kuomintang must endure long enough to lay the foundations of the Five-Power Constitution, the promise of which is the principal justification in the eyes of the Revolutionists for their seizure of power. Such a promise, as long as it maintains its credit, is an indubitable source of strength to the revolutionary movement in the name of which it is made. Those who accept it in good faith will bear burdens which otherwise would be intolerable. General belief in the desirability of such a constitution as Sun Yat-sen's followers are pledged to establish cannot fail to add to the durability of the régime which proposes to establish it. It is not necessary to demonstrate that the Five-Power Constitution is a perfect form of government. There may be no perfection in forms of government. It is likely that in an ever-changing world there must be continuous change in forms of government as in other things. Progress, not perfection, is the proper ideal of a scientific age. It should be enough to show that the Five-Power Constitution is a practicable form of government and one likely to be more serviceable than any other that might conveniently be established. The true function of a constitutional project such as that of Sun Yat-sen is not to define the ultimate end of political development. It is rather to determine its direction for a time and thereby to introduce law and order into the revolutionary process. The first great merit of Sun Yat-sen's plan of political reconstruction is that it helps to reconcile revolution with evolution.

Sun Yat-sen's theory of revolution bears a certain resemblance to that of the Communists. They too distinguish between the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the immediate instrument of their revolutionary purpose, and the coöperative commonwealth, which they proclaim as their ultimate goal. They too profess to regard their arbitrary use of power as a temporary expedient which need endure only long enough to usher in a better state, where justice shall prevail, the promise of which is in their eyes the principal justification for their seizure of power. But Sun Yat-sen's division of the revolutionary process into three stages is manifestly superior to the trichotomy of the Communists. His method emphasizes more than theirs the importance of relying upon moral authority rather than upon physical force; it puts greater stress upon the employment of the best men in affairs of state rather than those who merely subscribe to the official dogmas of the revolutionary party; it sets a higher standard of performance during the preparatory period before the attainment of the ultimate objective. Since it must be conceded that the goal may still be far away, these are solid advantages from the standpoint of those who must submit to the intermediate dictatorships which the two theories of revolution agree in prescribing. Fundamentally the Russian and Chinese theories of revolution are very dissimilar. The Russian Revolutionists, believing that power is the essence of the state, have regarded the problem of political organization as the most important in the intermediate stage of the revolutionary process. Hence their slogan, "All power to the Soviets," and their strenuous efforts to complete the organization of the Soviet Union as rapidly as possible. But the Chinese Revolutionists perceive more clearly that in the long run knowledge is power and hence cling to a theory of revolution which lays greater stress upon the education of their people. Hence, also, their emphasis upon the educational functions of the state during the period of tutelage. The dictatorship of the Kuomintang should be less dogmatic than that operating in the name of the Russian proletariat. It should be more favorable to freedom of thought and to private initiative in the processes of social and political change. To plan for such a dictatorship marks a great advance in the theory of revolution.

The soundness of Sun Yat-sen's theory of government is more debatable than that of his theory of revolution. Those who believe in the parliamentary or soviet forms of government cannot be expected to prefer the Five-Power Constitution and the principles upon which it is based to their own. Sun Yat-sen agrees with Montesquieu that "every man who attains power is prone to abuse it." Montesquieu added: "He goes forward until he finds the limit. If power is not to be abused, then it is necessary, in the nature of things, that power be made a check to power." With this thought in mind Montesquieu worked out his famous theory of the separation of powers, and sought to show how a people may obtain that sense of security against oppression — which he deemed the essence of liberty — by contriving suitable systems of checks and balances in the organization of their governments. In America the revolutionary leaders embodied this theory in the Constitution of the United States. So deeply impressed at first were the leaders of the French Revolution that their Declaration of Rights of 1789 contains the statement that there cannot be a system of constitutional government without a separation of powers. But more radical revolutionists repudiated the theory because it seemed to deny the right of a majority to rule and in the Declaration of Rights adopted by the French Convention in 1793 there is no mention of a separation of powers. Since then thoroughgoing democrats have consistently rejected the theory of Montesquieu and asserted the superiority of forms of government under which there are fewer restraints upon the power of a numerical majority of the people or their representatives. Hence their preference for parliamentary and soviet republics, in which the principle of majority rule is held in higher esteem, and for all measures which, as they say, put power directly in the hands of the people themselves.

The true character of Sun Yat-sen's theory of government is revealed by his unwillingness to accept these democratic ideas without qualification. His project for a five-power constitution is indeed based in part upon the principle of majority rule. The scheme for maintaining popular control of the machinery of government by means of the four rights of the people, the right to elect public officers and the associated rights of initiative, referendum, and recall, attests his faith in the sovereignty of the people. But he qualifies the democratic character of his proposed system of government by adding the principle of the separation of powers. He carries this principle further than it has ever been carried in the West by putting the powers of examination and of censorship on the same plane with the other three. This is consistent with his distinction between the sovereign power of the people, which enables them to control the government, and the governmental powers, strictly speaking, by means of which those who are competent operate it. Thoroughgoing democrats will not agree that the people should be restricted in their choice of representatives to candidates who have been duly examined and approved by the civil service examiners,[1] nor that the people's representatives should be liable to removal by a bureaucratic board of censors. But those who accept Sun Yat-sen's distinction between training for citizenship and training for statesmanship will consider this, as he did, a great advance in the science of government. The practical operation of the constitutional régime which he proposes would depend upon the manner in which the five departments of government were organized and the nature of the processes which were adopted for the exercise of the four rights of the people. To such details Sun Yat-sen gave little attention. He was content that they be left for experience to determine. It was the general principles of his plan which he deemed important and which will give him a high place among those political thinkers who insist upon the marriage of democracy and aristocracy to the end that popular government may be intelligent as well as strong.

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[1] See Wang Chung-hui, "The New Five-Power Government Explained," in *The China Weekly Review*, vol. XLVI, no. 8 (Oct. 20, 1928), p. 260.

Another debatable feature of Sun Yat-sen's theory of government is his attitude toward the distribution of power between the central government and the governments of the provinces. Thoroughgoing democrats generally desire a concentration of power at the point where it may most readily by controlled by a majority of the people or their representatives. But Sun Yat-sen was a partisan of decentralization. This appears most clearly from his program for the establishment of constitutional government. The establishment of constitutional government in the provinces, or a majority of them, which comes first, means the control of the provincial governments by their own people. If done in accordance with his plan, it means taking control of the provincial governments away from the central government. This is federalism. The eventual establishment of constitutional government in the Republic as a whole, if done in accordance with his plan, means the establishment of a federal republic. The experience of the United States shows the solid advantages of federalism in the government of an extensive country with a great diversity of interests among its several sections.

While there can be no doubt concerning the federal nature of the institutions which Sun Yat-sen favored for the period of constitutional government, he was not equally explicit concerning the institutional arrangements during the period of tutelage. But if the predominance of the educational functions of government is the characteristic feature of this period, the governments of the provinces, which are responsible for popular education, will necessarily be the most active agents in the process of reconstruction. Since the end of the process would be the establishment of a federal system of government, the provincial governments should become more and more important throughout the tutelage period. In the military stage of a revolution the decentralization of power makes for confusion and disorder, as the experience of contemporary China abundantly proves. But, once the central government is strong enough to keep the peace between the provincial authorities, the opportunity for continuous initiative in the development of governmental activities, which provincial autonomy affords, supplies the most favorable condition for rapid progress in the rehabilitation of the state. Moreover, vigorous provincial governments are the best security against the abuse of power by those who dominate the central government. In short, decentralization, such as Sun Yat-sen apparently contemplated for the period of tutelage, is itself a kind of constitutional government. His preference for decentralization is logically consistent with his advocacy of the separation of powers and strengthens his position among political thinkers of the modern empirical school.

If it were necessary to determine when, if ever, five-power constitutions will be adopted by a sufficient number of provinces to make possible the establishment of that supreme Five-Power Constitution which is the final objective of the Revolution, one might perhaps despair of finding the answer to the problem of China. But this is not necessary. The ultimate fate of that unique system of constitutional government, the construction of which is theoretically the special task of the period of tutelage, can be left to the future to reveal. It is sufficient to understand the influence of Sun Yat-sen's plans of national reconstruction and of his general system of political thought upon the present condition and prospects of the revolutionary movement in China and especially upon the stability of the present political system. For this purpose it is enough to know that his plans of national reconstruction, though incomplete and in part badly formulated, contain a great deal that is fundamentally sound and of excellent repute, and that his general system of political thought compares favorably with those of other great revolutionary leaders in modern times. Indeed it may be doubted whether any important revolutionary movement has been provided with a more serviceable political philosophy. The possession of such a political philosophy is a source of enduring strength to the Chinese revolutionary movement and to the political system which that movement has created.

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THE FUTURE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

If Sun Yat-sen's plans of national reconstruction are to be followed, it is evident that during the period of tutelage the stability of the government should not be jeopardized for the sake of a more rapid rate of economic and social progress. Political stability is the essential condition upon which the activities of that period depend, and, as long as it is maintained, the economic and social changes which occur, though perhaps slower than may be desirable, are bound to be in the right direction. Political instability means a reversion to the military stage of the Revolution. The proper check upon the power of the government in a period of pacific dictatorship, such as the period of tutelage is supposed to be by the followers of Sun Yat-sen, is the power of public, or at least of partisan, opinion, and, as long as the revolutionary leaders who actually hold sway pursue the educational policy which their political creed requires and respect the liberty of discussion within the party, they have theoretically the same right to obedience, at least from those who profess to be Revolutionists, as constitutional rulers in a period of constitutional government. By this reasoning the Left Wing radicals of the Kuomintang would not be justified in violent resistance to the authority of the revolutionary government, if it were operated in the spirit of the period of tutelage, but should oppose its measures and, if necessary, work for a change of men by the accepted methods of partisan agitation. But such reasoning does not apply to a government which itself relies unduly upon military force and neglects the activities proper to a period of tutelage. Nor can it greatly help an incompetent or otherwise untrustworthy government. The most promising mode of strengthening the revolutionary government and stabilizing the dictatorship of the Kuomintang is to push forward with greater vigor the work of reconstruction which was set on foot at the beginning of the period of tutelage. The diversion of soldiers to constructive employment, the extension of popular education, the improvement of the technical processes of government, these are measures which would contribute both to the stabilization of the revolutionary government and to the regeneration of China.

There are certain other measures, however, which would also contribute greatly to the stabilization of the present régime. In the first place, it is indispensable to improve the organization of the Kuomintang. Under the present political system the party performs the principal functions which under the old scholastic empire were performed by the Emperor. It chooses the men for the important public offices and makes the final decisions in important questions of policy. It also conducts the ceremonies and rites which express the political sentiments of the people and symbolize the unity of the nation. The Emperor was strictly bound by an elaborate ritual in the ceremonial part of his duties and in the political work of his office to some extent also by time-honored customs and the advice of his secretaries and censors. But the party is a law unto itself. This opens the door to irresponsibility and arbitrariness in the performance of its duties and to furtive intrigue among its leaders. To be sure, the party has its constitution and rules, by which the rights of its members are supposed to be protected and its proceedings duly regulated. But the party constitution makes ineffectual provision for its own enforcement and the observance of the rules leaves much to be desired. In the United States long experience with the evils of unregulated and irresponsible party organizations led eventually to the adoption of strict measures for the regulation of political parties by law. It is not possible in China to regulate the Kuomintang by law, since the party is above the law, but much might be accomplished by the party itself to purify its proceedings and enhance public confidence in the integrity of its decisions. The acceptance of self-imposed restraints by the party leaders is the first step in the process of education for statesmanship and in the development of constitutional government.

It is especially important to strengthen the party by enlarging its membership and fostering the activities of the local organizations. The suppression of the peasant and labor unions has closed needed outlets for the expression of revolutionary opinion in China. If the progress of the Revolution is not to be seriously obstructed, it is necessary to open other channels of opinion. The censorship of the press places further obstacles in the way of free political discussion and further increases the difficulty of making articulate the spirit of revolutionary China. Until the military stage of the Revolution definitely gives way to that of tutelage, the censorship of the press and the suppression of political movements which seem likely to get out of control are normal defence reactions of any vigorous government, but excessive reliance upon such protective measures by a supposedly revolutionary government threatens the very foundations of its own power. The ultimate source of power for a genuine revolutionary government is the revolutionary spirit which animates those who believe in the aims of the revolution. Doubtless the revolutionary movement in China is much broader than the Nationalist Party, to say nothing of the Center faction in office at Nanking, and the Kuomintang cannot hope to monopolize the revolutionary spirit. But unless it succeeds in affording an adequate vehicle for the expression of revolutionary purposes, it runs the risk of forfeiting its leadership of the Revolution. The more rigorously competing organizations, such as the peasant and labor unions and the independent press, are restrained from expressing the revolutionary spirit, the more freely the Kuomintang itself must be open to revolutionists of all kinds and the more actively its membership must participate in the discussion of public policy. In the last analysis the success of the Revolution will depend upon the perpetuation of the revolutionary spirit, and far-sighted revolutionists will give their first thoughts to keeping that spirit alive.

Secondly, it is necessary to strengthen the position of the new mandarinate. Under the present political system the civil administrative officers occupy a position similar to that of the old mandarins under the Empire. The establishment of constitutional government would of course bring about a radical change in their position, but the administration of the pacific dictatorship during the period of tutelage is, at least in theory, a governmental enterprise of the traditional kind. Under the old Imperial system the mandarins were sustained by the authority of the Emperor and that of the whole class of scholars. This was ordinarily sufficient to maintain their authority, because the functions of the Imperial government were narrowly limited and the people were left largely to themselves. It was not necessary to organize further support by appealing to the special interests of farmers or merchants or any other particular class of people and rallying them around the men in power, as is done by leaders of political parties in democratic countries of the West. The patriarchal system supplied the basis of law and order and the actual government was mainly in the hands of the village elders and selectmen, if not in those of the patriarchs themselves. But now the old family-system is under fire and the business of government is being taken over more and more by public officers. The new mandarins are becoming much more active than the old and they need more support for their authority than the old traditions of their office or the new prestige of the party behind them can give. Sun Yat-sen looked at first to the new students and in general to the youth of China for the fresh strength which was needed to sustain his revolutionary government, but these were not enough. Borodin and the Communists called into existence the peasants' and workers' associations and summoned them to the support of the Revolution, but these reënforcements got out of hand and threatened to destroy the new mandarinate. Now it is necessary to find some new basis of support. The most available class is that of the bankers and merchants and modern business men of the great cities, to whom the revolutionary government must look for the new revenues which it needs. It would be by an alliance with modern capitalism that the new mandarinate could best gain the strength it needs, but such an alliance would have to be reconciled with the third of Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People."

This is an urgent step in the political reconstruction of China and at the same time one of the most difficult. Sun Yat-sen's vision of the new China was one in which the power of the state was to be used to the end that the needs of all should be supplied by the efforts of all. The principle of livelihood, which is the culmination of his revolutionary politics, requires that the new China shall be not only a political but also a social democracy. The period of constitutional government will be one in which there will be constitutional government in industry as well as in politics. The mandarins in such a state will be the leaders of a civil service for business as well as for government. This is what Dr. Sun seems to have had in mind when he spoke of the future government of the new China as a "high-powered strong government" capable of accomplishing great things. But when he said that such a government would be "unequalled under Heaven," he was thinking only of the period of constitutional government, when the mandarins would be politicians and captains of industry also, so to speak, by and with the advice and consent of the people. In the period of tutelage the mandarins would likewise have to play a leading part in big business as well as in politics, but without much possibility of direct popular control. In other words, it would be necessary to open up the way toward state socialism by preliminary experimentation with state capitalism. By such a policy the interests of the dominant classes in capitalistic industry and in government would be more closely bound up together than heretofore and in such a union there would be greater strength for the governing class as a whole. But mandarins who are also captains of industry without much dependence upon the consent of the governed will abuse their power, unless subjected to moral restraints no less efficacious than those which make modern capitalism a tolerable and serviceable régime in the capitalistic states of the West. To the occidental mind the development of the necessary political and social morale seems the most visionary of all the Chinese revolutionary visions. But to the Chinese with their highly developed social capacity the cultivation of the morale appropriate for state capitalism need offer no greater difficulties than that of the morale appropriate for private capitalism. If the revolutionary spirit is capable of the latter achievement, it should be equally capable of the former.

Finally, it is necessary to work out a better adjustment of the relations between the central government and the governments of the provinces. It is evident that the new five-power government derives much support from the old foundations of the scholastic empire, but something remains still to be borrowed from the old political system, if the dictatorship of the Kuomintang is to attain the desired degree of stability. The old empire was a kind of federation of village-republics, and the reservation of time-honored rights to the local authorities provided an effective check against the abuse of power by the Imperial hierarchy. It established a balance between the Imperial and local governments which helped to maintain the equilibrium of the Far Eastern political system. But now it is proposed that the authority of the central government be greatly increased in order to meet the obligations of an independent state under the strenuous conditions of the modern world. Particularly important is the proposed increase of the military and financial power of the central government. This is indispensable, if the central government is to maintain the unity of China. But it means the impairment of the authority of the village-republics and the disturbance of the balance between the various depositories of power. To restore the equilibrium of the system it is necessary to strengthen the position of the provincial governments. At present the provincial governments are too largely the creatures of the various militarists who dominate the different sections of the country. It is necessary for the central government not only to subdue these militarists but also to give the provincial governments a definite position in the political system which will enable them to declare their independence of all militarists. The stabilization of the dictatorship of the Kuomintang calls for a redistribution of power between the central and provincial governments by which the former shall have a more powerful military position and the latter a freer hand in the management of their domestic affairs. It is necessary to provide statesmen in the period of tutelage with an opportunity for careers like those of the great governors-general or viceroys under the scholastic empire. The price of a pacific dictatorship at Nanking is well-secured provincial self-government in matters of civil policy.

The importance of governmental decentralization is magnified by the growth of power that will follow the adoption of a policy of state capitalism. Governments do not derive strength from the absence of legal restraints upon the nominal authority of the men at their heads, but from the weight of the interests which may be associated with those of the rulers and which may be thereby attracted to their support. Great pretensions on the part of those who aspire to rule, unsupported by a preponderance of interests among the ruled, indicate weakness rather than strength. The adoption of a policy of state capitalism means a multiplication of the number and variety of interests whose conflicts must be adjusted at the seat of government. If these conflicts of interest are to be adjusted fairly, it is necessary that the interests themselves be fairly represented in the process of government. The greater the power which it is proposed to vest in the rulers of a state, the more judiciously it must be distributed in order to make the burden supportable by those who must bear it. An inactive government may safely be a highly centralized one, but a government which is designed to be vigorous and energetic must have more than one center of attraction for the interests of the people in order that it may also have more than one point of support. In so extensive a country as China with such diversified interests as exist in its various sections it would be impossible to represent a strong and preponderant combination of interests effectively at any one point. Measures which make for prosperity and contentment in the millet and kaoliang fields of the North may cause intolerable injustice in the rice paddies of the South. Measures which would be hailed with enthusiasm in the thinly settled marches of Manchuria might be greeted with bitter resentment in the overcrowded deltas of Kiangsu and Kwangtung. The tendency since the overthrow of the Manchus to turn over the conduct of provincial affairs more and more to the inhabitants of the provinces is as clearly in the right direction as it is irresistible by the forces at the command of the central government. Political stability during the period of tutelage presupposes the strengthening of the provincial governments or the creation of regional governments capable of relieving the central government from responsibility for some of the vital problems of domestic policy. If Branch Political Councils cannot be utilized as the focal points of regional politics, some equivalent organ of government should be improvised which could perform the same function.

Can the Chinese Revolutionists solve these problems? If not, it is easy to imagine that there will be no peace in China until a suitable "strong man" is discovered, who can mount the Dragon Throne in person and revive the form, if not the substance, of the old Empire, or until the country is irreparably broken into pieces, which may be more manageable by local dictators or foreign Powers. There were plenty of observers in the Far East at the time of my visit who had no confidence in the stability of the revolutionary régime. The Revolutionists had made a failure of the Parliamentary Republic. They had failed also with the Soviet Republic. These critics did not believe in the capacity of the Revolutionists to make a success of their party dictatorship, to say nothing of so ambitious and exacting a political scheme as that embodied in Sun Yat-sen's project for a five-power constitution. Not a few of the critics, when I first arrived in the Far East, were unable to believe that the Revolutionists would ever drive the northern militarists from Peking, and the unification of the country under one flag seemed absurdly remote. Some of them could not even believe that the Northern Punitive Expedition would take the offensive again, so overwhelming then appeared the difficulties in its way. These sceptics were confounded by the rapid success of the Northern Expedition. But their confusion does not greatly simplify the task of the observer who would again essay the hazardous rôle of prophecy. The victorious Nationalist generals have already quarrelled among themselves, and it is not possible to affirm that these quarrels are at an end. The period of tutelage may have begun in theory, but in fact, the sceptics repeat, the period of military operations has not yet come to a close. And doubt persists concerning the ability of the Revolutionists to bring it to a close.

Before surrendering to these doubts, it is desirable to review the course of the Revolution and to reflect upon the significance of the trend of events. It becomes evident that a substantial beginning has been made in the reconstruction of the state. In the first place, the Revolutionists have revived the credit of the fundamental principles of Chinese politics. These are the principles which stress the importance of strengthening the moral authority of the rulers of men, of obtaining the best men for the service of the state, and of maintaining the right of the people to good government even at the cost of rebellion. They are principles which tend to make the way hard for vulgar military dictators, though habitual militarists may be slow to understand them. Secondly, the Revolutionists have replaced the sovereignty of the Manchus by that of the Kuomintang. This, as has been pointed out, means more than merely putting a narrow oligarchy of party leaders at the head of the state instead of an emperor. It means, if the dictatorship of the Kuomintang proves durable, the rule of men whose authority is limited by the principles of the party in the name of which they have conquered. It means that the revolutionary spirit of Sun Yat-sen sits upon the Dragon Throne. It means that Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary politics must be counted among the forces which rule the lives of the inhabitants of China. Thirdly, they have made a place for modern science in the education of the men who actually hold sway. This means more than merely superseding the old classical scholars by an ill-disciplined lot of military adventurers and political agitators. It means, if the new order continues, the eventual reconstruction of the mandarinate with men competent to handle the problems of the modern world. Finally, they have begun to introduce the improved processes of government which, western experience shows, are such important factors in the profitable operation of the machinery of the modern state. Above all is the concept of due process of law itself, the most important factor in the stability of modern states. This means, if the revolutionary movement persists, the eventual establishment of a genuine reign of law, the supreme attribute of constitutional government.

Can the revolutionary movement persist? That is the real question to be answered. A movement which has already achieved as much as has the Chinese Revolution is evidently endowed with great vitality. It has accomplished enough to make the promise of its future a bountiful source of present strength. It is not dependent upon the wisdom of any single leader or group of leaders. The men at the head of the present political system might fail, but the movement which gives the system its significance would remain and would produce other men to take over the leadership and carry on the work of reconstruction. Sun Yat-sen knew that the foundations of a state must be laid deep and strong when he proposed to regenerate the Chinese Republic by refurnishing the minds of its people. While these foundations endure, it is hard to believe that the political structure which is designed to rest upon them cannot be made to stand. To destroy the prospects of the Revolution it is not enough that the new militarists continue to quarrel among themselves. They must also destroy the foundations of the new order by refurnishing in their turn the minds of the people. This may not be impossible. But it would be a difficult task, because Sun Yat-sen and his fellow-revolutionists have on the whole planned well. A process of reconstruction which is fundamentally a system of education requires much time. A generation must grow up which not only understands the nature of a modern commonwealth but also is determined to do what is necessary to maintain it. Meanwhile the pacific dictatorship which Sun Yat-sen's plans call for during the period of tutelage may often be distinguished with difficulty from a military dictatorship of conventional pattern. But the essential difference exists and will produce its characteristic effects upon the minds of the people. It gives the dictatorship of the Kuomintang a better prospect of stability than that of any alternative form of dictatorship.

If the dictatorship of the Kuomintang proves durable, it is likely to endure a long time. Under the best of circumstances the educational task of the period of tutelage could not be quickly accomplished. Even if Sun Yat-sen was right in thinking that, when the political foremen or politicians understand the nature of their work in a modern state, the ordinary workers or citizens can be taught to do what is necessary to maintain the state without understanding the work of the foremen or politicians, to finish the education of the politicians will require years of practical experience. The period of tutelage is not likely soon to give way to the third stage in the revolutionary process, the period of constitutional government. But this does not condemn the Revolution. The period of tutelage, when it shall have been securely established, will mark an indubitable advance, not only over the period of military operations, but also over the old Imperial period. The dictatorship of the Kuomintang represents a type of political system which is not inferior in principle to that which formerly prevailed in China and which in practice should prove much better adapted to the modern world. It is not inferior in principle, because fundamentally its principles are the same. It should prove superior in practice, because its system of education is based on modern science. The Chinese formerly possessed the requisite political capacity for successfully operating the institutions of the scholastic empire. They presumably still possess the capacity to operate with success the institutions of a "five-power" republic. Despite the quarrels of the militarists, therefore, the outlook for the rehabilitation of China, if one does not take too short a view of the political scene, is favorable.

EPILOGUE

REVOLUTIONARY CHINA AMONG THE POWERS

On Saturday, June 1, 1929, the body of the Father of the Chinese Revolution was laid in its last resting-place in the splendid granite and marble mausoleum on the side of Purple Mountain at Nanking. The heavy bronze casket was lowered into the crypt under the dome of the tomb behind the great memorial hall. The soft light which shone within the tomb revealed the features of the revolutionary leader, remarkably well preserved by the art of the embalmers furnished by the Peking Union Medical College. More than four years had passed since Sun Yat-sen had died. Madame Sun Yat-sen, the widow of the late leader, recently returned from her long exile in Moscow and Berlin, Sun Fo, his son, Minister of Railways at Nanking and charged with the responsibility for the execution of his father's ambitious plans for the development of China's system of transportation, General Chiang Kai-shek, one of Dr. Sun's former aides and now at the head of the revolutionary government, several other close relatives and old friends, the principal members of the diplomatic corps and a few other representatives of the Powers, slowly filed past the crypt. Outside the hall the great throng, which had accompanied the funeral procession from the Kuomintang headquarters in Nanking along the new memorial highway to the great flight of granite stairs leading up to the mausoleum, stood respectfully at attention, following the final ceremonies within the tomb. Promptly at noon there was a profound silence. Throughout the city, throughout all China, throughout the whole world wherever patriotic Chinese could gather together, there was a similar stillness of reverent multitudes. During three minutes it continued. Then the solemn rites ended. The state funeral of Sun Yat-sen passed into history, at once an intensely dramatic expression of the traditional Chinese respect for their dead and a skilfully impressive climax of a major movement in the Chinese Revolution.

The ceremonies had begun on the preceding Sunday, when at 1 A.M., after a salute of 101 guns, the body of the late leader was taken from its temporary resting-place in the Western Hills outside of Peiping and under the mellow glow of the moon amidst the picturesque illumination of many lanterns the chief mourners started on their long journey to Nanking. There was a significant blend of the time-honored burial practices of the Far East and the most modern innovations of the West. The huge catafalque, in which the casket was carried from the Western Hills to Peiping, was borne on the shoulders of relays of coolies, sixty-four serving as pall-bearers at a time. Two white poles, about fifty feet long and two feet thick, supported the catafalque, and an ingenious arrangement of shorter and lighter poles distributed the weight among the bearers. Fifteen hours were required for the solemn but laborious journey of some twenty miles to the railroad station in Peiping, where the funeral train stood in waiting. The form of the procession was fixed by the ancient customs of China, but the mourners discarded the traditional white costumes of Chinese funerals for the conventional black of the West, and the catafalque itself was resplendent in the bright blue and white of the Kuomintang.

Three days of memorial services at the temporary tomb preceded the beginning of the funeral march. On the first day high government officials, members of the diplomatic corps, and other distinguished foreigners paid their respects before the casket in which the body lay, bowing three times as they approached the casket and again as they withdrew. On the second day representatives of various public bodies did likewise. The third day, May 25, was reserved for the homage of the widow of the late leader and that of other members and connections of his family. The specially prepared funeral train, consisting of a gorgeous funeral car and several private cars for the principal mourners, was preceded by a propaganda train and by two armored trains to insure the safety of the road, and was followed by other special trains to convey high state officials, the representatives of the Powers, and other distinguished mourners from the old northern capital to the new seat of government on the banks of the Yangtze. A salute of 101 guns celebrated the departure of the train from Peiping, a similar salute signalized its arrival two days later at Pukow on the bank of the great river opposite Nanking. Three days more the body lay in state in the main hall of the Kuomintang Headquarters at the new capital and again the high officers of the Government and the representatives of the Powers had an opportunity to pay their respects to the memory of the late leader of the Revolution. The principal members of the diplomatic corps left the seclusion of the legation quarter in Peiping and, repairing in a body to Nanking, repeated the ceremony of homage to the spirit of the departed prescribed by the traditions of the country. The representatives of the Powers, who had never cared to perform the prescribed ceremony of homage before the Son of Heaven upon the Dragon Throne, now bowed before the new symbol of national unity as an expression of the new respect for the rulers and people of China.

The great procession through the city of Nanking and along the memorial highway to the mausoleum on the day of the last rites marked the culmination of the ceremonies. Again 101 guns boomed. Again the representatives of the Powers paid their tribute to the revolutionary spirit. And all the people of China, as far as the Nationalist leaders could manage it, stood at attention and observed the signs that the old order was passing, giving way to the new. It was revolutionary China's most spectacular triumph. The apotheosis of Sun Yat-sen was complete. The process which began with the modest weekly memorial services at the Kuomintang headquarters in Canton had culminated after four years in the majestic ceremony at the mausoleum in Nanking. The name of the late leader was definitely associated in the minds of China's millions with the vindication of China's claim to a position of genuine respect in the family of Powers. His tomb was manifestly destined to become the shrine to which a grateful people would come throughout the years and pay their homage before the altar of patriotism.

A writer in the Peking *Leader* has well described the significance of the event. "These past four years have seen Sun Yat-sen transformed from a starkly determined but fallible revolutionary leader into the all-wise founder and guiding spirit of the Revolution before whom all should bow and to whom all should turn for guidance and inspiration. Other men, after their deaths, have been transformed in much the same way, and have become the symbols of unity and loyalty around which political or social or religious movements have turned. No man has caught and held people's imaginations, however, who did not have within himself certain great qualities of moral courage and unselfish devotion to what he saw as the right. Those qualities Sun Yat-sen had, and it was his possession of them to a rare degree which made him the force he was while alive and the still greater force after he died. . . . It is no small gain to China that it should have acquired such a symbol to which all eyes can turn as the transformed Sun Yat-sen has become. Through the centuries the tangible and visible symbol of the throne served as the focal point for governmental activities and for such sense of national unity as existed. With the establishment of the Republic this symbol disappeared, and there was nothing to take its place. Affairs were in the hands of ordinary men, behind whom stood no semi-mystic authority in whose name they could speak. That lack of a unifying symbol was one of the serious handicaps on the efforts to get the new régime going. In these four years since he died, Dr. Sun has come in no small measure to supply that lack. The leaders of today can and do speak and act under his aegis. They get from that association an authority which otherwise would not be theirs. And though some of them may misuse that authority, the fact that the authority is there is no small gain. These men, too, by using his name force comparisons between themselves and him — comparisons which help to hold them up to higher standards and which aid others to judge them and to what extent they fall short of the high standards they profess."[1]

Two events which followed closely upon the funeral rites at Nanking furnished striking evidence of the growing power and enhanced prestige of the National Government. One, which occurred on June 3, was the formal recognition of the Government at Nanking as the rightful government of China by the Imperial Government of Japan. Japan was the last of the Great Powers to recognize the legal validity of the régime created by the Kuomintang, and the acquiescence of her statesmen in the claim of the revolutionary leaders to speak for the Republic of China was a signal triumph for the Revolution. The other event, which occurred later in the same month, was the adjustment of the differences between the two most powerful of the new militarists, Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yu-hsiang, by diplomatic negotiation without recourse to war. The rivalry between these two leaders had developed into a personal conflict of the kind which in recent years had ordinarily been settled by fighting. In this instance also the conflict threatened to degenerate into a sanguinary feud, like so many of its predecessors, and throw Nationalist China back into the state of lawless violence and disorderly militarism — the so-called state of feudalism — from which it had so recently been extricated by the overthrow of Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang. The permanent settlement of such a quarrel by political methods would have marked an impressive advance towards the establishment of the supremacy of the civil over the military power and the effective unification of the state. In fact, the opportunity for increasing the power and prestige of the Nanking Government was not used to the best advantage and the adjustment of the differences between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yu-hsiang proved to be only temporary. Nevertheless the prevention of war between them at that time was a step in the right direction. The Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, meeting in June at its second plenary session since its election at the Third Party Congress in the preceding March, ventured to proclaim that the period of political tutelage had at last really begun and called upon all patriotic Chinese to show at least as much respect for their Government at Nanking as the representatives of the Powers who had attended the funeral rites.[1]

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[1] See *The Week in China* (June 1, 1929), pp. 444–445.

The differences between Chiang and Feng were by no means as purely personal as those of the "feudal" militarists who had been responsible for so much of the contention and violence in republican China. They struck down deep towards the roots of partisan policy and their settlement by political methods was as desirable in the interest of the Kuomintang as in that of the National Government. Feng stood for a more radical social and industrial program than that favored by the predominant factions of the Kuomintang and had been greatly displeased at the packing of the Third Party Congress by the Nanking leaders and at their interference with the freedom of discussion within the party. A vigorous and efficient administrator, he became a severe critic of loose administrative methods and strongly denounced inefficiency and corruption in high places. His practical turn of mind made him suspicious of excessive centralization and confirmed him in the disposition to favor a large measure of regional autonomy, at least in the region under his control. He had hoped to gain an outlet to the sea from his northwest provinces, either by annexing the province of Shantung upon its evacuation by the Japanese or by securing a foothold upon the Yangtze through the occupation of Hankow. But the swiftness with which Chiang Kai-shek destroyed the power of the Kwangsi faction in central China shut him out of the Yangtze valley, and the complaisance of the Japanese in delaying their promised evacuation of Shantung rendered his position in that province untenable. Deprived of access to the sea and turned back upon a region deficient in the means of supplying the munitions of modern war and temporarily prostrated by famine, Feng

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[1] See Appendix H.

Yu-hsiang was forced to choose under most unpromising circumstances between submission to Nanking and the arbitrament of the sword. He agreed to go abroad "for study and rest," as many another defeated revolutionary leader had done before him, while retaining his membership in the Kuomintang and his officers in command of his former provinces. The choice which he made appeared at the time to be a solid contribution to the stabilization of the dictatorship of the Kuomintang and to the inauguration of a period of genuine political tutelage.

To secure the full benefit of the truce between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yu-hsiang, it was necessary that the faction of the Kuomintang in power at Nanking make more effective efforts to satisfy its critics within the party. Without doubt the Nanking Government, as organized after the triumph of the Northern Punitive Expedition, was on the whole the best China had had in modern times. Many men of excellent abilities and character were connected with it. But the higher its aims, the greater its liability to criticism. Its faults were evident enough, and criticism was abundant. The greatest dissatisfaction existed among the members of the Left Wing. Unreconciled to their exclusion from the Third Party Congress, they had challenged the authority of the new Central Executive Committee and demanded both a bolder policy on the part of the National Government and a radical reorganization of the party itself. The temporary retirement of Marshal Feng gave the Nanking leaders a favorable opportunity to conciliate the "reorganizers" by timely concessions and thus to strengthen the credit of their government. Conciliation with all factions of the party is a policy that is thoroughly consistent with the spirit of a period of genuine political tutelage. It would seem to be the only promising mode of establishing the supremacy of the politicians over the new militarists and thereby transforming the military dictatorship into a workable party dictatorship. Since the Revolution there has been no practicable method of changing the leadership in affairs of state except by fighting. It is the great merit of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary politics that it offers a less objectionable method of choosing the principal leaders in public affairs. There is no better evidence of the growing solidarity of Nationalist China than the growing insistence of articulate Chinese that their public leaders settle their differences by political instead of by military manoeuvers.

It may be granted that China remains a disorderly country by contrast with the most orderly states of the West or with its own Far Eastern neighbors. Yet such a comparison does not suffice for a condemnation of the Revolution. If the present political system proves as stable as now seems likely, its past and prospective achievements insure the establishment of conditions of law and order which will mark a great advance over those which formerly prevailed under the Empire. The walls which surround, or at least until recently did surround, every considerable city in China and every village also in parts of the country, bear mute testimony to the fact that life and property were never sufficiently secured by the Imperial power. It was necessary for the people to be ready at all times to find security in themselves. This appearance of age-long insecurity does not fail to strike the modern traveler in China. But it made little impression upon visitors from Europe a century or two ago. They came mostly from lands in which cities also had walls for the better security of life and property. This has changed in Europe, not altogether because Europeans have acquired greater political skill than they formerly possessed, but partly because in consequence of the advance in the art of war walls could no longer give security. Europe had to find substitutes for city-walls and among others it now possesses the national state, a far more powerful political organization than the feudal states of former times, and more capable of protecting the lives and property of its people. Now the Chinese are participating in the advance of the military art and likewise are forced to seek substitutes for their obsolete city-walls. They will surely find what they seek, if the period of political tutelage continues, and their new state will at least be more powerful than the old. Whether it will also be a better state and a desirable member of the family of Powers depends upon the Powers themselves as well as upon the Chinese.

The formal recognition of the Nanking Government by the Japanese took place precisely one year after the flight of Chang Tso-lin from Peking. During that year the relations between China and the Powers had greatly altered. As late as May, 1928, the Peking Government still claimed to be the Government of China, and the League of Nations refused to receive a complaint from the Government at Nanking against the Japanese on account of their occupation of Tsinan and interference with the operations of the Nationalists' Northern Punitive Expedition. A few weeks later the Peking Government had disappeared, and in July the United States took the lead in recognizing the right of the Nationalists to speak for the whole of China by negotiating a new commercial treaty with Nanking. This treaty carried with it the consent of the United States to the grant of tariff autonomy to the Chinese and provided for mutual most-favored-nation treatment in tariff matters. By the end of 1928 such treaties had been signed by the representatives of no less than a dozen of the Powers. Among the Great Powers only Japan held back. Early in 1929 Japan fell in line with the other Powers, though differences between the Japanese and the Chinese concerning the negotiation of a new commercial treaty prevented the latter from enjoying immediately all the expected benefits of the grant of tariff autonomy. Nevertheless, one of the most irksome of the foreign restraints upon the independence of the Chinese was apparently at an end. But the formal recognition of the Nanking Government by Japan still waited upon a settlement of the Nanking, Hankow, and Tsinan "incidents," and it was not until May that the last of these was finally disposed of by the withdrawal of the Japanese army of occupation from Shantung. Important problems remained to be settled, however, especially those of extraterritoriality and the rendition of foreign "concessions," before the Nationalists would have attained the first objective of their foreign policy, the complete abolition of the "unequal" treaties.

The growing solidarity of revolutionary China compels the reconsideration of the Far Eastern policies of the Powers. These policies, Chinese believe, are incompatible with their national independence, injurious to their vital interests, and ruinous to their national honor. They have submitted to them since the failure of the Boxer movement because they could not do otherwise, but they have become increasingly conscious that it has been a submission under duress, and they have become increasingly resentful at their humiliation.

In the past foreigners have justified their policies on the ground that no satisfactory relations between China and the Powers were possible on terms of equality. The Manchus had persistently refused to recognize the equality of the Powers with the Celestial Empire until at last the time came when they were no longer able even to maintain the equality of the Empire with the Powers. There was an irrepressible conflict between the political ideas of the Far East and those of the West, for which there was no solution except by the submission of the Powers to the inferior position provided for them in the Far Eastern political system or by the acceptance by China of the political system of the West. Circumstances, notably the decadence of the Manchus and the inadequacy of the mandarins, conspired to give the victory to the Powers. It was no longer a question whether the Powers would be admitted into the ranks of the tributary states or excluded altogether from intercourse with the Empire. The question was, what would be the position of China among the Powers if it should survive as a political entity. Now the circumstances have changed. A vigorous oligarchy of revolutionary leaders has been installed in the seats of the Manchus and a rejuvenated and more competent mandarinate is succeeding to the authority of the old scholars. The rulers of the new China have accepted the fundamental ideas of the western political system and will accept nothing less than the equal position in that system which its fundamental ideas take for granted. They no longer think of themselves as the possessors of the supreme power in an exclusive political world of their own, as in former times, but aspire to become a modern World Power with a position not inferior to any in the family of Powers.

The Powers have long looked forward to the eventual admission of China to an equal position in the family of nations, but they have qualified their professions of eventual respect for the equal rights of China by insisting that the rulers of the country accept their tutelage in the modernization of Chinese institutions. These twin policies of foreign tutelage and deferred equality were adopted at the beginning of the present century. The principal Powers had been fighting the "battle of the concessions," which opened after the defeat of China in the war with Japan and culminated in the rising of the Boxers. This "battle" ended in a kind of armistice among the contending Powers. They had discovered the folly of sacrificing the general welfare of the family of Powers in the scramble for special "concessions" and other exclusive privileges. Promises were exchanged to maintain equality of opportunity for the commerce of all nations in all parts of China. Presently also inopportune schemes for the partition of the country were reluctantly laid aside and the policy of the "open door" was confirmed by the further undertaking among the Powers to preserve China's territorial and administrative integrity. But these policies, though advantageous to China, did not immediately secure Chinese equality in the political system of the West. They were adopted primarily in the interests of the Powers and were accompanied by an elaborate system of political tutelage designed to give further protection to foreign interests. Financial and legal advisers of various kinds were accredited to the restored Manchu Government and the termination of the period of tutelage was declared to be contingent upon the satisfactory modernization of the laws and political practices of the country. In 1902, for instance, the British made a treaty with China in which they agreed to give up their extraterritorial rights, "when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration and other considerations warrant," and in the following year this dubious promise was repeated by the Americans and Japanese.

Respect for the independence of China and for its territorial and administrative integrity has been the subject of repeated diplomatic professions on the part of the Powers since the final abandonment by the Manchus of their traditional policy of exclusiveness. Such respect was explicitly professed by the Americans and Japanese in the Root–Takahira agreement of 1908, was further evidenced by the admission of China to the League of Nations after the World War, and was proclaimed in the most emphatic manner by the Powers represented at the Washington Conference of 1921–22. But meanwhile the Chinese continued under foreign tutelage. It is this policy of foreign tutelage rather than that of the eventual equality of China among the Powers which has been on trial in recent years. It is a policy which has been closely associated with another policy of the Powers, the most important of all their Far Eastern policies. This is the policy of the united front on the part of the Powers in their dealings with China.

Whereas the penalty for the degeneracy of the Manchus and the inadequacy of the mandarins was submission by the Chinese to the tutelage of the Powers, the price of victory by the Powers over the exclusiveness of the Celestial Empire was the establishment of a concert of the principal Powers and the surrender of the right of separate action in Far Eastern politics. The continuance of foreign tutelage, indeed, as the event has shown, depended upon the maintenance of the concert of Powers. But the concert was never harmonious and its durability was always uncertain. The system of special alliances between different groups of Powers, which had grown out of the conditions of European politics, could not be excluded from the Far East, and the formation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 plainly foreshadowed the disruption of the Far Eastern concert. Though bolstered up at times by the formation of financial consortiums, it was badly shaken by the wars among the Powers. The victory of the Japanese over the Russians put a check upon unconcerted Russian aggression, but increased the opportunities for similar aggression by the Japanese themselves. The expulsion of the Germans from the concert during the World War made a wide breach in the united front of the Powers, and the policy of concerted foreign tutelage was smashed almost beyond repair after the Russian Revolution, when the new rulers of Soviet Russia renounced sundry special privileges under the old treaties and offered the Chinese private tutelage on more attractive terms. The Nine-Power and Four-Power Treaties, framed at the Washington Conference of 1921–22, may be interpreted as evidence of a desire to rehabilitate the Far Eastern concert. But exigencies of European politics delayed ratification of the Nine-Power Treaty until 1925, when the whole system of concerted foreign tutelage was attacked by the Nationalists, and thereafter the rump of the concert was paralyzed by the skillful diplomacy of the Nationalist Government.

The concert of the Powers in the Far East was finally broken up by the British and Americans in the winter of 1926–27. British trade had suffered severely under the Cantonese boycott, following the Shanghai and Shameen "incidents" of 1925, and was threatened with ruin by the Nationalist occupation of the Yangtze valley. British statesmen found the policy of tutelage, as redefined at the Washington Conference by the Nine-Power Treaty, ill suited to the altered conditions in the Nationalist sphere of influence. In a memorandum transmitted to the other Washington Conference Powers, December 18, 1926, the British Government proposed that "they should abandon the idea that the economic and political development of China can only be secured under foreign tutelage," and "should expressly disclaim any intention of forcing foreign control upon an unwilling China." The American Government, in a statement by Secretary Kellogg, dated January 26, 1927, declared that it was "ready now to continue the negotiations on the subject of the tariff and extraterritoriality," that is, the negotiations set up under the Nine-Power Treaty and discontinued the previous year on account of the disorganization of the Peking Government, "or to take up negotiations on behalf of the United States alone." The Hankow and Kiukiang "incidents" of January, 1927, and especially the Nanking "incident" of March 24, caused the British to waver in their determination to alter the old policy, but the Americans preferred to abandon the concert rather than to join in the coercion of Nationalist China. This was the end of the policy of the united front on the part of the Powers in their dealings with China.

The Japanese alone ventured to continue the old system of foreign tutelage. Deprived of the support of a concert of Powers, their newly named "positive policy" brought uncertain advantages in Manchuria and Shantung at the cost of disastrous commercial boycotts and impaired diplomatic prestige. Supplanting the British in the minds of the Chinese as the principal exponents of imperialistic aggression, they suffered from the discriminatory tactics of Chinese diplomacy in all parts of Nationalist China as the British had formerly suffered at Canton. Defeated in their attempt to exclude the Nationalist régime from Manchuria, embarrassed by the rising hostility of liberal sentiment at home, the Japanese Government followed the leadership of the other Washington Conference Powers and, recognizing the dictatorship of the Kuomintang, recognized also the right of the new rulers of China to substitute their own system of tutelage for the foreign system formerly established by the concert of the Powers. If the dictatorship of the Kuomintang continues, the old system of foreign tutelage cannot be revived. If the system of partisan tutelage, established by the Kuomintang, is not destroyed by fresh wars among the Chinese militarists, there will be no feasible alternative to the adoption of the "equal treaties" which the Chinese Nationalists demand. Never had the outlook for the regeneration of China under the leadership of the Chinese themselves seemed brighter than in the month which witnessed the last funeral rites for Sun Yat-sen at Nanking, the recognition of the National Government by the last of the Washington Conference Powers, and the submission to the supremacy of the civil authorities by the last and greatest of the Chinese militarists. The problems of readjustment between China and the Powers, as the new China takes its equal place in the family of nations, will tax the skill of the diplomats. Particularly the problems growing out of the special position of the Russians in northern Manchuria and that of the Japanese in southern Manchuria will call for exceptional patience and tact. But without the old concert of the Powers the twin policies of foreign tutelage and deferred equality cannot be maintained, and the old concert is gone forever.

It is interesting to speculate upon the possibilities of intervention in Far Eastern politics by the League of Nations, or by that more nebulous association of Powers to renounce war as an instrument of national policy, which is the creature of the Briand–Kellogg Pact. But such speculations lead too far into the realm of the imponderables of world politics. It is enough to suggest that action by either of these agencies is more promising than any that could be expected from a reconstructed concert of the Powers. It is evident that the breakdown of the Far Eastern concert, together with the effect of the Washington Conference Five-Power Treaty for the limitation of armaments, has given the control of Far Eastern waters to the Japanese. If force is the ultimate power in international relations, this means that the decisive voice in Far Eastern diplomacy must also be recognized as Japanese. Be that as it may, it is inevitable that the Japanese should bear the chief burden of international action in the Far East, and that the other Powers should look either to the League or to the association created by the Briand–Kellogg Pact, as the appropriate agency for inspiring in the Japanese, if necessary, a due sense of responsibility to the family of nations for its use of its paramount power in Far Eastern waters. Whichever agency may prove the more serviceable in Far Eastern politics, its operations will be based presumably upon the assumption of the equality of China among the Powers.

These speculations are more or less applicable to the foreign policies of all the Powers. It will suffice here to consider some of their applications to the foreign policy of the United States. In recent years American policy in the Far East has been based upon the Washington Conference treaties. Of these the Nine-Power Treaty is already obsolete on account of the breakdown of the concert of the Powers and the abandonment of the old policy of foreign tutelage. The Four-Power Treaty, which provides for mutual assistance under certain circumstances in the Pacific region between the Americans, English, French, and Japanese, is a type of regional understanding which is also rendered obsolete by the altered conditions in the Far East. From the American standpoint it was a logical development of the understanding with Japan, originally incorporated in the Root–Takahira agreement, and a desirable substitute for the Anglo-Japanese alliance. But such partial and temporary alliances are incompatible with the spirit of a universal compact such as that for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. It should either be broadened by the admission on equal terms of all the Powers in the region to which it applies, or it should be discontinued. There remains the Five-Power Treaty for the limitation of naval armaments, by which the Japanese possess indefeasible naval supremacy in the Far East. This treaty guided the Far Eastern policy of the United States into a new channel, and it is not now desirable for the United States to retrace its course. The treaty was designed to put the relations between the United States and Japan upon the solid foundation of mutual respect and good will. It implied the acceptance by both Powers of high standards of international honor in their intercourse with one another and with all the peoples of the Far East. It should be the unquestionable basis for the further development of the Far Eastern policies of the Powers. But it is necessary to be mindful of the position of the Chinese Republic as a member of the family of Powers.

Confidence in the capacity of the Chinese to regenerate their state has been much shaken by the turmoil and confusion which has accompanied the overthrow of the effete Manchus and the downfall of the old-fashioned mandarins. The continuance of the turmoil and confusion under the present Five-Power Republic impedes the revival of confidence in Chinese political capacity. Compared to Japan or any of the strong nationalist states of the West, China seems excessively weak and disorderly. The Great Powers can certainly rejoice in their political and military strength. But that alone is not enough to give them an incontestable superiority over China. The anti-British boycott of 1925–26, following the Shanghai and Shameen incidents, and the anti-Japanese boycott of 1927–28, following the occupation of Shantung, demonstrated the ability of the Chinese to make political interference a costly venture for any Power. Their great social capacity compensates in part for the present weakness of their political organization. Moreover, a comparison between China and any of the highly centralized nationalist states is misleading. A fairer comparison is one between China and the whole of Europe, or at least the whole of Western Europe. It is not with Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, or Italians that Chinese should be compared, but with Europeans. Such a comparison is not so disadvantageous to China, even from the strictly political standpoint. The unification of China is certainly very imperfect. But so is that of Europe. It may take a long time for the Chinese to complete the reconstruction of their state. Or the work of reconstruction may be on the verge of making rapid progress. In either event, the course of the Revolution indicates that there is no policy more promising in the long run for the tranquillity of the Far East and the peace of the world than the exercise of the necessary patience and forbearance by the Powers while the Chinese themselves set their own house in order. Statesmen who look beyond the next presidential campaign or ministerial crisis at home and all forward-looking people everywhere will justify this policy by their confidence in the potential political capacity of the Chinese.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

SUN YAT-SEN'S WILL

This is the document which may be most fittingly described as the Declaration of Independence of revolutionary China. The following version is based upon the English texts contained in the *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, vol. II, pp. 316–317, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, 1928), and in Mr. Frank W. Price's translation of the *San Min Chu I*, p. vii, published by the China Committee, Institute of International Relations (Shanghai, 1927), and upon the French text contained in Father Wieger's *La Chine Moderne*, tome VII (Hienhien, 1928), p. 93.

For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the National Revolution, the object of which is to raise China to a position of independence and equality [among the nations]. The experience of these forty years has convinced me that, to attain this goal, the people must be aroused and that we must associate ourselves in a common struggle with all the peoples of the world who treat us as equals.

The Revolution is not yet finished. Let all our comrades follow [the principles and methods set forth in] my writings, the *Plans of National Reconstruction*, the *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, the *Three Principles of the People*, and the *Manifesto*, issued by the First National Convention of our Party, and continue to make every effort to carry them into effect. Above all, my recent declarations in favor of holding a National Convention of the People of China and abolishing the unequal treaties should be carried into effect as soon as possible.

This is my last will and testament.

(Signed) Sun Wen

March 11, 1925

APPENDIX B

SUN YAT-SEN'S "OUTLINE" OR "FUNDAMENTALS OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION"

The value put upon this document by the Chinese Revolutionists is indicated by the fact that it has been carved upon the wall of the Memorial Hall in the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum at Nanking. The following version is based upon the translations by Mr. Frank W. Price of Hangchow College and by Messrs. S. S. Chow and Edward Bing-shuey Lee of the Kuomintang Publicity Department at Nanking. See *The China Weekly Review* (May 25, 1929), p. 542.

I. The National Government shall reconstruct the Republic of China upon the basis of the revolutionary principles known as the *San Min Chu I* (the "Three Principles of the People") and the Five-Power Constitution.

II. The first principle of reconstruction is that of popular livelihood or the promotion of the general welfare. In order to meet the most urgent needs of the people for food, clothing, shelter, and communication with one another, the Government shall coöperate with the people in the improvement of agriculture so that all may have sufficient food, in the development of the textile industry so that all may have sufficient clothing, in the building of houses on a large scale so that all may have comfortable homes, and in the building and improvement of roads and waterways so that all may conveniently travel and transport their goods.

III. The next principle of reconstruction is democracy. In order that the people may be fitted for participation in government, the Government shall instruct them in the exercise of their rights of voting for public officers, and of initiative, referendum, and recall.

IV. The third principle of reconstruction is nationalism. The Government shall protect the racial minorities within the country and assist them so that they may become able to exercise their rights of self-determination and self-government. It shall also resist oppression from foreign Powers and at the same time shall revise the treaties with the Powers so as to secure national independence and equality with all nations.

V. The process of reconstruction shall be divided into three periods:

the period of military operations, the period of political tutelage, and the period of constitutional government.

VI. During the period of military operations the area of operations shall be subject to martial law. The military authorities shall use their power to suppress reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces and to propagate the principles of reconstruction so that the people may be enlightened and the country unified.

VII. Military government shall cease in any province and the period of political tutelage shall begin as soon as order within the province is restored.

VIII. During the period of political tutelage the Government shall appoint trained men, who have passed the civil service examinations, to assist the people in the several administrative districts (hsien) in preparing for local self-government. When a census of any district shall have been taken, the land therein surveyed, an efficient police force organized, roads built throughout the district, the people trained in the exercise of their political rights and accustomed to the performance of their civic duties according to the principles of the Revolution, and when officers shall have been elected to serve as district magistrates and councillors, then the district shall be deemed fit for full self-government.

IX. The people of a fully self-governing district shall have the rights of voting directly for public officers, of recall, initiative, and referendum.

X. At the beginning of self-government in each district the value of all land in private ownership shall be assessed in the following manner. The landowners shall first declare the value of their lands to the district government, which shall impose taxes upon the declared valuations, and may purchase the lands at any time at the same valuations. If thereafter the lands rise in value in consequence of public improvements or social progress, the unearned increment shall accrue to the community and shall not be appropriated by the land owners.

XI. The annual revenue from land, the increase in land values, the products of public lands, forests and streams, and profits from mines and the development of water-power, shall be paid to the local government and shall be used for the development of local industries, the care of the young and the aged, the relief of the poor and the distressed, the care of the sick, and for other public needs.

XII. If a district shall not possess sufficient capital to develop its natural resources or its industries and commerce on a sufficiently large scale and additional capital from outside the district shall be required, the central government shall give the necessary financial assistance and the profits shall be divided equally between the central and local governments.

XIII. Each district shall contribute a certain portion of its revenues and other income to the central government, the exact proportion to be determined annually by the representatives of the people and not to be less than ten per cent nor more than fifty per cent.

XIV. After self-government shall have been established, each district shall be entitled to elect one representative to the national assembly and to participate in the government of the nation.

XV. All candidates for public offices, either elective or appointive, shall be required to qualify for office by passing civil service examinations which shall be held by the central government.

XVI. When all the districts within any province shall become fully self-governing, the period of constitutional government shall begin in that province. The provincial assembly shall elect a provincial governor to supervise the operation of self-government within the province. In all matters of national concern the provincial governor shall be subject to the authority of the central government.

XVII. During the period of constitutional government political authority shall be duly distributed between the central government and the local governments. Affairs of national interest shall be entrusted to the central government and those of local interest shall be entrusted to the local governments. There shall be neither undue centralization nor undue decentralization.

XVIII. The district (hsien) shall be the unit of self-government. The provincial government shall be the intermediary between the central and district governments and provide for effective coöperation between them.

XIX. At the beginning of the period of constitutional government the central government shall complete the organization of the five departments (yuan), which shall exercise the five constitutional powers, as follows: the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan.

XX. The Executive Yuan shall provisionally consist of the following ministries: (1) the Ministry of the Interior, (2) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (3) the Ministry of War, (4) the Ministry of Finance, (5) the Ministry of Agriculture and Mining, (6) the Ministry of Labor and Commerce, (7) the Ministry of Education, and (8) the Ministry of Communications.

XXI. Prior to the promulgation of the Constitution, the heads of the Yuan shall be appointed by and responsible to the President and shall be removable by him.

XXII. The Constitution shall be drafted by the Legislative Yuan upon the basis of the *Outline of National Reconstruction* in the light of experience, gained during the period of political tutelage and from constitutional government in the provinces, and shall be published for the information of the people and for their consideration prior to its final adoption and promulgation.

XXIII. When a majority of the provinces shall have reached the period of constitutional government, that is, when they have well-established local self-government in all districts, there shall be a national constitutional convention with power to adopt and promulgate the Constitution.

XXIV. When the Constitution shall have been promulgated, the central political power shall be vested in a national Congress. The Congress shall have power to elect and to recall the officers of the central government and to initiate laws and disapprove laws adopted by the central government.

XXV. On the day of the promulgation of the Constitution constitutional government shall be deemed to have been established, and the people shall hold a national election in accordance with the Constitution. Three months thereafter the provisional government shall be dissolved and the government elected by the people shall succeed to its authority. This will complete the program of national reconstruction.

(Signed) SUN WEN

The 12th day of the 4th month of the 13th year of the Republic

APPENDIX C

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S PARTY (KUOMINTANG) OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

As adopted by the First National Convention of Delegates of the Kuomintang, January 28, 1924, and amended by the Second National Convention, January 16, 1926, and by the Third National Convention, March 27, 1929.

This document contains the fundamental law of the Chinese Constitution, if the Republic of China can be said to have a constitution, during the dictatorship of the Kuomintang. The following translation was made by Mr. E. C. Tang of the Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and slightly revised by Professor William Hung of the Harvard–Yenching Institute.

The First National Convention of Delegates of the National People's Party of the Republic of China, in order to promote both the realization of the Three Principles of the People and the establishment of the Five-Power Constitution, hereby adopts the Constitution of the Kuomintang of China, as follows:

CHAPTER I

Membership

ARTICLE 1. All persons who are willing to subscribe to the principles of the Party, to strive to carry out its decisions, to obey its rules and regulations, and to perform the duties [of membership], shall, upon application and with the consent of the Party, without distinction of sex, become members of the Party.

ARTICLE 2. The Party shall consist of two kinds of members, regular and preparatory.

(*a*) Regular members. Any person, who is over twenty years of age and has been a preparatory member of the Party for at least one year shall, after being recommended by the Sub-precinct Party Organization, examined and found qualified by the Precinct Executive Committee, verified by the District or City Executive Committee, and approved by the Provincial Executive Committee, be admitted to regular membership.

(*b*) Preparatory members. Any person over sixteen years of age, who has made application in due form, has been recommended by two regular members of the Party, and has been approved at a meeting of the Sub-precinct Party Organization, shall, after examination by the Precinct Executive Committee and approval by the District or City Executive Committee, be admitted to preparatory membership.

ARTICLE 3. Regular members have the right to express their opinions, to vote, to take part in the elections [of Party officers], and to be elected [to offices] in the Party. Preparatory members have only the right to express their opinions.

ARTICLE 4. Each member shall receive from the Party Organization to which he belongs a certificate of membership in the form which shall be prescribed by the Central Executive Committee.

ARTICLE 5. A member who changes his place of residence shall notify the Sub-precinct Party Organization of the locality from which he moves and shall register with the Sub-precinct Party Organization of the locality to which he moves, thus effecting the transfer of his membership to the latter Party Organization. Any failure to give such notice and complete such registration shall be deemed a violation of Party discipline.

CHAPTER II

Organization

ARTICLE 6. A Party Organization covering the whole of any area shall have jurisdiction over Party Organizations covering parts of the same area.

ARTICLE 7. Every Party Organization shall recognize its subordination to the National Convention of the Party, and to other Conventions of Delegates and Conferences of Members, representing areas of which its own area forms a part.

ARTICLE 8. Local Conferences of Members, local Delegate Conventions, and the National Convention shall each elect an Executive Committee to conduct the activities of the Party.

ARTICLE 9. The general system of Party organization shall be as follows:

(*a*) Nation:
    National Delegate Convention; Central Executive Committee.
(*b*) Province:
    Provincial Delegate Convention; Provincial Executive Committee.
(*c*) District:
    District Delegate Convention; District Executive Committee.

(*d*) Precinct:
  Precinct Delegate Convention, or Precinct Conference of Members; Precinct Executive Committee.

(*e*) Sub-precinct:
  Sub-precinct Conference of Members; Sub-precinct Executive Committee.

The Sub-precinct Party Organization [or Local] shall be the primary unit of Party organization.

Article 10. The organs which shall exercise the authority of the Party shall be as follows:

(*a*) The National Delegate Convention, and, when it is not in session, the Central Executive Committee;

(*b*) The Provincial Delegate Convention and, when it is not in session, the Provincial Executive Committee;

(*c*) The District Delegate Convention and, when it is not in session, the District Executive Committee;

(*d*) The Precinct Party Conference, or the Precinct Delegate Convention, and, when it is not in session, the Precinct Executive Committee;

(*e*) The Sub-precinct Party Conference, and, when it is not in session, the Sub-precinct Executive Committee.

The subordinate organs of Party authority shall receive orders from and carry out the decisions of the higher organs of authority. If difficulties shall arise in the execution of such orders and decisions, the subordinate authorities may submit their opinions in writing; but if the higher authorities insist, their orders and decisions shall be executed as issued.

Article 11. The Central Executive Committee may create appropriate agencies to carry on under its supervision the ordinary and extraordinary activities of the Party. It shall also define their respective duties and powers. The Central Executive Committee shall control the organization of Party agencies within the Provinces.

Article 12. The Executive Committees of subordinate organs of Party authority shall be subject to the Executive Committees of higher organs of Party authority.

Article 13. Subordinate Party Organizations shall not be created without the consent of the next higher Party Organization.

Article 14. The Party may, if necessary, organize party "squads" or "cells" in places where Party activities are prohibited or restricted. Their organization shall be regulated by the Central Executive Committee.

CHAPTER III

Party Organization in Special Areas

Article 15. Party Organizations in Special Administrative Areas (such as Mongolia or Tibet) shall be entitled to the same rank as Provincial Party Organizations.

Article 16. The organization of special areas for the conduct of Party activities shall be regulated by the highest organ of the Party.

Article 17. Party Organizations in cities with special administrative organizations shall be entitled to the same rank as Provincial Party Organizations and shall be under the supervision of the highest organ of the Party.

Article 18. Party Organizations in other especially important cities shall be entitled to the same rank as District Party Organizations, and shall be under the direct supervision of the Provincial Party authorities.

Article 19. Plans for special Party Organizations in such cities shall be prepared by the Provincial Party authorities, subject to the approval of the Central Executive Committee.

Article 20. In foreign countries the principal Party Organization, the divisional Party Organizations, and the local Party Organizations shall be entitled to the same rank as Provincial Party Organizations, District Party Organizations, and Precinct Party Organizations, respectively.

CHAPTER IV

The President

Article 21. Dr. Sun, the originator of the Three Principles of the People and of the Five-Power Constitution, shall be the President of the Party.

Article 22. All members shall follow the direction of the President and work for the advancement of the principles of the Party.

Article 23. The President shall be Chairman of the National Convention.

Article 24. The President shall be Chairman of the Central Executive Committee.

Article 25. The President shall have the power to disapprove resolutions of the National Convention.

Article 26. The President shall have the power of final decision concerning acts of the Central Executive Committee.

Note. The President died on March 12, 1925. In January, 1926, the Second National Convention received his will and resolved to execute it. This chapter is retained here as a token of everlasting remembrance.

The following ceremony has been adopted for use in the President's memorial service:

(*a*) A picture of the President shall be hung in the assembly hall of every Party Organization in China and abroad.

(*b*) The President's will shall be read at the opening of every meeting.

(*c*) A memorial service shall be held once a week by all Party Organizations in China and abroad and by all political and military organizations of the National Government. Under special circumstances, with the permission of the higher Party Organization, it may be held once a fortnight.

CHAPTER V

The Highest Organs of the Party

Article 27. The supreme organ of the Party shall be the National Convention of Delegates, which shall ordinarily meet once every two years. Extraordinary sessions of the National Convention shall be called, when the Central Executive Committee deems necessary, or upon the demand of a majority of the Provincial Party Organizations and other Organizations of equal rank.

The Central Executive Committee may, under extraordinary circumstances, postpone a session of the Convention, but such postponement shall not be for more than one year.

Article 28. Notice shall be given at least three months before the opening of a session of the date of meeting and of the principal items upon the agenda.

Article 29. Regulations concerning the organization of the Convention, the election of delegates, and the apportionment of representation in the Convention, shall be made by the Central Executive Committee.

Article 30. The National Convention shall have the following duties:

(*a*) To receive, and, at its discretion, to adopt the reports of the Central Executive Committee and of the various central departments of the Party Executive;

(*b*) To revise the platform and the Constitution of the Party;

(*c*) To determine the policies and tactics of the Party regarding current problems;

(*d*) To elect the members of the Central Executive Committee and their alternates and of the Central Control Committee and their alternates.

Article 31. The number of members of the Central Executive and Control Committees and their alternates shall be fixed by the National Convention.

Article 32. Vacancies in the membership of the Central Committees shall be filled by the alternates in order.

Article 33. The Central Executive Committee shall have the following duties:

(*a*) To represent the Party in its external relations;

(*b*) To carry out the resolutions of the National Convention;

(*c*) To organize and direct the subordinate Party Organizations;

(*d*) To organize the various departments of the Central Party Executive;

(*e*) To supervise the finances of the Party and have custody of its funds.

Article 34. The Central Executive Committee shall be charged with the execution of decisions of the Central Control Committee, but, when deemed necessary, may return a decision to the Central Control Committee once for reconsideration.

Article 35. The Central Executive Committee shall hold a plenary session at least once every six months. Alternates may sit in its meetings and, in case of the absence of members, may take the places of the latter in order and exercise the right to vote. Alternates, not acting as substitutes for members, shall have only the right to express their opinions. Alternates, having the right to vote, shall constitute not more than one third of the total number of persons present and voting.

Article 36. The members of the Central Executive Committee shall elect from their own number a Standing Committee of five to nine members, which shall perform the duties of the Central Executive Committee, when the latter is not in session, and shall be responsible to it.

Article 37. The Central Executive Committee may create special committees, when necessary.

Article 38. The meetings of the National Convention, the plenary sessions of the Central Executive Committee, and the sessions of the Standing Committee, shall be held at the seat of the central government of the Party.

Article 39. The Central Executive Committee shall once a month inform the Executive Committees of the Provincial Party Organizations and other Party Organizations under its immediate control concerning the progress of its work.

Article 40. The Central Executive Committee may send its members or their alternates anywhere to direct the activities of the Party.

Article 41. The Central Control Committee shall have the following duties:

(*a*) To determine, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Party, the penalties for violations of Party discipline by Party Organizations or members;

(*b*) To audit the accounts of the Central Executive Committee;

(*c*) To review the progress of Party activities and to direct subordinate Party Organizations to reconsider matters of Party action and finance.

(*d*) To investigate and ascertain whether the aims and results of the administration of the Central Government are in accordance with the principles and policies of the Party.

Article 42. The members of the Central Control Committee shall elect from their own number five persons to perform their duties regularly at the seat of the Central Executive Committee. A plenary session of the Central Control Committee shall be held at least once every six months. Alternates may sit in its meetings and, in case of the absence of members, may take the places of the latter in order and exercise the right to vote. Alternates not acting as substitutes for members shall have only the right to express their opinions. Alternates having the right to vote shall constitute not more than one third of the total number of persons present and voting.

The Central Control Committee may send its members or their alternates anywhere in the performance of their duties.

CHAPTER VI

Provincial Party Organization

Article 43. The Provincial Delegate Convention shall meet ordinarily once a year. But extraordinary meetings may be called under the following circumstances:

(*a*) By order of the Central Executive Committee;

(*b*) If the Provincial Executive Committee deems it necessary;

(*c*) If half or more of the District Executive Committees deem it necessary.

ARTICLE 44. Regulations concerning the organization of Provincial Conventions, the election of delegates, and the apportionment of representation, shall be prepared by the Provincial Executive Committee, subject to approval by the Central Executive Committee.

ARTICLE 45. The Provincial Convention shall have the following duties:

(*a*) To receive, and at its discretion to adopt, the reports of the Provincial Executive Committee and of the various departments of the Provincial Party Executive;

(*b*) To determine the policies and tactics for the promotion of Party activities in the Province;

(*c*) To elect the members of the Provincial Executive Committee and their alternates and of the Provincial Control Committee and their alternates.

ARTICLE 46. The Provincial Executive Committee shall have the following duties:

(*a*) To execute the orders of the higher authorities and the resolutions of the Provincial Convention;

(*b*) To organize and direct the subordinate Party Organizations;

(*c*) To organize the various departments of the Provincial Party Executive;

(*d*) To supervise the finances of the Party in the Province and have custody of its funds.

ARTICLE 47. The Provincial Executive Committee shall once a month make a report of its activities to the Central Executive Committee.

ARTICLE 48. The Provincial Executive Committee shall meet at least once a week. Alternates may sit in the meetings and, in case of the absence of members, may take the places of the latter in order and exercise the right to vote. Alternates, not acting as substitutes for members, shall have only the right to express their opinions. Alternates having the right to vote shall constitute not more than one third of the total number of persons present and voting.

The above provisions shall apply also to the Provincial Control Committee.

ARTICLE 49. The members of the Provincial Executive Committee shall elect from their own number a Standing Committee of three to five members, which shall perform the ordinary duties of the Committee.

ARTICLE 50. Vacancies in the membership of the Provincial Executive Committee shall be filled by the alternates in order.

Article 51. The Provincial Control Committee shall have the following duties:

(*a*) To determine, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Party, the penalties for violations of Party discipline by Party Organizations or members under its jurisdiction;

(*b*) To audit the accounts of the Provincial Executive Committee;

(*c*) To review the progress of Party activities in the Province;

(*d*) To investigate and ascertain whether the aims and results of the administration of the provincial government are in accordance with the principles and policies of the Party.

CHAPTER VII

District Party Organization

Article 52. The District Delegate Convention shall meet ordinarily once every six months. But extraordinary meetings may be called under the following circumstances:

(*a*) By order of the Provincial Executive Committee;

(*b*) By request of half or more of the Precinct Executive Committees;

(*c*) If the District Executive Committee deems it necessary;

(*d*) By request of a majority of the members of the Party in the district.

Article 53. Regulations concerning the organization of District Conventions, the election of delegates, and the apportionment of representation, shall be prepared by the District Executive Committee, subject to approval by the Provincial Executive Committee.

Article 54. The District Convention shall have the following duties:

(*a*) To receive, and at its discretion to adopt, the reports of the District Executive Committee and of the various departments of the District Party Executive;

(*b*) To determine the policies and tactics for the promotion of Party activities in the District;

(*c*) To elect the members of the District Executive Committee and their alternates and of the District Control Committee and their alternates.

Article 55. The members of the District Executive Committee shall elect from their own number a Standing Committee of one, which shall have power to perform the ordinary duties of the Committee.

Article 56. The District Executive Committee shall have the following duties:

(*a*) To execute the orders of the higher authorities and the resolutions of the District Convention.

(*b*) To organize and direct the subordinate Party Organizations;

(*c*) To organize the various departments of the District Party Executive;

(*d*) To supervise the finances of the Party in the District and have custody of its funds.

Article 57. The District Executive Committee shall every two weeks make a report of its activities to the Provincial Executive Committee.

Article 58. The District Executive Committee shall meet at least once a week. Alternates may sit in the meetings and, in case of the absence of members, may take the places of the latter in order and exercise the right to vote. Alternates not acting as substitutes for members shall have only the right to express their opinions. Alternates having the right to vote shall constitute not more than one third of the total number of persons present and voting.

The above provisions shall apply also to the District Control Committee.

Article 59. Vacancies in the membership of the District Executive Committee shall be filled by the alternates in order.

Article 60. The District Control Committee shall have the following duties:

(*a*) To determine, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Party, the penalties for violations of Party discipline by Party Organizations or members under its jurisdiction;

(*b*) To audit the accounts of the District Executive Committee;

(*c*) To review the progress of Party activities in the District;

(*d*) To investigate and ascertain whether the aims and results of the administration of the district government are in accordance with the principles and policies of the Party.

CHAPTER VIII

Precinct Party Organization

Article 61. The Precinct Conference of Members shall meet ordinarily once every two months. If the area is too big or the members too numerous for such a Conference, a Precinct Convention of Delegates shall, with the approval of the District Executive Committee, be held instead.

Article 62. The Precinct Conference, or the Precinct Convention, shall have the following duties:

(*a*) To receive, and at its discretion to adopt, the reports of the Precinct Executive Committee;

(*b*) To determine the policies and tactics for the promotion of Party activities in the Precinct;

(*c*) To elect the members of the Precinct Executive Committee and their alternates and of the Precinct Control Committee and their alternates.

Article 63. The Precinct Executive Committee shall have the following duties:

(*a*) To execute the orders of the higher authorities and the resolutions of the Precinct Conference or Convention;

(*b*) To organize subordinate Party Organizations in the Precinct, subject to the approval of the higher authorities;

(*c*) To direct the activities of the Sub-precinct Party Organizations under its jurisdiction;

(*d*) To supervise the finances of the Party in the precinct and have custody of its funds.

Article 64. The Members of the Precinct Executive Committee shall elect from their own number a Standing Committee of one, which shall have power to perform the ordinary duties of the Committee.

Article 65. The Precinct Executive Committee shall every two weeks make a report of its activities to the District Executive Committee.

Article 66. The Precinct Executive Committee shall meet at least once a week. Alternates may sit in the meetings, and, in case of the absence of members, may take the places of the latter in order and exercise the right to vote. Alternates, not acting as substitutes for members, shall have only the right to express their opinions.

Article 67. Vacancies in the membership of the Precinct Executive Committee shall be filled by the alternates in order.

Article 68. The Precinct Control Committee shall have the following duties:

(*a*) To determine, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Party, the penalties for violations of Party discipline by Party Organizations or members under its jurisdiction;

(*b*) To audit the accounts of the Precinct Executive Committee;

(*c*) To review the progress of Party activities in the Precinct.

CHAPTER IX

Sub-precinct Party Organization

Article 69. The Sub-precinct Party Organization shall be the primary unit of the Party. It shall consist of five or more members.

Article 70. The Sub-precinct Conference of Members shall meet ordinarily at least once every two weeks. Its duties shall be as follows:

(*a*) To receive, and at its discretion to adopt, the reports of the Sub-precinct Executive Committee;

(*b*) To determine the policies and tactics for the promotion of Party activities in the Sub-precinct;

(*c*) To study the principles and policies of the Party and to discuss Party and public problems;

(*d*) To elect the members of the Sub-precinct Executive Committee and their alternates.

Article 71. The Sub-precinct Party Organization shall have an Executive Committee of three members. Its duties shall be as follows:

(*a*) To execute the orders of the higher authorities and the resolutions of the Sub-precinct Conference of Members;

(*b*) To recruit, examine, and train members of the Party;

(*c*) To disseminate Party propaganda;

(*d*) To collect dues and special contributions from members of the Party.

Article 72. The members of the Sub-precinct Executive Committee shall elect from their own number a Standing Committee of one, which shall have power to perform the ordinary duties of the Committee.

Article 73. The Sub-precinct Executive Committee shall every two weeks make a report of its activities to the Precinct Executive Committee.

Article 74. The Sub-precinct Executive Committee shall meet every two weeks. Alternates may sit in the meetings and, in case of the absence of members, may take the places of the latter in order and exercise the right to vote. Alternates not acting as substitutes for members shall have only the right to express their opinions.

Article 75. Vacancies in the membership of the Sub-precinct Executive Committee shall be filled by the alternates in order.

CHAPTER X

Terms of Office

ARTICLE 76. The terms of delegates to Conventions shall end at the close of their respective sessions. But they shall report on the proceedings and conclusions of the Conventions which they attend to the Party Organizations which they represent.

ARTICLE 77. The terms of members of the Central Executive and Control Committees shall be two years; of the Provincial, District, and Precinct Executive and Control Committees, one year; of the Subprecinct Executive Committees, six months.

ARTICLE 78. The number of members of Provincial and District Executive and Control Committees shall be fixed by the Central Executive Committee.

ARTICLE 79. A member of the Executive or Control Committee of any Party Organization shall not at the same time be a member of the Executive or Control Committee of another Party Organization. But a member of the Central Executive or Control Committee may, with the approval of the Committee, at the same time be a member of the Executive or Control Committee of another Party Organization. The same shall apply to alternates.

CHAPTER XI

Discipline

ARTICLE 80. Every member of the Party shall strictly observe the following discipline:

(*a*) To obey the Constitution and regulations of the Party and to accept its principles;

(*b*) To discuss Party problems freely, but, when a resolution shall have been adopted, to give it unconditional obedience;

(*c*) To keep Party secrets strictly;

(*d*) To make no attack upon a fellow member of the Party or upon a Party Organization outside the Organization;

(*e*) To abstain from joining any other political party;

(*f*) To abstain from forming any factional organization within the Party.

NOTE. This Party has a historic mission to perform. The struggle for the territorial integrity, independence, and tranquillity of our country depends entirely upon the outcome of the efforts of this Party, which in turn depends upon the maintenance of strict discipline. Since the success or failure of the Party depends upon this, all members should do their best.

ARTICLE 81. Any person violating any provision of the Party discipline, as prescribed above, shall be punishable by the following penalties:

(*a*) Warning;
(*b*) Suspension of the rights of membership for a limited time;
(*c*) Dismissal for a limited time;
(*d*) Permanent expulsion.

Expulsion becomes effective only upon prosecution by a subordinate Party Organization, conviction by a Provincial Party Organization, and approval by the highest organ of the Party. An expelled member shall not be allowed to hold any office under the Party.

Any Party Organization violating any provision of the above discipline shall be punishable by the following penalties:

(*a*) Re-registration of the members of the Party Organization with a view to determining who shall be expelled and who shall be permitted to remain in the Party;

(*b*) Dissolution of the Party Organization.

ARTICLE 82. A case in which a member, or a group of members, of a Party Organization is accused or impeached, shall be thoroughly examined by the Control Committee, or by a member or members thereof, of the Party Organization to which the defendant belongs, and, together with the decision and sentence, if any, shall be referred to the Executive Committee of the same Party Organization for action. If the defendant is not satisfied with the judgment, an appeal may be taken to the Executive Committee of the next higher Party Organization or, if necessary, to the National Convention. But before any further action is taken by the Executive Committee of the next higher Party Organization or by the National Convention, the original sentence shall be carried into effect. The same shall apply to Party Organizations, when similarly accused or impeached.

The National Convention may grant restoration to membership to an expelled member of the Party or to all the members of a Party Organization, which has been penalized.

CHAPTER XII

Finance

Article 83. The income of the Party shall consist of the dues and special contributions of members and other revenues.

Article 84. Each member shall pay a monthly contribution of twenty cents. In case of unemployment, sickness, or other disability, he may be exempted from the payment of dues, provided that he reports his disability to the Party Organization to which he belongs. His Party Organization shall in turn report the case to the next higher Party Organization.

Article 85. A member who without leave fails to pay his dues for three months shall be suspended from the enjoyment of his rights of membership.

By-laws

Article 86. The power of interpreting this Constitution shall be vested in the highest organ of authority in the Party.

Article 87. This Constitution shall take effect on the day of promulgation, which shall be fixed by the National Convention.

APPENDIX D

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL TUTELAGE, PROMULGATED BY THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE KUOMINTANG ON OCTOBER 3, 1928

This document forms an essential part of the actual constitution of the Chinese Republic, but, like the "Organic Law," which follows in Appendix E, it is not, strictly speaking, the fundamental law. The fundamental law of the Chinese Constitution is the Constitution of the Kuomintang, which is reprinted in Appendix C. The following is an official translation published by authority of the Nationalist Government.

With a view to carrying out Dr. Sun's *Three Principles of the People* in accordance with the *Outline of National Reconstruction* and with a view to training the people during the Period of Tutelage in the exercise of political authority until the Constitutional Period begins in order to arrive at a democracy of all the people, the Kuomintang of China enacts the following principles:

1. During the Period of Political Tutelage of the Republic of China, the National Congress of Representatives of the Kuomintang of China on behalf of the People's Convention guides the people in the exercise of political authority.

2. The National Congress of Representatives of the Kuomintang of China, upon its adjournment, entrusts the political authority to the Central Executive Committee for execution.

3. With a view to laying the foundation of Constitutional Government, the people should be trained in the gradual adoption of the four political powers, namely: election, recall, initiative, and referendum, according to what is laid down in Dr. Sun's *Outline of National Reconstruction.*

4. With a view to laying the foundation of government elected by the people during the Constitutional Period, the five divisions, namely: the administrative, legislative, judicial, examination, and control, of the governing power are entrusted *in toto* to the National Government for execution.

5. The Political Council of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang of China shall guide and superintend the execution by the National Government of important national affairs.

6. The amendment and interpretation of the organic law of the National Government of the Republic of China shall be made by resolutions adopted by the Political Council of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

APPENDIX E

THE ORGANIC LAW OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Promulgated at Nanking, October 4, 1928. Official translation by authority of the National Government.

The Kuomintang of China, in order to establish the Republic of China on the basis of the Three Principles of the People and the Constitution of Five Powers, which form the underlying principle of the Revolution, having conquered all opposition by military force and having now brought the Revolution from the military stage to the educative stage, deem it necessary to construct a framework for the Constitution of Five Powers with a view to developing the ability of the people to exercise political power, so that constitutional government may soon come into existence and political power be restored to the people; and, further, in virtue of the responsibilities hitherto entrusted to the Party for the guidance and supervision of the Government, do hereby ordain and promulgate the following Organic Law of the National Government:

CHAPTER I

The National Government

ARTICLE 1. The National Government shall exercise all the governing powers of the Republic of China.

ARTICLE 2. The National Government shall have the supreme command of the land, naval, and air forces.

ARTICLE 3. The National Government shall have the power to declare war, to negotiate peace, and to conclude treaties.

ARTICLE 4. The National Government shall exercise the power of granting amnesties, pardons, reprieves, and restitution of civic rights.

ARTICLE 5. The National Government shall be composed of the following five Yuan: the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan.

ARTICLE 6. There shall be a President and from twelve to sixteen State Councillors of the National Government.

Article 7. The Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Five Yuan shall be appointed from among the State Councillors of the National Government.

Article 8. The President of the National Government shall represent the National Government in receiving foreign diplomatic representatives and in officiating or participating in State functions.

Article 9. The President of the National Government shall concurrently be the Commander-in-Chief of the land, naval, and air forces of the Republic of China.

Article 10. In case the President of the National Government is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the President of the Executive Yuan shall act in his place.

Article 11. The National Government shall conduct national affairs through the State Council. The State Council shall be composed of the State Councillors of the National Government, and the President of the National Government shall be the Chairman of the State Council.

Article 12. All matters which cannot be settled between two or more of the State Yuan shall be referred to the State Council for decision.

Article 13. All laws promulgated and all mandates issued by virtue of a decision of the State Council shall be signed by the President of the National Government and countersigned by the Presidents of the Five Yuan.

Article 14. Each of the Five Yuan may, according to law, issue orders.

CHAPTER II

The Executive Yuan

Article 15. The Executive Yuan shall be the highest executive organ of the National Government.

Article 16. The Executive Yuan shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 17. The Executive Yuan shall establish Ministries to which shall be entrusted the various executive duties.

The Executive Yuan may appoint Commissions to take charge of specified executive matters.

Article 18. The Ministries of the Executive Yuan shall each have a Minister, a Political Vice-Minister, and an Administrative Vice-Minister, and the various Commissions shall each have a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, all of whom shall be appointed or removed by the National Government at the instance of the President of the said Yuan.

ARTICLE 19. The Ministers, and the Chairmen of the various Commissions, of the Executive Yuan may, when necessary, attend the meetings of the State Council and of the Legislative Yuan.

ARTICLE 20. The Executive Yuan may introduce in the Legislative Yuan bills on matters within its own competence.

ARTICLE 21. Meetings of the Executive Yuan shall be attended by the President, the Vice-President, the Ministers of the various Ministries, and the Chairmen of the various Commissions, and presided over by the President of the said Yuan.

ARTICLE 22. The following matters shall be decided at a meeting of the Executive Yuan:

(1) Bills on legislative matters to be introduced in the Legislative Yuan.

(2) Budgets to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan.

(3) Amnesties to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan.

(4) Declaration of war, negotiation for peace, conclusion of treaties, and other important international matters to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan.

(5) The appointment or dismissal of administrative officials of or above the rank of Chien-Jen (Third Class)

(6) All matters which cannot be settled between the various Ministries and Commissions of the Executive Yuan.

(7) All matters which, according to law or in the opinion of the President of the Yuan, should be decided at a meeting of the said Yuan.

ARTICLE 23. The various Ministries and Commissions of the Executive Yuan may, according to law, issue orders.

ARTICLE 24. The organization of the Executive Yuan and of the various Ministries and Commissions shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER III

The Legislative Yuan

ARTICLE 25. The Legislative Yuan shall be the highest legislative organ of the National Government.

The Legislative Yuan shall have the power to decide upon the following: legislation, budgets, amnesties, declaration of war, negotiation for peace, conclusion of treaties, and other important international affairs.

ARTICLE 26. The Legislative Yuan shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

ARTICLE 27. The Legislative Yuan shall be composed of from forty-nine to ninety-nine members, who shall be appointed by the National Government at the instance of the President of the said Yuan.

ARTICLE 28. The term of office of the members of the Legislative Yuan shall be two years.

ARTICLE 29. The members of the Legislative Yuan shall not concurrently be non-political administrative officials of the various organs of the central or local governments.

ARTICLE 30. The President of the Legislative Yuan shall preside at all meetings of the Legislative Yuan.

ARTICLE 31. All resolutions passed by the Legislative Yuan shall be decided upon and promulgated by the State Council.

ARTICLE 32. The organization of the Legislative Yuan shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER IV

The Judicial Yuan

ARTICLE 33. The Judicial Yuan shall be the highest judicial organ of the National Government and shall take charge of judicial trial, judicial administration, disciplinary punishment of officials, and trial of administrative cases.

The granting of pardons and reprieves and the restitution of civic rights shall be submitted by the President of the Judicial Yuan to the National Government for approval and action.

ARTICLE 34. The Judicial Yuan shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

ARTICLE 35. The Judicial Yuan may introduce in the Legislative Yuan bills on matters within its own competence.

ARTICLE 36. The organization of the Judicial Yuan shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER V

The Examination Yuan

Article 37. The Examination Yuan shall be the highest examination organ of the National Government and shall take charge of examinations and determine the qualifications for public service. All public functionaries shall be appointed only after having, according to law, passed an examination and their qualifications for public service having been determined by the Examination Yuan.

Article 38. The Examination Yuan shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 39. The Examination Yuan may introduce in the Legislative Yuan bills on matters within its own competence.

Article 40. The organization of the Examination Yuan shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER VI

The Control Yuan

Article 41. The Control Yuan shall be the highest supervisory organ of the National Government and shall, according to law, exercise the following powers:

(1) Impeachment.
(2) Auditing.

Article 42. The Control Yuan shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 43. The Control Yuan shall be composed of from nineteen to twenty-nine members, who shall be appointed by the National Government at the instance of the President of the said Yuan.

The security of tenure of office of the members of the Control Yuan shall be determined by law.

Article 44. All meetings of the Control Yuan shall be attended by members of the Control Yuan and presided over by the President of the said Yuan.

Article 45. The members of the Control Yuan shall not concurrently hold any office in any of the organs of the central or local governments.

Article 46. The Control Yuan shall have the power to introduce in the Legislative Yuan bills on matters within its own competence.

Article 47. The organization of the Control Yuan shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER VII

Additional Article

Article 48. The present Law shall come into force on the day of its promulgation.

APPENDIX F

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

Promulgated 25th Oct. 16th year of Min Kuo. The following is an official translation published by authority of the National Government.

ARTICLE I. In each Province, a Provincial Government shall be established which in accordance with the principles of the Kuomintang and the Mandates of the National Government shall administer the political affairs of the whole province.

ARTICLE II. The powers of the Provincial Government shall be exercised by the Provincial Council which shall be composed of from nine to thirteen members appointed by the National Government.

ARTICLE III. No member of the Provincial Council shall hold concurrent administrative positions in any other province.

ARTICLE IV. A Chairman shall be named by the National Government from amongst the members of the Council.

ARTICLE V. The Chairman of the Council shall execute the resolutions adopted by the Council and administer the ordinary affairs.

ARTICLE VI. Regular meetings of the Council shall be called by the Chairman. In case of necessity, or at the request of three of the members, however, special meetings shall be called.

ARTICLE VII. In case the Chairman of the Council is unable to attend to his duties, another member of the Council shall be elected to act as *pro tempore* Chairman, whose acting, however, must be reported to and approved by the National Government.

ARTICLE VIII. The Provincial Council shall have a general secretariat consisting of a chief secretary and secretaries. They shall in accordance with the instructions of the Chairman of the Council attend to the general affairs of the secretariat.

ARTICLE IX. Under the Council, there shall be established the Department of Civil Affairs, the Department of Finance, and the Department of Reconstruction. When circumstances require, Departments of Education, Agriculture and Labor, Industry, and Land shall be established which shall have charge of the respective provincial administrative affairs.

Each department shall be under a Commissioner appointed by the National Government from among the members of the Council.

Article X. Constitutions and by-laws governing the organization of the different departments shall be separately drawn up.

Article XI. The Provincial Government may issue orders regarding the administrative affairs of the province, provided they are not in contravention of the Laws and Mandates of the National Government.

Article XII. In the appointment and removal of the provincial officials of the Third Rank (Chien Jen), the Provincial Government shall follow the resolutions of the Provincial Council and submit them to the National Government for approval.

Article XIII. The Provincial Government shall impeach before the National Government any provincial officials of the Second Rank (Tsien Jen) who are considered to be negligent of duty.

Article XIV. The Provincial Government may suspend or abrogate orders or dispositions of any subordinate organ considered to be in violation of law, *ultra vires*, or improper in other respects.

Article XV. The different provincial departments shall administer their respective affairs by issuing departmental orders excepting when otherwise provided for by law or otherwise decided on by resolutions of the Provincial Council.

Article XVI. The Provincial Government shall submit a report concerning its administration to the National Government at the end of each month.

Article XVII. This law shall come into force on the day of promulgation.

APPENDIX G

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE THIRD NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE KUOMINTANG WITH REGARD TO CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

The following is an official translation published by authority of the National Government. The Third National Congress was convened on March 15 and adjourned March 28, 1929.

The Third National Congress, after hearing the report on China's foreign relations, is aware of the fact that the principle of equality and reciprocity laid down by the Kuomintang for dealing with China's foreign relations has recently been accepted by the Powers. The initial move towards tariff autonomy has also been crowned with success. These achievements are the result of solidarity and united action of the Chinese people under the guardianship of the Kuomintang, whose aim it is to see the enforcement of the Three People's Principles in this country. However, the Congress regards the present diplomatic achievements as only the first step towards full realization of the Party's foreign policy.

At the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, resolutions were adopted to the effect that the abrogation of the unequal treaties and the conclusion of new treaties on the basis of absolute equality and reciprocity be laid down as the basic principle of China's foreign policy.

With the ushering in of the political tutelage period, the time has come for the enforcement of the program laid down by our late Leader, Dr. Sun.

The resolutions of the First National Congress outlining China's foreign policy, containing altogether seven articles, may be summarized as follows:

1. All existing unequal treaties between China and foreign Powers shall be abrogated and new treaties shall be concluded on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

2. All future treaties concluded between China and foreign Powers shall be made in such a way as not to encroach upon the sovereign rights of either of the contracting parties.
3. China's foreign loans shall be reconsolidated and only such foreign loans as are not injurious to China's political and economic interests shall be given recognition.

These three points form not only the guiding principles for the abrogation of existing unequal treaties, but also the very road leading to China's new international status of equality and freedom.

China, after being kept under the yoke of political and economic imperialism for a period of more than eighty years, has found herself in a semi-colonial state. The weapons the imperialists have employed in exploiting this country are no other than the unequal treaties. Such being the case, the Kuomintang and all its members, with the coöperation of the people, shall lead a nation-wide campaign for the realization of the foreign policy formulated by the First National Congress, thereby liberating China from her semi-colonial state and restoring her all lost sovereign rights.

However, in order to carry out the program of abrogating unequal treaties, the following conditions are prerequisite. First, the country shall be in fact under centralized and unified control; the thoughts of the people shall be solely guided by the Three People's Principles, and all domestic, diplomatic, military and financial affairs shall be unified under the National Government. Secondly, the reconstruction of the country shall be carried out in accordance with the program drawn up by our late Leader in his book *Plans for the National Reconstruction* so as to expedite the material reconstruction and to stabilize the economic condition of the nation. It is only when these will have been achieved that we can expect success in our foreign affairs. Therefore, the more we can accomplish in the direction of these two prerequisite conditions, the less we shall be hindered in disposing of the unilateral treaties. In other words, the earlier we can fulfill these two conditions, the earlier we can see the unequal treaties terminated. These are what the Party expects all Party members and the people to struggle for during the period of political tutelage.

After all unequal treaties will have been terminated, China will become a strong and wealthy nation and, as a matter of course, occupy an important position in the family of nations. It will then be our time to strive for the realization of the spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's foreign policy in its entirety.

The spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's foreign policy in its entirety is based upon world brotherhood. From the foundation of absolute equality of the peoples of the world is to be built world peace. He recognized that in the history of the world, there have been two conflicting foreign policies. One is represented by the ancient Chinese idea of assisting the weak and the other is represented by the modern western idea of imperialism. The difference of these two policies is fundamental. Imperialism aims at the conquest of territory, control of economic life, and even suppression of native culture. The result is the creation of a line of demarcation dividing the world into two classes — the imperialists and the weaker and smaller races — similar to the division in the capitalist society. Imperialism is worse than capitalism in that the imperialists, in their exploitation of weaker peoples, usually find their interests conflicting with one another which eventually leads to world war.

Our late Leader was convinced that the prevalence of foreign policy based upon imperialism will eventually lead to the destruction of mankind. Therefore, he strongly advocated the Party should revive our ancient teaching of helping the weak as it has been fighting for nationalism.

China for many thousand years has been a powerful nation. In spite of her advantageous position, however, she never attempted to deprive Korea, Siam, Burma, Annam, and other small countries of their independence, but has given them instead her civilization. The imperialist Powers of today, on the contrary, with only several hundred years of history behind them, have conquered these small nations one after another and converted them into their own colonies. Which one of these two policies is really superior is self-evident.

Regarding the basic principle of China's foreign policy, Dr. Sun declared: "When China becomes a strong Power, not only she should restore the former status of the Chinese race, but also discharge the grave responsibility she owes the world — the responsibility of helping all the weaker peoples."

It is clear, therefore, that we should asssist the weak and resist the strong; and with our moral and peaceful background as a foundation, we shall build up a world of permanent peace.

The basic principle of China's foreign policy should be permanent world peace through equality of peoples. If and when all the nations of the world have equality and independence, world peace will then be permanent; and all our energy, physical and mental, which would otherwise be exerted in warfare, can be used for the development of civilization and peace.

The spirit of the above basic principle of China's foreign policy should always be unaltered though its enforcement might permit deviation from rigidity. It is the foundation upon which China's future foreign relations are to be based. It is what the Chinese people demand in the interest of their race. It is this goal the Kuomintang is striving to reach.

APPENDIX H

MANIFESTO OF THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION OF THE KUOMINTANG CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, JUNE 18, 1929

The following is an official translation published by authority of the National Government.

The most important task of our Party during the educative period of the Chinese people's development consists in observing the injunctions of our late Leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and in realizing the "Three Principles of the People" in actual constructive work. The people should be thoroughly trained in the exercise of political power so that the Revolution may be really brought to an end and the foundations of the Republic solidly laid. The unification of China is now completed; the State Burial of Dr. Sun has been held; and we have opened the present Conference of the Central Executive Committee as a part of the program of the recent Third Party Congress and in fulfilment of the wishes of the people. It is the intention of the present Conference to concentrate upon the purely constructive side and to submit those fundamental questions with which the nation is now confronted to the most careful consideration in order that we might be able to decide upon the policy of the Party and the Government which must be one that can be fully realized and fulfilled.

Unification Now Completed

Such being the functions of the present Conference, the questions which were brought up for discussion partook of a constructive nature and every one of them underwent thorough analysis. All the resolutions which we have adopted are those which we think can be immediately carried out. Among the important resolutions are those which appertain to the progress of the Party, to the limitation of the length of the educative period, to popular organizations, to the promotion of local self-government, to the proper exercise of the functions of government, and to the organization and completion of the five Yuan as established by the Organic Law. All these questions are of great importance to the Party and to the Government, and it therefore behooves the present Conference to decide upon the policy to underlie these fundamental questions. As regards foreign affairs, military affairs, finance, communications, education, home affairs, agriculture, mining, commerce and such other economic questions, and also as regards conservancy work, the suppression of banditry, the suppression of opium and the organization of Tibetan and Mongolian affairs, we have decided on the different stages in which their programs should be carried out as well as the specific functions to which they should each be given. It is our hope that we will thus be able to make the educative period in the development of China one of actual accomplishments and to devise a comprehensive program of reconstruction. There is no question that the country is already unified, and that the Party is now fully in the educative stage. What the people expect from the Party is that we may be able to carry out our program to the fullest extent. It is only then that the Party can be considered, in the real sense of the term, the leaders of the country. It is only then that those who desire to coöperate, may have a definite policy to go by. It is the firm belief of the present Conference that all the Party members and all the people in the country who realize the present conditions of the country and the need of positive accomplishments in our revolutionary endeavour will exert their utmost in supporting what we have decided upon and in helping to carry out our resolutions.

1. In order to fulfill the principles of the Party we must see to it that the country is truly unified. In order, however, to have true unification we must abide by the injunctions of Dr. Sun to lay out a comprehensive constructive program and to improve the conditions of the country both in a spiritual and in a material sense. It is only under such circumstances that the militarists will have no room for expansion. The general policy laid down by the Third Party Congress is what the Party acknowledges to be of great importance. But in the prosecution of these principles, if we do not have genuine unification, if the country does not give its entire support to the Government, it will be difficult not to find the Government confronted with all kinds of obstacles. This result is that the people will find reason to be disheartened, which will eventually leave its scars in our constructive work. That is the reason why, in addition to carrying out our constructive schemes with all the energy we can muster, the Party will still find it necessary to continue showing its revolutionary spirit and to remove all vestiges of the old régime both in their implicit and explicit forms. These vestiges encourage counter-revolutionary activities and are thus serious obsta-

cles to the real unification of the country and to any endeavour of a constructive nature. That is the reason why the whole nation should regard them, in whatever form they appear, as our worst public enemy. This is the first point which we should bear in mind.

THE UNEQUAL TREATIES

2. In order to carry out the principles of the Party there is another consideration which we must bear in mind, and that is the attainment for China of a status of equality and complete freedom in the family of nations. So long as unequal treaties remain, all constructive schemes, however well thought out they may be, are of no avail, because as long as our political sovereignty is impaired, we are unable to exercise the fullest freedom in our constructive work. The abolition of the unequal treaties must therefore be an integral part of our revolutionary endeavour. We have seen what our efforts to abolish these unequal treaties has already meant for us within the last year. But we should continue to exert renewed energy on the work thus begun. The present Conference feels that in order to carry out the resolutions we have adopted we should first establish genuine equality of status for China. The unequal treaties must be done away with at whatever sacrifice. We should proceed with an attitude of determination, and with a method which is really practicable. This is the second point which we must bear in mind.

PROMOTION OF LOCAL AUTONOMY

3. Training the people to exercise the five powers and establishing local self-government are important items in the program during the educative stage. These ideas are stated in Dr. Sun's two works, *The Principles of National Reconstruction* and *The Methods in the Promotion of Local Self-Government.* If there are no solid achievements in local self-government, it will be difficult for the Party and the Government to establish complete political democracy. In that case we shall not be in any better condition than the countries where the powers are delegated to an enlightened oligarchy, and the whole meaning of the term "educative" will be entirely lost. It will be difficult also under those circumstances to reduce the hardships of the people and to carry out any real constructive program. Fully acknowledging that the establishment of local self-government is the most important task of the present educative stage, the present Conference has not only decided upon the means whereby local self-government will be promoted and the length of time in which local self-government for the hsien will

be completed, but it has also decided to impress upon all Party members that the promotion of local self-government is the most important part of their duty. Let all those, therefore, who call themselves the true followers of our late Leader devote their entire energy to the promotion of local self-government. This is the third point which we should bear in mind.

THE LENGTH OF THE EDUCATIVE PERIOD[1]

4. The present Conference has decided that the educative period should be one of six years and shall terminate by 1935. We are fully aware that in view of the vast extent of the country's territory, the wide discrepancies in the standard of the education of the people and also the possibilities of counter-revolutionary manifestations, we shall perhaps find six years much too short a period, especially as we are entrusted with so many responsibilities. But we hope the whole nation realizes that, after all, the one aim of the present revolution is that it may satisfactorily complete the educative period in the development of the nation so that the constitutional powers may ultimately be delegated to the people. The establishment of constitutionalism is not what the Party alone should do everything to realize, but we hope that the whole country should be fully conscious of its great importance, and there should therefore be the fullest coöperation between the Party and the nation. If we really fail to bring this educative work for which Dr. Sun has made such considerable sacrifice, it will augur well neither for the Party nor for the whole country. It is the wish of the Party, therefore, that the whole country will emphasize this essential aspect of our work. This is the fourth point we should bear in mind.

The above four considerations are what the Party believes should be the main task of the nation to be fully carried out within the shortest period. The present Conference feels that we really should entertain no fear for the militarists of the old régime, nor for counter-revolutionary activities, nor even for the dangers of feudalism. What we should really be afraid of is that we would not be able to carry out the spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and courageously to complete the constructive program of the revolution. It is the further belief of the present Conference that it is not difficult to suppress the aggression on the part of the imperialist powers nor is it difficult to establish complete equality of status for China in the family of nations. What we should really be afraid of is that the people will not be able to endure hardships and to show to others that the nation does not brook effrontery of any sort. What the present Conference considers to be the greatest danger is when the nation shows inertia and moral lassitude. If we succeed in suppressing the militarists of the battlefield and are unable to conquer the habit of laziness, then, indeed, is it difficult for the nation to reap the fullest benefit from the revolution. If the Party is unable to alleviate the sufferings of the people through a policy based upon established principles, and to arouse the confidence and respect of the people through actual constructive work, then what we have sacrificed is indeed something which we have frittered away. Without peace, it is really impossible to mitigate the sufferings of the people in China today. But in order to attain peace, we must have unification, and it is impossible to attain real unification without removing all the obstacles which the régime of militarism has chosen to cast upon the nation. In order to prevent the militarists from having their way, however, we must do all we can to show something constructive and to train the people in real political democracy. But again when we speak of constructive schemes, nothing can be accomplished without mustering all the forces of the nation into an organized unit. The causal relations between these factors are indeed irrefragable, so that the only way to remove all the difficulties whatsoever is to continue our struggle and our endeavour. It is only when all the Party members and all the people in the nation coöperate to the fullest extent in pushing forward with the guidance of the principles of the Party and show willingness to sacrifice and a firm determination to complete the educative period in an orderly manner that we shall be able to remove the sufferings of the people. Under these circumstances only can the nation establish a solid foundation. It is only thus that counter-revolutionary measures can be suppressed and national equality won. It is our hope that we shall be loyal and courageous, and present a united front in the attainment of our declared aims.

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[1] Official version of term usually translated "period of political tutelage."

APPENDIX I

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

A. Executives of the Chinese Republic

Oct. 10, 1911	Formal Beginning of the Revolution.
Jan. 1, 1912	Inauguration of Sun Yat-sen as Provisional President of China at Nanking.
Feb. 12, 1912	Abdication of Manchus and Succession of Yuan Shih-kai at Peking.
1912–16	Presidency of Yuan Shih-kai at Peking.
1916–17	Presidency of Li Yuan-hung at Peking.
1917–18	Presidency of Feng Kuo-chang at Peking.
1918–22	Presidency of Hsu Shih-chang at Peking.
1922–23	Second Presidency of Li Yuan-hung at Peking.
1923–24	Presidency of Tsao Kun at Peking.
1924–26	Provisional Government of Tuan Chi-jui at Peking.
1926–28	Dictatorship of Chang Tso-lin at Peking.

1917–25	Independent Revolutionary Government of Sun Yat-sen at Canton.
1925–26	Nationalist Government at Canton.
1926–27	Nationalist Government at Hankow.
1927–28	Nationalist Government at Nanking.
1928–	Presidency of Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking.

B. Meetings of the Legislative Body of the Parliamentary Republic

1912	Provisional Parliament at Nanking.
1913	First Session of Republican Parliament at Peking.
1916–17	Second Session of Republican Parliament at Peking.
1922–24	Third Session of Republican Parliament at Peking.

C. MEETINGS OF THE GOVERNING BODIES OF THE KUOMINTANG OR NATIONAL PEOPLE'S PARTY

1924 (Jan.)	First Party Congress at Canton.
1926 (Jan.)	Second Party Congress at Canton.
1926 (Jan.)	First Plenary Session of Central Executive Committee at Canton.
1926 (May)	Second Plenary Session of Central Executive Committee at Canton.
1927 (Mar.)	Third Plenary Session of Central Executive Committee at Hankow.
1928 (Feb.)	Fourth Plenary Session of Central Executive Committee at Nanking.
1928 (Aug.)	Fifth Plenary Session of Central Executive Committee at Nanking.
1929 (Mar.)	Third Party Congress at Nanking.
1929 (Mar.)	First Plenary Session of (new) Central Executive Committee at Nanking.
1929 (June)	Second Plenary Session of Central Executive Committee at Nanking.

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